Event Notification Report for October 20, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/19/1999 - 10/20/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35790 36309 36310 36311 36312
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35790 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/03/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:44[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 06/02/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:30[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/19/1999|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |DAVID HILLS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |DON COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: THOMAS WHITE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i) ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THREE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO CORRODED HEADS (24-hour |
| report) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah: |
| |
| "On 06/02/99 at 1630 CDT, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified |
| that numerous sprinkler heads were corroded, affecting 16 sprinkler systems |
| in C-337 and one system in C-333, such that the ability of the sprinklers to |
| flow sufficient water was called into question. Subsequently, these |
| sprinkler systems were declared inoperable, and TSR-required actions |
| establishing roving fire patrols were initiated. This deficiency was |
| detected during scheduled system inspections conducted by Fire Protection |
| personnel. Currently, functionality of the sprinkler heads has not been |
| fully evaluated by Fire Protection personnel, and the remaining cascade |
| buildings are currently being inspected, and if necessary, this report will |
| be updated to identify any additional areas. |
| |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to |
| function as designed." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event. |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1022 EDT ON 06/04/99 FROM CAGE TO TROCINE * * * |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system D-1 in C-337 and two sprinkler heads on |
| system 27 in C-335 were identified to also be corroded. These were |
| identified to the PSS on 06/03/99 at 1600 CDT and 1601 CDT, respectively, |
| and determined to require an update to this report by the PSS. |
| |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to |
| function as designed." |
| |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector of this update. The |
| NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Combs). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2152 EDT ON 06/17/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * * |
| |
| "Three sprinkler heads on system C-15 and five sprinkler heads on system B-8 |
| in C-333 were identified to also be corroded. The PSS was notified of this |
| condition at 1300 CDT on 06/17/99 and determined that an update to this |
| report was required." |
| |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to |
| function as designed." |
| |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector of this update. The |
| NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1440 EDT 6/18/1999 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system C-15 and one sprinkler head on system B-8 in |
| C-333 were identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of this |
| condition at 1350 CDT on 06/18/99. The area of the fire patrol for system |
| C-15 was expanded to include the two heads identified as corroded. The one |
| head on system B-8 was in the area already being patrolled. The PSS |
| determined that an update to this report was required." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO |
| (Madera). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1315 EDT 6/25/1999 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system D-8 and three sprinkler heads on system D-7 |
| in C-337 were identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of the |
| condition on system D-8 at 0125 CDT on 06/25/99 and at 1019 CDT on 06/25/99 |
| for system D-7. Both systems were immediately declared inoperable and LCO |
| fire patrol actions were implemented. It was determined that an update to |
| this report was required." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO |
| (Jordan). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 2119 EDT 7/30/1999 FROM CAGE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "Five sprinkler heads and one sprinkler piping tee on C-337 system D-7 were |
| identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of these corroded system |
| parts and declared the system inoperable at 0931 CDT on 07/30/99. LCO |
| required fire patrols of the affected area were initiated. The PSS |
| determined that an update to this event report was required." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO |
| (Wright). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1655 EDT 7/31/1999 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-1 were identified to have corrosion. |
| The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system |
| inoperable at 1155 CDT on 7/31/99. LCO required fire patrols of the |
| affected area were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this |
| report was required." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO |
| (Wright). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1546 EDT 8/10/1999 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 system C-15 were identified to have corrosion. |
| The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system |
| inoperable at 1130 CDT on 8/10/99. LCO required fire patrols of the |
| affected area were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this |
| report was required." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO |
| (Burgess). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1154 EDT 8/22/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * * |
| |
| Four adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333 System B-1 were identified to have |
| corrosion. The PSS was notified of the corroded system parts and declared |
| the system inoperable at 0918 CDT on 8/22/99. LCO required fire patrols |
| were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this report was |
| required. |
| |
| It has been determined that this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) |
| as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as |
| designed. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be notified. |
| |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Clayton). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 2015 EDT ON 8/28/99 FROM W.F. GAGE TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The following information was provided as an update to this report: |
| |
| "Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-11 were identified to have |
| corrosion. The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared |
| the system inoperable at 1420 [CDT] on 8/28/99. LCO required fire patrols |
| of the affected area were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to |
| this report was required." |
| |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 2037 EDT ON 8/29/99 FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The following information was provided as an update to this report: |
| |
| "Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-15 were identified to have |
| corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 0925 [CDT] on |
| 8/29/99. Also two adjacent heads on C-337 System D-10 were identified to |
| have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1450. LCO |
| required fire patrols for both of the affected areas were initiated in the |
| time frame required by TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this |
| report was required." |
| |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0930 EDT ON 9/1/99 BY ERIC WALKER TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 D-14. Paducah personnel informed |
| the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO |
| (David Hills) and NMSS (Robert Pierson). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1133 EDT ON 9/8/99 BY TOM WHITE TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-331 System 26, system declared |
| inoperable at 2155 CDT on 9/7/99. An LCO required fire patrol for the |
| affected area was initiated in the time frame required by the TSR. Paducah |
| personnel informed the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC operations officer |
| notified the R3DO (Monte Phillips) and NMSS (Josie Piccone). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0948 ON 9/30/99 BY ERIC WALKER TO DOUG WEAVER * * * |
| |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333 System B-15 were identified to |
| have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 0815 on |
| 9/30/99. An LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated in |
| the time frame required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to |
| this report was required. |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (Vegel) and NMSS (Cool). |
| |
| |
| *** UPDATE ON 10/13/99 @ 1600 BY WALKER TO GOULD *** |
| |
| Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333 System A-11 were Identified to have |
| corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1307 on 10-13-99. An |
| LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated in the time |
| frame required by the TSR, The PSS determined that an update to this report |
| was required. Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The |
| NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera) and NMSS (Moore). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1520 10/19/1999 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| Six sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-16 were identified to have corrosion |
| and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1052 CDT on 10/19/99. An LCO |
| required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated in the time frame |
| required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this report was |
| required. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. |
| Notified R3DO (Jorgensen). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 2140 10/19/1999 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| Seven sprinkler heads on C-337 System A-7 were identified to have corrosion, |
| and another four had been painted over. In addition, three adjacent |
| sprinkler heads pm C-337 System A-8 were identified to have corrosion. The |
| PSS declared the systems inoperable at 1900 CDT on 10/19/99. LCO required |
| fire patrols for the affected areas were initiated in the time frame |
| required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this report was |
| required. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. |
| Notified R3DO (Wright). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36309 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PALO VERDE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/19/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:36[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/19/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:49[MST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAN MARKS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/19/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LINDA SMITH R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNEXPECTED EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR START |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "The following event description is based on information currently |
| available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional |
| information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the |
| information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be |
| made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73." |
| |
| "On October 19, 1999, at approximately 0049 MST, Palo Verde Unit 1 |
| experienced an unexpected start of the Train A Emergency Diesel Generator. |
| In addition, many Train-A components actuated to the post Safety Injection |
| Actuation (SIAS) condition. No safety injection pumps or valves actuated, |
| and no injection into the reactor coolant system occurred. Train A Leg 2-4 |
| (half leg) annunciation alarms were received and immediately cleared for |
| SIAS, Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS), Main Steam Isolation |
| Signal (MSIS), Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS), Auxiliary |
| Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS-1 and AFAS-2), and Recirculation Actuation |
| Signal (RAS). The Train A Emergency Diesel Generator received a start |
| signal, started from a standby condition, and ran unloaded until it was shut |
| down. Based on initial investigation, a Plant Protection System (PPS) power |
| supply anomaly is suspected to be the cause of this condition. The unit is |
| stable with all fuel removed from the reactor vessel to the spent fuel pool |
| during a scheduled refueling outage (U1R8)." |
| |
| "Palo Verde personnel are investigating the PPS power supplies and power |
| sources to the power supplies. There was no valid actuation signal. The |
| event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or |
| result in any releases of radioactive materials. There were no adverse |
| safety consequences or implications as a result of this event. The event |
| did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and |
| safety of the public." |
| |
| The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required in response to |
| this event; however, the root cause of the event is under investigation. |
| There were no maintenance activities involving the power supplies ongoing at |
| the time of the event. Spent fuel pool cooling was not affected by this |
| transient. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36310 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GE NUCLEAR ENERGY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/19/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:16[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2) |EVENT DATE: 10/18/1999|
| LEU FABRICATION |EVENT TIME: 15:15[EDT]|
| LWR COMMERICAL FUEL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/19/1999|
| CITY: WILMINGTON REGION: 2 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: NEW HANOVER STATE: NC |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: SNM-1097 AGREEMENT: Y |CAUDLE JULIAN R2 |
| DOCKET: 07001113 |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: LON PAULSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE - CRITICALITY CONTROL (24-HOUR NOTIFICATION) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "EVENT DESCRIPTION: At approximately 1515 on October 18, 1999, during |
| packaging of materials in drums for burial, administrative controls |
| associated with drum loading were violated. The quantity of uranium |
| involved was 2,083.3 grams U at 3.6% enrichment. This amount of uranium is |
| under the safe batch value of 27,411 grams U at 3.6% enrichment. Therefore, |
| no unsafe condition existed." |
| |
| "Controls were reestablished within 4 hours by direct removal of the |
| material inadvertently added to the drum during preparation for shipment. |
| This event is reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 (within 24 hours) due |
| to the failure to comply with procedural controls. Associated operations |
| have been shutdown pending investigation and implementation of corrective |
| actions." |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Low safety significance - [The] actual |
| uranium content in [the] drum [was] determined to be 2,083.3 grams U (3.6% |
| enrichment)[, which is] below the safe batch mass limit of 27,411 grams U |
| (3.6% enrichment)." |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): Multiple failure modes [are] required before a |
| criticality accident could occur." |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETER(S) (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| Mass [and] mass/concentration. [Mass was not controlled.]" |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, [AND] FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE |
| PROCESS UNIT AND % WORST BASE CRITICAL MASS): Composite sample analysis |
| showed 75 [grams of] U235 at 3.60% enrichment (2,083.3 grams U). [The] safe |
| batch value is 986.8 [grams of] U235 at 3.6% (27,411 grams U) where [the] |
| safe batch is defined to be 45% of the minimum critical mass." |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF |
| THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Administrative controls on queuing materials |
| and loading the drum were violated." |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| (1) Drum preparation operation was shutdown, (2) [Nuclear safety Engineering |
| (NSE)] [has] oversight of content removal from drum #1 to empty drum #2 [as |
| well as] re-sampling of both drums[, and] (3) Investigation and |
| implementation of corrective actions [is] pending." |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Region 2 Office (David Ayres), North |
| Carolina Emergency Management (Mel Fry), and New Hanover County Emergency |
| Management (Dan Summers). (Call the NRC operations officer for a site |
| contact telephone number.) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36311 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CATAWBA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/19/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:06[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/19/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARCUS ABERNATHY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/19/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DESIGN ISSUE REGARDING BULK HYDROGEN SUPPLY PIPING IN VICINITY OF RWST |
| |
| "A licensee audit of the design, operation, and maintenance of the site bulk |
| hydrogen systems identified an apparent deviation from the approved Fire |
| Protection Program. It was observed that a section of hydrogen supply piping |
| located in a safety-related area appeared not to meet the requirements in |
| section C.5.d.5 of Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1 (SRP). BTP |
| CMEB 9.5-1, section C.5.d.5 requires that 'hydrogen lines in safety related |
| areas should be either designed to seismic Class I requirements, or sleeved |
| such that the water (i.e. guard) pipe is directly vented to the outside, or |
| equipped with an excess flow valve so that in case of a line break, the |
| hydrogen concentration in the affected areas will not exceed 2%.' An |
| immediate evaluation determined that this is an old design issue and it does |
| not present a current operability issue. In the Catawba SSER No. 2, the |
| staff indicated that the bulk hydrogen system at Catawba was designed in |
| accordance with the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. Other hydrogen lines |
| that are located in safety related areas are either seismically designed or |
| supplied with an excess flow check valve. The piping in question travels |
| from the hydrogen bulk storage house, is buried in the yard, enters the |
| Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) trench, and proceeds into the auxiliary |
| building. It appears that the failure to seismically design the hydrogen |
| piping located in the RWST trench was an oversight. Engineering is |
| evaluating appropriate long-term corrective actions. |
| |
| "The licensee's staff has completed an evaluation and determined that this |
| situation constitutes a deviation from the approved Fire Protection Program |
| as described in the Facility Operating License (FOL) condition 2.C.(8) |
| |
| "Catawba FOL NPF-35 (Unit 1) and NPP-52 (Unit 2) require a 24-hour |
| notification to the NRC for deviations from the approved Fire Protection |
| Program. The above deviation is being reported under that license condition |
| criterion. A follow-up report describing the cause of the deviation and |
| corrective actions will be submitted to the NRC within 30 days." |
| |
| The licensee has notified the resident NRC inspector of this issue. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36312 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DRESDEN REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/19/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:21[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 10/19/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:31[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GLEN MORROW |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/19/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GEOFFREY WRIGHT R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ACCS 50.72(b)(1)(iv) ECCS INJECTION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL ECCS INJECTION INTO REACTOR VESSEL |
| |
| The licensee manually initiated the "2B" core spray subsystem to restore |
| reactor vessel water level after observing a decrease in reactor vessel |
| water level. At the time of the event, the reactor vessel was flooded up |
| above the main steam lines. The licensee had removed the "B" main steam line |
| plug in order to perform some refueling outage activities when the level |
| decrease was observed. Level decreased approximately six inches before |
| recovering. |
| |
| Reactor vessel water level was restored to normal and the "B" main steam |
| line plug was reinstalled. Upon investigation, the licensee discovered that |
| the "2E" electromatic relief valve (ERV) was open, creating a flow path from |
| the main steam line to the suppression pool. The ERV was closed by the |
| licensee. The licensee is currently investigating the cause of the ERV |
| opening. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021