Event Notification Report for August 16, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
08/13/1999 - 08/16/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36023 36025 36027 36028 36029 36030 36031 36032
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36023 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/1999|
| UNIT: [] [3] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:49[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:05[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROKES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/13/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |HAROLD GRAY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|3 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT HAD A REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO A LOW STEAM GENERATOR |
| LEVEL. |
| |
| An automatic reactor trip occurred during a transient on the 34 instrument |
| bus, which de-energized for unknown reasons. This resulted in a turbine |
| runback and loss of automatic control of steam generator level. The reactor |
| trip was generated as a result of a low level on the 33 steam generator. |
| Auxiliary feedwater automatically started as a result of the trip. All |
| rods fully inserted, and no ECCS injection occurred. No primary relief |
| valves lifted, but one steam generator relief valve lifted. (They have no |
| steam generator tube leaks.) |
| |
| The plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with the heat sink being the condenser. |
| The cause of the instrument bus transient is under investigation. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector was notified by the licensee. |
| |
| ******************* UPDATE AT 1306 ON 08/13/99 FROM NICK LIZZO RECEIVED BY |
| TROCINE ******************* |
| |
| "An [emergency notification system (ENS)] notification was made at 0750 on |
| August 12, 1999, which identified [that] an automatic reactor trip occurred |
| due to a transient on the 34 instrument bus. In response to a question by |
| the NRC contact in regard to whether any primary relief valves had lifted, |
| we responded that no primary side relief valves had lifted but that one |
| steam generator relief valve had lifted. In fact, one pressurizer |
| pilot-operated relief valve (PORV), PORV-PCV-455C, did lift and quickly |
| [reseated] when the automatic reactor trip occurred. This question was |
| originally answered in the 0750 ENS notification in the context that it was |
| known that a steam generator safety/relief valve had lifted and reseated but |
| that no primary safety valve had lifted. The answer to the question was not |
| clarified as to the lifting of the pressurizer PORVs themselves as opposed |
| to the primary or secondary side safety valves." |
| |
| "The 0750 ENS notification is also updated to indicate that a media/press |
| release was subsequently made concerning the automatic reactor trip on |
| August 12, 1999, at approximately 1100 that same day." |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R1DO (Gray). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Hospital |Event Number: 36025 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: THERATRONICS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/1999|
|LICENSEE: SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:11[EDT]|
| CITY: NORFOLK REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 08/06/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: VA |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/13/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |HAROLD GRAY R1 |
| |CHARLES OGLE R2 |
+------------------------------------------------+BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DOUGLAS BEATTY, RSO |DALE POWERS R4 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+KEVIN RAMSEY (fax) NMSS |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i) DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PART 21 REPORT - DEFECT IN A GAMMAMED BRACHYTHERAPHY UNIT |
| |
| DOUGLAS BEATTY, RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER, THERATRONICS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED |
| IN KANATA, ONTARIO, CANADA, REPORTED THAT ON 08/06/99, AN Ir-192 SOURCE |
| CABLE ON A GAMMAMED BRACHYTHERAPY UNIT, MODEL #12i, SERIAL #709, LOCATED AT |
| SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL IN NORFOLK, VA, FAILED TO RETRACT TO ITS SHIELDED |
| POSITION. THE SOURCE WAS MANUALLY RETURNED TO ITS SHIELDED POSITION BY A |
| THERATRONICS SERVICE TECHNICIAN ON 08/06/99. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE IS PERFORMING AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE |
| DEFECT AND PLANS TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT TO THE NRC. |
| |
| NOTE: REFER TO RELATED EVENT #35998. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1614 ON 08/13/99 BY JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| On 08/12/99, MDS Nordion, Kanata, Ontario, Canada, the parent company of |
| Theratronics International Limited, issued GammaMed User Bulletin #GMUB |
| 99-01 as follows: |
| |
| Subject: Notice of Incident - GammaMed High Dose Remote (HDR) Afterloader |
| Units |
| |
| Units Affected: GammaMed Models 12i and 12it HDR Afterloader Units operating |
| in the United States and Canada. |
| |
| We have recently been notified of four incidents involving GammaMed HDR |
| Afterloader Units in which the source cable became separated from the |
| driving mechanism. In each of these incidents, the source remained in an |
| exposed position, and required intervention to place the source into a |
| shielded position. |
| |
| We have investigated these incidents, and have concluded that the cause is |
| attributable to a specific lot of cable used by the source manufacturer in |
| the production of these sources. These sources have been installed only in |
| the United States and Canada. |
| |
| We strongly recommend that your institution suspend use of your GammaMed |
| Models 12i and 12it HDR Afterloader Unit until the source is replaced. We |
| are presently working with the source manufacturer to expedite replacement |
| of these sources. A representative of our service department will contact |
| you shortly to schedule a date for replacement of the source in your |
| GammaMed Unit. |
| |
| We, at MDS Nordion, believe that safety of the patient and hospital |
| personnel is of the utmost importance. We will strive to correct this |
| situation as soon as possible. |
| |
| For further information, please contact Dave Marquez, Manager, Installation |
| and Service, MDS Nordion. |
| |
| Note: Refer to Event #36027 for a related event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 36027 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/1999|
|LICENSEE: CIS-US, INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:14[EDT]|
| CITY: BEDFORD REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 08/13/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: MA |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/13/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |HAROLD GRAY R1 |
| |CHARLES OGLE R2 |
+------------------------------------------------+BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL P. WHALEN |DALE POWERS R4 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+KEVIN RAMSEY (fax) NMSS |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - GammaMed HDR Afterloader Unit Ir-192 sources are incapable of being |
| retracted into their shielded position - |
| |
| On August 13, 1999, Tony Honnellio of CIS-US, Inc, Bedford, MA, reported to |
| the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program that High Dose Remote (HDR) |
| Afterloader Unit Ir-192 sources they supply for GammaMed devices have been |
| incapable of being retracted into the shielded position. CIS-US believes |
| this problem may be due to the new wire shipment they recently received. |
| |
| In February, 1998, CIS-US changed their wire order so that they could |
| purchase directly from the supplier, Gemo G. Moritz, instead of through the |
| device manufacturer, Isotopen-Technik Dr. Sauerwein, GmbH; both German |
| companies. Mr Honnellio states that the sealed source and device sheet |
| number NR-555-S-104-S stipulates that the wire for the 724 source assembly |
| may be 1.09 �0.1 mm in diameter. Recently, CIS-US received wire that was |
| 2-3 one thousandth of an inch (0.0762 mm) smaller than 1.19 mm, but still |
| within specifications. CIS-US believes that this wire diameter may be the |
| culprit, resulting in the wire slipping off the two wheels that |
| protract/retract the source, but they are still investigating. |
| |
| On August 12, 1999, MDS Nordion, the parent company of Theratronics |
| International Limited, issued GammaMed User Bulletin #GMUB 99-01 (MA |
| Radiation Control Program Docket Number 08-1463) strongly recommending to |
| all 34 of its customers not to use their GammaMed device until the |
| wire/source assembly has been replaced. (Refer to Event #36025). This |
| action was due to four incidents of the source getting stuck in the |
| unshielded position either due to the wire becoming kinked or falling off |
| the two wheels that protract/retract the source. Three of these incidents |
| occurred during a quality control check and one instance involved a hospital |
| patient (there was no medical misadministration). CIS-US estimates it will |
| take one to two weeks to replace all the wire/source assemblies. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36028 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:27[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/13/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:27[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: WALKER/WRIGHT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/13/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |HAROLD GRAY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - PLANT SECURITY EVENT - |
| |
| SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION RELATED TO MONITORING FUNCTIONS. COMPENSATORY |
| MEASURES IMMEDIATELY TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC |
| RESIDENT INSPECTOR. REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36029 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:18[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE: 08/13/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:28[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE HILL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/13/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHARLES OGLE R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |JOSE CALVO NRR |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS |FRANK CONGEL IRO |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |99 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |99 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |99 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| -TS REQD SHUTDOWN OF ALL 3 UNITS DUE TO BOTH CONTROL ROOM VENT SYSTEM |
| CHILLERS INOP |
| |
| UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOMS SHARE A COMMON VENTILATION SYSTEM; UNIT 3 |
| CONTROL ROOM HAS ITS OWN VENTILATION SYSTEM. TWO CHILLERS SERVE THE |
| VENTILATION SYSTEMS FOR ALL THREE CONTROL ROOMS. |
| |
| AT 1659 ON 08/13/99, THE 'B' TRAIN CONTROL ROOM CHILLER TRIPPED DURING |
| MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES. TECH SPEC 3.7.16 REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO RESTORE |
| THE INOPERABLE CHILLER TO OPERABLE STATUS WITHIN 30 DAYS OR SHUT ALL THREE |
| UNITS DOWN. |
| |
| AT 1728 ON 08/13/99, THE 'A' TRAIN CONTROL ROOM CHILLER ALSO TRIPPED DURING |
| MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES. TECH SPEC 3.0.3 REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO START |
| SHUTTING ALL THREE UNITS DOWN WITHIN ONE HOUR AND PLACE ALL THREE UNITS IN |
| MODE 3 WITHIN 12 HOURS WITH BOTH CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM CHILLERS |
| INOPERABLE. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE IS REDUCING THE POWER OF ALL THREE UNITS AT THE RATE OF 1% PER |
| HOUR AND IS ATTEMPTING TO RESTORE AT LEAST ONE CHILLER TO OPERABLE STATUS. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2336 ON 08/13/99 FROM SCOTT BATSON TO JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| AT 2240, THE LICENSEE RESTORED THE 'B' CHILLER TO OPERABLE STATUS USING THE |
| 'A' PUMP AND EXITED TS 3.0.3. TS 3.7.16 REMAINS IN EFFECT FOR THE 'A' |
| CHILLER. THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INCREASE POWER FROM A LOW LEVEL OF 87% AND |
| HAS INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER |
| NOTIFIED THE R2DO CHUCK OGLE. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36030 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:20[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2) |EVENT DATE: 08/12/1999|
| FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY |EVENT TIME: 14:30[PDT]|
| COMMERICAL LWR FUEL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/13/1999|
| CITY: RICHLAND REGION: 4 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: BENTON STATE: WA |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: SNM-1227 AGREEMENT: Y |DALE POWERS R4 |
| DOCKET: 07001257 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+LINDA HOWELL R4 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: LOREN MAAS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT - |
| |
| The Mop Powder Dissolver Facility dissolves dirty Urania powder and uses a |
| vacuum drum filter to separate the dissolved uranium from the dirt. |
| Shavings from the vacuum drum filter (filter media, dirt, and a presumably |
| small quantity of uranium) are collected in a 4-gallon container, sampled, |
| and queued one foot apart. When sample results are received, the contents |
| of the 4-gallon containers are placed into a 55-gallon drum. The drum is |
| then reverified to contain less than 100 grams U-235 by non-destructive |
| assay (NDA). After the second verification, the drum is then moved to the |
| waste storage pad. |
| |
| At approximately 1730 PDT on Tuesday, August 10, 1999, the Siemens Power |
| Corporation (SPC) Laboratory Supervisor contacted an SPC Criticality Safety |
| Specialist with evidence that the laboratory method normally used to analyze |
| the uranium content of these shavings may have been 30% low. This |
| information was based on the fact that a microwave dissolution process put |
| all of the shavings into solution. Subsequent analysis of the liquid |
| yielded higher results. The SPC Criticality Safety Specialist determined |
| that this relatively small error did not have immediate criticality safety |
| concerns but requested SPC laboratory personnel to continue further |
| investigation. |
| |
| At approximately 1430 PDT on Thursday, August 12, 1999, the SPC Laboratory |
| Supervisor reported to the Criticality Safety Specialist that microwave |
| dissolution of sample material from a 4-gallon container had yielded uranium |
| results that exceeded those found using the normal dissolution method by a |
| larger margin than previously reported. Further evaluation of additional |
| samples demonstrated that the microwave dissolution method provides uranium |
| results that are three times higher than those indicated by NDA of the |
| shavings. |
| |
| Safety Significance of Event: |
| Assuming the uranium content determined by NDA is low by a factor of three, |
| the three drums with the highest uranium content, if stored in three-tier |
| array, would exceed the allowed surface density by 23%. (Hypothetical worst |
| case conditions are 49.4% of the minimum critical surface density.) |
| Additionally, no drum contains greater than 60 grams U per liter. The |
| minimum critical concentration is greater than 280 grams U per liter at 5.0 |
| wt.% U-235. Therefore, criticality was not possible with this material. |
| |
| Potential Criticality Pathways Involved: |
| A criticality accident is only possible if the concentration of uranium |
| exceeds the minimum critical concentration, i.e., approximately 280 grams U |
| per liter at 5.0 wt.% U-235. |
| |
| Controlled Parameters: |
| Surface density (mass per unit area, i.e., kgs U per square foot), and |
| concentration control. |
| |
| Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of Licensed Material: |
| A total of 32 drums were stored in a three-tier array. Assuming the NDA is |
| off by a factor of three, the highest amount of uranium in any drum is less |
| than 10 kgs and the total amount of uranium in the array is less than 209 |
| kgs. The enrichment is less than 5.0 wt.% U-235. The average enrichment is |
| expected to be 3.6 wt.% U-235. The analytical data currently available |
| shows enrichment between 2.98 and 3.75 wt.% U-235. |
| |
| Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or Control System(s) and Description |
| of the Failures or Deficiencies: |
| - Preprocessing of laboratory samples did not put all of the uranium solids |
| into solution. |
| - The standard used to calibrate the NDA equipment did not adequately |
| reflect the material and geometry of the shavings when they are counted. |
| |
| Corrective Actions to restore safety systems and when each was implemented: |
| - The Mop Powder Dissolver has been shut down and tagged out and production |
| of shavings has therefore been stopped, as has the processing of shavings |
| now in 4-gallon containers. |
| - Drums of shavings currently on the storage pad were moved into a |
| single-tier arrangement. |
| - Additional multi-drum samplings were initiated to verify the actual |
| uranium content. |
| - Production and processing of shavings will remain shut down pending |
| further investigation and completion of corrective actions. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36031 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/14/1999|
| UNIT: [] [3] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:35[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 08/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:35[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BOB BIRMINGHAM |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/14/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |HAROLD GRAY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|3 N Y 95 Power Operation |95 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO |
| OSCILLATIONS IN PARAMETERS DISCOVERED DURING PLANNED TESTING. |
| |
| "HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO FLOW, PRESSURE AND SPEED OSCILLATIONS WHILE IN |
| AUTOMATIC AND MANUAL. IT WAS DISCOVERED DURING PLANNED HPCI TESTING. |
| TROUBLESHOOTING IS IN PROGRESS AND REPAIR PLANS ARE BEING MADE." |
| |
| WITH THE HPCI SYSTEM INOPERABLE, UNIT 3 ENTERED THE 14 DAY LCO ACTION |
| STATEMENT #99-3-625. THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT |
| INSPECTOR. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36032 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/15/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:13[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 08/15/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 05:30[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/15/1999|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF CASTLE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NCFR NON CFR REPORT REQMNT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NON-CFR REPORT INVOLVING A VALID ACTUATION OF A "Q" SAFETY SYSTEM |
| |
| "At 0530 hours on 08/15/99, Operations personnel responded to CADP |
| Outleakage Detection System Smokehead SXE2783 alarm at the X-333 Low Assay |
| Withdrawal (LAW) compressor area. Operators responded per Alarm Response |
| Procedures, checked for outleakage and observed smoke in the vicinity of the |
| LAW A/B compressor. Operations immediately evacuated the area, called 911, |
| and initiated a building recall. The CADP smokehead alarmed during |
| compressor startup activities. Initial investigation revealed that the |
| smoke was from the LAW A/B compressor seal. CADP smokehead SXE2783 reset |
| and the outleakage was stopped when the LAW station was vented down below |
| atmospheric pressure. |
| |
| "The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) responded and monitored air |
| quality for Hydrogen Fluoride, airborne radioactivity and surveyed for |
| surface contamination. All sample results were less than minimum |
| detectable activity. |
| |
| "This is reportable to the NRC as a valid actuation of a 'Q' Safety System |
| (CADP Smokehead) in accordance with Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.9 |
| (24-Hour Report). PTS-1999- 067/PR-PTS-99-04619." |
| |
| Operations notified the NRC Resident Inspector and DOE Site Representative. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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