Event Notification Report for May 21, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           05/20/1999 - 05/21/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35720  35726  35739  35744  35745  35746  35747  35748  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35720       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BROWNS FERRY             REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/15/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:25[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4           |EVENT DATE:        05/15/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:56[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RODNEY NACOSTE               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/20/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RUDOLPH BERNHARD     R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR SCRAM DURING MAIN TURBINE MECHANICAL OVERSPEED TESTING  |
|                                                                              |
| While the licensee was resetting the mechanical overspeed trip during main   |
| turbine mechanical overspeed testing, the main turbine tripped which         |
| generated an automatic reactor scram.  All control rods fully inserted into  |
| the core.  The resulting scram caused reactor vessel water level to lower to |
| below the primary containment isolation system group 2 (drywell), group 3    |
| (reactor water cleanup), group 6 (ventilation), and group 8 (traversing      |
| incore probes) isolation setpoint resulting in those isolations along with   |
| control room emergency ventilation system and the standby gas treatment      |
| system initiations.  Reactor feedwater is maintaining reactor vessel water   |
| level, and the turbine bypass valves are maintaining reactor vessel          |
| pressure.  All emergency core cooling systems and the emergency diesel       |
| generators are fully operable if needed.  None of the safety-relief valves   |
| opened, and the offsite electrical grid is stable.                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is investigating what caused the turbine trip/reactor scram.  A |
| Licensee Event Report will be filed with the NRC within 30 days concerning   |
| this event.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1207 ON 05/20/99 BY JOE BENNETT TO JOLLIFFE * * *            |
|                                                                              |
| During an investigation of the above event, the licensee determined that     |
| five main steam relief valves had opened automatically due to high reactor   |
| pressure and immediately closed completely following the reactor scram.  The |
| licensee plans to include this additional information in their Licensee      |
| Event Report on this event.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to inform the NRC Resident Inspector of this update.  The |
| NRC Operations Officer notified the R2DO Ann Boland.                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   35726       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  U.S. ARMY                            |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/17/1999|
|LICENSEE:  U.S. ARMY                            |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:03[EDT]|
|    CITY:  ROCK ISLAND              REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        05/16/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  IL |EVENT TIME:             [CDT]|
|LICENSE#:  12-00722-13           AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/20/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|                                                |PETER ESELGROTH      R1      |
+------------------------------------------------+JOE HOLONICH         NMSS    |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JEFF HAVENER                 |FEMA, DOE, USDA, HHS FAX     |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |EPA, DOT (VIA NRC)   FAX     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i)    LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOST OR STOLEN 3-CURIE TRITIUM SOURCE FROM AN M140 ALIGNMENT DEVICE          |
|                                                                              |
| Sometime on 05/16/99 near Watervliet Arsenal (about 35 miles from Albany,    |
| NY) at a contractor's facility (Wright Malta Corporation at Wright Malta     |
| Station), a break-in occurred.  In the facility was a howitzer with an M1A1  |
| collimator (10 curies tritium) and an M140 alignment device (3 curies        |
| tritium).  The two devices were taken but were recovered on site when the    |
| thieves were interrupted on the way out and dropped them.  However, the      |
| source was missing from the M140 alignment device, and it is unknown whether |
| the source was missing previously or removed and taken by the thieves.  The  |
| local police are following up on the break-in and theft.  The Watervliet     |
| Arsenal contacted the State of New York, who in turn notified NRC Region 1.  |
|                                                                              |
| (Call the NRC Operations Officer for additional information.)                |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1730 EDT ON 05/19/99 FROM JEFF HAVENNER TO S. SANDIN * * *   |
|                                                                              |
| Additional information received by the licensee on 05/19/99 indicates that   |
| an M58 and an M59 aiming post light may also be missing.  These are 5 and 4  |
| curies of tritium for a total of 9 curies.  The NRC Operations Officer       |
| notified R1DO (Eselgroth), R3DO (Clayton), NMSS EO (Haughney) and FEMA, DOE, |
| USDA, HHS, EPA, and DOT (via NRC) by fax.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1329 EDT ON 05/20/99 FROM JEFF HAVENNER TO MACKINNON * * *   |
|                                                                              |
| Mr Havenner reported that the M58 and M59 aiming post lights containing      |
| tritium were not missing but two aiming post lights which do not container   |
| radioactive material were missing.  The two missing aiming post lights are   |
| battery operated.  The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO (Peter       |
| Eselgroth), R3DO (Brent Clayton), NMSS EO (Scott Moore) and FEMA, DOE, USDA, |
| HHS, EPA, and DOT (via NRC) by fax.                                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35739       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MCGUIRE                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/19/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:38[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/19/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TIM HEAFNER                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/20/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ANN BOLAND           R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-hour Condition of License report involving fire protection barriers.      |
|                                                                              |
| "On May 19,1999 at 1030 hours. McGuire Nuclear Station determined that       |
| provisions of the McGuire fire protection program had not been maintained as |
| required by conditions C.(4) (Unit I) and C.(7) (Unit 2) of the McGuire      |
| Facility Operating License.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9-5 requires that all fire rated assemblies |
| and sealing devices separating                                               |
| 1. Safety from non-safety related areas or,                                  |
| 2. Redundant analyzed post fire safe shutdown equipment or,                  |
| 3. The Control Complex (Control Room, Cable Rooms, and Battery Rooms) from   |
| the remainder of the plant or,                                               |
| 4. Containment from Non-containment areas shall be operable.                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Contrary to this, numerous fire barrier penetrations designed to satisfy    |
| the above separation criteria for certain containment to non-containment     |
| penetrations have been determined to be inoperable. This discovery was made  |
| as part of routine surveillance testing.  A particular penetration design    |
| has been identified to have been installed in non-conformance with the       |
| design. The design specifies the incorporation of a fire resistive block     |
| material surrounded by a metal frame as the physical penetration which is    |
| installed in the wall as a unit. Necessary cables then penetrate through the |
| fire resistive block.  Physical penetrations were installed in excess of     |
| those actually necessary for transporting cables to accommodate future       |
| modifications or other contingencies. Penetrations in these 'blank           |
| locations' incorporated a welded steel plate as opposed to the design        |
| described above. This configuration has not been qualified as a 3 hour fire  |
| rated assembly.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Remedial actions required by Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9-5 have been  |
| implemented (fire watches). The ability of the facility to achieve safe      |
| shutdown conditions under a postulated design bases fire has not been        |
| compromised by the discovered condition. Therefore, McGuire did not operate  |
| outside the design basis of the plant.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The resident Inspector has been notified.  A follow-up written report will  |
| be issued within 14 days. Note that this event is not reportable under the   |
| requirements of 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73."                                   |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2101 ON 05/20/99 BY LARRY TUMBLESON AND JULIUS BRYANT TO     |
| JOLLIFFE * * *                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The following is an update to this event:                                    |
|                                                                              |
| ". . . A particular penetration design was thought to have been installed in |
| non-conformance with design requirements.  Specifically, penetrations in     |
| 'blank' locations incorporated a welded steel plate as a barrier rather than |
| a fire resistive block material surrounded by a metal frame.  Station        |
| personnel concluded that this welded steel plate design did not satisfy the  |
| requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9-5.  Consequently, these    |
| penetrations were declared inoperable and the May 19, 1999 NRC Notification  |
| was made.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Subsequent to the May 19,1999 notification, further evaluation of the welded |
| steel plate fire barrier penetration design determined that these            |
| penetrations do satisfy the requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment     |
| 16.9-5.  Consequently, these penetrations were operable and the May 19, 1999 |
| NRC notification is retracted.  As a result, the remedial actions specified  |
| in that notification have been discontinued and a follow up written report   |
| will not be issued.  The Resident Inspector has been notified,"              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R2DO Ann Boland.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35744       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE                REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/20/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:23[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP           |EVENT DATE:        05/20/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:14[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRADSKY                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/20/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PETER ESELGROTH      R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          N       0                         |0                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|  - FAILURE OF BOTH SAFETY RELATED CONTAINMENT CUBICAL SUMP AIR DRIVEN PUMPS  |
| -                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| ON 5/16/99 DURING THE 18 MONTH SURVEILLANCE FOR THE SAFETY RELATED           |
| CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION CUBICAL SUMP AIR DRIVEN PUMPS, BOTH PUMPS FAILED   |
| TO DISCHARGE WATER FROM THE SUMPS TO OUTSIDE THE ENGINEERING SAFETY FEATURES |
| BUILDING.  A REVISION TO THE SURVEILLANCE TO INCREASE THE AIR PRESSURE TO    |
| THE PUMPS WAS APPROVED ON 5/19/99.  ON 5/19/99, BOTH AIR DRIVEN PUMPS WERE   |
| DECLARED INOPERABLE WHEN PUMP DAS*P15A FAILED TO DISCHARGE WATER FROM THE    |
| SUMPS TO OUTSIDE THE ENGINEERING SAFETY FEATURES BUILDING WITH THE INCREASED |
| AIR PRESSURE.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| THE SAFETY RELATED CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION CUBICAL SUMP AIR DRIVEN PUMPS   |
| ARE REQUIRED FOLLOWING A LOCA WHEN THE ENGINEERING SAFETY FEATURES BUILDING  |
| IS INACCESSIBLE DUE TO HIGH DOSE RATES IN THE BUILDING.  THE PLANT IS        |
| CURRENTLY IN A REFUELING OUTAGE AND THE NON-SAFETY RELATED CONTAINMENT       |
| RECIRCULATION CUBICAL SUMP PUMPS ARE FUNCTIONAL.                             |
|                                                                              |
| THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT IS CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION.  AT THIS TIME, IT   |
| IS HYPOTHESIZED THAT THE AIR CHAMBER OF THE PUMPS ARE FLOODED WITH           |
| LUBRICATING OIL WHICH REDUCES THEIR CAPABILITIES TO PUMP WATER.              |
|                                                                              |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED.                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35745       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/20/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:52[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/20/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        10:40[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/20/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |SCOTT MOORE          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICK LARSON                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NONR                     OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - DOE NOTIFIED OF URANIUM BEARING SOLUTION LEAKING FROM A POLYBOTTLE -       |
|                                                                              |
| At 1040 on 05/20/99, the DOE was notified of an off-normal event classified  |
| as a Level 3 Nuclear Criticality Safety Incident that occurred in the X-706  |
| West Annex which is regulated by the DOE and operated by USEC under a        |
| Regulatory Oversight Agreement.  The Site DOE Manager and the DOE Regulatory |
| Oversight Manager were verbally notified.  The notification stated the       |
| following:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| At 1800 on 05/19/99, plant personnel discovered a small amount of uranium    |
| bearing solution leaking from a small diameter storage container             |
| (polybottle) in the HEU cylinder cleaning area of the X-705 West Annex.      |
| Plant Nuclear Criticality Safety personnel determined the leak to be a loss  |
| of geometry control, such that only one of the double contingency controls   |
| remained in place.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| This event is reportable to the NRC per requirements in the plant's Safety   |
| Analysis Report, Section 6.9, Table 1, Criteria P, Miscellaneous:  USEC      |
| shall notify the NRC of any event or situation, related to the health and    |
| safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment,  |
| for which a news release is planned or notification to other government      |
| agencies has been or will be made.  Such an event may include an onsite      |
| fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35746       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/20/1999|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:23[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        12/01/1975|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TOM McKEE                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/20/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PETER ESELGROTH      R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - COMPONENT COOLING WATER PIPING IS RUN INSIDE A CRANE WALL (NOT MISSILE     |
| PROTECTED) -                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| During a 10CFR50.54(f) review of the UFSAR, the licensee discovered a        |
| certain component cooling water (CCW) piping run inside a crane wall (i.e.,  |
| not missile protected from LOCA generated missiles by the crane wall) [DER   |
| 99-0840].  After searching plant records, the licensee has not located any   |
| initial engineering documentation justifying the running of piping inside    |
| the crane wall.  Based on this review, the licensee has concluded that the   |
| CCW piping may have been outside the system design basis stated in the UFSAR |
| since original operation of the plant in December 1975.  The licensee        |
| believes that the design requirement (i.e., protected from LOCA generated    |
| missiles) for the system was restored in March 1986 based on the NRC Safety  |
| Evaluation for Generic Safety Issue A-2.  The Safety Evaluation Report (SER) |
| states, in part, that "dynamic effects associated with postulated pipe       |
| breaks in the primary coolant system of this facility need not be a design   |
| basis."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has declared the CCW piping operable based on the 1986 SER and  |
| is continuing to reconcile the design basis of this issue using the          |
| 10CFR50.59 process.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   35747       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  NC DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/20/1999|
|LICENSEE:  UNKNOWN                              |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:10[EDT]|
|    CITY:  PLYMOUTH                 REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        05/19/1999|
|  COUNTY:  WASHINGTON                STATE:  NC |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/20/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |ANN BOLAND           R2      |
|                                                |CHARLEY HAUGHNEY     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JIM ALBRIGHT, NC DRP         |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - 15 YEAR OLD MALE OPENED A FIRE EXIT SIGN AND PARTIALLY REMOVED TRITIUM     |
| AMPOULES -                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| ON 05/19/99, JAMES ALBRIGHT, NC DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION (DRP), WAS  |
| NOTIFIED THAT A 15 YEAR OLD MALE HAD OPENED A FIRE EXIT SIGN WITH A RAZOR    |
| KNIFE AND AT LEAST PARTIALLY REMOVED SOME OF THE TRITIUM AMPOULES (INCIDENT  |
| #99-09).  ON THE MORNING OF 05/19/99, A DRP SURVEY TEAM  RESPONDED.  ALL     |
| AMPOULES HAVE BEEN ACCOUNTED FOR; NONE WERE DAMAGED OR BROKEN.  WIPES TAKEN  |
| INDICATE NO CONTAMINATION.  THE SIGN AND THE AMPOULES ARE CURRENTLY IN THE   |
| POSSESSION OF THE WASHINGTON COUNTY, NC, SHERIFF DEPARTMENT.                 |
|                                                                              |
| ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE TO RETURN THE SOURCE AMPOULES TO THE MANUFACTURER. |
|                                                                              |
| NC DRP CONSIDERS THIS INCIDENT CLOSED.                                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35748       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SALEM                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/20/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:57[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/20/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:37[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE GWIRTZ                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/20/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |PETER ESELGROTH      R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - UNIT 1 TRIP FROM 100% DUE TO NEGATIVE RATE TRIP SIGNAL DUE TO A DROPPED    |
| CONTROL ROD -                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| AT 2137 ON 05/20/99, UNIT 1 REACTOR AUTOMATICALLY TRIPPED FORM 100% POWER    |
| DUE TO A NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION NEGATIVE RATE TRIP SIGNAL.  PRELIMINARY     |
| INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE NEGATIVE RATE TRIP SIGNAL WAS DUE TO THE LOSS OF    |
| THE STATIONARY GRIPPER VOLTAGE TO CONTROL ROD #1A3 DUE TO A BLOWN FUSE FOR   |
| UNKNOWN REASONS CAUSING CONTROL ROD #1A3 TO DROP INTO THE CORE CAUSING THE   |
| NEGATIVE RATE TRIP SIGNAL ON NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT CHANNELS 2 AND 4.  NO        |
| TESTING WAS BEING CONDUCTED AT THE TIME.  ALL OTHER CONTROL RODS INSERTED    |
| COMPLETELY.  THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ACTUATED, AS EXPECTED, DUE TO    |
| THE LOW-LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVELS REACHED DURING THE TRIP, ALSO AS          |
| EXPECTED.  NO SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVES LIFTED FOLLOWING THE TRIP.  DECAY HEAT |
| STEAM IS BEING DUMPED TO THE MAIN CONDENSER.  UNIT 1 IS STABLE IN MODE 3     |
| (HOT STANDBY) WITH REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TEMPERATURE AT 547�F AND PRESSURE  |
| AT 2235 PSIG.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| NUMBER 11 CONTAINMENT FAN COIL UNIT WAS INOPERABLE PRIOR TO THE REACTOR TRIP |
| AND WILL BE REPAIRED PRIOR TO THE RESTART OF UNIT 1.                         |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSE OF THE REACTOR TRIP, REPAIR THE  |
| ROD CONTROL SYSTEM, MAINTAIN HOT STANDBY MODE, AND PREPARE TO  RESTART UNIT  |
| 1.                                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE PLANS TO NOTIFY THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND LOCAL OFFICIALS, |
| AND ON 05/21/99, ISSUE A PRESS RELEASE.                                      |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021