Event Notification Report for April 21, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
04/20/1999 - 04/21/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35609 35610 35611
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35609 |
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| FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/20/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:39[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/20/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:53[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: R. HASTING |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/20/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MELVYN LEACH R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| Postulated fire in the Auxiliary Feedwater room could affect diesel power to |
| Safe Shutdown Equipment. |
| |
| For a postulated fire in the north half of the Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) |
| Pump Room, the G-0l Diesel Generator is relied upon to provide emergency |
| diesel power to Safe Shutdown Equipment. Without the fuel oil pump, there |
| will only be enough fuel in the day tanks to run the diesel for 4 hours. |
| This will not support maintaining Hot Shutdown of the units. The G-02 Diesel |
| Generator will not be available due to loss of ventilation to the G-02 |
| Diesel Room for room exhaust fan cables being located in the north half of |
| the AFW Pump Room. The G-03 or G-04 Diesel Generators will not be available |
| due to the potential loss of control circuitry and power feeds to |
| transformers 1X-14 and 2X-14 being located in the north half of the AFW Pump |
| Room as well. |
| |
| The primary significance of this scenario is that in order to insure the |
| proper Appendix R equipment is available for a fire in the north half of the |
| AFW Pump Room the 1A-05 bus must have power. Provisions must be made to |
| maintain G-01 as that supply source or qualify another source such as G-05 |
| Gas Turbine. Without G-01 availability, this places the plant outside of |
| design basis for Appendix R. |
| |
| Compensatory actions at this time are twice per shift (8 hour shift) |
| Appendix R fire inspections. |
| |
| The licensee is looking into using the Gas Turbine, G-05, or locally |
| starting the G-03 Diesel Generator. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this notification by the |
| licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35610 |
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| FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/20/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:17[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/20/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:14[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN MUTZ |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/20/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MELVYN LEACH R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
|2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| - Aux Bldg Vent Systems may not meet their safety and accident mitigation |
| function during accident conditions - |
| |
| The licensee reviewed the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Systems as part of |
| the Expanded System Readiness Reviews (ESRRs). The scope of the ventilation |
| review included the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Ventilation, known as |
| Auxiliary Equipment Subsystem (AES), which is the focus for this report. |
| |
| The AES safety and accident mitigation function is to provide sufficient |
| cooling to the general areas and safety related equipment rooms required to |
| operate during accident conditions for multiple safety related systems, |
| including Component Cooling Water System, Containment Spray System, Residual |
| Heat Removal System, Charging System, and Safety Injection System. |
| |
| As a result of the ESRR, it has been concluded that currently there is |
| insufficient assurance that the AES is capable of meeting its safety and |
| accident mitigation function for temperature control of the Auxiliary |
| Building in its present configuration. This conclusion is based on |
| significant errors that were identified in ventilation related temperature |
| calculations for the Auxiliary Building, combined with the small margin that |
| previously existed between calculated results and design requirements, such |
| that there is little assurance of adequate auxiliary building room cooling |
| for ESF equipment. In addition, the AES dampers are not single failure |
| proof (as previously reported) and the system lacks missile protection |
| between trains. |
| |
| Both units are currently in Operational Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown). Priority |
| evaluation of these issues, including determination of the need for physical |
| modifications, is ongoing and will be resolved prior to startup of the |
| units. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35611 |
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| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/20/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:21[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/20/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:32[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RAY McKINLEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/21/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MOHAMED SHANBAKY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |CURT COWGILL R1 |
|ACCS 50.72(b)(1)(iv) ECCS INJECTION |RANDY BLOUGH R1 |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION |DON FLOREK R1 |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION |ART BURRITT SRI |
| |WILLIAM BATEMAN NRR |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| - AUTO REACTOR SCRAM FROM 100% POWER DUE TO LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER; ECCS |
| INJECTION - |
| |
| AT 1832 ON 04/20/99, WITH UNIT 1 AT 100% POWER, ALL EIGHT CONDENSATE SYSTEM |
| DEEP BED DEMINERALIZER OUTLET MOTOR OPERATED VALVES FAILED CLOSED POSSIBLY |
| DUE TO A COMPUTER MALFUNCTION. THE DEMINERALIZER BYPASS VALVES TRIPPED DUE |
| TO THERMAL OVERLOADS AND FAILED TO OPEN, CAUSING ALL THREE STEAM DRIVEN MAIN |
| FEEDWATER PUMPS TO TRIP. THE REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL DROPPED FROM A |
| NORMAL LEVEL OF +35 INCHES TO +12.5 INCHES, CAUSING THE REACTOR TO |
| AUTOMATICALLY SCRAM FROM 100% POWER DUE TO LOW REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL. |
| ALL CONTROL RODS INSERTED COMPLETELY; HOWEVER, ROD #30-39 INSERTED SLOWLY. |
| NO SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES LIFTED. STEAM IS BEING DUMPED TO THE MAIN |
| CONDENSER. |
| |
| REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL FURTHER DROPPED TO -38 INCHES, CAUSING THE HIGH |
| PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) AND THE REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING |
| (RCIC) SYSTEMS TO ACTUATE AND INJECT INTO THE REACTOR VESSEL. THE REDUNDANT |
| REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM INITIATED TO TRIP THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR THE |
| REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMPS. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM GROUPS |
| 1B, 2A, 2B, 2C, 3, 6A, 6B, 6C, 7B, AND 8B ISOLATED. THE DIVISION 'A' |
| ATWS/RPT CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR THE 'A' RECIRC MOTOR GENERATOR SET FAILED TO |
| TRIP, AS REQUIRED. SMOKE WAS OBSERVED TO BE COMING FROM THE BREAKER. THE |
| BREAKER WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED FROM THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE SMOKING STOPPED. |
| THE 'A' AND 'B' RECIRC MOTOR GENERATOR SET DRIVE MOTOR CIRCUIT BREAKERS ALSO |
| FAILED TO TRIP ON THE 13 kV BUS FAST TRANSFER. THE BREAKERS WERE MANUALLY |
| TRIPPED. |
| |
| REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL DROPPED TO A LOW LEVEL OF -75 INCHES ABOUT 40 |
| SECONDS INTO THE EVENT (TOP OF ACTIVE FUEL IS -161 INCHES). THE HPCI AND |
| RCIC SYSTEMS RECOVERED REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL TO +25 INCHES, AT WHICH |
| TIME CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS MANUALLY SECURED THE HPCI SYSTEM. THE RCIC |
| SYSTEM IS MAINTAINING REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL AT +25 INCHES WITH REACTOR |
| PRESSURE AT 875 PSIG AT AN INJECTION RATE OF 300 GPM. |
| |
| PLANT OPERATORS ENCOUNTERED A PROBLEM WITH THE AUXILIARY STEAM SYSTEM AND |
| THE MECHANICAL VACUUM PUMP. THEY MANUALLY CLOSED THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION |
| VALVES. THEY ARE CONTROLLING REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL WITH THE RCIC |
| SYSTEM AND REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE WITH THE HPCI SYSTEM. |
| |
| UNIT 1 IS STABLE IN OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 (HOT SHUTDOWN) AND COOLING DOWN |
| TO COLD SHUTDOWN. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PARAMETERS ARE NORMAL. THERE WAS NO |
| RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL. RELEASE RATES ARE NORMAL. THIS EVENT HAD |
| NO IMPACT ON UNIT 2 WHICH IS IN OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 IN A REFUELING |
| OUTAGE. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND IS INVESTIGATING THIS |
| EVENT. THEY PLAN TO ISSUE A PRESS RELEASE. |
| |
| *** UPDATE ON 4/21/99 @ 0418 BY HUNTER TO GOULD *** |
| |
| THE REACTOR IS IN OPCON 3 AT 350 PSIG CONTINUING TO COLD SHUTDOWN. |
| CONDENSER VACUUM IS BEING REESTABLISHED IN ORDER TO RE-OPEN THE MSIVs AND |
| SECURE HPCI FROM PRESSURE CONTROL MODE. FEEDWATER SYSTEM IS BEING |
| REPRESSURIZED TO REESTABLISH NORMAL FEED AND SECURE RCIC FROM LEVEL CONTROL |
| MODE. |
| |
| ALSO THE "1A" AND "1B" MG SET DRIVE MOTOR BREAKERS DID NOT TRIP DURING THE |
| TRANSIENT SINCE PLANT LOADS WERE PREVIOUSLY TRANSFERRED BY A REACTOR |
| OPERATOR PRIOR TO THE TURBINE TRIP. THE BREAKERS, THEREFORE, OPERATED AS |
| DESIGNED. |
| |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. |
| |
| THE REG 1 RDO(SHANBAKY) WAS NOTIFIED. |
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