EA-97-350 - Department of the Army

November 12, 1997

EA 97-350

Jimmy C. Morgan, Director
Armament and Chemical Acquisition
and Logistics Activity (ACALA)
U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and
Armaments Command
Rock Island, Illinois 61299-7630

SUBJECT:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY - $16,000 (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 030-13027/97001(DNMS);030-21073/97001(DNMS), and 030-22274/97001(DNMS))

Dear Mr. Morgan:

This refers to the NRC inspections conducted between December 9, 1996 and March 28, 1997, of activities authorized at the U. S. Department of the Army's Ft. Bragg, NC; Rock Island, IL; Ft. Leonard Wood, MO; Anniston, AL; Ft. Devens, MA; and Rhode Island National Guard facilities. As described in the NRC inspection reports sent to you by letter dated April 11, 1997, thirteen apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified. On August 8, 1997, a predecisional enforcement conference was held with Major General Beauchamp, you and other U.S. Army representatives to discuss the violations, their causes, and your corrective actions. In addition, ACALA's progress with the assistance of the Department of the Army, in completing the action items described in a Confirmatory Order Modifying License (Order) issued to the ACALA on March 26, 1997, was discussed.

Based on the information developed during the inspection, the information provided during the conference, and the information provided in the ACALA's June 15, 1997 and September 9, 1997 responses to the Order, the NRC has determined that violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report. In particular, the violations include failures to:

(1) conduct annual inspections at all named Army depots, (2) provide training to users of licensed materials, (3) ensure that tests for leakage and/or contamination were performed by persons specifically authorized to perform that service, (4) conduct inventories of licensed commodities annually, (5) conduct surveys to demonstrate compliance with personnel/public exposure limits contained in 10 CFR Part 20, (6) secure licensed material in storage from unauthorized access or removal, (7) properly prepare a package containing radioactive material for shipment, (8) notify the local Radiation Protection Officer of non-illuminated or damaged fire control devices containing tritium and place defective fire control devices in plastic bags, (9) properly set the pressure level for purging of fire control devices, that resulted in damage to the device and release of tritium gas, (10) limit storage of damaged fire control devices to unoccupied buildings, (11) limit repair/maintenance activities on tritium-containing fire control devices, (12) provide notification to NRC of incidents pursuant to 10 CFR 20.2201 (immediate), and (13) provide notification pursuant to 10 CFR 30.50 (24 hour). Many of these violations involved multiple examples.

The violations impact nearly every aspect of your radiation protection program. The number and nature of the violations are indicative of a continued breakdown in the control of licensed responsibilities. Ten of the thirteen violations were repeat violations, having been previously identified during four NRC inspections conducted in 1992, 1993 and 1995. During those inspections, a total of 21 violations were identified. This inspection determined that the Army's implementation of previous corrective actions, especially for the 1992 inspection findings, for which six of seven violations were identified as repetitive during this inspection, had been ineffective in precluding similar violations from recurring.

Safety significant, repeat violations were identified for the failure to properly store damaged tritium devices. During two incidents, one at Camp Kineohe and the other at Ft. Campbell, known damaged M1A1 collimators were stored in occupied offices for extended periods of time. During those periods of storage, the damaged devices continued to off-gas tritium, resulting in facility contamination, and unnecessary exposure of personnel. These events had the potential to result in significant intakes of tritium that could have resulted in exposures in excess of regulatory limits.

Violations were also identified for failure to make timely notifications of events, such as those discussed above. Ten examples were identified, several of which the NRC likely would have dispatched inspectors to follow up. The failure to notify the NRC impacted the NRC's ability to fulfill its regulatory responsibilities.

Furthermore, fundamental commitments regarding accountability for licensed material were not met. The Army was not able to determine the quantity of licensed material in its possession or determine with any certainty all locations of possession and use. It appeared that ACALA had requested arbitrarily inflated possession limits in order to preclude the likelihood of exceeding those limits. The large possession limits notwithstanding, the NRC expects its licensees to be able to account for all radioactive materials possessed under their licenses.

ACALA's continued failure to effectively manage its licensed radiation safety program is a very significant safety and regulatory concern to the NRC. The NRC entrusts you with the responsibility for radiation safety within the Department of Defense for the items authorized under your NRC licenses. Incumbent upon you is the responsibility to protect public health and safety, including the health and safety of military and civilian personnel, by assuring that all NRC requirements are met and any potential violations are identified and promptly corrected. The repetitive nature of the violations and your relatively poor past performance demonstrate continued severe programmatic deficiencies and the lack of management oversight. Therefore, the violations in Section A of the Notice addressing ACALA's failures regarding inspections, procedures, maintenance, training, leak tests, inventories, surveys, security, and shipping are classified in the aggregate in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, as a Severity Level II problem. The violations in Section B of the Notice addressing ACALA's failures to make timely notifications, are also classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level II problem.

In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $8000 is considered for a Severity Level II problem. Because the Army has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two inspections, ⁽¹⁾ the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. No credit is warranted for Identification due to the fact that seven of the thirteen violations identified during the inspection were identified by the NRC. Credit for Corrective Action is warranted. The Army's corrective actions were confirmed in the March 26, 1997, Order. The corrective actions described in the Order were initially agreed upon during the exit meeting conducted on January 31, 1997. The first milestone in the Order required the Army to have an independent audit conducted within 30 days of NRC's approval of the audit plan. The audit plan was approved by NRC on April 17, 1997, and subsequently the audit was conducted, as required. The audit report, dated June 16, 1997, included a comprehensive root cause analysis. Subsequent actions, involving development and implementation of long-term corrective actions for audit findings, were addressed in a letter to the NRC dated September 9, 1997. The corrective actions include restructuring the Army's radiation safety program, improving the procedures for annual inventories, improving and consolidating the audit criteria and schedule, upgrading training requirements, revising Technical Manuals to include NRC reporting requirements, creating and distributing additional information concerning safe handling, maintenance, storage and disposal of radioactive material, reducing or eliminating radioactive sources containing tritium, and ensuring adequate staffing in the safety office.

Therefore, to emphasize the importance of lasting and effective corrective action, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) in the base amount of $8000 for each of the two Severity Level II problems. This is a total Civil Penalty of $16,000. In addition, issuance of this Notice constitutes escalated enforcement action that may subject you to increased inspection effort.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Sincerely,

Original signed by J. Caldwell for A. Bill Beach Regional Administrator

Enclosure: Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties

Docket Nos. 030-13027; 030-21073; 030-22274
License Nos. 12-00722-06; 12-00722-13; 12-00722-14

cc:
Major General Roy E. Beauchamp, Commander
U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armament Command
ATTN: AMSTA-CG
Warren, MI 48397-5000

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NOTICE OF VIOLATION
AND
PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES

U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command Armament and Chemical Acquisition and Logistics Activity Rock Island, Illinois

Docket Nos. 030-13027, 030-21073, 030-22274 License Nos. 12-00722-06, 12-00722-13, 12-00722-14 EA 97-350

During an NRC inspection conducted on December 9, 1996 through March 28, 1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the NRC proposes to impose civil penalties pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282 and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth below:

A. Radiation Safety Program Issues

1. Condition 17. of License No. 12-00722-06 requires that the licensee conduct its program in accordance with the statements, representations, and procedures contained in a letter dated August 24, 1984, an application dated November 6, 1988, and other referenced documents.

The August 24, 1984, letter states that, annually, the licensee will inspect storage, inventory, and distribution of licensed items at each named depot as well as each depot radiation safety program. Condition 11.A. of License No. 12-00722-06 lists the named depots, which included Letterkenny Army Depot, Anniston Army Depot, Red River Army Depot, Rock Island Arsenal, New Cumberland Army Depot, Sharpe Army Depot, Marine Corps Logistics Base-Albany, Georgia, and Marine Corps Logistics Base-Barstow, California.

Contrary to the above, between January 1, 1996, and December 31, 1996, the licensee did not inspect storage, inventory, and distribution of licensed items at each named depot nor did the licensee inspect radiation safety programs at Rock Island Arsenal, Letterkenny Army Depot, Anniston Army Depot, Red River Army Depot, New Cumberland Army Depot, Sharpe Army Depot, and Marine Corps Logistics Base-Barstow, California. (01012)

This is a repeat violation which was previously identified during the July 24 – August 11, 1995, NRC inspection.

2. Condition 12. of License No. 12-00722-06 requires that licensed material be used by, or under the supervision of, named individuals, or U.S. Army and Marine Corps civilian and/or military personnel trained in accordance with the application dated April 12, 1982. Enclosure 3 to Supplement 1 of the referenced application states, in part, that users of radioactive commodities are trained to use the equipment in accordance with published technical manuals.

Contrary to the above, as of October 30, 1996, the licensee did not adequately train soldiers at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, who used the M224 mortar to use the equipment in accordance with the published Technical Manual, TM 9-1010-223-20&P, for that device. Specifically, the soldiers were not instructed that removal of the range indicator from the firing mechanism assembly on an M224 mortar was prohibited, and they removed the range indicator. (01022)

This is a repeat violation which was previously identified during the June 5 – August 17, 1992, and July 24 - August 11, 1995, NRC inspections.

3. Condition 12.D. of License No. 12-00722-13 and Condition 14.D. of License No. 12-00722-14 require that tests for leakage and/or contamination be performed by the licensee or by other persons specifically licensed by the Commission or an Agreement State to perform such services.

Contrary to the above, as of March 28, 1997, tests for leakage and/or contamination on M43A1s, containing 250 microcuries of americium-241, and Chemical Agent Monitors, containing 10 millicuries of nickel-63, were routinely performed by the Rock Island Arsenal and Anniston Army Depot, persons not specifically licensed by the Commission or an Agreement State to perform such services. (01032)

4. Condition 15. of License No. 12-00722-06 requires that the licensee conduct a physical inventory of muzzle reference sensors, containing nominally 10 curies of tritium each, every 12 months to account for all sealed sources received and possessed under the license.

Conditions 15. of License Nos. 12-00722-13 and 12-00722-14 require that the licensee conduct a physical inventory every 12 months to account for material possessed under the licenses.

Contrary to the above, as of March 28, 1997, the licensee had never conducted a physical inventory of muzzle reference sensors to account for all sealed sources received and possessed under License No. 12-00722-06. Furthermore, the licensee had not conducted a physical inventory to account for all material possessed under License Nos. 12-00722-13 and 12-00722-14 since 1995. (01042)

This is a repeat violation which was previously identified during the October 19 – November 9, 1993, NRC inspection.

5. 10 CFR 20.1501(a) requires, in part, that each licensee make, or cause to be made, surveys that may be necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 and are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the potential radiological hazards that could be present.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1003, survey means an evaluation of the radiological conditions and potential hazards incident to the production, use, transfer, release, disposal, or presence of radioactive material or other sources of radiation.

Contrary to the above, as of March 28, 1997, the licensee did not make surveys to assure compliance with 10 CFR 20.1201, which limits radiation exposure to adult occupational workers. Specifically, from September 6 through November 7, 1995, U.S. Marines, located at Camp Kineohe, Hawaii, repeatedly handled a damaged source containing 10 curies of tritium gas, and the licensee did not make, or cause to be made, surveys necessary and reasonable to determine the radiation exposure of the individuals involved. (01052)

This is a repeat violation which was previously identified during the June 5 – August 17, 1992, NRC inspection.

6. 10 CFR 20.1801 requires that the licensee secure from unauthorized removal or access licensed materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas. Unrestricted area means an area, access to which is neither limited nor controlled by the licensee.

Contrary to the above, on numerous occasions the licensee did not secure from unauthorized removal or access licensed materials that were stored in controlled or unrestricted areas. Specifically:

a. Between February 9, 1995, and June 15, 1995, the licensee did not secure from unauthorized removal or access licensed materials, consisting of 18 M43A1 chemical agent detectors, each containing 250 microcuries of americium-241 as a plated foil, that were stored in a general storage area on Johnston Atoll, an unrestricted area.

b. The licensee did not secure from unauthorized removal or access an M43A1 chemical agent detector containing 250 microcuries of americium-241 that was stored in an unrestricted area at Ft. Irwin, California. The licensee became aware that the material was lost on March 28, 1996;

c. The licensee did not secure from unauthorized removal or access a M140 alignment device containing 3.0 curies of tritium and that was stored in an unrestricted area at Ft. Irwin, California. The licensee became aware that the material was lost on May 30, 1996;

d. The licensee did not secure from unauthorized removal or access an M43A1 chemical agent detector containing 250 microcuries of americium-241 and that was stored in an unrestricted area at Ft. Carson, Colorado. The licensee became aware that the material was lost on August 28, 1996. (01062)

7. 10 CFR 71.5(a) requires, in part, that each licensee who delivers licensed material to a carrier for transport to comply with the Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations in 49 CFR Parts 170 through 189 appropriate to the mode of transport.

49 CFR 173.475 requires, in part, that before each shipment of any Class 7 (radioactive) materials package, the offeror must ensure by examination or appropriate tests, that the external radiation and contamination levels are within the allowable limits in 49 CFR Parts 171-178. 49 CFR 173.443(a) requires, in part, with exceptions not applicable here, that for beta and gamma emitting contaminants, the level of non-fixed (removable) radioactive contamination on the external surfaces of each package offered for transport, at the beginning of transport, not exceed 0.4 Becquerel per square centimeter (22 disintegrations per minute per square centimeter) on any single wiping material, determined by wiping an area of 300 square centimeters of the surface concerned with an absorbent material, using moderate pressure, and averaging over the surface wiped. Sufficient measurements must be taken in the most appropriate locations to yield a representative assessment of the non-fixed contamination levels.

Contrary to the above, on November 7, 1995, the licensee delivered to a carrier for transport a package which contained 10 curies ( 370 GBq) of hydrogen-3, and the licensee did not make sufficient measurements to assess the non-fixed contamination level prior to offering the package for transport.

Condition 17. of License No. 12-00722-06 requires that the licensee conduct its program in accordance with the statements, representations, and procedures contained in a letter dated August 24, 1984, an application dated November 6, 1988, and other referenced documents. Item 10.b. of the November 6, 1988, application states that users of devices containing tritium illumination devices are required to utilize and maintain each device in accordance with military regulations and technical manuals issued.

8. U.S. Army Technical Manual TM 9-1240-324-34&P, also known as U.S. Marine Corps TM 04914B-34&P, for the M1A1 infinity aiming reference collimator, NSN 1240-00-332-1780, states in Chapter 1, Section I (10)(b)(3), that if the tritium source is cracked, or if no illumination in the device is observed, personnel are to contact the local Radiation Protection Officer and seal the collimator in double plastic bags.

Contrary to the above, on June 13, 1996, soldiers at the Indiana National Guard facility at Kempton, Indiana, determined that the tritium source on an M1A1 was cracked and did not seal the collimator in double plastic bags. In addition, on September 6, 1995, marines at Camp Kineohe, Hawaii, determined that the tritium source on an M1A1 infinity aiming reference collimator was cracked and they did not notify the local Radiation Protection Officer, and on April 7, 1995, a soldier at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky, determined that the tritium source on an M1A1 was cracked and did not seal the collimator in double plastic bags. (01082)

This is a repeat violation which was previously identified during the June 5 – August 17, 1992, NRC inspection.

9. U.S. Army Technical Manual TM 750-116, General Procedures for Purging and Charging of Fire Control Instruments, which includes the M1A1 infinity aiming reference collimator, states in Chapter 3, Section II, Subsection 3-4, that in order to purge the collimator, personnel are to maintain nitrogen pressure at 3 pounds per square inch (psi) for 5 minutes.

Contrary to the above, on June 13, 1996, soldiers at the Indiana National Guard facility at Kempton, Indiana, used nitrogen gas at a pressure in excess of 5 psi during purging operations on an M1A1, resulting in damage to the tritium source. Other examples of over purging M1A1 collimators were identified by the licensee at Ft. Riley, Kansas, on October 9, 1996; at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, on September 27, 1996; at Ft. Drum, New York, on July 28, 1996; at U.S. Marine Corps Reserve facility in Joliet, Illinois, on June 24, 1996; at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in March 1996; and at Ft. Shafter, Hawaii, on January 29, 1996.

In addition, on April 7, 1995, a soldier at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky, used nitrogen gas at a pressure in excess of 3 psi during purging operations on an M1A1, resulting in damage to the tritium source. (01092)

This is a repeat violation which was previously identified during the June 5 – August 17, 1992, NRC inspection.

10. U.S. Army Technical Manual TM 9-1240-324-34&P, also known as U.S. Marine Corps TM 04914B-34&P, for the M1A1 infinity aiming reference collimator, NSN 1240-00-332-1780, states in Chapter 2, Section IV, Subsection 2-16 (b)(5), that the M1A1 shall not be stored in inhabited or unventilated buildings.

Contrary to the above, from September 6, 1996, to November 7, 1996, an M1A1 with a damaged tritium source was stored at a desk located in the optical maintenance shop at Camp Kineohe, Hawaii, an inhabited building. In addition, from April 7, 1995, to May 11, 1995, an M1A1 with a damaged tritium source was stored at the "Smokes office," located at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky, an inhabited building. (01102)

This is a repeat violation which was previously identified during the June 5 – August 17, 1992, NRC inspection.

11. U.S. Army Technical Manual TM 9-1010-223-20&P, for the M224 mortar, states in Chapter 1, Section III, Subsection 1.11 (a)(b), that maintenance of the mortar at the user level consists of the replacement of modules and that the mortar has one replaceable module, the handle and firing mechanism assembly. Included in the assembly is the range indicator, the firing selector, and the trigger. Maintenance instructions contained in Chapter 2 of the TM do not authorize removal of the range indicator from the firing mechanism assembly.

Contrary to the above, on October 30, 1996, soldiers at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, removed the range indicator from the firing mechanism assembly on an M224 mortar. (01112)

This is a repeat violation which was previously identified during the June 5 – August 17, 1992, NRC inspection.

These violations represent a Severity Level II problem (Supplements IV & VI).
Civil Penalty – $8000.

B. Event Reporting

1. 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(I) requires that each licensee report to the NRC Operations Center by telephone immediately after the licensee becomes aware of any lost, stolen, or missing licensed material in an aggregate quantity equal to or greater than 1.0 microcurie for americium-241, or 1.0 curie for tritium (each of which is 1000 times the quantity specified in Appendix C to Part 20), under such circumstances that it appears to the licensee that an exposure could result to persons in unrestricted areas.

Contrary to the above, as of March 28, 1997, and on numerous occasions, the licensee did not report to the NRC Operations Center immediately after the licensee became aware that quantities of americium-241 in excess of 1.0 microcurie and tritium in excess of 1.0 curie (each of which is 1000 times the quantity specified in Appendix C to Part 20) were lost or missing. Specifically:

a. On December 10, 1996, the licensee became aware of the loss of 12 muzzle reference sensors, each containing 10 curies of tritium, at Ft. Knox, Kentucky, under such circumstances that an exposure could have resulted to persons in unrestricted areas, and the licensee did not report the occurrence to the NRC until January 29, 1997;

b. On August 28, 1996, the licensee became aware of the loss of 250 microcuries of americium-241, contained in an M43A1 chemical agent detector, at Ft. Carson, Colorado, under such circumstances that an exposure could have resulted to persons in unrestricted areas, and the licensee did not report the occurrence to the NRC until January 31, 1997;

c. On July 31, 1996, the licensee became aware of the loss of 10 curies of tritium, contained in a muzzle reference sensor, at Ft. Drum, New York, under such circumstances that an exposure could have resulted to persons in unrestricted areas, and the licensee did not report the occurrence to the NRC until January 31, 1997;

d. On July 16, 1996, the licensee became aware of the loss of 18 M43A1 devices, each containing 250 microcuries of americium-241, at Johnston Atoll, under such circumstances that an exposure could have resulted to persons in unrestricted areas, and the licensee did not report the occurrence to the NRC until July 19, 1996;

e. On June 3, 1996, the licensee became aware of the loss of 3.0 curies of tritium, contained in an M140 alignment device, at Ft. Irwin, California, under such circumstances that an exposure could have resulted to persons in unrestricted areas, and the licensee did not report the occurrence to the NRC until January 31, 1997;

f. On March 28, 1996, the licensee became aware of the loss of 250 microcuries of americium-241, contained in an M43A1 chemical agent detector, at Ft. Irwin, California, under such circumstances that an exposure could have resulted to persons in unrestricted areas, and the licensee did not report the occurrence to the NRC until January 31, 1997;

g. On December 7, 1995, the licensee became aware of the loss of 10 curies of tritium, contained in a muzzle reference sensor, at Ft. Riley, Kansas, under such circumstances that an exposure could have resulted to persons in unrestricted areas, and the licensee did not report the occurrence to the NRC until January 31, 1997;

h. On October 26, 1994, the licensee became aware of the loss of 10 curies of tritium, contained in a muzzle reference sensor, at Ft. Knox, Kentucky, under such circumstances that an exposure could have resulted to persons in unrestricted areas, and the licensee did not report the occurrence to the NRC until January 31, 1997. (02012)

This is a repeat violation which was previously identified during the June 9 – 15, 1993, NRC inspection.

2. 10 CFR 30.50(b)(1) requires, in part, that each licensee notify the NRC within 24 hours after the discovery of an unplanned contamination event involving a quantity of tritium greater than 400 millicuries (which is greater than five times the lowest annual limit on intake specified in Appendix B to Part 20) that requires access to the contaminated area, by workers or the public, to be restricted for more than 24 hours by imposing additional radiological controls or by prohibiting entry into the area.

Contrary to the above, as of March 28, 1997, and on several occasions, the licensee did not notify the NRC within 24 hours after the discovery of unplanned contamination events involving quantities of tritium greater than 400 millicuries (which is greater than five times the lowest annual limit on intake specified in Appendix B to Part 20) that required access to the contaminated area, by workers and the public, to be restricted for more than 24 hours by imposing additional radiological controls and by prohibiting entry into the area. Specifically:

a. On March 13, 1997, the licensee became aware of an unplanned contamination event involving 450 millicuries of tritium at a night vision goggle room located at Ft. Devens, Massachusetts, that required access to the room to be restricted by imposing additional radiological controls and by prohibiting entry into the area beginning on March 5, 1997, and the licensee did not notify the NRC of the event until March 21, 1997;

b. On April 13, 1995, the licensee became aware of an unplanned contamination event involving 4.6 curies of tritium at an optical repair shop at Camp Dodge, Johnston, Iowa, that required access to the shop to be restricted by imposing additional radiological controls and by prohibiting entry into the area from December 1994 through February 1995, and the licensee did not notify the NRC of the event until January 31, 1997. (02022)

This is a repeat violation which was previously identified during the June 9 – 15, 1993, NRC inspection

These violations represent a Severity Level II problem (Supplement IV).
Civil Penalty – $8000.

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, the Department of the Army (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.

Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalties by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or the cumulative amount of the civil penalties if more than one civil penalty is proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalties, in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalties will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an "Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violation(s) listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalties, in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalties.

In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalties, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing civil penalties.

Upon failure to pay any civil penalties due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalties, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234(c) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c.

The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalties, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to: James Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint, North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III.

Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.

Dated at Lisle, Illinois
this 12th day of November 1997

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¹December 28, 1993 – Civil penalty, in the amount of $17,500, for a significant breakdown in the control of NRC licensed activities, identified as a result of an inspection conducted October 19 to November 9, 1993, at the Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB), Barstow, California.