Escalated Enforcement Actions Issued to Fuel Cycle Facilites - H

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NRC Action Number(s) and Facility Name	Action Type (Severity) & Civil Penalty (if any)	Date Issued	Description
EA-12-157 Honeywell International, Inc., IL	ORDER	10/15/2012	On October 10, 2012, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Honeywell Metropolis Works to formalize the corrective actions committed to in the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) issued on July 13, 2012 (ML12198A109). In addition, Honeywell committed to (1) complete an evaluation of external events and their safety basis; (2) document the design basis for the proposed modifications; (3) develop, implement, and have available for inspection quality assurance measures for the modifications; (4) implement the modifications before seeking to resume NRC-licensed operations; (5) demonstrate the adequacy of the revised emergency response plan by conducting an onsite exercise; and, (6) submit a revised ISA Summary no later than six months after resuming licensed operations. This enforcement action was issued in lieu of a notice of violation for (1) the failure to identify all relevant accident sequences related to credible seismic events and tornadoes, that could result in large UF6 releases for which protective actions may be needed as required by 10 CFR 40.31(j)(3); and, (2) the failure to provide complete and accurate information related to Honeywell Metropolis Work’s Emergency Response Plan as required by 10 CFR 40.9(a). The NRC concluded that formalizing the actions proposed by Honeywell Metropolis Works necessitated the issuance of this Confirmatory Order, consistent with Section 3.7 of the NRC’s Enforcement Policy. This Confirmatory Order supersedes the CAL issued on July 13, 2012.
EA-04-064; EA-04-065 Honeywell International, Inc., IL	NOV (SL III) NOV (SL III)	05/10/2004	On May 10, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for two Severity Level III violations involving (1) the reconfiguration of the fluorination system without detailed instructions (which allowed a uranium hexafluoride leak to occur) and (2) the failure to maintain and execute various response measures in the emergency response plan.