United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > ACRS > Meeting Schedule and Related Documents > 2001 > Advanced Reactors (Workshop on Regulatory Challenges for Future Nuclear Power Plants) - June 4, 2001

Advanced Reactors (Workshop on Regulatory Challenges for Future Nuclear Power Plants) - June 4, 2001

 

                         UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
           NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                     + + + + +
     ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
                      (ACRS)
         SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADVANCED REACTORS
                      Monday,
                   June 4, 20001
                Rockville, Maryland
                 The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear Regulatory
           Commission, Two White Flint North, Auditorium, 11545
           Rockville Pile, at 9:00 a.m., Thomas S. Kress,
           Chairman, presiding.
           COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
                 THOMAS S. KRESS
                 GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS
                 MARIO V. BONACA
                 F. PETER FORD
                 GRAHAM M. LEITCH
                 DANA A. POWERS
                 WILLIAM J. SHACK
                 JOHN D. SIEBER
                 ROBERT E. UHRIG
                 GRAHAM B. WALLIS
                 B. JOHN GARRICK                                A-G-E-N-D-A
           INTRODUCTION
                 Tom Kress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
           KEYNOTE ADDRESS
                 Commissioner Nils J. Diaz. . . . . . . . . . 8
           DOE PRESENTATIONS
           Overview and Introduction to Generation IV 
                 Initiative
                       W. Magwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
           Generation IV Goals and Roadmap Effort
                       R. Versluis. . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
           Near-Term Deployment Efforts
                       R. Miller. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73
           Generation IV Concepts
                       R. Versluis. . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
           Next Steps Generation III +/IV
                       S. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
           GENERATION IV DESIGN CONCEPTS
           Pebble Bed Modular Reactor
                       W. Sproat, Exelon. . . . . . . . . . 116
                       J. Slabber, PBMR, Pty. . . . . . . . 119
           International Reactor Innovative and Secure
                       M. Carelli . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
           General Atomic-Gas Turbine Modular
                       L. Parme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
           General Electric Advanced Liquid Metal 
           Reactor and ESBWR Designs
                       A. Rao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
           
           NRC PRESENTATIONS
           NRC Response to 2/13/2001 SRM on 
           Evaluation of NRC Licensing 
                 Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
                       M. Gamberoni, T. Kenyon, 
                       E. Benner, 
                                 A. Rae
           Planned RES Activities
                       J. Flack, S. Rubin . . . . . . . . . 279
           PANEL DISCUSSION ON INDUSTRY AND NRC LICENSING
           INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDED FOR GENERATION IV
           REACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
           
           CLOSING REMARKS AND RECESS . . . . . . . . . . . 339
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
                                      P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
                                                      9:02 a.m.
                       DR. KRESS:  I don't have a gavel to 
           convene this meeting, but I'll pretend I have, so the
           meeting will now please come to order.
                       This is the first day of the meeting of
           the ACRS Subcommittee on Advance Reactors.
                       I'm Thomas Kress, the Chairman of this
           Subcommittee.
                       Subcommittee members in attendance are
           ACRS Chairman George Apostolakis, Mario V. Bonaca,
           Graham Leitch, Dana Powers, William Shack, Jack
           Sieber, Robert Uhrig and Graham Wallis.
                       Also attending is ACNW Chairman John
           Garrick.
                       The purpose of this meeting is to discuss
           matters related to regulatory challenges for future
           nuclear power plants.  The Subcommittee will gather
           information, analyze relevant issues and facts and
           formulate proposed positions and actions, as
           appropriate, for deliberation by the full committee.
                       Michael T. Markley is the cognizant ACRS
           staff engineer for this meeting.
                       The rules for participating in today's
           meeting have been announced as part of the notice to
           this meeting, previously published in the Federal
           Register on May 10, 2001.
                       A transcript of the meeting is being kept
           and will be made available as stated in the Federal
           Register notice.
                       We have received no written comments or
           requests for time to make oral statements from members
           of the public regarding today's meeting.
                       So that we can effectively manage the time
           and allow for a maximum member, presenter and public
           participation in sharing, the Subcommittee has set
           down some rules of engagement, I guess we can call it,
           or the following protocols.  Please pay attention to
           these.
                       Number one, the presenters should be
           allowed to make their presentations without
           substantial interruptions.  Questions from the
           audience and stakeholders will be entertained at the
           end of presentation sessions, not the individual
           presentation.  So keep your questions in mind, you may
           even want to write them down.
                       Members of the public and audience should
           use question cards that we have supposedly provided to
           you.  The ACRS staff facilitator Mike Markley will
           collect these and group them as practical and read
           them into the record, and refer questions and comment
           to questions to presenters and/or panel participants
           as appropriate.
                       It may not be possible to respond to all
           questions and comments,  however all questions and
           comments will be listed in the meeting proceedings
           following the workshop.
                       Opportunities for direct audience
           participation will be provided during panel discussion
           sessions each day.  Microphones have been arranged for
           convenience of the audience during this meeting.  So
           it is requested that speakers identify themselves and
           speak up with sufficient clarity and volume so they
           can be readily heard.
                       I would like to remind speakers and the
           audience that we set down some things that we want the
           audience and the speakers and the presenters to
           address.  And I'd like to repeat what these are so
           that we can focus correctly in this meeting.
                       One, we want to describe the design and
           key safety features and status of the development of
           the design for the various concepts.
                       We want to provide the planned license
           application and deployment schedules, if available.
                       We want to identify licensing challenges
           and opportunities as compared to Gen II reactors.  
                 I think that's the major thing we want to get
           out of this meeting, is to identify the licensing
           challenges.
                       We want to discuss planned approach to
           licensing, construction and operation as compared to
           that currently used for Gen II reactors.  
                       And this is another important element,
           what changes are needed in the current NRC and
           industry licensing infrastructure?  Do the schedules
           adequately support the planned Gen IV license
           applications and employments.  That's the licensing
           schedule.
                       And a general comment, what if any
           additional initiatives are needed.
                       So, with that as a statement of what we're
           after here, I'll turn to the microphone over to our
           Chairman Dr. Apostolakis.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I'm very pleased to
           introduce our keynote speaker for this workshop,
           Commission Nils Diaz.  Dr. Diaz was serving as a
           Commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
           in August 1996.  Prior to that time Dr. Diaz had a
           distinguished career in nuclear and radiological
           engineering as a scientist, engineer, researcher,
           consultant and entrepreneur.
                       In the research and development arena,
           Commissioner Diaz worked for mundane light water
           reactor safety and advanced designs to more complex
           space power and propulsion systems and on the
           conceptual design and testing of futurist reactors
           like the UF-6, UF-4 and uranium metal fueled reactors
           for the Strategic Defense Initiative.
                       Commissioner Diaz?
                       COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  Thank you. I think I'm
           going to stand.
                       Well, good morning.  That last part of the
           introduction was just to kind of let you know that,
           you know, although some of these new reactors might
           sound advanced, there were other monsters around that
           were a little more difficult to work with.
                       I am reminded of the time that we actually
           work with a reactor in which we only had to have it
           working for minutes.  How is that we only had to have
           that reactor on and for three minutes?  So somebody
           finally said let's make things simple.  Let's make
           things very simple.  Let's do away with everything
           else.  We just take uranium metal and start inject
           into this reactor, it will be vaporized and we'll have
           a uranium vapor reactor which will run and the core
           was perfectly fine. It would run, very well for three
           or four minutes. There was no problem.  Looked over
           all the core calculations, and looked at everything
           else and everything was fine.  It will actually
           probably run.
                       There was minor detail, one of these
           practical little details. It was the nozzle to inject
           the reactor fuel, which of course the reactor was
           liquid at the time.  And no matter where we put it, it
           will have a density of about, oh say, neutral blocks
           of 10 to the 18 neutrals per square centimeters per
           second, which power density will vilify the nozzle,
           the fuel before it gets to the reactor. 
                       So, those were the problems, and those
           real problems.
                       I'm very really very, very pleased to be
           talking with you today.  This is an issue that, of
           course, is very important to the country and it is
           particularly appropriate that the Advisory Committee
           on Reactor Safeguards is hosting this meeting at this
           time.
                       The discussion on nuclear power has now
           fully entered the national debate on the future of
           America's energy supply and nuclear safety is going to
           be a priority on everybody's agenda.  The Commission
           relies on ACRS for expert advice, safety of reactors
           existing or submitted for licensing.  The
           recommendations of the Committee will be of particular
           value to the Commission as we deliberate the
           licensing.
                       I will be presenting my individual views
           today.  They do not necessarily represent the views of
           my fellow Commissioners or the Agency.  
                       I want to premise my remarks from a few
           selected quotes from a "couple" of speeches during my
           tenure as a Commissioner, just to set the tone from
           where I'm really going to.
                       So let me start with a quote that I
           believe is of extreme value.  
                                  "There is no credible regulator without a
                       credible industry.  And there is no
                       credible industry without a credible
                       regulator."
                                  "It is essential for the regulator to be
                       cognizant of the technology.  It is
                       essential for the industry and
                       technologists to be cognizant of the
                       regulations."
                                  "Regulations need to result in a benefit
                       or they will result in a loss."  There is
                       no reason to be any regulations unless
                       they will benefit society.
                                  "My goal is to ensure the paths are
                       clearly marked."  That has been really
                       kind of what I've tried to do during my
                       years.  "A path that is clear  of
                       obstacles and unnecessary impediments,
                       with well defined processes, will provide
                       regulatory predictability, equity and
                       fairness."
                                  Again, another one:  "We are learning how
                       to define adequate protection in more
                       precise terms, and to define it in terms
                       that make sense to the American people."
                                  And finally, "We have learned from our
                       mistakes and we are bound not to repeat
                       them."  This last point, I hope that you
                       prove me right.
                       At the 2001 United States NRC Regulatory
           Information Conference, I said "We might be asked, as
           would other government agencies and the private
           sector, to sharpen our skills, and improve our
           efficiency to meet the needs of the country."  We have
           been asked.  It is worthwhile to try to understand why
           the President and the Vice President of the United
           States have brought nuclear power generation center-
           stage in the debate of the energy policy of our
           country.
                       Shown in the next figure it's a
           compilation of important aspects of the debate,
           summarizing what has changed in 20 years.  All of
           these issues are known to you, both economically from
           the regulatory side.  Everything that had to do with
           productivity, all of those things have actually
           changed.  A few things have remained the same.  For
           example, it is important to national security that we
           have a stable generating base that will anchor the
           electrical generation in this country.  But many of
           the other things have changed as the bottom line
           changed from low predictability to good
           predictability.  It is our job to change it from good
           to high.
                       The NRC has been changing to meet the
           challenge of what must be changed and to strengthen
           what must be conserved. I submit to you that we have
           changed for the better, especially the last three
           years, and that improvements in regulatory
           effectiveness and efficiency are changing from goals
           into reality.  But it has not been easy, as many of
           you know, and there are still lessons to be learned. 
                       I must say, though, that there is one
           change that I believe speaks louder than words for the
           NRC staff and the agency as a whole:  Priority is now
           placed on what should be done better rather than on
           what was done wrong.  And this is a major cultural
           change.  
                       This cultural change is needed to enable
           the consideration of newer, better and enduring ways
           to exercise the mandate entrusted to the NRC by the
           people of this country:  To license and regulate the
           peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with adequate
           assurance of public health and safety.  
                       I believe that we are now capable of
           meeting the regulatory challenges that we face today
           regarding advanced nuclear plants.  The improve
           industry performance over the past decade has enabled
           the NRC to initiate and implement reforms that are
           progressively more safety-focused.  Furthermore, it
           allowed the industry to concentrate resources on the
           issues important to safety which provided a sharper
           focus to regulatory improvements.  Safety and overall
           performance, including productivity, became supporters
           of each other, with the clear and unmistakable proviso
           that safety is first.
                       For existing nuclear power plants, the
           list of profound regulatory changes and
           accomplishments, many done under the mantle of the so-
           called risk-informed regulation, would occupy the rest
           of this meeting.  Skip them.  But five of them stand
           out:  The revised rules on changes, tests, and
           experiments, the  50.59, the new risk-informed
           maintenance rule; the revised reactor oversight
           process; new guidance on the use of PRA in risk-
           informed decision-making (Regulatory Guide 1.174); and
           the revised license renewal process.
                       The list is growing.  About two weeks ago,
           the Commission approved COMNJD-01-0001 instructing the
           staff to give priority to power uprates, bring it up
           the priority list, make it a real purpose of the
           Agency and allocate appropriate resources, streamline
           the NRC power uprate review process to ensure that it
           is conducted in the most effective and efficient
           manner.  All of these and most of the other regulatory
           improvements conform to the Commission's decision to
           focus attention on real safety.  The resulting
           improvements in rules, regulations and processes,
           including changes to the hearing process and enhanced
           stakeholders participation, are assuring the nation
           that a fair, equitable and safety-driven process is
           being used.
                       I mentioned risk-informed regulation, and
           I can see Chairman Apostolakis a little more lively in
           here, as an important component of the changes NRC
           regulatory structure.  And I firmly believe it is an
           important point. I want to be sure you know what I
           mean, what I personally mean when I use the term risk-
           informed regulation, so I'm going to present you with
           my own personal definition of it:
                                   Risk-informed regulation is an integral,
                       increasingly quantitative approach to
                       regulatory decision-making that
                       incorporates deterministic, experiential
                       and probablistic components to focus on
                       issues important to safety, which avoids
                       unnecessary burden to society.
                       And I think you know most of these things. 
           I really want to focus on why I am extremely attracted
           to risk-informed regulation, and it's the last
           sentence, which avoids unnecessary burden to society. 
           And I firmly believe that that is the test.
                       The definition can also be used for risk-
           informed operations, risk-informed maintenance, risk-
           informed engineering, risk-informed design, whatever
           you want to.
                       For new license applications, much
           groundwork has been done, and a lot of it is useful to
           address today's issues.  Going back in history in the
           statement of considerations for 10 CFR Part 52, the
           Commission stated that the intent of the regulation
           was to achieve the early resolution of licensing
           issues and enhance the safety and reliability of
           nuclear power plants.  Nothing wrong with that.  
                       The Commission then sought nuclear power
           plant standardization and the enhanced safety and
           licensing reform which a standardization could make
           possible.  In addition, 10 CFR Part 52 process
           provides for the early resolution of safety and
           environmental issues in licensing proceedings.
                       The statement of considerations for 10 CFR
           Part 52 goes on to say, and it's a very interesting
           statement "The Commission is not out to secure,
           single-handedly, the viability of the [nuclear]
           industry or to shut the general public out."  In
           essence, it's continuing to quote "The future of
           nuclear power depends not only on the licensing
           process but also on economic trends and events, the
           safety and reliability of the plants, political
           fortunes, and much else.  The Commission's intent with
           this rulemaking is to have a sensible and a stable
           procedural framework in place for the consideration of
           future designs, and to make it possible to resolve
           safety and environmental issues before plants are
           built, rather than after."
                       In February of this year, the Commission
           directed the staff in COMJSM-00-0003 to assess its
           technical, licensing, and inspection capabilities and
           identify enhancements, if any, that would be necessary
           to ensure that the agency can effectively carry out
           its responsibilities associated with an early site
           permit application, a license application and the
           construction of a new power plant.
                       In addition, the Commission directed the
           staff to critically assess the regulatory
           infrastructure supporting both 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52
           with particular emphasis on early identification of
           regulatory issues and potential process improvements.
           The focus of these efforts is to ensure that the NRC
           is ready for potential applications for early site
           permits and new nuclear power plants.
                       I repeat, the purpose of these efforts is
           to ensure that the NRC is ready for potential
           applications for early site permits to certify designs
           or designs to be certified, and that the NRC does not
           become an impediment should society decide that
           additional nuclear plants are needed to meet the
           energy demands of the country.
                       In this case, let me assure you that the
           Commission I'm sure will be interested on necessary
           safety-focused regulations, definitely yes. 
           Unnecessary, not safety-focused regulations, no.  The
           staff is working hard to carry out this direction and
           I am sure you will hear about some of our efforts over
           the next two days.  
                       Risking being repetitive, I'm going to re-
           start at the beginning, and I know that I sound
           strange, but it's really at the very beginning.
                       The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
           a three-pronged mandate:
                      Protect the common defense and security.
                      To protect public health and safety, and
                      To protect the environment.
           by the licensing and regulation of peaceful uses of
           atomic energy.  I have long advocated that an adequate
           and reliable energy supply is an important component
           of our national security.  An important component of
           our national security.  And I firmly believe that this
           three-prong approach is going to endure the test of
           time because it is good, and because it is balanced.
                       Within that mandate, within that three-
           prong mandate I am an advocate of change, functioning
           under the rule of law.  As we face the regulatory
           challenges that are sure to be posed by the
           certification and licensing of new designs, a series
           of all too familiar requirements will have to be met,
           regardless of the licensing path chosen.  And this,
           you know them well:
                      Public involvement
                      Safety reviews
                      Independent ACRS review
                      Environmental review
                      Public hearings
                      NRC oversight
                       I am convinced, and I have white hairs to
           prove it, by practical experience that the present
           pathway for potential licensing success of certified
           or certifiable new reactor applications is Part 52,
           and I will tell you why.
                       First, it exists; and this is not the
           minor issue the fact that it's here and available, and
           is in the books.
                       Second, it contains the requirements for
           assurance of safety and the processes for their
           implementation.  
                       And lastly, it can be upgraded to meet
           technological advances that require new licensing
           paths, without compromising safety.
                       Windows of opportunity can be opened, yet
           the price is always the same:  Reasonable assurance of
           public health and safety.  A new technology, with
           different design basis phenomenology.  In other words,
           things like single phase coolant that we are talking
           about, could present the need for a different pathway. 
           Yet, it would have to face the same requirements
           listed above.  What could be different is the manner
           in which some of these requirements are addressed. 
           There is definitely room for innovation and
           improvement, within the safety envelope that has to be
           provided for assurance of public health and safety.
                       I am also convinced that the NRC and all
           stakeholders need to apply a common criteria to the
           tasks at hand. Every success path, whatever direction
           you're coming, however you define success should
           follow this simple criteria:  Every path, every step
           has to be disciplined, meaningful and scrutable.
                       Allow me to consider widely different
           roles.
                       The NRC has the statutory responsibility
           for conducting licensing and regulation in a
           predictable, fair, equitable and efficient manner to
           ensure safety.  Every step of these processes of the
           licensing and the oversight has to be disciplined, has
           to be meaningful and has to be scrutable.
                       Applicants need to satisfy the technical,
           financial, and marketplace requirements, and meet the
           NRC and other regulatory requirements.  Every step
           that is taken has to be disciplined, meaningful and
           scrutable.
                       I have no doubt that there will be
           objections and opposition and the law of the land will
           respect them and give them full consideration.  The
           objections will have to be disciplined, meaningful and
           scrutable.
                       These common criteria are necessary, but
           they are not sufficient as you all know.It is
           indispensable that what we have learned, and it is
           much what we have learned, be incorporated into the
           science, engineering and technology supporting any new
           reactors; they have to be as good as the state-of-the-
           art permits.  
                       Let me take a chance and depart from my
           statement.  There is no doubt that we're all creative,
           we're all innovative, we like to do things better. 
           But this is the time that will not take too many
           errors.  This is the time in which we need to be
           patient and we need to exercise what we know in a
           disciplined manner to make sure that errors are
           avoided.  Okay?  
                       Things that we do will have to be upscale. 
           And everything applicants do will have to be on
           budget.  Anything else is not good enough.
                       Whatever we do with the technology, we
           have to match it with the regulatory processes.  They
           have to be as good as the state-of-the-art permits. 
           I happen to believe that risk-information can be a
           contributor to disciplined, meaningful and scrutable
           processes and to the underlying science and
           technology.
                       Someone once wrote a phrase framing how to
           achieve high performance expectations, which is where
           we are right now, and it may be appropriate then to
           just pause a moment and think that a lot of us need to
           promise to think only the best, to work only for the
           best, and to expect only the best.
                       Thank you very much.
                       DR. KRESS:  At this time I think we are
           collecting some written questions.  Is that true,
           Mike?
                       MR. MARKLEY:  We're working on it, Dr.
           Kress.  At this time we don't have any.
                       I think we could entertain oral questions
           from the audience at this time while collecting these
           written ones. They don't have to be written.  So, if
           anyone has a burning question they'd like to ask
           Commissioner Diaz, please feel free to do so.  Use
           this microphone or this one over here, please.
                       Please identify yourself.
                       MR. QUINN:  Commissioner Diaz, it's Ted
           Quinn.
                       The question I have that the combined
           operating license part of Part 52 is unproven.  We
           haven't run through that yet, as well as early plant
           siting.  Can you define how the Commission can help
           the staff to provide, to make this a more stable
           process as we go through it so that the financial
           community will help us to get these through?
                       COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  It's a very good
           point.  We have it, it's there.  We've been looking at
           it for some time, but it's not been tested.  The issue
           is how do we make sure that it works the way it should
           be, effectively and efficiently.
                       I think we learned a lot at the license
           renewal process.  And I believe that what I have
           learned the last few years is that Commission
           involvement is very, very, very, very necessary in
           this step.  That we cannot let a lot of these things
           go a lot of the time to perfection.
                       I will use one of the first phrases I used
           in a meeting down there that the enemy of the good is
           the better and the enemy of the better is the best. 
           And, therefore, we are going to have to be in very
           close contact with the staff.  And I believe the
           Commission will actually take an important role in
           making sure that the processes are timely.
                       In this respect what we have done is many
           other things the last 3« years, is we have maintained
           our doors open.  We have allowed stakeholders from all
           different areas to come and visit and let us sometimes
           close this little gap that exists, it is vital
           information to us how stakeholders, whether they're
           industry or there are other, you know, groups that
           have an interest in the proceedings, let us know how
           things are going.  And that has worked very well.  It
           keeps the Commission informed early.  Sometimes, you
           know, the staff protects the Commission and shields us
           from knowing the little problems that are happening. 
           And sometimes that is fine. It's really, you know, I
           appreciate it.  But there are times in which we need
           to know ahead of time.
                       And I think this process should be very
           similar as far as the Commission is -- really on top
           of it all the time.
                       DR. KRESS:  Other questions?  Do the
           members of the ACRS wish to ask a question of
           Commissioner Diaz.
                       DR. POWERS:  Dr. Kress, I'd like to phase
           the issue of nuclear waste, which comes up repeatedly
           in connection with all the discussions of nuclear
           power, especially as we go to looking at maybe an
           increased use of nuclear power.
                       Are we making any progress on this nuclear
           waste issue?  Is there something that the NRC can do
           or is this totally in the hands of the Department of
           Energy?
                       COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  I think the NRC has
           done as much as it can do.  We have engaged in the
           process all the way.  And we have tried to make sure
           that everybody understands that we believe there is
           the science and technology that offers a better
           pathway that ensures public health and safety.
                       I think the decisions right now are
           practically at final stages. I cannot comment on them. 
           I think that, you know, we are going to do what we do
           best; we're going to take whatever the country decides
           in the Congress of the United States and the
           President, and EPA and we're going to work with them. 
           We're going to try to make it, you know, an inspective
           process. And that is what we do best.
                       You know, whatever is coming down, we're
           going to use it.  And if an application is submitted,
           we're going to try to license working through a
           process, and that process if not assured. We're going
           to have to look at it every step of the way.  And,
           hopefully, you know, the Department of Energy will do
           a good job and will allow us to do a provision of it. 
           And we will like to ensure that the process is open to
           the public.  We need to make sure that this is
           disciplined, meaningful and scrutable.
                       DR. POWERS:  Not to get off point or
           anything.
                       DR. KRESS:  I have a question, Mr. Diaz. 
           With some of the new reactor concepts, I see one of
           the hard places regulatory challenges to be in the
           area of defense and death, which is you  know a
           general guiding principle for regulation.
                       Do you think the concept of defense and
           death is sufficiently rigorously defined to quiet some
           of the newer reactor concepts or will we have to
           rethink what we think defense and death is?
                       COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  This is a setup.
                       DR. KRESS:  I'm sorry about that.
                       COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  I think, you know,
           those of us who work in reactor science know what
           defense and death really is and what are its
           limitations. I think we have actually reached the
           limitations of defense and death, and that it is time
           to move forward and use it in the best possible
           manner, but complimented with everything else that we
           can to make sure that we don't make cumbersome, you
           know, design requirements or cumbersome regulatory
           requirements.  And I go back to that definition, the
           end of the definition and risk-informed regulation,
           which avoids unreasonable burden.  And that's what we
           have to do, because the burden eventually will be in
           the top, you know.  The logical thing the burden will
           be on whoever it is, the burden is eventually in the
           people of the United States.  
                       So, I believe that we need to relook and
           resharpen our focus.  I know the ACRS has been working
           on this, and I share a lot of your views.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, this is related I
           think to the use of risk-information in licensing and
           regulations.  And we hear that the agency may, in
           fact, receive license application in the very near
           future.  Do you believe, Commissioner, that the
           regulatory system is ready to review such a license
           application or does it require some fundamental
           changes, which will take time, of course?
                       COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  This is setup number
           two.
                       Knowing we think we're ready, but we count
           on the ACRS to make us ready.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I am speechless.
                       COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  We will work hard at
           it. And you guys are going to need to come and pitch
           in.  I think everybody is getting their attention
           focused on how can we move in this area, what is that
           we know sufficiently that will provide within that
           envelop that I keep referring to provide the
           protection of all the processes.  And I think there
           are hard decisions to be made, and I'm not kidding
           that we can revoke our problems.
                       DR. KRESS:  Any other questions?
                       Mike, are there written questions that we
           could entertain?
                       MR. MARKLEY:  No, we have no written
           questions at this time.
                       DR. KRESS:  Okay.  With that, I'd like to
           personally thank once again Commissioner Diaz for an
           excellent keynote speak.
                       As a matter of fact, we're a little bit
           ahead of time.  But at this time I would like to go
           ahead with our scheduled break.  Let's keep it to
           about 20 minutes, and return about 10:00.
                       (Whereupon, at 9:30 a.m. a recess until
           10:01 a.m..
                       DR. KRESS:  Let's get started again,
           please.
                       Based on our experience so far, I'm going
           to go out on a limb and change the mode of operation
           just a little and do away with the cards as an
           experiment and allow questions to be entertained after
           each presenter makes his presentation, so it'll be
           fresh in your mind what you just heard, and you can
           give all the questions at each of the microphones.  So
           we'll try that and see if it works better.  If it
           doesn't work, we'll go back to the cards.
                       Now we'll turn to the spot on the agenda
           in which we will hear extensively from DOE for Gen IV
           and Gen III.  And the first DOE speaker is listed as
           Mr. Magwood, so I'll turn the floor over.      
                       MR. MAGWOOD:    Good morning.
                       Are you sure you can hear me?  Are you
           sure you want to hear me?
                       Well, good morning.  I'm Bill Magwood, I'm
           Director of DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy, Science
           and Technology.
                       Thank you for scheduling a break in a time
           that I was able to go to the restroom.  I really
           appreciate that.  It will make the presentation a
           little bit longer, but that's a good thing or a bad
           thing; depends on what you think about what we have to
           say.
                       First, in the way of introduction, and I
           apologize.  I'm a little behind on what the viewgraphs
           look like.  I know that I saw these about a week ago,
           but since I've been out of town and then here I am. 
           So, I'll be sort of looking at these a little bit
           fresh, I think.  
                       Of course, I just got paged, and hopefully
           it's not the Secretary's office.  Okay.  That can
           wait.
                       Well, first, let me give you a little of
           background about the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science
           and Technology.  Our program, as you know, has been
           around since the beginning of the Atomic Energy
           Commission back in the late 50s.  And we're basically
           the same program that's existed throughout the '60s,
           '70s and '80s; the names have changed, the faces have
           changed but basically we're the Nuclear R&D program of
           the federal government.  We're responsible for
           advanced reactor technology development, fuel cycle
           technology, medical isotopes, space reactors; the
           whole range of federal involvement in nuclear R&D.
                       And over the last decade we've seen our
           activities plummet to a really, quite frankly,
           embarrassingly low level.  Actually, in 1998 our
           budget actually for nuclear energy research
           development and development actually hit zero.  And it
           was kind of an embarrassing situation for us.  We had
           people coming in from Korea and Japan asking what's
           going on, what does this mean.  And it was very
           difficult to explain to them well, you know, it's kind
           of like being between jobs.  You know, we're between
           programs right now.
                       What we were doing during 1998, though,
           was not sitting on our hands.  What we were doing was
           trying to understand what DOE's rule in nuclear R&D
           really ought to be in the long term future.
                       In the past, DOE's program is
           characterized largely by the creation of demonstration
           reactors, very large, very expensive programs like the 
           integral fast reactor program, defense reactor
           project, things like that.  It was pretty clear that
           we weren't going to be seeing hundreds of millions of
           dollars anytime soon, so we were going to have to find
           a smarter, more efficient way to do nuclear research.
                       What we came up with was a variety of
           things.  First, we recognized that we were going to
           have to base our program much more on international
           cooperation than in the past.  In the past, DOE always
           had been a large monolith to which other people tagged
           on.  The Japanese worked with us, the French worked
           with us, other people worked with us, but DOE was much
           more self-reliant and was more interested in
           assimilating technology than it was in bringing
           technology in.  That had to change because of the
           resource issue.       
                       The other thing that we recognized was
           we're going to have to bring in much more outside
           perspective, much more of an outside peer review
           approach.  So that ultimately became our nuclear
           energy research initiative, the NERI program which
           some of you are familiar with.
                       But we also recognized that it was going
           to require more of a cooperation with our stakeholders
           such as NRC, which we're now working more closely with
           than ever before, the industry, our Nuclear Energy
           Compensation Program, entities like that.  And also
           focusing more on infrastructure, which is something I
           think you're going to hear a little bit more about
           over the course of the morning.
                       And one of the parts of research we have
           been working on a great deal has been our university
           research reactors and education program.
                       So our program over the last several years
           has really changed dramatically from what it was, say,
           five or ten years ago.  In fact, I think a lot of
           people looking at the program from that perspective
           will probably be very surprised to see (1) how much
           less money we have, but (2) but in the way we operate,
           how different it is.
                       What we're going to be focusing on today
           is what is the future for the nuclear research program
           both in the federal government, but also more broadly
           talk about that.
                       See the next slide, please.
                       One of the primary focuses that we've
           enjoying over the last year or so has been Generation
           IV systems.  You're going to hear largely about that
           I think this morning.  I think that's the focus of
           this presentation, and I'm going to explain to you
           what that is.
                       Now, this proves this I haven't seen this
           because I would never be giving you a talk with little
           mailboxes on it.  And I think these are pencils. 
           They're either pencils or ballistic missiles, I'm not
           really sure which.  Since we're a civilian program,
           I'm going to assume they're pencils.
                       Generation IV energy systems are systems
           that can be deployed by 2030.  So, I'm going to
           actually skip this chart and go to the next chart.  I
           think it's much more descriptive. Why don't you give
           me the next chart.  I think I'm right.  Yes, okay,
           much better.
                       Here's how we got to Generation IV. 
           Looking back in the past we had this first generation
           of systems, such as the Dresden plant, the
           Shippingport plant, the very first ventures in the
           commercial scale of nuclear power production. These
           lead to the most successful energy programs, I think,
           in the history of the federal government in some ways;
           today's nuclear power plants, Generation II nuclear
           power plants. And these make up most of the plants in
           operation in the world today. These are all the LWRs
           in the United States and most of the LWRs throughout
           the world, as you know, which are based on U.S.
           technology.
                       The very successful program, obviously,
           has not been entirely successful otherwise we would
           still be building them, but nevertheless when you look
           at the fact that 20 percent of our electricity comes
           from these power plants, it's hard to say it's been
           less than successful.
                       We did, however, need to do some
           improvements. And as we learn more about how nuclear
           power plants operate, we were able to design the next
           generation of plants, Generation III plants, the
           advanced light water reactors and the advanced BWR,
           the System 80+, the AP600 that generation of nuclear
           power plants.  And this is also, I think, on the verge
           of being very successful.  They're already building
           some of these plants overseas, obviously in Japan,
           Taiwan, but also parts of the technology are beginning
           to disseminate elsewhere in Korea.
                       So when we start to think about what the
           future ought to be, the question really was where do
           we go from here?  Where do we go from the Generation
           III reactors?  Well, there's two steps.  There's a
           near-term step which we either consider to be just a
           follow on to Generation III or we actually give a
           little bit of an extra push and call it Generation
           III+.  And then we speak of Generation III+ we're
           usually talking about slight enhancements to the
           existing state-of-the-art nuclear power plants.
                       For example, the AP1000 versus the AP600
           is considered to be a Generation III+.  There are
           others.  I'll try not to get too specific about that
           because you get in arguments about what's Generation
           III+ versus Generation IV, and it's a pointless
           exercise.
                       But part of our program is focused on
           trying to move to this next step, deployment of the
           state-of-the-art technologies possibly with some
           enhancements in technology, Generation III and III+. 
           But the more exciting part of our program, I think, is
           looking at Generation IV reactors.  Generation IV,
           quite frankly, is just characterized in very simple
           ways:  What comes next?
                       Now, we do have some more of a definition
           then at this point, and I'll talk about that.
                       Let's go to the next slide.
                       What we've done so far is the Subcommittee
           of our Nuclear Energy Research Advisory (NERAC) to
           establish specific technology goals regarding these
           future reactors.  I think we're going to get some more
           detail about this.  But when NERAC brought this group
           together in just October 2000, it's been a very, vary
           active group ever since.  Their job is to help us
           develop a technology roadmap for Generation IV nuclear
           power plants.
                       This technology roadmap is going to be
           lead by a subcommittee of NERAC, which is composed of
           people from U.S. industry, academia.  And now there
           are laboratory people helping them, but really the
           core of the group is made up of academia and is co-
           chaired by Neil Todreas at MIT and Sal Levy of GE. 
           And they provide a lot of leadership in trying to move
           this process forward.
                       Let's take a look at the new viewgraph. 
           Okay. That helps.
                       The NERAC Subcommittee had as its first
           action, and we gave it a very, very short term time to
           do this, to draft these technology goals for the
           direction for nuclear power plants.  As I say, you're
           going to hear more about this, but to give you an
           example the technology goal for Generation IV is, one
           of the goals, and it's my personal favorite states
           that there should be no operating or accident
           condition that required an off-site response to an
           emergency.  And that means eliminating the concern of
           the public, basically, that the operation of nuclear
           power plant would effect their lives.  Whatever
           happens to the plant stays on site.  It becomes an on
           site issue, but would not have an impact off site. 
           That's a technology goal.
                       Now, we had a lot of discussion about that
           as a goal, obviously, because a lot of people say
           "Well, you know, you can't ever promise it will never
           be outside event.  But, you know, we took a philosophy
           that if it's a technology goal, you work towards that,
           you see how close you get, you see where the
           technology leads you.  So, that's part of the process
           and you'll hear more about this.
                       More to the point, these technology goals
           aren't an end into themselves. They're used to drive
           an R&D program.  And what NERAC's next goal, and this
           is where we are right now, was to take those
           technology goals and formulate an R&D program based on
           them.  And how are we doing that?
                       Now, as you're about to hear what we've
           done is we've reached out to a very, very large group
           of people out to the international community.  We have
           -- let's skip over to the next one.  I'm not going to
           go on all these viewgraphs.
                       We've brought together something called
           the Generation IV International Forum, which I expect
           to be official by the end of this month.  We're
           working with eight other countries; Argentina, Brazil,
           Canada, France, Japan, South Africa, South Korea and
           the United Kingdom.  We're working with these
           countries to try to formulate what concepts, what
           technologies can meet these very, very high level
           technology goals that were set by NERAC.  So the
           Generation IV International Forum has worked with us
           to identify approximately a 100 people all over the
           world, most are in the U.S. but there's about 40
           percent or so of them are actually international from
           these various countries, but also including people
           from the IAEA, people from the OECD/Nuclear Energy
           Agency and people from the European Commission to help
           look at all of the various concepts that are out
           there, all the ideas that come from our NERI program,
           for example, and put them through a very, very
           extensive rigorous progress with the goal of arriving
           at a small number of technology concepts about which
           the international community including the U.S. can
           rally about.
                       Our goal is that by the end of -- and I
           don't know if the next one's got names or not, we'll
           take a look.  No, we'll skip that one.  Okay, that'll
           do.
                       Our goal -- work backwards on this chart.
           Our goal is by September '02 to be in a position to
           tell you what handful of concepts, we're aiming for
           maybe about a half a dozen concepts, hopefully less.
           But a half dozen is probably the most we can stand. 
           What small number of concepts would be acceptable
           under the Generation IV technology goals and about
           which you can write specific R&D plans.
                       Now NERAC's job will be to identify those
           concepts and then write the R&D plans, and that will
           constitute the technology roadmap.
                       This has already been a very ambitious
           project. In fact, I think a lot of people when they
           first heard about what we were going to try to do,
           thought we would never be able to get this far.  We'd
           never be able to get so many countries to agree on a
           process that would narrow so many concepts down over
           such a short period of time. But so far, we've been
           very successful.
                       We've been able to keep the Generation IV
           International Forum together as a unit. In fact,
           rather than having it fly apart, it's actually become
           much more close knit, much more integrated than it was
           when we started off.  And we've actually agreed to a
           charter that each of the countries will sign by the
           end of this month.  So we're very excited about that.
                       Now, in the nearer term, obviously,
           because of the energy concerns we're experiencing in
           this country, we do have to think about what can be
           done this decade.  Let me speak about the dates for a
           moment.
                       One of the things that I said earlier was
           that Generation IV concepts need to be deployable by
           2030.  That's not to say that if you can arrive at a
           Generation IV concept it can be deployed next year
           that we shouldn't go forward with it.  But the limit,
           the outer limit is 2030.  That means that we don't
           have a situation where we're competing with fusion to
           be the long lead technology for the Star Trek
           generation, okay?  We want to make sure that where we
           talk about real technologies things can be engineered
           now and try to arrive as -- projects can be
           demonstrated within a very, very reasonable of time.
           So 2030 is the outer limit.
                       In the case of the near-term plans, the
           Generation III+ technologies for example, we're
           focused on things that can be done in about 2010. 
           Now, we're a little softer with that date because
           there may be some things that are more arrival in
           2012, say, versus 2010.  So we're a little squashier
           about that.  About 2010 is the time frame we want to
           see these new near-term technologies deployable.
                       Our goal is to make sure that we can
           identify the technologies, the technology programs,
           the institutional barriers that need to be resolved in
           time to enable these plants to be built in the U.S. by
           2010.  And we are working very closely with the
           industry on this.  We have a task force under the
           NERAC Subcommittee that's chaired, I believe, by Lou
           Long of Southern Company.  Is that correct?  I think
           it's Lou Long.  Is there a co-chair?  Tony McConnell.
           Okay.  And these folks are helping us on an industry
           basis.  In fact we've just come out with a CBD notice,
           I believe and a Federal Register notice to solicit
           input from the industry to identify what those
           institutional barriers are, technology barriers are
           and to put forward a plan to try to resolve all those
           barriers in a time frame consistent with our 2010
           date.
                       This one is a little ahead of the
           Generation IV side. We expect to have that more
           completed this September.  And actually, most of it is
           already done. We're really just about there.  There's
           a lot of things that need to be refined, but the
           larger ideas are really in place.  And by next year,
           September '02 we'll have the entire Generation IV
           roadmap.
                       So that's what we're pursuing at this
           point.  It's a very, as I said, ambitious activity. 
           It involves a huge number of people.
                       You're going to hear about how we've
           organized this.  Who's giving that?  Is that you, Rob? 
           Rob is going to describe how we've organized this. It
           looks like a spaghetti nightmare, but trust me; it
           makes sense, it works.
                       Is that the last viewgraph?  Okay.  
                       With that, let me just summarize by saying
           that the U.S. DOE has been gratified with the response
           we've gotten from the international community and from
           the industry, and from NRC and everyone else that's
           worked with us on this.  It's been a very important
           activity.
                       And excuse me, John, for turning my back
           to you.  John here is helping us a lot with this, so
           he's very familiar with what we're doing.  And what
           we're trying to do now is to bring all this home. 
           We've organized it, we've got participation from
           everybody that we think we need participation from. 
           We're going to reach out a little bit more to
           stakeholders over the next year, I think.  But this is
           really working and we're going to keep the work, and
           we're looking forward to your thoughts as we go
           forward.
                       And I appreciate the opportunity to talk
           to you today, and I'd be happy to answer any
           questions.
                       DR. KRESS:  We'll entertain questions from
           the audience or from the members, either one.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Dr. Magwood,if you had
           to give us the two most important regulatory
           challenges for meeting all these wonderful
           initiatives, what would they be?
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  That's a good question. I
           think that the most -- I think I'll answer the
           question a little more generic.
                       I think that it's extremely important the
           NRC  move as close to performance based risk-informed
           regulation as possible.  Because these technologies
           are dissimilar in so many ways, and you're already
           starting to see it.  There's already a large
           discussion going forward about the pebble bed reactor
           versus light water reactor technology and how you
           license those.
                       The only way to do that successful with
           these different concepts floating around out there is
           to move to a technology independent regulatory
           approach.  And unless you do that, you're going to
           inhibit the development of these new technologies
           because people will not have the confidence that NRC
           can respond quickly enough to regulate these
           technologies.
                       I know there's a lot of concern about how
           long it's going to take to get regulations for the
           pebble bed reactor.  And we're working with General
           Atomics at DOE with the development of their system,
           and that presents similar challenges.  So I think that
           that larger issue is the one you have to deal with.
                       In the nearer term I think it's really
           more a job of demonstrating the pieces are already out
           there.  But even as we look at these newer
           technologies coming in before now, they present
           issues, many that you are already very familiar with.
                       So I would say that pushing as fast as
           possible towards a new regulatory regime that will
           support new technologies in the next century is really
           going to be -- should be a high priority.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  In the next century?
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  Well, in this century.  I'm
           sorry, I fell back. In this century.  I'm sorry I fell
           back.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Speaking of long term.
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  Well, you know, it's
           interesting one of the things I mentioned to the
           international community -- I'll just sort of digress
           for a moment.
                       One of the things that was very
           challenging about pulling everyone into this early on
           was that unlike the U.S., other countries know where
           they want to be in 20 or 30 years.  You know, the
           Japanese have very specific plans of where they'd like
           to be over the next 30 years. So, you know, getting
           countries like Japan and France that know where they
           want to go to agree to a process like this was
           challenging, to say the least.  But I think that the
           fact that we're open-minded about where the answers
           come out gives them confidence that, you know, that
           their ideas may well fit into whatever comes out of
           the end of this.
                       Also just for your gratification, one of
           the things that we were very pleased about with the
           international community was that they made very clear
           that they believe that the U.S. was the only country
           that pulled this together and that without the U.S. in
           the middle of this bringing all these other countries
           together, that there's no way you would ever be able
           to arrive at what they believe, what many countries
           believe the future really has in store for us which is
           more common reactor designs international.
                       And so doing this on an international
           basis is absolutely essential.  Having the U.S. go off
           and do this on its own would be a waste of everybody's
           time and money.  And so, you know, we've been very
           pleased with the international response. But I think
           that in the future we're going to see that the steps
           that you take and the steps the NRC takes towards
           regulating these new technologies will really set the
           tone for the rest of the world.  So it's very
           important that we go about that in the right way.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Is NERAC going to give
           us any ideas as to how we can have this regulatory
           system that will not be technology specific?
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  We've talked about whether
           to get involved in that.  And I think the main
           conclusion was that we shouldn't because for two
           reasons.  First, it really is something that NRC needs
           to deal with.  You know, it's something that the NRC
           has more experience with than we do and very few of
           the people that we've been working with are very
           comfortable going off to give NRC a lot of specific
           advice.
                       And secondly, quite frankly, the time that
           it would take to do that probably means that it would
           require a different project than what we're currently
           doing.  That's not to say that we wouldn't have a
           follow on step where we would try to move in that
           direction.  But for the near-term, I don't think
           there's anything that NERAC's is going to add to where
           NRC is going.  We just need to encourage them to move
           forward quickly with what they're doing.
                       In a longer term, it may make sense to
           bring another group together to look at those long
           term regulatory issues.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Thank you.
                       DR. KRESS:  Other questions?

                       DR. POWERS:  Well, it seems to me that if
           you're going to encourage people to move to a
           performance based regulatory system, that must mean
           surely you're looking at performance indicators for
           these new generation?  Is that the case?
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  I think the answer to that
           is yes.  If you look at our technology goals, and I
           think you're going to get a rundown of that.  Is that
           going to be part of your presentation?  You're going
           to get a rundown of that.
                       You'll see a very high level version of
           what those performance goals are.  On a regulatory
           space, you're talking about safety.  You'll see some
           indications where we think things should go, but not
           to the level of detail because these technology goals
           are very, very high level.  You're not going to see a
           low level of detail, but you will see an overall
           vision.
                       DR. POWERS:  High level and not very
           specific doesn't make for useful regulation.
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  That's a --
                       DR. POWERS:  At some point somebody has to
           come down and say if you want a performance based
           system, you got to have performance indicators that
           are used and monitored.
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  But what I would say is that
           what -- what we can provide as part of our process,
           all these high level goals. These high level goals
           will very quickly, depending on which technology
           concept you're looking at, provide some framework that
           NRC or someone else could use to begin to design a
           regulatory approach.  It's not really -- again, it
           wasn't our intent to try to set this up to defeat the
           NRC process.  You know we clearly could to do that,
           but that's not the intent here.
                       Our intent was to drive an R&D program,
           not separate or instruct.  Now, I'm willing to hear
           some advice.  You're an advisory group, so give us
           some advice.  We're part of the program.
                       If you think that we should follow on this
           activity with an activity focused more to the
           regulatory side, you know, I would be very happy to
           work with Ashook and his group to try to put together
           an appropriate advisory group that will do that. 
           Because I think it's important that it be done.  And
           if takes DOE involvement to get it started, I'm happy
           to do that.  But this isn't the activity to do it,
           that's my biggest point.
                       DR. KRESS:  Okay.  Seeing no other -- oh,
           there's one. Okay.  Please identify yourself.
                       MR. LYMAN:  Ed Lyman from the Nuclear
           Control Institute.
                       Bill, I think there is public issues that
           really have to be thought about before large expansion
           in DOE's research budget has to be contemplated.
           Because these days you have to really worry about
           whether what looks like government subsidization of
           one energy technology over another, how that will be
           perceived, especially by small scale generators using
           other competitive fossil fuel technology and stuff. 
           And in a deregulated environment that's going to be a
           greater concern.
                       So, I was encouraged when these reports of
           a task force on near-term deployment that recently
           reported to NERAC discussed a cost sharing program
           with industry for near-term deployment. I was
           wondering if industry had actually made any firm
           commitments in that regard, since would be a positive
           step since I don't think they've put any money down so
           far in these initiatives?
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  First, it's important to
           clarify, and I think you raised a good point.  There's
           two things really important to clarify.
                       First, in general, you know our office is
           not in the business of corporate welfare.  We're not
           here to make technologies marketable that wouldn't
           otherwise be marketable, you wouldn't otherwise
           compete on it. In fact, our goals, and you'll hear
           about it, for our Generation IV have a lot of built
           into them about the need to be economically
           competitive.  That's a hallmark of what we're trying
           to do.
                       And let me say for the record that there
           should not be a new nuclear power plant that's not
           economically competitive in this country.  It
           shouldn't be built because we're not going to
           subsidize it and if industry is not willing to go off
           and do it because they can make money, it shouldn't
           happen.  It shouldn't be done.
                       Now, regarding the specific point you
           raised, I think that where we are right now -- well,
           first it's important to recognize that this is a NERAC
           advisory group, so we're not at the point where we're
           making commitments on a policy basis on behalf of the
           industry.   We have asked certain experts in industry
           along with academia and working with our national
           laboratories to come together and make
           recommendations.  These recommendations will flow up
           through the NERAC process and if it comes out the
           other side, NERAC will make a recommendation to DOE
           that we should go pursue a program in that vein.
                       But at that stage, if that were to happen,
           we would be in a position to approach the industry and
           say "Okay, your people were on this panel, here's the
           recommendation that they made, Mr. CEO do you want to
           buy into this?"  And if they don't want to buy into
           it, we don't have to do it.  But, you know, it's a
           recommendation.  It's not a commitment on anyone's
           part, especially ours.
                       You know, with my budget I couldn't commit
           to anything they recommended at this point.  So, it's
           really a recommendation for the future.
                       The question we asked was if we were going
           to solve these problems, how would we go about it? 
           And that's what these recommendations gives us.  It
           gives us a way of solving the problems.
                       It doesn't mean that we have to do it.  It
           doesn't mean the industry has to do it, but it gives
           us a methodology.
                       So the answer to your question is no, no
           one's made any commitments, nor would it be
           appropriate to at this point in time.
                       DR. KRESS:  Okay.  With that, let's move
           on to the next speaker.  But before we do, the
           question that George asked about what you may think is
           the two or three most challenging, most difficult
           regulatory challenges, each speaker might want to
           consider that as a generic question and feel free to
           volunteer an answer to it without it being asked.
                       The other item is, I don't have any
           introductory information or remarks to make about each
           speaker, so as was obvious with Mr. Magwood, so would
           each speaker please introduce himself when he gets to
           it.
                       So, with that, I'll turn it over to the
           next speaker.
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Good morning, ladies and
           gentlemen.  My name is Rob Versluis.  I'm the project
           manager for the Generation IV roadmap.
                       Now that Bill Magwood has given you an
           overview of Generation IV process, I'd like to focus
           on the long term and in my talk summarize the roadmap
           process and products that we expect.
                       The first objective of the Generation IV
           roadmap is to identify and evaluate the most promising
           advanced nuclear energy concepts.  And we have three
           years to do this.  We started in October of last year. 
           And expect to be finished September next year.
                       An important role is played by the
           advisory group.  Bill has already mentioned it, the
           NERAC Subcommittee. Actually, it's better known as
           GRNS, Generation IV Roadmap NERAC Subcommittee,
           although that's not actually their official name.
                       They are very much working with us and
           directing or advising us on the direction for the
           roadmap work.
                       The actual work is being done by several
           working groups.  The staff consists of about 50 U.S.
           experts, about evenly divided between industry, labs
           and academia.  And recently we have received 40
           volunteer experts from the GIF countries.  That is a
           very respectable participation from the international
           community.
                       The second objective, and really the
           product we are looking for from the roadmap, is the
           R&D plan to support future commercialization of the
           best concepts.  And this completed roadmap will do two
           things.
                       It will identify and evaluate concepts. 
           That is we intend to make a good start in calling out
           the most promising concepts.
                       And secondly, it will formulate the R&D
           tasks for the best concepts; that is to find a
           sequencing and preliminary costs of the R&D tasks
           required for commercialization.
                       We recognize that even after two years of
           hard study there will be many questions left about the
           viability of the most promising concepts.  The R&D
           defined by the roadmap is intended to both answer
           questions of viability and show the real performance
           capabilities of the selected concept.
                       And, of course, the final nuclear energy
           system selection will involve industry and the
           marketplace.
                       Like any planning activity we start with
           formulating goals, which was actually done by GRNS. 
           And these goals strive to reflect energy needs for
           mid-century, and we actually have the date of 2030 on
           it, but obviously if these plans are going to be built
           and deployed, they're going to be run for many years.
                       And so we've tried to envision mid-century
           with its population growth, its growth in standard of
           living, its world economy and its need for other
           energy projects besides electricity, such as clean
           water.  This is reflected in the appearance of
           sustainability goals alongside safety and economic
           goals.  And let me quickly take you through the goals.
                       In fact, this is all I'm going to show
           about them, because Neal Todreas is tomorrow and his
           talk will go in more detail about the goals.
                       There are three sustainability goals.  One
           that is concerned with the resource inputs, that is
           fuel, materials, energy inputs in nuclear energy
           system.  Second with waste outputs.  Waste streams of
           all sorts.  And the third is proliferation resistance
           or nonproliferation.
                       Then there are three safety and
           reliability goals.  One on excellence, one on core
           damage and one on emergency response.
                       And finally, there are two economics
           goals:  Life cycle cost and risk to capital.
                       These goals, in fact, provide the basis
           for evaluating the technologies.
                       What do we really mean with a Generation
           IV system?  It is an entire energy production system,
           including the nuclear fuel cycle front and back end,
           the nuclear reactor, the power conversion equipment
           and its connection to the distribution system.  It
           must recognize various energy products, electricity,
           hydrogen, fresh water, process heat, district heat,
           propulsion.  And also the infrastructure for
           manufacture and deployment of the plant.
                       Furthermore, we limit to systems that are
           likely to be commercially viable by 2030.  And also
           the primary energy generators in the system must be
           based on critical fission reactors.  That means that
           subcritical systems, accelerator driven system, would
           have a secondary role in the fuel cycle, but the
           primary energy generators should be critical systems.
                       The next slide shows the roadmap
           organization.  The central part shows the working
           groups and the integrating functions.  And I'll come
           back to that in a minute.
                       On the left it shows the advisory
           committee relating, of course, to DOE-NE in the
           roadmap.  And also the technical community, the left
           bottom, from which both the GRNS and the roadmap draw
           its resources; that is its staff.  Further resources
           are drawn then from the GIF countries on the right
           hand side.
                       DOE-NE manages the program. This is where
           Tom Miller, who will speak next, and I sit.  And
           underneath -- actually it shows the near-term
           deployment group in orange underneath DOE-NE.
                       Then the next group that it shows is the
           roadmap integration team, RIT.  And look at those
           abbreviations because they will come back in later
           slides.
                       The RIT does what it says, it manages the
           roadmap process and does the final integrating of the
           roadmap itself. It is composed of two senior managers
           from Argonne National Laboratory, two from Idaho
           National Energy Environmental Laboratory and myself.
                       The next group shown is the evaluation
           methods group, and this is the group that is charged
           with defining the criteria and metrics by which they
           evaluate the concepts on their ability to meet the
           Generation IV goals.  They actually start with the
           goals and they translate them into criteria and
           metrics, which is a long process, actually.
                       The actual work of identifying, describing
           and evaluating the concepts is spread over the four
           groups shown in the middle bottom.  They are organized
           by a coolant technology somewhat arbitrarily, but it
           lines well up with people's expertise.  And so there's
           a group on water coolant, on gas, on liquid metals and
           then there is none of the above where the non-
           classical concepts are being evaluated and described.
                       In addition, we envision forming
           technology crosscut groups.  And that group, you know,
           standing vertically there on the right is an example
           of such a group.  It draws actually from the same
           people, from the same working groups, but it lines up
           the experts in a certain technological area and it
           puts them together to get a crosscut perspective over
           all the concepts.  And you can envision crosscut
           groups like fuel cycles, risk and safety, materials,
           power conversion and others, perhaps.
                       The fuel cycle group was formed early to
           deal with the common fuel cycle issues for all of the
           concepts, and also to define the fuel cycle framework
           for the energy systems.  And they have defined four
           generic fuel cycles:  The once through fuel cycle; a
           single plutonium recycle; multiple plutonium recycle;
           and a full actinide recycle.  And they describe those
           and provide a framework for the other groups to work
           within.
                       They also analyze energy demand scenarios.
           They're not making any new ones, they use the World
           Energy Council's scenarios and they pick the three
           scenarios of those to drive the thinking about
           resources and build up.
                       This shows a high level overview of the
           schedule for producing the roadmap. 
                       Phase 1, the initial work is getting
           organized and staffed.  Phase II, the needs assessment
           looks at the concepts and identifies the technology
           gaps.  Phase III, the response development defines the
           needed R&D.  And Phase IV, the implementation planning
           actually finalizes the roadmap.  And the slide also
           shows the time frame when the activities take place
           and about the product of the phases.
                       Let's step through the tasks.  First the
           goals and plans.  First, we drive the technology goals
           based on industry needs, and that has been done by the
           GRNS and it's been reviewed and with some comments
           endorsed by GIF.  And it's captured in a technology
           goals document.
                       Next, plan the activity.  We published the
           Roadmap Development Guide for use by the roadmap
           participants that describes the overall approach, and
           the working groups have been convened including
           international participation.
                       The first time we convened all the working
           groups was in February in Denver, and it only included
           the U.S. participants and we described to them the
           approach of the roadmap, the various responsibilities
           of the groups and what's expected from them.
                       Then again, in Chicago we had the second
           joint meeting of all the working groups.  That was
           last month in May.  And that included all the
           international participants.  So we had, again, a
           familiarization stage, but they also actually were
           there to do work.
                       Then next we determine how to measure the
           concepts against the goals.  We developed a criteria
           and metrics for each goal and then continue on to
           develop the evaluation methodology.  This is conducted
           by the evaluations methods group with the feedback and
           assistance from the roadmap integration team and the
           GRNS.
                       This slide discusses how we're dealing
           with the concepts.  First, identify the concepts for
           evaluation.  We have now about 100 concepts and they
           are drawn from the U.S. and a broad  international
           base.  And they are now adopted by the technical
           working groups and synthesized.  When I say
           synthesized, I mean that in many cases a concept was
           not complete and needed to be synthesized with other
           fuel cycle systems or parts of the fuel cycle system.
                       The concepts are also being grouped into
           sets if they show sufficient similarity to increase
           the productivity.  To conceive a 100 concepts we're
           going to have to package them up a little bit, and I
           will talk about that later this morning.
                       Then the most promising concepts need to
           be detailed better, so that's the next step.  And the
           TWGs are now interacting with the concept teams and
           the advocates to get more information.  They actively
           study and compare the underlying technology.  And they
           are now getting ready for what's basically two
           screening stages.  The first screening is called
           screening for potential and the EMG has developed
           criteria, qualitative criteria for that.  That initial
           screening is pretty lenient and it's because it's been
           based on limited information and we really don't want
           to throw too many things out at this point.
                       And then  a later evaluation next year
           will be done next year.
                       Let me clarify what I mean with concept
           and concept sets.  Concept, as we use the word, is a
           technical approach for a Generation IV system with
           enough detail to allow evaluation against the goals,
           but broad enough to allow for optional features and
           trades.  And a concept set is a logical grouping of
           concepts that are similar enough to allow their common
           evaluation.
                       In the second year we evaluate and
           assemble.  We evaluate the most viable concepts, we
           compare the concept performance to the goals, and that
           is really the finally screening.  And then we identify
           the technology gaps.  And in this work the TWGs, the
           technical working groups have the lead.  And, of
           course, the RIT and the EMG looks over their shoulders
           and make sure that the criteria are being applied
           consistently.
                       DOE has the approval function here, and we
           will seek the endorsement of GIF.
                       And then the final stage is assemble the
           roadmap to support the most promising concept.  That
           means identifying the R&D needed to close the gaps
           that have been identified in areas of crosscutting
           technology, assemble a program plan with recommended
           phases.  And that will then contain the sequencing and
           estimated costs of the R&D tasks.  And the groups
           write here their final reports.  The RIT takes the
           input and integrates this into the roadmap.  Again,
           the DOE has an approval function and will seek the
           endorsement of GIF.
                       This slide is another cut at the schedule
           from the perspective of the screening and down
           selection.  A lot of work is actually going into
           taking these goals, translating them into criteria and
           metrics and applying them in these screenings.  And,
           as you see, the screening for potential is coming up
           in July, 2001.  Then there is an eight to nine month
           period before we do the final screening, which will be
           more strict and based on further developed and have
           more sophisticated criteria and perhaps in some cases,
           quantitive metrics.
                       After the roadmap completion, planning
           becomes more uncertain as you go further into the
           future because it involves things such as government
           policy, budget, market, et cetera.  But we have
           indicated there sort of a base scenario that includes
           the terms of viability and performance R&D.  And we
           have made provision for further down selection using
           more quantitive metrics to show if the potential can
           really be realized.   
                       At some point we envision to hand off to
           industry based on their reading of the markets.
                       That concludes my presentation.
                       DR. KRESS:  Thank you.  Questions anyone?
                       DR. POWERS:  Yes, I have a question that
           comes to mind when I see these plans for Generation IV
           reactors.  My good friends at the Nuclear Energy
           Institute regularly provide me metrics on the
           performance of the current generation of plants in a
           variety of areas, including resources, safety and
           economics.  And they show excellent performance, just
           outstanding performance in the last ten years going
           along.  
                       In all this roadmapping exercise, do you
           carry along some representative of the current
           generation plants as a comparison so you can see if
           you're really going to accomplish anything with these
           new plants?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Well, it's a good question
           because the initial screenings are really not much
           more than comparing in a number of different areas
           with the Generation III technology. So, they are
           qualitative comparisons, and that's how we approach
           it, is comparing it with the Generation III
           technology.
                       DR. POWERS:  See, now the Generation III
           is like the --
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  The fast light water
           reactor.
                       DR. POWERS:  The 600 or the 80+ or
           something like that?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Yes.
                       DR. POWERS:  We don't have a whole lot of
           performance and data on those Generation III plants
           the way we do with the existing plants?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  We think at this point with
           the amount of data that we have on the various
           concepts, there is no need to be very, very precise
           about these things.  What the schedule, the last slide
           really showed is that we need to do a certain amount
           of viability research where we get a better handle on
           how to measure, how we can measure the various
           indicators before we can do a more sophisticated
           screening.
                       DR. GARRICK:  Rob, it might be important
           to point out, too, that GRNS has put a lot of emphasis
           on the total energy system concept, and that has kind
           of evolved.  When we first got together, that wasn't
           so much an emphasis.  And when you think about
           performance indicators, you've also got to think about
           the scope that we're addressing this time, namely the
           total energy system.
                       So, it would seem that if we're going to
           go in the direction of performance indicators that are
           compatible with risk-informed performance based
           regulatory practice, we'll be talking about probably
           a different structure and at least a more range of
           indicators that we've perhaps ever seen before.  Is
           that not correct?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Yes.  I thank you for
           pointing that out.  For example, the base case we're
           comparing with, of course, has a once through fuel
           cycle.  We have various criteria that have to do with
           the waste and use of fuel, but particular the waste
           forms that can be achieved by other fuel cycles.
                       So, you're very right that we are not just
           looking at the reactor, but the entire system from
           soup to nuts, so to speak.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If we go to slide 3, you
           had the word "excellence" under "safety and
           reliability goals."  What exactly does that mean? 
           That you don't want excellence on the other goals or
           that this is something special here?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Actually, it is something
           special.  And I would like almost to defer to Neil who
           is going to be discussing those tomorrow.  But I can
           say that there is a strong feeling among the GRNS that
           one of the important issues in improving the
           technology and also making it safer is practices of
           excellence in operations, maintenance, design.  And as
           such, they have made a specific goal with that title
           and it translates into criteria and metrics having to
           do with safety to the public during normal operations,
           frequent occurrences all out -- throughout the fuel
           cycle, not only the reactor but also the other fuel
           cycle facilities.  And so there's a number of metrics
           that have been defined to implement this goal of
           excellence.
                       MR. JOHNSON:  Mr. Chairman, if I could add
           to that response?  I believe your question actually
           ties very well into Dr. Powers' question regarding the
           current operating fleet of reactors and the experience
           and lessons learned from that, and how that's going to
           feed into the process.
                       The goal of excellence truly is looking
           at, you know, what are the best practices.  You know,
           what has led to the success in the current fleet of
           operating reactors and making sure that the new
           generation reactors, you know, meet or exceed that
           level of operational and maintainability excellence. 
           So I think that is the intent of those goals.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now when you say
           reliability goals, I mean are they goals the way we
           understand them, numerical goals for reliability?  For
           safety I understand it, but reliability?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  That's where we would like
           to end up, but reliability you can't really put a
           metric of reliability together until you know the
           design pretty well.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Sure.
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  And so early on we are
           really looking at very general indicators that might
           lead to reliability, but it's not -- as I remember
           well, it's actually not a screen for potential
           criteria.  It doesn't come into play until later.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And a last comment, if
           I may.
                       On the third column, "Economics Goals," it
           says "risk to capital."  That's a very interesting
           idea.  I mean, do you envision at some point in the
           future that we will have a probablistic risk
           assessment for a proposed design that in addition to
           end states that involve various levels of damage to
           the core, we'll also have other end states that refer
           to economic losses? I mean, that would be a very
           exciting thing to do, actually.
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Well, I don't know if we
           need new methodologies along that probablistic risk
           assessment line.  But, yes, there are now ways of
           assessing risk for a certain project and what we want
           to indicate here is that nuclear energy systems when
           investors look at them, the risk to their capital
           should be comparable with other projects.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Which is intimately tied
           to the second column, right, "Safety and Reliability
           Goals"?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Yes.  Well, actually, many
           of the other goals, of course, have an economics
           impact.  Definitely, yes.
                       DR. KRESS:  I know you wanted to leave
           something for Neil Todreas, but under that "Safety and
           Reliability Goals" you have emergency response.  Could
           I read that as no emergency response?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  The goal is in fact to
           eliminate the emergency response.  And this may be a
           good time to reiterate what Bill said.  These are
           goals that drive R&D programs.  They are not
           regulatory criteria. In fact, we take pains to point
           out that it may not be possible to reach all these
           goals, but we will be evaluating the concepts on how
           well they get there on a scale from, you know, zero to
           the goal; how close they get and across how many
           goals.
                       MR. LEITCH:  I'm trying to better
           understand the level of effort that's going on.  These
           50 U.S. experts and 40 experts internationally, are
           they involved full-time or only at times of these
           meetings that you refer to?  In other words, between
           meetings what are they doing?  Are they back home
           working on this full-time or is this just part-time?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  We didn't mean anyone to be
           working on it full-time, but they are expected to work
           on these issues between meetings or the work wouldn't
           get done.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's pretty much like
           the ACRS, I guess.
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Yes, right.
                       Roughly speaking we expect people to spend
           some 20 percent of their time on the roadmap and in
           the chairs, the co-chairs of these groups some more
           time.
                       The international participants, again,
           they're expected to do the same thing but they are
           funded by their own organizations.  Nevertheless,
           there is a lot of work to be done here, which they all
           recognize, and there is a real sense of wanting to do
           this correctly.  So, we are probably getting a little
           more than we are paying for.
                       MR. LEITCH:  And these individuals are
           sponsored by their parent organization, either
           industry or academia or labs?  In other words, DOE's
           responsibility is the oversight and management of this
           program?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  For the U.S. participants
           we contracted most of the individuals and our total
           budget is $4« million for this year.
                       MR. LEITCH:  Who do you see as the
           customer of this activity?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Well, the customer at this
           point is DOE, because we are looking for guidance on
           our R&D program in the long term.  And we also are
           looking for a well-reasoned, a well-organized plan
           that allows us to discuss our needs with Congress and
           with other agencies.
                       But ultimately, and this is one of the
           reasons we have gotten the utilities -- I'm sorry, the
           industry, owner operators and vendors involved very
           early on, because we feel that they're ultimately the
           customers for these efforts.  And as I ended up my
           talk, I said we need to be able to define a hand off
           to industry at some point.
                       At this point I would say DOE is the
           customer.
                       MR. LEITCH:  Okay.  Thank you.
                       DR. KRESS:  With that, I think I'll stop
           the questions and move on to the next speaker to keep
           us on time.  The next speaker is Mr. Thomas Miller.
                       MR. MILLER:  Thank you. My name is Tom
           Miller.  I am in the Office of Technology and
           International Cooperation.  I'm responsible for the
           near-term deployment working group of the Gen IV
           roadmap effort.  I'm also the project manager for NERI
           and the INERI programs.
                       Very early on in the Gen IV roadmap effort
           we realized that the effort in the near-term was going
           to determine a lot of what happens out in the future
           2020/2030 time frame. We didn't have a nuclear
           component, a new nuclear component in the 2010, the
           2020 time frame there probably wouldn't be something
           beyond that.  So we looked at what it was going to
           take to have new nuclear plant deployment in the U.S.
           by the year 2010.  We picked that target date, and as
           Bill said we're a little bit flexible on that date,
           but that was our target date with the intention of
           having new plant orders by 2005.
                       And the intention was to have not only
           plant operational, but to see what it would take to
           have multiple plants in operation by 2010.  And by
           that you can see some differences of how you may
           approach things if you have multiple plants being
           built.
                       The participants, and it's a multi-
           industry oriented organization because of the near-
           term effort, we have nuclear utilities; the major
           utilities that are involved in the nuclear power
           generation to date and those that are looking to the
           future in nuclear power are participating.
                       The reactor vendors, national labs Argonne
           and INEEL.  We have academia through Penn State
           University participating.  Industry is also
           participating through EPRI.  And we have participation
           of our NERAC committee on our panel.
                       Early on we identified two deliverables
           that we felt were important. One was a working group
           set of recommendations early that we called the near-
           term actions for new plant deployment.  That near-term
           actions was intended to offer DOE some recommendations
           based on the experience of the group itself without
           any outside input, and it was intended to offer up
           recommendations that could be used by the Energy
           Policy Committee by the Vice President and DOE and the
           lobbyists in helping support the department's budgets
           in FY '02 and '03.
                       The longer term product of this group was
           a near-term deployment roadmap that's targeted for
           September of this year.
                       In the near-term actions the things that
           came out of our group were recommendations involving
           early site permit demonstration, combined
           construction/operating license demonstration,
           certification of the 1000+ MWe ALWR and confirmatory
           testing and code validation of advanced reactors using
           new technology.  In effect, support code validation
           and testing requirements that industry might not be
           able to do for the gas reactors.
                       Supporting this effort we issued a request
           for information to the general community with targeted
           directions to specific groups.  This RFI was issued in
           April with a request to have material back in May,
           with a one month turn around.  As it turns out with
           most RFIs, we're still having some information come
           in.
                       The RFI was issued to the public through
           the CBD.  We gave a directed submittal to the members
           of the NEI New Plant Task Force, directly to the
           reactor vendors to facilitate getting a response back
           in this one month time frame.  
                       What we were asking for was to identify
           the design specific generic institutional regulatory
           barriers to new plant deployment, identify the gaps
           associated with those.  And in the RFI we broke it
           down in various sections that looked at reactor
           specific design issues and site related activities and
           generic barriers.
                       We received responses from 12
           organizations, and right now those are being reviewed
           by the panel.
                       The RFI requested these designs, the
           reactor designs to meet six specific criteria.  And
           these were intended to assure that they could meet the
           2010 time frame, and it was intended to weed out other
           designs that might have fallen more under the Gen IV
           category rather than in this near-term deployment.
                       You all have these in the handout, and I
           don't intend to read through them, but they were
           focused on things dealing with:  How the reactor
           vendor planned to gain regulatory acceptance; did he
           have an infrastructure that would support the
           deployment of his design; what was his plan for
           commercialization of the design;  if he had a
           particular utility that was interested in or not; if
           not, how was he going to get it into the marketplace;
           if there was work to be done and there was a need for
           government level support, what is the cost-share, how
           would they want to implement that and what are the
           specific activities; they had to demonstrate economic
           competitiveness to assure that they could compete in
           the marketplace that was there within the next 10
           years.  And one of the most interesting was that they
           had to rely on the existing fuel infrastructure.
                       Then we also addressed generic gaps.  And
           in the RFI we identified specific gaps that we, as a
           group, knew already existed and asked the respondees
           to rank those generic gaps and identify additional
           ones.  And in ranking those generic gaps, we also
           asked them to identify what they believed were
           solutions and appropriate levels of funding to reach
           those solutions.
                       The responses we got in the design area
           are on the slide.  Typical that we expected from
           Washington and GE responses.  We got responsible on
           gas reactors from Exelon/PBMR and General Atomics. 
           And one we had not expected, but showed up, was from
           Framatome, the SW 1000.
                       At this point of time the group is
           evaluating these designs.  We're conducting a two
           level review, one based on the six criteria and then
           we're going to do a summary level design review of
           each design and look at it from that perspective.
                       As expected, the generic gap responses
           that came back pretty much matched what the working
           group believed as necessary, but there were some
           additional ones that were identified.
                       The three first ones involve parts of
           demonstrating Part 52 licensing requirements. 
           Identification now shows up with the risk-informed
           regulation for future design certification.  And there
           was a specifics identifying emergency planning and
           plant security issues.
                       The last six were identified by
           organizations that were not the reactor vendors or
           your typical utility, but were other inputs we
           received from the national laboratories and other
           concerned nuclear industry groups, and they provide
           some input for the group to consider.
                       Brought up earlier was the idea of
           economic risk and risk assessment tool, and in fact
           one of those was identified in our group.
                       As I want to state right now, we're on a
           track to issue this report in September.  The working
           group is split off in teams right now. They're
           diligently looking at these designs.  Our next meeting
           is the end of June, and we'll be having an assessment
           by each of the design review teams given to the
           working group, and in addition having the reactor
           vendors come in and demonstrate to the working group
           how they meet each one of these criteria.
                       And at this point in time I will conclude,
           because there really is no further information I have
           to give the committee.
                       Thank you.
                       DR. KRESS:  Thank you.  
                       Questions?
                       MR. WALLIS:  I have a question.  A lot of
           your criteria is the credible plan for gaining
           regulatory acceptance.  Now, presently there's an
           infrastructure for doing this.  Response to things
           like regulatory guides and standard review plans and
           so on.  In the absence of those from the NRC side, how
           are you going to have a credible plan for gaining
           acceptance?
                       MR. MILLER:  This criteria was focused
           towards those industry groups, utilities or vendors
           that were going to come in with a new reactor design
           and they had to show how they were going to try and
           either meet Part 50, Part 52 and have a design that
           was either accepted by the NRC or design certified and
           ready to be built and operational by 2010.
                       From the experience we've seen with the
           ALWR program, there is a timely process.  We're asking
           these vendors to come in and tell us how they had
           planned to get through that process.
                       DR. POWERS:  One of the frustrations, I
           think, the agency has when it confronts new designs or
           anything new with the regulations is that the
           applications tend to come in piecemeal and whatnot. 
           There's some effort here to have more comprehensive,
           better quality applications coming in?
                       MR. MILLER:  We're not addressing that.
                       MR. LEITCH:  One of the significant
           activities that you list is design certification of a
           1000 megawatt ALWR.  Does that suggest a predeposition
           to large reactors versus smaller modular designs?
                       MR. MILLER:  No, that's not a
           predeposition.  That is one of the responses we got
           back.  We also got feedback from the GT-MHR from
           General Atomics, which is a small design, the pebble
           bed reactor design, which is a small design.  There
           was also a response back from Westinghouse for the AP
           600.  So, I don't see a predisposition to larger
           plants.
                       DR. KRESS:  If there are no more
           questions, we'll follow on to the next item on the
           agenda, which is Mr. Johnson.  Mr., Mr. Versluis
           again.
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Yes, that's me again.  Yes. 
           Thank you.
                       I'm going to talk a little bit about the
           Generation IV concepts that we have received.  And I'm
           going to take you on a whirlwind tour and scare you a
           little, probably, in the regulatory area.
                       We felt that we needed to take a good look
           at all concepts that could show promise, particularly
           since we have built in a good period of R&D, we really
           want to look at concepts with the proper amount of R&D
           and can meet the goals or can advance very much
           through the goals.  And we started also with a request
           for information in March.  That request closed
           sometime last month, a few things have still been
           dribbling in. It was published in the Commerce
           Business Daily, the Federal Register and was also
           distributed very widely in the international
           community.
                       We now have about a 100 responses, and I'm
           going to be talking about the key features and the
           statistics, and basically you're getting this hot from
           the press without much digestion because we just got
           them in.  But I'll talk about grouping and then the
           current activities.
                       This is the definition we've already gone
           through, so next.
                       We received totally 94 concepts, but we
           also had internally generated some of the concepts and
           not all of these here were full energy concepts.  So
           we figure we have about a 100 total, and this shows
           the breakdown by different coolant technologies, by
           country and by organization type.  And I will leave
           this for you to pursue through at your convenience and
           go to the next slide.
                       And this shows the variety of concepts
           that were received.  Going to the water group, and
           these were reported by the water group, the variables
           that they recognized in looking at these concepts are:
           The coolant, light, heavy water; phase and conditions;
           thermal, epi-thermal and fast spectrum; primary system
           layout - there were a number of integral PWR types but
           also conventional; the fuel cycle - uranium and
           thorium once-through various recycles; the thermal
           output and particularly also the maturity of concepts,
           different.
                       Some of the crosscutting R&D issues that
           they immediately identified for all of these are high
           temperature materials, modular manufacturing
           technologies, internal control rods and I&C issues. 
           That doesn't mean that these are the only ones, but
           those jumped out when I first looked at them.
                       In the gas group the variables they
           recognized are the reactor concepts and the
           applications of fission heart.  And within the reactor
           concepts there were the gas turbine modular gas cooled
           reactors, PBMRs, fluidized bed reactors and a gas
           cooled fast reactor.
                       And there was a great variety of the
           applications, the energy products for which the
           fission heat could be used:  Electricity generation,
           both direct and indirect cycle; various process heat
           applications as well as district heating and
           desalination.
                       They recognized different fuel forms and
           fuel cycles with uranium, thorium and uranium
           plutonium.  There are good plutonium burners, the gas
           reactors, so there were a number of concepts that
           focused on that.
                       And their generic R&D issues are:  The
           fuel fabrication quality assurance; fuel performance -
           integrity and fission product retention; lifetime
           temperature and irradiation behavior of graphite
           structures; high temperature materials and equipment;
           and, passive heat decay removal for fast-spectrum
           concepts.  Fast-spectrum concepts have less of a
           thermal capacity because many of the lighter elements
           have to be removed.
                       The liquid metal coolant, the variables
           are:  the size - large/monolithic designs, modular
           designs, transportable designs - and targeted clients. 
           And I think I'm not sure what they meant through that,
           but I think it means a transportable reactors that you
           can take to less developed areas of the world with
           less stable grids and less of an infrastructure.
                       Different coolants, sodium, lead and lead
           alloys.  
                       Fuel type, oxide, metal, nitride,
           composites meaning the entire spectrum that you can
           think of.
                       Primary system layout, look and pool.  
                       BOP options and energy products also
           there.
                       Energy conversion options that include
           some pretty advanced things like Mtech, the thermal
           electric conversion and other high technology MHD was
           also in there.  And fuel recycle technology, aqueous
           and dry recycling.
                       Now in the non-classical concepts we may
           have to ask assistance from Commissioner Diaz because
           so many different things came in and he has a lot of
           experience with some pretty way out designs.
                       The focus of this group is on adequately
           defined concepts with significant potential, and the
           variables there are:  The cooling approach; the
           coolant itself, molten salt, organic; the fuel phase,
           solid, liquid, gas and vapor; electricity generation
           technology conversion including a direct fission-
           fragment energy conversion; alternative energy
           products or services; and also the fuel cycle.
                       The crosscut issues that they identified
           are:  Modular deployable; hydrogen production and very
           high temperature systems; advanced fuels and fuel
           management techniques; and energy conversion systems,
           especially non-Rankine.
                       Now, I'd like to say something about the
           grouping, because that's really the first step of our
           work is to look at this entire group and organize
           them, and get them ready for the first screening.
                       All the TWGs, all the working groups have
           taken a first cut at the grouping them into concept
           sets that share a technology base and a design
           approach.  And rational for the grouping is, first of
           all, the efficient division of the analysis effort,
           but also the streamlined evaluation process and an
           avoidance of premature down-selection at this point
           when there's so little information available about
           some of these concepts and we run the risk of throwing
           out the baby with the bath water.
                       For the water group we found we have three
           PWR loop type reactors.  These are, in fact, the sets. 
           Three PWR loop reactors, a set of three.  Integral
           primary system PWRs, six.  Integral BWRs, six. 
           Pressure tube reactors, three.  High conversion cores,
           11.   Three supercritical water reactors and then 14
           advanced fuel cycle concepts of various types, you can
           read.
                       The gas group there were five pebble bed
           modular reactor concepts.  Five prismatic modular
           reactor concepts.  One very high temperature reactor
           operating at ~15003øC.  Five fast-spectrum reactor
           concepts, and four others including fluidized bed and
           moving ignition zone concepts.
                       The liquid metal group looked at four
           major categories and concepts:  Medium-to-large oxide-
           fueled systems of which there were six; eight medium-
           sized metal-fueled systems; eight medium-sized Pb/Pb-
           Bi systems; and six small-sized Pb/Pb-Bi systems.
                       They're also examining three supporting
           technology areas:  oxide, metal and nitride fuels;
           different coolants; and different fuel cycle
           approaches.
                       And in the non-classical group, as you can
           see, they were not real successful in creating a lot
           of economy here with the grouping, but there are some.
                       There are two eutectic metallic fuel
           types, four molten salt fuel concepts, a gas core
           reactor, a molten salt coiled/solid fuel reactor, an
           organic cooled reactor, a solid conduction/heat pipe
           reactor and two fission product direct conversion
           systems.
                       Okay.  I hope this didn't scare you too
           much.  
                       The current activities now with the
           concepts in the working groups is to analyze these
           candidate concepts for performance potential relative
           to the technology goals and to start working and
           identifying the technology gaps.
                       And this fiscal year a report will be
           prepared to describe these concepts and we have laid
           out a format for that.  We want all the concepts to be
           described in a similar manner.  The R&D needs will be
           covered in that report.  And the results of the
           initial screening for potential evaluations.
                       And that's where we are.
                       DR. KRESS:  Questions?
                       DR. SHACK:  One of the things I noticed
           this morning in the whole discussion of the Generation
           IV thing was that the word "severe accident" never
           appeared anywhere.  Do you envision that as being a
           technology need that will have to be addressed in the
           R&D program?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Yes.  One of the goals, the
           second safety and reliability goal has to do with core
           damage. And then the third goal has to do with the
           emergency response.  So in both of these goals severe
           accidents are an issue.
                       And the second goal will assume the
           performance of a PRA.  And the third goal will have to
           involve all the severe accident that could lead to a
           release off-site. 
                       Does that answer your question?
                       DR. SHACK:  I guess so.  You know, I guess
           my question is are you going to handle it by
           essentially your PRA argument that core damage is so
           unlikely that I don't have to address a severe
           accident, per se?  Or do you really envision a need,
           for example, to determine source terms for some of
           these reactor concepts?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Well, for those concepts
           that are selected that make it through the early
           stages of the screening, there will have to be a
           better description of source term and the various
           scenarios leading to the source terms, yes.  But early
           on, as you can see by this wide variety of concepts,
           we're going to have to use surrogates and indicators
           with potential and severe accidents.
                       And we are looking at physics parameters,
           at heat capacity at the typical things that you would
           look at to determine whether or not it's likely to --
           and what the passive severe accident would be.
                       DR. FORD:  We've been told earlier on that
           risk-informed regulation is going to be a part of your
           strategy, and yet we're looking at a whole lot of new
           systems here for which we have no experience at all in
           terms of time dependent degradation.  So as you're
           going through your screening process, does the time
           needed for R&D to resolve those questions, does that
           enter into your timing, your decision making?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Yes, it does.  And
           certainly we hope or we intend but in early on in
           particular to focus on those issues where there's a
           large amount of uncertainty and try to reduce that
           uncertainty.  That's how we will focus what we call
           the viability R&D, so that we have a better idea of
           what the potential is to really meet --
                       DR. FORD:  And have you also taken into
           current the question of manpower capable of doing that
           research?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Well, there will of course
           be as part of the roadmap an estimate of required
           manpower, resources and infrastructure. But we are
           certainly aware that there is a lot of work needed
           there and a lot of investment needs to be made.  I
           should probably let Bill Magwood talk to this issue,
           because this is wider than just the Generation IV.
                       You want to say anything about that?
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  Well, I think it's always
           important to think between time and maybe the
           distinction wasn't made as cleanly.  But when Tom was
           talking about the near-term deployment, we're aiming
           for systems, and I think you can tell from the types
           of technologies Rob was talking about, that on Tom's
           side will be deployable before 2010.  And then the
           case that Rob was talking about, we're talking about
           systems that will be deployable by 2030.
                       So, clearly once we make a selection of
           the concepts that should be pursued, the roadmap will
           lay out what the R&D programs should look like.  And
           that actually is a little -- to some degree. You know,
           rather than simply saying we need to maintain a
           healthy university system, we need to maintain a
           healthy infrastructure to make sure that we'll be able
           to develop advanced concepts, we'll be able to point
           to the technology roadmap and say we can't do that
           because the infrastructure doesn't look like the
           following, we don't have the kinds of professionals
           available.
                       One really good example in the United
           States, and I think some of you are aware of this, is
           that we're in pretty poor shape when it comes to
           nuclear chemists.  There just aren't very many left
           and a lot of them are retiring.  And the universities
           aren't putting out any more nuclear chemists.  So, you
           know, as we get into some of these areas, especially
           molten salt reactors and things like that, you know,
           you're going to have to know that you have nuclear
           chemists available to go off and do this research over
           the next, you know, ten or 20 years.
                       So clearly the roadmap itself will become
           a vehicle for us to get a better handle on the kinds
           of requirements we need.  Right now it's very
           speculative, it's very high level, there aren't a lot
           of specifics.
                       For example, NERAC has rolled out a long
           term R&D plan to cover the wide area, but it doesn't
           focus on specific concepts.  This will do that.  
                 So I think that there's time to respond to the
           need.
                       But Rob was right, the much bigger issue
           is support.
                       MR. WALLIS:  When you were listing all
           these concepts, it reminded me of the '50s and '60s
           when there was a blooming of dozens of concepts,
           rather like these ones and only two or three survived. 

           So, there's a sort of a redoing about this and I'm
           trying to think about what is it that's going to make
           a difference this time?  Are there some breakthroughs
           in technology or are there some changes in criteria,
           or something which will make a difference this time
           around?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Well, I think you answered
           your question partially yourself.  There are indeed
           new materials. 
                       I also think that there has been an new
           recognition among policymakers and the public that
           we'd better start some planning for our energy future
           and issues like sustainability, climate issues they
           now play a much bigger role than they did 40 years ago
           when we designed the first round of technologies.
                       But, yes, in fact when you look at the
           technologies that have been submitted, many of them
           are really not new.  But it is time to look at them
           with the eyes of today, or actually the eyes of mid-
           century and the need for hydrogen production and the
           need for clean water, and the need for other energy
           products.
                       And in addition to that, of course, there
           is the change in the market structure.  There is
           deregulation of the energy markets.  There is the
           internationalization of the vendors as well as the
           owner operators.
                       So, really the environment for judging
           these technologies has truly changed and it is worth
           looking at them again.
                       DR. BONACA:  Yes, going back to the
           question of severe accidents, we call today severe
           accidents those accidents which were not considered as
           part of the original design basis of the plans.  Are
           you going to have designs that address all kind of
           severe accidents, or something akin to what we had in
           the past?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  There really is no doubt
           among the roadmappers that the concepts that are
           selected for the development as we get further into
           the development and designs are becoming more
           specified, that they have to be shown to be safe.  I
           mean, there's no way around that.  And I'm not sure
           how to answer your question other than, we're not
           looking for cutting corners on safety.  In fact, we
           are hoping to make advances towards safety.
                       DR. BONACA:  So essentially the design
           basis of the plan will include consideration of severe
           accidents?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Yes.
                       DR. BONACA:  What we call today severe
           accidents?
                       DR. GARRICK:  Rob, one of the things that
           bothers me a little bit about this program is that if
           I look at other programs like the Apollo program, the
           atomic bomb program, et cetera, et cetera and ask what
           was the real driver, where was the real cadre of
           activity and creativity, and they of course had very
           specific groups that constituted the think tank and
           the nucleus of where everything kind of emanated from,
           and I'm also thinking of the model that I think is a
           very good one, the Lockheed Skunkworks.  Here was a
           small number of people that just generated immense
           breakthroughs in terms of solving these kinds of
           problems.  I don't see that here.
                       I see a lot of review groups and I see a
           lot of proposals from different organizations, but I
           don't see -- and I don't know what this has to do with
           regulatory challenge, but it might because they should
           be part of that team, too.  But I don't see the kind
           of inspiration and drive that comes from a Von Brun
           group that is putting together the rockets that are
           going to get us to the moon.  And yet the time
           constant here is much longer than any of those
           programs.
                       How is this all gelled  together in terms
           of a first rate group of people that we really look to
           make it happen?  Maybe Bill has to answer that one, I
           don't know.
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Well, let me take a first
           crack at it.  I mean, I'm not sure I understand --
                       DR. GARRICK:  I'm looking for the core
           group.
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Right.  What I wanted to do
           at least is to point out that we're not only working
           with the U.S. expertise, one of the things that Bill
           has insisted in, and he's very right about that, is to
           expand this into the world, and particularly into the
           nuclear community with credible programs.   The people
           like the Japanese and the French that bring a lot of
           resources and expertise to the table that we are just
           kind of hanging on to.
                       So, I think that looking at taking a wider
           view, there is a lot of resource or a lot of
           capability available.
                       You were saying how can you focus it to --
                       DR. GARRICK:  Right.  Right.  Where is the
           Robert Oppenheimer group?  Where's the Skunkworks
           group?  Where's the group that really is the driver?
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  Well, they need money, and
           this is -- and Bill can correct me if I'm not
           representing this correctly, but this is a way to in
           a fairly transparent manner make a strategic plan
           where you start with all the concepts that you can
           find and you narrow down to the most promising ones,
           and then you focus your R&D on those.
                       So, perhaps the answer to your question is
           we will get a focused effort, we will get a -- I don't
           know if it's a small group, we hope it is, with enough
           resources there to do the R&D that needs to be done.
           But it will be focused and it will be done on a small
           number of promising concepts.
                       MR. JOHNSON:  John, if I could take a
           shoot at answering your question.  With all respect,
           I'm not sure the analogy is an appropriate one because
           those former federal programs were really single
           objective oriented in terms of creating the bomb,
           putting a man on the moon.  What we're talking about
           here is developing the enabling technologies and
           getting those technologies to a point for a hand-off
           to industry and industry to make a decision on whether
           to take those technologies and commercialize them and
           apply them.  We're not advocating the United States
           get into -- the federal government embark on a reactor
           design deployment mission here.
                       DR. GARRICK:  Yes, and I'm not even saying
           it has to be the federal government.  Because, you
           know, the Skunkworks model was not necessarily a
           government program.  But, yes, go ahead.
                       MR. JOHNSON:  Oh, I was finished, John.
                       DR. GARRICK:  Okay.
                       DR. KRESS:  Seeing no other questions,
           let's move on to --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Just a minor comment.
                       DR. KRESS:  Oh, okay.  Comments,
           questions.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I wonder whether for the
           new concepts we should also rethink the terminology
           that we've been using, which is of course water
           reactor driven.  There was a discussion on severe
           accidents a few minutes ago, and I don't know that we
           really want to carry over this terminology and other
           similar stuff.
                       So, I know this is a detail at this point,
           I mean you're thinking about much bigger things.  But
           it seems to me that's something to have in the back of
           our minds, whether we want to continue using some of
           the terminology of the past, especially since one of
           the earlier goals that were stated was public
           acceptance.
                       MR. VERSLUIS:  I think it's something that
           we should think about.  We really haven't delved into
           severe accidents much at this point, and it may well
           be a good time to review the terms.  Thank you.
                       DR. KRESS:  Yes.  That's a concept that
           comes about because we have been used to design basis
           accidents.  And in order to separate the two, we'd
           call them severe accidents. And it almost seems like
           an arbitrary separation.
                       I don't know.  My question is are you
           going to try to fit -- well, I guess it may be
           premature to ask this, but fit the licensing of this
           into a design basis concept to fit it into the current
           regulations or are you going to try to develop PRAs
           that are sufficiently acceptable that you couldn't go
           completely a risk-informed route?  I guess that's my
           question:  Are we going to stick the design basis
           concept?
                       DR. BONACA:  The reason why I think is
           important, however, is that we're still having to deal
           with credibility of an accident.  What is the most
           limited credible accident.  I mean when the current
           design basis was defined, is because it was believed
           that that was the most credible accident, the most
           limiting ones.  And so in good faith people put limit
           to the -- and that yet is going to be challenging in
           the course of --
                       DR. KRESS:  There's a whole issue of how
           do you go about defining design basis accidents.
                       DR. BONACA:  Exactly.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, it's very
           interesting because the first paper on risk in 1967 by
           Reg Farmer raised the same question; is it logical to
           consider to have a distinction between credible and
           incredible accidents.
                       DR. POWERS:  And I think we have found the
           limitations on the maximum credible accident kind of
           concept.  I was fairly excited when one of the
           speakers said that the approach was that once they had
           refined down their list of viable concepts down to a
           more trackable few, that they would then look more
           carefully at the source driven.  It seems to me that's
           where you'd look rather than the accident scenarios. 
           And I think this is a place where we need to come back
           and revisit what we discussed in the past on frequency
           consequence curves, which is actually coming back to
           your man Farmer a long time ago that this may be a
           much more valuable direction for us to take than the
           classic level one, two, three kinds of approaches and
           design basis accidents versus beyond design basis
           accidents.
                       I mean, it's a much better continuum to
           look at rather than these categorizations.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So you were excited
           earlier, Dana, and now I'm excited.
                       DR. POWERS:  Well, we actually find some
           use for those probablistic things that you do, but
           we'll get into some really good metallurgy stuff here
           in a little bit.
                       DR. KRESS:  With that, I'd like to move on
           to the next speaker, please.  Mr. Johnson, you're
           next.
                       MR. JOHNSON:  Yes.  Thank you.
                       Good morning.  My name is Shane Johnson,
           and I'm the Associate Director for Technology and
           International Cooperation for the Office of Nuclear
           Energy at the Department of Energy.  And what I'm
           going to do briefly is just try to summarize what you
           have heard over the last hour and 45 minutes from our
           discussion this morning.  And that is, where do we go
           from here?
                       You've heard us talking about our
           Generation IV activities, our Generation IV activities
           being defined as both the near-term deployment
           activities as well as our technology roadmap
           development.
                       Before I embark on summarizing that, I
           would just like to say to get back to a question that
           the Chairman put early on relative to the regulatory
           challenges.  And that is we have recognized that in
           both our near-term and our longer term activities that
           there is an inherent regulatory facet to the programs.
                       For example, these two activities, both
           our near-term deployment as well as our longer term
           Generation IV  technology roadmap, while we have got
           them linked to under a single program, they are
           somewhat as you've heard significantly different in
           terms of their objectives and the time frames.
                       Our near-term deployment group really is
           focused on identifying regulatory and institutional
           barriers that exist in the United States for
           deployment of new nuclear assets.  And we have also
           approached that in looking in terms of technologies
           that require no or little further development.  So our
           near-term deployment activities are really focused at
           the regulatory environment in the United States and
           has very little in terms of a focus on technology
           development.
                       Our Generation IV technology roadmap is
           really just the opposite end of the spectrum of that,
           and that is we're looking at in terms of the
           Generation IV technologies is truly technology
           development.  Looking at technologies that are,
           hopefully, stretching our current knowledge of reactor
           design and operation.  But simultaneous with that,
           while we don't want to lose sight of regulatory
           implications, again it's a technology development
           program and the regulatory aspects of deploying that
           technology are going to come, again, in the future.
                       The Department, as the Committee well
           knows, is the federal government's technology agency
           as opposed to the NRC, which is its regulatory body.
                       But in our activities we have been
           working, in both the near-term activities and our
           longer term Gen IV activities, with the agency.  We
           have been working with the Office of Research here,
           Ashok Thadani and his staff, in both the near-term
           deployment activities as well as our Generation IV
           technology activities and having a representative from
           the Office of Research involved especially with our
           Generation IV International Forum.  John Flack, one of
           Ashok's staff here, has had the privilege of trotting
           around the globe with us as we engage the
           international community in the Generation IV
           technology arena.
                       Quickly to summarize, first I'd just like
           to address those things on the near-term deployment
           activities, as Tom Miller went over earlier. And that
           is our goal in our near-term activities is to complete
           our near-term deployment report by September of this
           year.  The report will identify primarily generic
           issues that the government could pursue in a cost
           share cooperative basis with industry to establish an
           environment that will enable industry to step out and
           make informed decisions on the deployment of new
           nuclear assets in the United States.  Those issues as
           it appears right now primarily are going to be related
           to early site permitting, going through that untested
           process, as well as the combined construction and
           operating license process.
                       We are also working with the NRC in
           helping them to get started in the development of
           generic advance gas reactor regulatory framework,
           because as everyone knows it's an area that needs some
           work and there are organizations in the industry who
           are coming forward and having those discussions with
           NRC, so it is a responsibility of the federal
           government to be prepared to address these technology
           concerns.  And we're glad to be working cooperatively
           with the NRC in aiding them as they develop these
           generic reactor technology regulatory framework.
                       With respect to our Generation IV
           technology roadmap really our near-term actions, as
           Robert Versluis has summarized, is to take the almost
           100 concepts and to go through a systematic evaluation
           of those concepts and identify those concepts which
           are most promising which to the extent at which we are
           able to make such an evaluation at this time, meet the
           technology goals that have been established by our
           nuclear energy research advisory committee as well as
           our Generation IV International Forum.  And after
           identifying those most promising concepts, is to put
           together the comprehensive research and development
           plan that will, hopefully, lead to the development of
           these technologies and bring them to a point at which
           time in the future they can be handed off to industry
           for further and eventual commercialization.
                       And with that, I believe our discussion on
           the Generation IV activities is complete.
                       Mr. Chairman.
                       DR. KRESS:  Questions for the speaker or
           any of the previous speakers?  I guess we must be
           hungry.  Ah, there's one. Please identify yourself.
                       MR. LYMAN:  Ed Lyman again, Nuclear
           Control Institute.
                       I just have to follow up from my earlier
           question, because I think what we've just heard is a
           list of activities which I don't think it's
           appropriate for the government to be funding. These
           are activities which are associated with providing a
           regulatory climate or easing licensing advanced
           reactors.  And I think in today's context, that's a
           cost that really should be born by the applicants.
                       Licensing is expensive, but that is part
           of the package for trying to develop a new nuclear
           reactor and market it.  And so I think it raises real
           questions whether DOE should be involved in trying to
           facilitate or come up with ways of easing the site
           permits and other regulatory activities.  
                       I'm also concerned about DOE proposing a
           licensing framework for reactors and then a way of
           meeting those licensing criteria.  I think there
           really has to be a separation maintained between the
           licensing standards and the actual applicant.  Because
           otherwise these criteria could be gerry-rigged to
           justify or to facilitate the particular reactor you're
           pushing.
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  Again, Ed raises an
           important point and I think it requires a little bit
           of distinction drawn.
                       What we're doing, Ed, and for everyone
           else who had concern about this, is we're focusing on
           generic issues, and this is something that DOE has
           done basically throughout history.
                       For example, in the case of gas reactors
           there are some very generic issues related to the
           implementation of gas reactor technology in the United
           States whether it's a pebble bed or GT-MHR or
           something else, you have to deal with, for example --
           and this is something that we've had a lot of very
           important discussions about.  If in the case of a case
           reactor you're relying very heavily on the quality of
           the fuel, how does one go about thinking about fuel
           manufacturing in concert with the design of a power
           plant?  You can't separate it as easily as you can in
           the light water reactor.  That's a very, very broad
           generic technology issue.  
                       And I think it's entirely appropriate for
           DOE to be involved in that.
                       What we will not be involved in are the
           specific -- and NRC, by the way I'll point this out,
           NRC's Office of General Counsel has been very, very
           diligent about keeping both NRC and DOE straight about
           this issue.
                       We will not contribute to the specific
           design related regulatory activities NRC will be
           participating in with the vendors.  There will be a
           separate activity that will probably be coming on in
           the next year or so.  We expect that Exelon, or
           whoever, will come to the NRC and will be obligated to
           pay for those activities. We don't anticipate being
           involved in that.
                       But the generic activities are things that
           we think the government ought to be involved in and
           should be involved in.  And I'll be happy to talk with
           you more about that later, but I think it's entirely
           appropriate what we're doing as long as you stay on
           this generic level.  I think there has to be a
           distinction.
                       DR. UHRIG:  There's a number of rather
           exotic materials involved in the various concepts that
           have been talked about this morning.  Is there any
           consideration or any time being spent looking at the
           availability of these?  Even something as common as
           hydrogen -- I mean helium, excuse me, there's a
           limited amount of that unless you want to produce it
           artificially.  And I just wondered if this is an issue
           that's going to be brought into the consideration?
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  That's a really good
           question, and something that I've actually started to
           worry about myself.  The answer to the question is no,
           we haven't done this stage.  And the reason we haven't
           is because we haven't reached this 2002 target of
           narrowing down the number of options.  When we know
           what concepts we're really going to spend our energies
           on, we're going to really have to deal with those
           materials issues.  
                       And I can't talk too much about this, but
           we are expecting in the next few weeks to really
           strengthen our materials activities within the DOE
           infrastructure and start to have more focus on these
           issues.  Because I think they're too disperse right
           now.  We need to really focus our energies there, and
           we're going to be doing that very soon. We'll make
           some announcements about that.
                       But your question is really good one, and
           we're worried about it but it's too early for us to
           really go a whole lot further.
                       MR. UHRIG:  I guess my point was that this
           could e an issue that would eliminate an otherwise
           attractive concept.
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  Well, that's a really good
           point.  I mean, for example if we don't have enough
           helium for the helium cooled reactors --
                       MR. UHRIG:  I think that's not a major
           issue, but it's something that certainly should be
           looked at.
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  Yes. I think it's something
           that will have to be looked at in concert with the
           evaluations that NERAC is doing.  I mean, I'm not
           aware of any major materials limitations.  If someone
           has some exotic material that, you know, it's just not
           available, I expect that will become one of the
           technology issues.  And if it is such an issue that
           you simply can't rely on being able to build numbers
           of plants, I would expect it would be kicked out on
           that basis.  So, I think that's something we ought to
           take back to the group and make sure they're conscious
           of that.  So, I appreciate that thought.  
                       But so far I've never heard of any exotic
           material that would simply eliminate a concept being
           considered.
                       MR. UHRIG:  Thank you.
                       MR. FEINROTH:  My name is Herbert
           Feinroth.  
                       As I listened to some questions from the
           ACRS and also the DOE presentation I sort of see a
           different -- there's a gap between what the DOE is
           focusing on, which is the entire fuel cycle not just
           the reactor and their interest is in these goals that
           they've described to achieve safety and public health
           for the entire fuel cycle.  Whereas the ACRS is
           focused, I believe, in the past and I think still on
           reactors only.  And it seems to me that this is more
           of an observation than a question, because I don't the
           question has an answer that the regulators need to
           look at the whole fuel cycle as well and not just the
           reactor as they provide advice or input to the DOE in
           their section process.
                       The gentleman asked about the source term. 
           Well, the source term of importance to public health
           is not just what's in the reactor, but what gets
           transported, but gets recycled, what gets sent to a
           repository.  So I think the context that DOE is
           looking at this is correct. And I think the regulatory
           agency needs to figure out how to address the
           imbalance, the public health from the different parts
           of the fuel cycle.  And my concern is the ACRS just
           looks at the reactor.
                       I don't know if anybody has a response to
           that, but I think that's an issue that needs to be
           addressed by the regulatory agency.
                       DR. POWERS:  Well, we'll comment quickly
           that we do have the Chairman of the Advisory Committee
           on Nuclear Waste look at the waste portion of it.  And
           that ACRS does also look at the fuel fabrication part
           of the problem as well, though we probably haven't
           focused on it very much in the discussion today
           because the fuel cycle has only been mentioned briefly
           here as being changed.
                       DR. KRESS:  I think the questioner had a
           good point.  I did want to point out that the ACNW
           also focuses on regulations related to sensitive
           materials and materials applications.
                       Perhaps ACRS could do a little more on the
           fuel cycle parts, but our conception, at least our
           feeling is, the real risk part of the thing is in the
           reactor or perhaps in the fuel fabrication.
                       George, did you want to say anything?
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And we also have joint
           committees with the ACNW when the issues warrant it. 
           But it's certainly a good thought.
                       MR. CLEMENTS:  Yes, I'm Tom Clements with
           the Nuclear Control Institute.
                       I was a little confused during the DOE
           presentation about the relationship between the
           roadmap and the review you're doing and what's
           happening with the Exelon pebble bed reactor.  From
           what I hear, depending on what happens in South
           Africa, they plan to start construction in 2004 and
           have a reactor operating in this country 2006.  It
           sounds to me like you're behind the curve on what's
           happening with that reactor.  Are you going to ask
           them to slow down their decision process in pursuing
           this with NRC?  You're behind the curve on what
           they're doing here on the ground with the NRC or do
           you assume that you're going to include this reactor
           in your roadmap?  I'm just confused about the
           relationship between what you're doing and the pebble
           bed.
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  The pebble bed, that's a
           good question because I saw something and I thought
           someone would ask that question.
                       The pebble bed reactor that Rob spoke to,
           he spoke to a class of PBMRs, those are not
           necessarily , in fact may not really all be the
           reactor that Exelon is interested in and is now being
           discussed in South Africa.  That specific design is
           being discussed as part of the near-term deployment
           activities.  And, as I've mentioned, those activities
           are largely complete and will be final -- scheduled to
           be final through the NERAC process in September, and
           include largely institutional issues that are being
           raised by NERAC that are fully in concert with the
           schedule that PBMR corporation is on.
                       And, in fact, there are representatives of
           Exelon on some of the working groups that are
           providing information about the schedule and trying to
           keep everything in concert.
                       So that PBMR is slated for near-term
           deployment as opposed to being in the longer term
           Generation IV activities. And that's simply because of
           the fact that it's of near-term interest to a utility
           and, therefore, it's appropriate that we look at it as
           something to be deployed by 2010.  And whether it
           actually gets deployed by 2010 or not is up to Exelon
           and others.
                       MR. QUINN:  It's Ted Quinn.
                       Bill or Shane, we've read the Vice
           President's report -- or the President's report and it
           addresses investment in new technologies for
           renewables, for coal for example, and some of the 105
           recommendations address advance nuclear.  Can you
           advise in FY '02 and beyond how those recommendations
           will come into DOE planning?
                       MR. MAGWOOD:  No.  To expand on no, nein. 
           Let me just say that, obviously, certainly and our
           international partners are all very pleased with the
           outcomes that were in the Vice President's review and
           have every hope that eventually there'll be more
           resources devoted to nuclear research and development
           by the government.  Certainly there would have to be
           to do any of the things that we've talked about today.
                       What will happen in specific fiscal years,
           2002 in particular, I simply don't have an answer for
           you. I think that as the government continues digest
           results of the review, we'll begin to talk more in
           terms of what do we have to do to actually implement
           those things, and those discussions have already
           started moving.
                       But I wouldn't expect to hear any specific
           implementation announcements other than what you may
           have already heard from the Secretary.  I think he
           made some announcements recently about specific things
           in non-nuclear aspects.  But on the nuclear aspects
           it's going to take a while to adjust it, move on it
           and to formulate those implementation activities.  
                       So I would expect that over the course of
           the next few months those would start to come out.
                       DR. KRESS:  With that, I'd like to thank
           all of our speakers this morning for getting us off to
           an excellent start.  And remind everyone that we have
           some good things this afternoon on specific designs
           and some of the regulatory activities that are
           underway to get ready for this, and some very
           interesting panel discussions on regulatory
           challenges.
                       With that, I'll recess for lunch and ask
           people to be back at 1:00 please.
                       (Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m. the Subcommittee
           was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m.)
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
                     A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N   S-E-S-S-I-O-N
                                                    (1:01 p.m.)
                       DR. KRESS:  Let's get started again,
           please, for the afternoon part of this Subcommittee on
           Advanced Reactors.
                       Earlier when I mentioned into the record
           the ACRS members present, I was remiss in not pointing
           out that Dr. Peter Ford is also here as an ACRS
           member.  So I apologize and get that read into the
           record.
                       We are the point now where we're going to
           talk about Gen IV design concepts, and we're starting
           out with representatives from Exelon.  As I mentioned
           earlier, I don't have introductory material for
           people, so you have to introduce yourself.  And so
           I'll just turn it over to you.
                       MR. LEITCH:  Dr. Kress, I'd like to
           declare that I have an organizational conflict, so
           I'll recuse myself from the discussions of the pebble
           bed.
                       DR. KRESS:  Yes. Yes.  We need to do that
           because this is a Subcommittee meeting.  Thank you
           very much.
                       MR. SPROAT:  Mr. Chairman and fellow
           members of the ACRS, thank you for your invitation
           today for Exelon and PBMR to come to give you a
           briefing on the pebble bed modular reactor project
           currently underway in South Africa.
                       My name is Ward Sproat.  I'm the Vice
           President of Exelon Generation in charge of
           international projects, and I represent Exelon's
           interests on the board of directors of PBMR, the joint
           venture in South Africa.
                       Today's presentation is going to cover
           three areas.  One is I'm going to give you a brief
           introduction and project update about where the
           project stands.
                       Second, I'm going to introduce by co-
           presenter, Dr. Johan Slabber from PBMR Pty in South
           Africa, who arrived yesterday afternoon with several
           of his colleagues, and he'll be talking about the
           design philosophy of the PBMR.
                       And then finally, I'm going to come back
           on and talk about the licensing issues that we see
           trying to license the PBMR here in the U.S.
                       Well, I'll keep talking and we'll move
           forward.  
                       Let me just start off with giving you a
           project overview about where the PBMR project stands. 
           There's been a lot in the press, obviously, about the
           project some of which is correct, some of which is not
           correct.  And I want to make sure that the ACRS has a
           full understanding of where the project and where the
           Exelon stands regarding this technology.
                       The project is completing the preliminary
           design stages in South Africa at this point in time. 
           And we are currently finalizing what is called the
           detailed feasibility report.  That report is being
           generated by the project team in South Africa as well
           as several contractors, as well as with us, the
           members of the joint venture. And that feasibility
           report will be completed sometime probably this
           summer, at which time then all of the investors in the
           joint venture will make their own individual decisions
           regarding whether or not to proceed to the next phase
           of the project.
                       The next phase of the project is to move
           forward with the detail design and the construction of
           a demonstration PBMR in Republic of South Africa near
           Capetown on the site of the Kuberg Nuclear Station.
                       The other investors in the project at this
           stage of the game, besides ourselves, are BNFL,
           British Nuclear Fuels Limited, SCOM, which is the
           electric utility in South Africa and the Industrial
           Development Corporation of South Africa.
                       So each of those investors will, in turn,
           make their own decisions about whether or not to
           proceed with the project, as well as the South African
           government needs to make their decision regarding
           whether or not they'll approve the instruction and
           operation of the plant in South Africa.
                       Assuming all of those decisions are
           favorable, which is not an assured outcome by any
           stretch of the imagination at this stage of the game,
           but assuming they are favorable, then construction
           would start on that demonstration PBMR in South Africa
           probably in late 2002 and would then take
           approximately 36 months to complete construction with
           then a one year start up test program in South Africa.
                       That's the program in South Africa.  As
           far as Exelon's decision making process and Exelon's
           involvement, clearly we are pointing to make a
           decision as to whether or not to continue to proceed
           as a member of the joint venture in South Africa by
           the end of this year.  We'll make that decision
           primarily based on economics; do we think that Exelon
           can make money operating these reactors in a
           deregulated electric utility market in the U.S.  And
           if so, then obviously we would have to require board
           of director approval to proceed that way, but it would
           be our intent to try and make a decision on whether or
           not to proceed with the joint venture in South Africa
           by the end of the year.  
                       We probably also make a decision sometime
           in that time frame, whether or not it's the end of the
           year or early next year, to begin the licensing
           process in this country for the first set of PBMRs
           here in the U.S.  And I'll talk a little bit later
           when I come back on about what some of the obstacles
           and challenges would be if we decide to move forward
           with that.  But that decision, I think, would also be
           made sometime around the end of the year, nearly next
           year as to whether or not to begin the actual
           licensing process for the PBMR.
                       So, with that that's the current state of
           both the project in South Africa and Exelon's
           involvement in the project.
                       With that, I'd like to introduce Dr. Johan
           Slabber, who arrived yesterday from the Republic of
           South Africa along with several of his colleagues. 
           Hopefully, we have the right people here to answer
           some of your questions as we go through this.  And
           I'll let Dr. Slabber introduce himself and explain his
           background.
                       DR. SLABBER:  Thanks, Ward.
                       Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen.  This
           is a very nice privilege for me to be able to speak to
           you.  And I would like to give you some preliminary
           information, and then go deeper into the design and
           the important things regarding the safety as well
           licenseability status.
                       Something about myself.  My name is S-L-A,
           although it is pronounced in South Africa as Slabber. 
           In America, if you pronounce it it sounds like
           Slobber, and that I don't mind.  You can say Slabber
           or Slobber or Slabber.
                       Something about my background. I was
           graduated as an electrical engineer with a physics
           degree.  And I did my Ph.D in mechanical engineering,
           but between those two times, graduations, I spent some
           nice years in Oak Ridge and I was fortunate to be able
           to have attended the last -- in the U.S.  So I am
           really indebted to the U.S. for really wetting my
           appetite for nuclear technology.
                       I also spent a short time, brief time, at
           IAEA in safeguards.  So in the matter of nuclear
           nonproliferation, I am also in a position to highlight
           to you the attributes regarding that aspect of our
           plan.
                       The design actually started evolving when
           I was an employee. I was General Manager Reactor
           Technology at the South African Atomic Energy
           Corporation.  But at that stage the Board of Directors
           said the climate is wrong, the money isn't there, so
           please let's not look at something although it might
           be very promising.  So that was the point when I
           departed the Atomic Energy Corporation to a systems
           engineering company who still today is involved in the
           project.
                       This, what I'm going to present to you,
           was actually developed from the initial concept of a
           direct cycle turbine generating electricity.
                       What we have as the philosophy and we,
           right from the outset, have set as goals inherent
           safety features employing passive means.  It must be
           modular in size because in South Africa we've got a
           relatively small grid, but we want high efficiency.
           And the possibility to eventually supply fresh water
           for South Africa, it's a semi-desert country.  So in
           25 years we might run out of water, so that was the
           focus for the first initial design.
                       And you will see on the screen there the
           three bullets which are actually some of the
           cornerstones of our initial ideas.  
                       Employ passive and active engineered
           features, but I would like to qualify this.  Because
           active might sound funny in this context.  Active
           there should be seen in the context of keeping the
           facility, the reactor, operating within the normal
           boundaries.  In other words, supply cooling, supply
           ventilation, et cetera.  But the passive is to keep it
           within the limitations which does not lead to
           radiation release.
                       The second bullet is rather saying what it
           is, just that you can mitigate but that you do not
           have cliff edge effects like suddenly you've got time
           built into your system.
                       And then the third bullet actually
           supports that, reduce dependence on operator actions.
                       Can I have the next slide?  This is,
           unfortunately, you must see this drawing as it stands
           at the moment drawn on unigraphics and modeled.  But
           just to show you the width is 25 meters.  The length
           is 50 and the height is 50 and 25 is below grade.  But
           what I would like you to concentrate at this stage on,
           and it will become clear when we evolve from this,
           that we have the reactive vessel sitting in an area --
           and it's not very clear here -- which is we call the
           reactive cavity.  And we've got the power conversion
           sitting in a volume called the PCU area and this total
           strengthened section around the reactor and the PCU we
           call the citadel which, in fact, is containing, acting
           as a containment around all those high pressure
           radioactive components.  But I'll come back to that
           later.
                       Can I have the next slide, please?  This
           is the complete stuff taken away.  What we have here
           is the reactor vessel of 20 meters high and 6.8 meters
           diameter. And we have the PCU, and I think I must just
           explain slightly the workings.
                       This was the initial concept of changing
           from a single-shaft turbo generator to a multi-shaft
           turbo generator employing a high-pressure turbine,
           turbo compressor, a low-pressure turbo compressor, a
           turbo generator.
                       And in the reactor cavity, which we have
           the reactor cavity cooling system and then below grade
           we have the spent fuel tanks which can house --
           contain the fuel for 40 years of operation, 35
           effective years of operations.
                       It is also designed to store the fuel for
           another 40 years during the formal decommissioning
           phase.
                       The fresh fuel is in the fresh fuel
           building, and that area we've got the so-called helium
           inventory control system which employs -- which uses
           the helium to increase the thermal hydraulic power
           taken up by the gas in the reactor.  And due to
           coupling of the heat processor co-efficient and the
           negative temperature co-efficient, the neutronics is
           just about following the request for semi-hydraulic
           power.
                       And then we've got the fuel handling
           system, which is loading spherical fuel into an
           angular core in the reactor and graphite spheres into
           the central and a central reflector.  So the core
           itself consists of an angular pebble bed core with a
           central column of graphite spheres.  And this was
           necessitated because no control rods -- the design
           objective was not to have control rods in the core
           itself, but to have a system where the reactor physics
           of the core pushes out the flux towards the reflector
           region for reactivity coupling. 
                       So we've got the fuel handling system,
           we've got fueling tubes as well as graphite tubes. 
           And we've got -- and we've got some separation of fuel
           and graphite at the bottom.  So this is the PCU.  This
           is the spent fuel, the fresh fuel and the helium
           control system and the reactor cavity cooling system.
                       Just at this point we are also taking note
           of the proliferation resistant aspects that needs to
           be built in a facility like this.  So the reactor
           safety design principles is actually highlighted in
           these three bullets.
                       An objective of the design, to start off
           with, was to focus the design around existing proven
           German spherical fuel fabrication and testing
           technology.  That was a go, that was a given.  No
           deviation from that.
                       And then in the design apart from the
           microsphere providing the primary barrier, multiple
           fission product barriers to the environment, to the
           public outside.  And this is not really a safety
           issue, but we put it under these, and I highlighted it
           in the previous slide.
                       Can everybody hear me?  Okay.
                       The fuel itself is a 6 centimeter diameter
           graphite sphere with containing in the fueled region,
           which is 50 millimeter diameter, 15,000 microspheres
           of -- it's got a core of UO2, it's got a porous region
           around the microsphere which acts as a fission product
           buffer, something like the buffer region in a LWR. 
           Then we've got three layers, pyrolytic carbon, high
           density pyrolytic.  The silicon carbide and then other
           layer of pyrolytic carbon.  And the diameter is just
           under one millimeter.
                       So 15,000 of these in there and in there
           the enrichment is 8.1 percent for the equilibrium core
           and 4.9 percent for the burning core.  And the amount
           of material in that little ball is 9 grams heavy
           metal.
                       And around the 50 millimeter diameter
           sphere we've got a five millimeter unfueled section to
           take care of abrasion and while this is moving through
           the core so that you don't expose and allow
           microspheres to come out.
                       The first bullet, next slide, to assure
           fuel integrity.  So, as I said the baseline as far as
           proven technology German fuel and we have been given
           the opportunity to access and purchase into the total
           German database which they have developed for their
           high temperature reactors.  And it's been in the
           process -- for South Africa.  And we are actually
           planning, and I'll come back to that a little bit
           later, to replicate critical experiments and
           qualification experiments and tests that were done in
           the German program.
                       The next sub-bullet is because it's an
           onload refueling system, you've got to good control
           over excess reactivity added to the reactor core under
           various conditions, and also to ensure under all
           conditions normal operation as well as upset events
           you assure removal, heat removal from the fuel by
           means of passive means.
                       And prevention of chemical attack, which
           is one of the events defined as one of the licensing
           based events, and prevent excess of burnoff.
                       Now, in the development project we had to
           structure the project very definite according to
           certain rules.  And for that we have developed the so-
           called integrated design process in South Africa. 
           It's a PBMR integrated design process which embodies,
           and we call it the PIDP, the upfront evaluation of any
           structure system or component, SSC, in its role to
           mitigate or to cause events leading to the release of
           radioactivity.  And those components are then
           evaluated and classified according to a scheme which
           is in line with our national nuclear regulator, the
           NMR, prescriptions of failure frequencies versus
           consequences.
                       And we have the three regimes that we are
           using in the development of this facility.  Events
           having a frequency higher than 10 to the minus 2, in
           other words one in a 100 years, we call the
           anticipated operational occurrences.
                       And the events lying between -- into the
           minus 2 and into the minus 6 is the licensing base
           events.  And then the occurrences with a lower
           frequency than ten to the minus 6, those are the
           extreme events or the unlikely event.
                       So what do we do to design a facility in
           these regimes?  The two, the first ones, the ten minus
           two and -- plus ten minus 2 and between 10 minus 2 and
           10 minus 6 we design for all those events.  Below 10
           minus 6 we analyze for and see what the consequence
           are.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I have a question.  I
           don't understand what you mean by event.  Do you mean
           a sequence or do you mean what we call initiating
           events?
                       DR. SLABBER:  Yes.  Yes.  I was explaining
           the integrated design process, so I interrupted myself
           just to say what we're focusing at.  But it is a
           sequence.  It is initiating event that can lead to a
           sequence, that can lead to a --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So the 10 to the minus
           2 refers to this initiator or the whole sequence?
                       DR. SLABBER:  It's the initiator.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, given that the
           concept of an event is not really well defined --
                       DR. SLABBER:  Yes.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- I can imagine an
           event that has a frequency of 10 to the minus 4,
           therefore I have to design for it, as you said, but
           then I can break it up into a 100 little pieces each
           one having a frequency of 10 to the minus 6, so now I
           don't have to design for it.  So, how do you avoid
           this kind of -- I'm sure you don't it that way.
                       DR. SLABBER:  Oh, no, we don't do it.  But
           we're looking at the logic also.  In other words,
           there are some enveloping frequencies which is also
           the initiator plus the consequence, the total chain in
           looking at all the events in between.
                       I wouldn't be able to completely reply to
           your question because it's in the process of being
           done at the moment, but a similar philosophy.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But it seems to me when
           you have to go with the cumulative frequency at some
           point?
                       DR. SLABBER:  Yes.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Because just where you
           consider in sequences, you know, this is not a well
           defined concept.
                       DR. SLABBER:  But in any case, thank you
           for that comment.
                       DR. KRESS:  As you will notice, we've
           departed from our usual procedure and we'll allow
           questions that interrupt the speakers.  It's just the
           ACRS can't seem to avoid -- control himself.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It was pain from this
           morning.
                       DR. SLABBER:  In any case, after we have
           now identified these events, we can for that specific
           SSC identify a preliminary classification.  And then
           for that specific SSC, we also classify the various
           loads that it will achieve during its operational and
           upset lifetime, and we develop a loading catalog.  And
           using the classification which drives the quality
           assurance requirements as well as the loading catalog
           and the codes and standards to which the SSC will have
           to be developed and designed, we call that suite of
           documents; the design rules for that specific SSC.
                       The QA requirements, the loading catalog,
           the classification and the codes and standards, and
           maybe some other additional things which must -- could
           come into play like safeguard issues, et cetera.  And
           those are the suite of documents which are the design
           rules.  And then from there, there might be some
           situations to improve the SSC design, so we can go
           back to square one.  Typically if the failure
           frequency is too high.
                       So in the total development of the reactor
           we have given priority to looking at the fuel first of
           all.  Next slide.
                       So we look at the fuel quality here and
           the fuel design which we have chosen has been proven
           internationally.  And another feature that we also
           embody in the design is that we do not want to develop
           new material.  We will be sticking at qualified
           materials for all the structure systems and
           components.  This is one component which we have
           decided we will, as far as practically possible and I
           agree there will be a question that how do you prove
           equivalence on such an important issue.  This will be
           done by laboratory tests, PBMR specific tests and
           irradiation tests, as well as maybe taking part in an
           international irradiation program.
                       And this is actually what is said here in
           this sub-bullet.  The fuel qualification program will
           follow and the fuel performance testing program and
           the fuel fabrication quality assurance program which
           is still at the moment already starting to be based.
                       DR. KRESS:  The performance testing
           program.
                       DR. SLABBER:  Yes?
                       DR. KRESS:  Excuse me for interrupting.
                       Is that under irradiation conditions?
                       DR. SLABBER:  Yes. Yes.
                       DR. KRESS:  So you do this in a reactor?
                       DR. SLABBER:  In a reactor.  We will do it
           stepwise and it will be going beyond the design basis
           burnup of 80 megawatts, which is presently the design
           target.  But it will be irradiated beyond that.
                       DR. KRESS:  Did you say there were 15,000
           of these pellets in the --
                       DR. SLABBER:  15,000 microspheres in one-
           sixth centimeter fuel sphere.
                       DR. KRESS:  And how many of those
           centimeter --
                       DR. SLABBER:  Pardon?
                       DR. KRESS:  How many of those 6 centimeter
           spheres are in the core?
                       DR. SLABBER:  330,000.  So there's a total
           of 4.8 to the nine small pressure boundaries, primary
           pressure boundaries in the core.
                       Then in the facility, in the reactor there
           will be an operational fuel integrity assurance
           surveillance program which will monitor operational
           release in the primary coolant and to compare it with
           predicted value.
                       Next slide, please.  One of the other
           bullets which we've seen is the first one was fuel
           quality and control of excess reactivity.  The reactor
           is designed to be load following, and to be able to do
           load following we will use the inventory, called
           helium inventory control system to pressurize the
           helium in the primary circuit so that your heat pickup
           in the core and the heat deposition in the bell
           conversion unit is in-phase.
                       Now, to enable you to load follow one
           needs to also to some extent -- Xenon buildup fission
           products developed or Xenon developed during the
           operational cycle.  If you reduce your neutronic
           power, the poison increase.  So you've got to cater
           for during load following operations for a certain
           amount of reactivity that could be added by means of
           the control rods.  And we have limited that amount to
           1.3 delta k effective.  In other words, 1.3 niles and
           this was chosen so that in the event of a stepping out
           of a control rod without anything checking it, you can
           add in a random fashion 1.3 delta k to the reactivity. 
           And this is a value of power that will limit you
           inherently to a temperature, a maximum fuel
           temperature below the maximum defined limit.  I'll
           come back to that.
                       We have also provided a measure to design
           the system so that for all credible pressurization
           events and reactivity events, if there are anything
           which will raise the power suddenly, like a control
           rod injection, the core geometry is always maintained,
           even in a depressurization event where you could have
           for a short time a pressure differential across the
           core barrel.
                       The core is also, although it's tall it's
           quite a long core.  8.5 meters high and 3.7 meters
           diameter with a central column.  Although it's tall,
           it's still within the window which precludes Xenon
           oscillations. In other words, a critical area at the
           top uncontrolled and a subcritical area and swinging
           of the flux.  So the geometry precludes Xenon
           oscillations.
                       And then due to the nature of the reactor
           physics of the core, we've got a very high negative
           temperature coefficient of reactivity.  It's minus 4.5
           times 10 to the minus 5, delta k over 33 centimeters.
                       And then we are designing an inherently
           safe critically safe spent and used fuel tank.
                       Next slide.  The material properties in
           the core at end of life, and this is now talking about
           thermal volatility and emissivity is all assumed to be
           at the risk point and in a static condition with no
           forced cooling. These material properties are
           sufficient that the heat can be taken away from the
           core into the outer side where it's taken away by this
           passive heat sink provided by the reactor cavity
           cooling system for an extended period.
                       The reactor cavity and its structures will
           maintain its geometry.  In other words, during a safe
           shutdown earthquake, the reactor vessel will stay in
           tact. It will stay or so be cooled.  The reactor
           cavity cooling system will still function.  And this
           goes for that third bullet there, the reactor cavity
           including its structures will maintain geometry during
           all credible events.
                       DR. KRESS:  Does this heat removal depend
           on having the helium in place pressure, or how does it
           work --
                       DR. SLABBER:  Can I explain the reactor
           cavity cooling system?
                       DR. KRESS:  Oh, sure.
                       DR. SLABBER:  Yes.  The reactor cavity
           cooling system consists of three independent cooling
           tanks.  The ultimate heat sink is the C or air coolers
           on the roof of the reactor for all three tanks.  It
           consists of two loops each.  In other words, the
           primary coolant flows through a heat exchanger which
           then dumps its heat into the ultimate heat sink.  So
           there's an intermediate loop.  
                       The cooling system consists of three tanks
           of 50 percent in the cavity surrounding the reactor
           vessel.  Each tank is 60 centimeters diameter and
           covers the total length of the reactor core plus an
           area about 2 meters, 2« meters above the reactor
           vessel.
                       The sequence of events could be seen now
           during a loss of cooling event in that if for instance
           something goes wrong in the primary cooling, because
           primary cooling is done by means of the primary -- the
           conversion unit.  The turbo compressor is running
           because it's a break in cycle, it's in a bootstrap
           operation; they must be running to circulate.  We've
           got a -- what we call a starter blower system which
           must bootstrap the breaking cycle to start off with. 
                       So if something should go wrong and we
           should lose this cooling loop in the primary circuit
           to cool the core, because heat rejection is done in
           the intercooler and precooler at the turbo compressor; 
           If that heat rejection mode is lost, then we've got a
           core conditioning system which can run parallel to
           that.  And that is forced convection.  That's active
           component.  But should that all fall away, then the
           reactor cavity cooling system will be capable of
           handling the decay heat coming from the core exactly
           after shutdown, in other words 1.3 megawatts of heat
           which could be dissipated to the reactor cavity
           cooling system.  
                       The reactor cavity cooling system has got
           a few layers. It's an active system consisting of
           these loops, the primary loop, the secondly loop which
           is backed up with the cooler on the roof, and then if
           that fails, then we go into a boil-off mode and the
           tanks will boil-off if it's not being replenished by
           means of operator action.  After a couple of days,
           even, it will boil-off in something like four days. 
                       We believe that operator intervention will
           take place in that time.  However, if that even fails
           the concrete structures are sufficient to eventually
           dissipate.  Obviously, in such instances, the reactor
           -- the concrete will be heated up to a value which we
           are still determining at the moment and we're
           engineering some methods, but we believe that we will
           not damage the concrete unnecessarily.
                       Does that answer your question?
                       DR. GARRICK:  Can I go back and ask a
           question?
                       DR. SLABBER:  Yes.
                       DR. GARRICK:  Out of curiosity, on the
           Xenon oscillation issue.  I can see with this annular
           design where you would have good neutron coupling in
           the radial direction.
                       DR. SLABBER:  Yes.
                       DR. GARRICK:  But it is not so obvious in
           the axial direction.
                       DR. SLABBER:  We have looked in it because
           for Xenon oscillations there is a reactor height which
           takes you out of the safe region of oscillation.
                       DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
                       DR. SLABBER:  And we are still within that
           limit.
                       DR. GARRICK:  Okay.  But there is a limit?
                       DR. SLABBER:  There is a limit, yes.
                       DR. GARRICK:  Yes, okay.
                       DR. SLABBER:  Any more questions?
                       Next slide.  Skip that one.  I'll come
           back to that.
                       In the German program, the licensing was
           completed for the HDR model and Xenon's developed a
           curve which they used to convince the regulators that
           the reactor is safe from a release point of view, and
           they generated this curve, and I must explain to you
           because this curve you might see also in our safety
           analysis report.
                       We do not, and I stress do not intend to
           just follow this slavishly.  And I would like to
           explain this and, please, we must take note of the
           importance of this.  It is so important in Germany
           that they have coined the word "the holy curve."  And
           they didn't want to deviate from this at all.
                       Now, what we've got on this axis, we've
           got the failure fraction of practical and we've got
           temperature here.  And then we've got three lines
           representing beginning of life, fresh fuel.  We've got
           a life cycle and end of life.
                       What they've done to develop this curve,
           they took 212 microspheres to get good statistics and
           they did, on fresh fuel, they did a burn leech test. 
           In other words, as code fuel freshly produced they
           just measured the unclad uranium friction by means of
           a leeching test to see which of these microspheres are
           cracked.  And they found it to be 6 times 10 to the
           minus 4.  That is a very important baseline for them. 
           That is why, yes -- to the minus 5.
                       What they've done is that they took that
           and then they irradiated all those 212 out of the same
           batch, although it was the same batch, they took 212,
           they took another batch 212; they irradiated it and
           they didn't find any failed particles, zero.  So they
           were faced with a dilemma how to now extrapolate from
           that result what is the end of life of failure
           fraction.  And what they then did, they applied
           Poisson statistics for zero failures at the 95 percent
           confidence.  And they found that to be 2 times 10 to
           the minus 4.  And then they slapped on that some
           conservatisms and they added that to the original 6
           times to the minus 5 and they came up with that 2.6
           times 10 to the minus 4.
                       And then what they did, they wanted to do
           the same at 1600.  They assumed that those values
           stayed constant, because from a methodological -- the
           graphical consideration is no reason for
           disintegration of the cladding between those two
           values.  They extrapolated the same values and they
           took a sample.  And this is where we will be deviating
           from their approach.  They took only a sample of
           65,000 and because of the statistics and they couldn't
           find any broken particles after heating it up, so they
           just used zero failure statistics and that pulled up
           because of the uncertainty, the failure fraction to
           that high values.
                       We in PBMR are planning to replicate this,
           but we will be keeping the sample sizes constant.  And
           we expect that our fuel failure fraction will be
           around 10 to the minus 4, and it will be relatively
           constant up to 1600.
                       Can I have the next slide?
                       DR. KRESS:  Excuse me, George.  I was
           surprised to see this as a failure fraction rather
           than a failure fraction rate.  Do you think there is
           a rate involved here?
                       DR. SLABBER:  Well, what is assumed, and
           this is also our approach, is that we are not assuming
           any rates the fusion constant, et cetera, because that
           will put us in a maze of uncertainties.
                       DR. KRESS:  Yes.
                       DR. SLABBER:  We assume that if the fuel
           reaches a specific temperature, the content is -- that
           takes us away from proving experimentally that a
           certain isotope like silver or cesium or strontium
           defuses at a certain rate through the microsphere.
                       DR. KRESS:  That's what General Atomics'
           model does.
                       DR. SLABBER:  That's right.  And we
           believe in South Africa that it puts you in a maze of
           uncertainty, and we have done the analysis and we have
           seen that with releases in a big depressurization
           event, the containment performance -- and I'll come to
           that a little bit later -- is sufficient.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So do I understand
           correctly that these curves were produced from zero
           failures?
                       DR. SLABBER:  The rest.  That was produced
           from experimental we determined on means that were
           done on the leech test.  And everything was based on
           that specific one.
                       We will be repeating this, but we will
           allow us to be criticized at every point.
                       DR. POWERS:  I guess what I don't quite
           follow is that you're testing -- you're assuming that
           just temperature is the variable.  Does that mean that
           you're not running these fuel particles through
           operational events?
                       DR. SLABBER:  Such as?
                       DR. POWERS:  Shutdown, restart, abrasion?
                       DR. SLABBER:  No.  Abrasion we will be
           testing in the fuel handling system, the diameter. And
           if it goes below a certain value and that leaves you
           a very big margin because thickness of the unclad --
           of the unfueled section is five millimeters, we will
           allow the diameter to go down to 58 --
                       DR. POWERS:  What I'm asking you is there
           no synergism between temperature, irradiation and fuel
           motion as well as normal cycling operation on the cool
           failure rates?
                       DR. SLABBER:  I'm talking about fuel
           failure rate in terms of microsphere failure rate.
                       DR. POWERS:  Yes, I understand. I
           understand.
                       DR. SLABBER:  Yes.  We believe it's
           uncoupled.
                       DR. POWERS:  And is there any
           substantiation to that uncoupling?
                       DR. SLABBER:  Substantiation for
           uncoupling?
                       DR. POWERS:  Yes.  I mean, what I'm really
           trying to understand is why is it the temperature is
           the only variable to consider here?
                       DR. SLABBER:  It has found that in the
           German test that the temperature is the driver of the
           cracking if there is something.  And the
           manufacturing-- the pressure, though, the ramp rate
           because the temperature gradient through microsphere
           integration has not been considered, and it was
           believed that it's uncoupled.
                       Next slide, please.  
                       The previous -- sorry.  The previous
           slide.
                       This is a artifact which we have developed
           from German literature showing, and this is the -- if
           you noted at this stage that it's showing the
           tendency, what happens beyond 1600 without saying that
           this is what we expect, because this was extrapolated
           back from releases.  Real releases back to failure
           fraction.
                       Now what is happening here at 1600, the
           silicon carbide coating on the microsphere slowly
           starts thinning due to reactions with fission
           products.  And you get this slight increase in failure
           fraction -- I say you're going this way now -- they
           look back from a release rate.  And then there is a
           gradual increase, and then at 2200 degrees Centigrade
           there is quite a gross dissociation of the silicon
           carbide microsphere coating.  And that's the reason
           for this rapid increase.
                       So this is silicon carbide thinning and
           degrading, and this is actually the disintegration. 
           This is the reason why I brought this, because this
           will also be part of the testing.
                       Skip the next slide.
                       Our conversion unit is interfaced in the
           coolers with an auxiliary cooling system which
           interface directly in the coolers with a helium
           coolant.  What happens is that the pressure in the
           primary system is always higher than the coolant in
           the auxiliary cooling system.  So if there should be
           a leak, the water should leak out into the auxiliary
           system and there are instruments that detect any leak. 
           If we are doing maintenance on the reactor and the
           system is depressurized, then there is the only
           interface with the primary -- with the core is by
           means of the core conditioning system, which has got
           a very limited volume of water circulating through the
           heat exchangers.  And then the primary coolant system
           is always monitored from a radiation point of view to
           see if there is any contaminants like fission
           products, especially in this case, moisture and air.
                       The physical design of the core itself is
           such that in the event of even a beyond licensing
           based event, that the establishment of a established
           flow regime of air through the core is not feasible,
           but this is being modeled by means of CFD at the
           moment.  We believe we think our difficulty could be
           to -- and this is also time dependent, and it's got a
           temperature limit beyond -- 400 degree average
           temperature, it is not possible even with gross
           ingress of air.  So, it's really an event which gives
           you time.
                       Next slide, please.
                       The physical core design for the
           prevention of excess burn-up, because a fuel has got
           a limit and licensed to a limit of burn-up.  And we
           will be licensing our fuel for 80,000 megawatts and
           it's got that limit.  And we will -- the core is
           designed that a ball could not be trapped like in the
           German reactor program, there were certain of these
           spheres that were trapped somewhere in the core,
           pressed into the graphite for some long time.  It did
           not give rise to a rise in activity, but our core
           design is such that the flow is so well defined that
           we do not expect that.
                       And then we've got on-line spectrometric,
           gamma spectrometric measurements because we need to
           evaluate -- is it fuel or is graphite.  And if it is
           fuel, by means of gamma spectrometry we determine if
           the burn-up has reached the limit or can it be
           recycled.
                       So, these are those attributes.
                       Next slide, please.
                       So if we now look at the barriers to the
           environment from the kernels, we have beyond -- before
           that we've got the UO2 kernel which provides some
           degree.  I say some, but we do not take credit.  And
           then we've got the three -- the pyrolytic graphite,
           we've got the silicon carbide and we've got the other
           pyrolytic carbide.  But credit is only -- we're
           looking from a qualification point of view only at the
           silicon carbide.  We listed those three layers because
           that is the reality.
                       And then we've got our high integrity
           primary pressure boundary, and we are learning and
           we're using information from the light water reactor
           people which has developed materials, steels, et
           cetera, and we try not to deviate from that developed
           and evaluated envelop.
                       So we will be using pressurized water
           reactor reactive pressure vessel and the pressure
           boundary we will take note of developments.
                       And coming to the containment, which we
           have been defining in the past, and it's a debateable
           question, as confinement but we are using the term
           containment.  But at this stage let me just explain to
           you what is happening during a event when release
           takes place.
                       You get a rupture of the primary pressure
           boundary, and we've got 10 millimeter breaks analyzed,
           we've got 65 millimeter because that is the size of
           the fueling tube. And then we've got big breaks like
           the control rods or the bottom unloading shute or the
           PCU pipes.  And we've got graded pressure releases. 
           And for each of these we've got a system, a pressure
           release system by means of ruptured panels which
           release from specific cavities in the containment to
           a pressure relief stack which automatically opens and
           closes again after this puff goes out.  And then it's
           got a backup which could be closed if it does not
           close automatically by an operator.
                       And then if there's an excessive event
           like a 10 minus 6 and lower event like the rupture of
           the big manifold pipes, in addition to this pressure
           relief, there are -- if we think back to the first
           slides of the building that can lift up above the PCU
           and release into a big plenum.  And then if the
           pressure is still in excess, panels will blow out, but
           remember, of the wall.  But remember this is an
           analyzed event.
                       The containment is designed to relief
           through the pressure relief stack and be closed
           automatically with operator backup.  So we define for
           the performance requirement that we need this
           containment has a high leakage vented containment,
           because we've got also the HVAC.  And the HVAC is also
           automatically closed off during such a
           depressurization and could be opened again later to
           filter light releases at a low pressure.
                       So we've got a concrete structure which is
           a citadel, but actually it is high-leakage vented
           containment.  We've got a filtered vent path for later
           releases.  And we've got hold up of fission products
           in plate out in the system, et cetera, which is not
           lifted out.  And the auto-close blowout panels.  And
           then we -- by means of this HVAC later releases from
           these particles if there are any additional.
                       Thank you.
                       Just coming back to the nonproliferation
           aspects.  
                       Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry, I'm taking a
           little bit longer.
                       There is a number of attributes.  It's a
           closed -- it's an on-load fueling system.  The IAEA
           can install flow monitors to see where fuel is and
           track the fuel movement.  And the burn-up is 80,000
           megawattage per ton which gives a plutonium mix which
           is very unfavorable for weapons manufacture.  And then
           the fuel produced during the operational time of the
           reactor is all stored in the facility under the
           surveillance of IAEA.
                       DR. POWERS:  It seems like it's a design
           that's well suited for producing 239 because of the
           on-line fueling/defueling at the facility.
                       DR. SLABBER:  Yes, it is.  But if you look
           at the amount for even the first cycle, you must
           divert about 212,000 spheres continuously out of your
           system to produce a favorable mix.  So what we have
           during a ten cycle, which is from a -- point of view,
           the optimum at the moment we're thinking about five,
           it gives some problems -- not problems, but a higher
           flux higher up in the core.  At discharge the mix is
           66 percent 239 and compared to either -- 
                       DR. POWERS:  Change your cycle.  Lots of
           239 --
                       DR. SLABBER:  You need only one force of
           fuel sphere to give you a very small -- and you've got
           to take them all out into the diversion path.  And
           this is not difficult to detect.
                       MR. SPROAT:  Thank you, Johan.
                       What I'd like to do is just briefly close
           and address the issues.  So now you understand a
           little bit about the technology itself and the
           preliminary design of the PBMR itself, what about
           getting it licensed here in the U.S.?
                       As part of Exelon's decision making
           process, we are currently evaluating and doing a
           license ability assessment on the PBMR.  And I want to
           talk about very quickly the key issues that we see
           both technical and nontechnical.
                       And on the technical side, obviously right
           now most of the regulations existing in the U.S. are
           focused on light water reactors.  And if we were to
           come in today with an application for this technology,
           the NRC reviewers would sit there and they'd use what
           we call the "two finger approach;" one finger on the
           regulations and one finger on the submittal and say
           "Okay, how did you meet this, how did you meet that?" 
           In some cases that'll be very appropriate and in some
           cases it won't be appropriate at all given differences
           and uniqueness of this technology.
                       So, working with the NRC staff over the
           next 18 to 24 months, we hope to develop a regulatory
           framework that they can use and that we can use to
           design against, they can to review against so that
           we've got a credible regulatory framework that we can
           try and license the PBMR with if we go forward.
                       The second area is fuel qualification and
           testing. Johan talked about that.  The key thing about
           the fuel is that, you know, this isn't new.  You know,
           trico-coated practical fuel was used back as early as
           1967 in the dragon reactor in the U.K.  So there's a
           great body of information out there.  We need to be
           able to tap that and use it as part of our licensing
           basis and not have to reinvent the wheel.
                       But the other aspect of this is the first
           fuel loads for the PBMRs in the U.S., if we do go
           forward, would come from South Africa.  So the role of
           the NRC in reviewing that fuel plant down there and
           licensing it or not licensing it but certifying the
           end product for use in a U.S. reactor is a whole area
           that we really haven't explored yet and will need to
           be addressed.
                       DR. KRESS:  When you talk about fuel
           quality, are you talking about that fraction of
           particles fail versus temperature curve?
                       MR. SPROAT:  Yes.  Knowing how the fuel
           will react under various conditions that's consistent
           with the safety case for the reactor licensed in this
           country.
                       DR. KRESS:  Does that include any trapped
           uranium that might get trapped in the --
                       MR. SPROAT:  Yes, obviously the test
           program takes a look at what the -- not only what the
           failed fuel fraction is, but also the trapped uranium
           that's on the outside of the particles as a result of
           manufacturing process.
                       DR. KRESS:  You have a goal for how many
           particles can be failed within the core before you
           violate 10 CFR 100 --
                       MR. SPROAT:  I'm not sure we're that far
           along in the analysis at this stage of the game.
                       DR. KRESS:  Okay.
                       MR. SPROAT:  Clearly an issue that we're
           going to have to wrestle with the staff, once we
           decide ourselves how we think the appropriate way of
           addressing it, is what's the source term?  Is it
           mechanically  mechanistically determined source term
           or deterministically determined source term --
                       DR. KRESS:  Well, it's the answer obvious
           there?
                       MR. SPROAT:  Pardon?
                       DR. KRESS:  Isn't the answer obvious
           there?
                       MR. SPROAT:  No, the answer's not obvious. 
           I know what we would like to do, but the issue of how
           good are your goods analyzing your diffusion
           coefficients and being able to provide an analytic
           framework for migration of fission products from the
           core to the environment is going to be a challenge. 
           It's going to be a challenge.
                       Obviously, containment performance
           requirements, Johan talked about the containment
           design and whether or not a zero leakage or a LWR type
           containment would be required versus moderate to high
           leakage filtered containment would be required is
           obviously an issue that's going to be discussed at
           some length.
                       DR. KRESS:  And that would be linked to
           the fuel quality?
                       MR. SPROAT:  Absolutely, and to the source
           term.
                       The issue of the various computer codes
           that are being used in South Africa to design this
           plant, how they're verified and validated and how
           they're benchmarked against the other existing codes
           will be an extensive effort associated with that.
                       The PRA itself that's being developed in
           South Africa that we're advising them on, it's kind of
           interesting.  You know, if you have -- what's your
           endstate if core melt isn't a valid endstate for your
           reactor?  And what is your endstate? What are you
           initiators and how do you determine your uncertainties
           of your various accident sequences?
                       DR. KRESS:  Your endstate is quantity of
           fission products.  Frequency of fission products.
                       MR. SPROAT:  It might be.  But the point
           is that we're exploring some new ground here and,
           obviously, there'll be some discussions with staff
           about how we go and do that.
                       The regulatory treatment of nonsafety
           systems and how we classify the SSCs, the safety
           system components, will really be a key issue.
                       And then finally, an issue that I lumped
           in the technical area, but it's a real practical issue
           is there aren't a lot of people left in the U.S. in
           the NRC, in the national labs or in DOE that have gas
           reactor experience and understanding.  And so,
           obviously, I think you've gotten a sense as we go
           forward with this, if we submit an application having
           people who understand the technology, understand the
           science and can provide good independent review of the
           submittal is going to be a real challenge.
                       On the last slide I have is the
           nontechnical, what I'll call the legal licensing
           challenges. And I personally believe we have a very
           good chance at satisfactorily resolving a number of
           the technical issues that I showed on the previous
           slide.  I'm not as confident about some of these,
           because some of these are potential deal breakers for
           moving forward with merchant nuclear power plants in
           this country.  And that's what we're talking about
           here; this is not a power plant or nuclear plant
           that's going to go into a rate base somewhere.  This
           is a merchant plant where the shareholders are going
           to take the risk of building and operating this plant
           and whether or not it makes money in the deregulated
           marketplace is solely dependent on the technology and
           the company that runs it.
                       So, the first issue up here is Price
           Anderson.  The current law and the way it's currently
           interpreted by the NRC is that each reactor in the
           country is assessed a retrospective premium of $90
           million per reactor in the case of an accident
           anywhere in the U.S. associated with any reactor.
           Well, if I've got a 2200 megawatt light water reactor
           plant, like our Limrick plant, that means my
           retrospective premium at risk due to a reactor
           accident somewhere in the U.S. is $180 million
           retrospective premium associated with that plant.
                       If I have the same capacity of pebble bed
           modular reactors under today's law, my retrospective
           premium would be $1.8 billion for that same amount of
           capacity.  Even I would have difficulties selling our
           board of directors to take that kind of a risk
           associated with that kind of retrospective premium
           associated with an accident from a reactor that we
           don't own or operate.  So that's got to be addressed
           somehow.
                       The second issue up there is the NRC
           operational fees.  Right now the operational fees are
           approximately $3 million per reactor. Again, say at
           our Limrick plant, that means about $6 million a year
           for the two reactors.  The same size for 2200
           megawatts, you're talking about $60 million a year in
           NRC licensing fees for a 2200 megawatt set of string
           of PBMRs.  Really excuse the economics of a merchant
           nuclear plant significantly.
                       The decommissioning trust fund is another
           issue that's clearly going to have to be addressed. 
           The law gives a number of different alternatives, but
           those alternatives have presupposed that generally the
           plant is going to be operated by a regulated utility
           and that in the rate base in which the plant is based
           rate, you have a set aside income stream that goes and
           funds the decommissioning trust fund.  In our case
           that won't be the case.  These plants won't be in a
           rate base.  How we fund the decommissioning trust
           fund, how much we have to put up front and what we can
           put into a sinking fund needs to be resolved.  The law
           is not clear on that at this point in time.
                       Clearly, Part 52 licensing process which
           is, we think, the right way to go is untested at this
           point in time.  Nobody's actually done it.  So the
           staff will be learning, the applicants will be
           learning, and how we actually work our way through
           that and how long it takes is going to be a key
           challenge for us.
                       And then finally, I have up there up the
           potential number of exemptions.  As I talked about
           earlier, there is no gas reactor licensing framework. 
           And if there's not when we go with an application, the
           staff might decide that a number of the things we're
           asking for are very appropriate to license this plant,
           but will require exemptions from the existing
           regulatory framework.  And, obviously, it would be
           undesirable to all of us to have the first advanced
           reactor in place with a significant number of
           exemptions.  It just doesn't work.
                       So, those are the key issues and
           challenges we see on the licensing side, both from the
           technical side and the legal side.  And, as I said, we
           are considering all that and now we'll go into our
           decision making process as to whether or not to
           proceed with both the venture in South Africa and the 
           licensing process here in the U.S. by sometime around
           the end of the year.
                       DR. KRESS:  These appear to me like mostly
           policy issues rather than technical ones related to
           the reactor design?
                       MR. SPROAT:  A number of these will
           require some policy statements and decisions by the
           Commission itself, yes.
                       DR. KRESS:  Very good.  Is there any
           discussion or questions for either of our two
           speakers?
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, I have a question. 
           As I recall in one of your communications to the staff
           in addressing these issues, the key legal licensing
           issues, you proposed that a site with ten units be
           considered as one reactor?
                       MR. SPROAT:  One facility.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  One facility.
                       Now, if this is accepted by the staff,
           then should we also be applying the same idea to
           various safety goals and say, assuming that the
           concept of core damage makes sense here, that if the
           goal is 10 to the minus 4 and that would apply to the
           facility, so each unit then would have to ten to the
           minus 5.  And given the fact that you have ten of
           them, you have some synergistic effects, maybe it'll
           have to be even lower than ten to the minus 5.
                       MR. SPROAT:  Well, synergistic effects is
           not intuitively obvious to me that there are
           synergistic effects when in fact the risk from one
           reactor to the other.  I'm not ready to concede that
           point at this point.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  Fine.  
                       DR. KRESS:  Some common mode.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Some common mode,
           perhaps.  Anyway, but I mean how about the thought
           process here that you would apply stricter criteria --
                       DR. KRESS:  Yes, instead of calling it
           core melt, call it fission product release --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Call it something else. 
           Yes, fission product release.  
                       If we treat 10 PBMRs as one facility with
           respect to these five bullets that you showed us,
           shouldn't we be doing the same when it came to risk
           and treat it as one facility and apply the goals to
           the facility, in which case of course we will have
           much lower goals for each individual unit?
                       MR. SPROAT:  Well, we certainly haven't
           done that for two and three unit light water reactors. 
           So, I hesitate to do that for a smaller, supposedly
           safer reactor.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, safer of course is
           something that you would approve of.
                       MR. SPROAT:  Sure.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But for a two unit
           reactor there are some PRAs where they look at these
           things.  But a factor of two in the goals really
           doesn't mean anything.  But when you talk about ten,
           a factor of ten, then you're beginning to see some
           difference.  
                       So it seems to me that if we are to apply
           this idea to the five legal licensing challenges you
           mentioned, maybe we ought to think about doing the
           same thing to the goals.  Now, you don't have to
           answer right now, but --
                       MR. SPROAT:  I would probably disagree
           with that, but that's okay.
                       DR. POWERS:  Explain why you would
           disagree other than the fact that you wouldn't like
           the numbers when they came out.
                       MR. SPROAT:  No. What would the basis be
           for doing that?  For example, in airline travel
           there's a certain risk associated with flying on an
           airplane.  Now, the fact that there are increasing
           numbers of airplanes in the air doesn't necessarily
           mean that your risk of being killed on an airplane has
           proportionally increased.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The societal risk has.
                       DR. POWERS:  Right.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The individual risk has
           not.
                       DR. KRESS:  You don't fly the same number
           of people on the airplanes.  What you have is a site
           with a given fixed population around it, for example.
           And that population is exposed to either one module or
           ten modules who could fail independently of each
           other, and in fact that's probably the assumption. 
           But the risk of being on that site and associated with
           those reactors is, in my mind, ten times when you have
           ten modules over one module.  
                       DR. POWERS:  Tom, isn't it even higher
           than that because you've got a mode failure with the--
                       DR. KRESS:  Yes.  And then if there's
           common mode failures, it's even higher.  
                       DR. POWERS:  Especially if you go up --
                       DR. KRESS:  And that would be the
           reasoning behind --
                       DR. POWERS:  -- to a centralized control
           room?
                       DR. KRESS:  Yes.  So you treat it as one
           reactor, but in order to accommodate the ten of them
           you have to do something to one end; you either up the
           frequency by ten or the lower safety goal by --
                       MR. SPROAT:  Well, then clearly you have
           to take into account in that kind of an analysis the
           concept of coincident events happening in multiple
           units at the same time.
                       DR. KRESS:  No, no, that's not --
                       DR. POWERS:  It's just common mode failure
           is what we are talking about here.
                       DR. KRESS:  But that's not what I had in
           mind.
                       MR. SPROAT:  Assuming there is a common
           mode failure that --
                       DR. POWERS:  But that's not what we're
           saying.
                       DR. KRESS:  Yes, but that's not what we're
           saying.  I mean, that's another issue, coincidence
           events and common mode failures.  No, I'm not just
           talking about an independent frequency of something
           happening to one or something happen to the other
           independently.
                       DR. SHACK:  Of course, now he does get
           something back because he probably has a smaller
           source term.
                       DR. KRESS:  Oh, I think that's a -- for
           this concept, that's --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I didn't say anything
           about the assessment.
                       DR. KRESS:  Yes. He said --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I'm just talking about
           the goals.
                       DR. KRESS:  I'm sure they could meet the
           ten times or the ten percent --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You don't use a facility
           of ten PBMRs only on these things.  I mean, and the
           goals have to be reflected.
                       MR. PARME:  George, I might add in the
           mid-80s submittal on the MHTGR where there were
           multiple reactors coupled to a common steam plant, it
           was viewed as a plant and we took the safety goals and
           the release limits that we were analyzing it and
           considered multiple reactors. And, in fact, if you
           look back in the mid-80s submittal you'll see there is
           at least one event that has all four MHTGR models
           leaking simultaneously without cooling.  And it was
           handled that way.
                       It's not quite the case where his reactors
           are truly independent, but we did consider the four
           modules to be a plant consistent with your thinking. 
           What you would do with truly independent modules, I
           guess, is something that one might want to think of.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If we decide, for
           example, that as we were saying earlier that the
           appropriate way to look to formulate the goals here
           would be through frequency consequence curves, then it
           seems to me that you would have one such curve or a
           family of curves for the facility.
                       DR. GARRICK:  Yes.  Well, why wouldn't you
           have a CCDF for the facility?
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  For the facility, that's
           what I'm saying.
                       DR. GARRICK:  And every time you add a
           module, you get a new CCDR.
                       DR. KRESS:  Yes, absolutely.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
                       DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But the goal would be
           one.  And then what you do under it, you know,
           assuming you're acceptable is your business.
                       DR. GARRICK:  Right.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Anyway, that's just a
           point.
                       DR. KRESS:  But it's a thought.
                       MR. SPROAT:  Understood.
                       DR. KRESS:  Other questions?  Okay. Please
           use the microphone and identify yourself for the
           record.
                       MR. GUNTER:  Paul Gunter, Nuclear
           Information Resource Service.
                       Obviously fuel integrity is a big question
           here.  And what I would like to get a little better
           idea of, is have you looked at the THTR that was a 300
           megawatt PBMR in Germany?  I believe there was an
           event there on May 4, 1986.  And I'd like to know what
           your assessment is of the fuel failure mechanism that
           occurred there?
                       DR. SLABBER:  I do not have at this stage
           information about that specific occurrence.  But what
           I can tell you is that due to the uniqueness of the
           THTR core where they had control rods and shutdown
           rods of this size pushing vertically into effect
           pebble bed during shutdown, that caused some of the
           pebbles themselves to break, although no evidence was
           ever found that they found loose coated particles
           somewhere in the fueling system.  But that gave rise
           to a bigger than normal fuel sphere breakage, the
           specific design itself.
                       MR. GUNTER:  It was the graphite that
           broke apart or was it the pyrolytic coating that
           broke?
                       DR. SLABBER:  It was the graphite, the
           matrix that kept all these coated particles in a
           configuration.
                       MR. GUNTER:  Right.  So just for my
           understanding from what I've been able to ascertain is
           that the fission products are to be retained inside
           the pyrolytic coating, though?
                       DR. SLABBER:  Inside the silicon carbide.
                       MR. GUNTER:  Right.  So if there was a --
           so it would seem like there was some kind of failure
           mechanism on that pyrolytic coating as well.  I mean,
           was the coating crushed as well as the graphite
           sphere?
                       MR. SPROAT:  What we know from that event,
           and I haven't gotten all the details of the German
           government review, is that as Johan said that the
           pebble bed that's in the THTR in Germany had its
           control rods inserted directly into the pebble core. 
           That broke a number of pebbles.  So and then when they
           tried to come out through the bottom for the fuel
           handling system; if the ball's round, then it goes
           through the system really well.  If it's broken into
           pieces, it gets stuck.  And evidently what the German
           operators did is they found they had some broken and
           stuck particles -- not particles, but pieces of the
           fuel spheres in the handling system that got stuck,
           and they had to clear them out of there.
                       MR. GUNTER:  And that was done with back
           pressure of helium or --
                       MR. SPROAT:  Well, I know that back
           pressure of helium is one of the methods they used to
           clear some of that fuel handling system, but they also
           I think in that case you're referring to is they used
           some mechanical force where they tried to either hit
           things with either hammers or with rams to free that
           piece.  And it appears what happened in that case is
           that a number of the little particles from that
           mechanical impact were ruptured, and that released
           some of the fission products from inside the spheres. 
           But it was basically mechanical damage to the fuel
           particles itself due to operator interaction.
                       MR. GUNTER:  Okay.  If I could ask one
           more question.  It's also my understanding that the
           Germans abandoned the technology because of problems
           with quality control on unused fuel.  Have you looked
           into that as to what the failure mechanism was for the
           unused fuel?
                       DR. SLABBER:  The only records we have is
           that the German program would have continued, but
           there was some other political pressure to terminate
           any further investigations.  But the database that we
           have access to do not address any of such problems
           that you're highlighting now.  In fact, they have
           still available for evaluation some of their unused
           fuel spheres and we intend to do some pre-irradiation
           evaluation of those spheres.
                       MR. GUNTER:  Of course, if there was
           evidence of damage to unused fuel, you would be
           interested in seeing that
                       DR. SLABBER:  Of course, yes.
                       MR. GUNTER:  Thank you.
                       DR. SLABBER:  Can I just make another
           comment.  The design, the German design which had the
           control rods in the bed directly in the core was one
           of the reasons why pebble bed design deviates totally
           from that design.  And the decision was made, control
           rods only in the reflector, sides reflector.
                       DR. KRESS:  Okay.  I'd like to move it on
           because we are running behind now, and move to the
           next topic, which is, I believe, the IRIS by
           Westinghouse representatives.
                       MR. CARELLI:  Good afternoon.  I'm Michael
           Carelli from Westinghouse Science & Technology
           Department.  And among the many things we do is the
           leading edge support of the business units, also
           heavily involved in Generational IV reactors, and
           especially on IRIS.
                       Now, I have to tell you a couple of things
           before I start.  And the first one is you have in the
           passouts some viewgraphs that aren't exactly right.
                       Last week I at IA meeting in Cairo and I
           was trying to do very much control.  This presentation
           is terribly efficient.  But we have the right package,
           and if you need it you see me and I'll get you a copy.
                       And with that, I think my time is up now,
           right?
                       DR. KRESS:  Yes.
                       MR. CARELLI:  Okay. Nice meeting you.
                       Okay.  IRIS.  Can I have the next one? 
           IRIS is International Reactor Innovative and Secure
           and the key word there is international, and you'll
           see in a second why.
                       If I can have the next, please?  I'll try
           to move fast as I can.
                       Is the new kid on the block.  We've been
           in business for about 18 months, so what you see is
           about we started at the end of '99 this work, and so
           in trying to compress in about a half of hour the work
           we've done on a new design, I had to skip a bunch of
           items.  And I'll be happy to answer and expand them
           during the session this evening.  So right now I try
           to kind of streamline on the key things and then hit
           the issues, because for this new reactor thing that's
           what you want to hear most.
                       So I'm going to have a brief overview; our
           team, the funding, the objectives.  I'm going to tell
           you about a few designs.  It's plural, it's not a
           typo.  It's few designs, plural.  And then the
           configuration of the integral vessel.  And I'm going
           to spend quite some time -- well, "quite some time"
           relatively speaking on the safety design because I
           think that's kind of a trademark of IRIS.  They
           approach the safety we have together with the
           maintenance optimization.  These are the two things
           IRIS, I believe, does different. And then, as I say,
           I hope to spend some time talking about the issues.
                       Let's move to the next one, please. 
           Overview, keep going.  I have a bunch of fillers.  At
           least you know where we are.
                       Okay.  This is a capsule on IRIS, just to
           give you a kind of best view what the reactor is. 
           What you have on the right is an earlier version, it's
           100 megawatt electric that we designed until around
           December of last year.  It's an integral system.
           Integral means everything is inside the vessel; steam
           generators, clamps, pressurizers -- pressurizer,
           singular, is inside the vessel.  Is integral, integral
           configuration.  And it has a lot of advantages.  It is
           really an excellent configuration for safety and we're
           going to touch on that, as a straight bell core, no
           shuffling to refueling.  You put the fuel in, take it
           out at the end of life.
                       And we have two designs for five years, an
           ATS lifetime.  And you'll see in a second, in a couple
           of seconds.  
                       It utilize LWR technology.  In the new
           engineering burnt is a proven technology.  This is a
           key point when you look at development schedule, this
           is a new engineering.  We are not demonstrating a new
           technology.  Also the integral configuration for the
           light water reactor is not the first time.  There is
           a surface ship in Germany has been running along the
           seas with an integral reactor like this, and of course
           all of you know the submarines, they are running on
           that.  And also there's been experience -- on integral
           reactors.
                       Safety is and most action initiators are
           handled by design.  And I'm going to go into safety by
           design issue and what we do -- we do on that.
                       Potentially the cost, is the cost
           competitive with that options both in nuclear and non-
           nuclear and the development, the construction, the
           deploying and everything from the very beginning is by
           international team.  This, by no means, suggest
           Westinghouse -- this international team that is
           designing IRIS.
                       And we are projecting the first module
           deployment in the 2010-2015 time frame.  2010 is kind
           of widely optimistic, 2015 is probably conservative.
           And this morning you heard about 2020/2012, and this
           is about the time I think we are targeting.
                       The way IRIS started was in answer to the
           Generation IV RFI that we had from DOE.  And basically
           we were trying to look at satisfying the goals of
           safety and unsafety, sustained development. 
                       What you have on the left are the various
           design features of IRIS, and you can read.  And
           basically what we found that those design features,
           the way we started the design, was they were to
           satisfy safety and to satisfy the waste minimization 
           issue.  And then we found that every single one also
           has a positive effect on economics.
                       Next slide.  Thank you.  So I said every
           single one does end up on the positive column of
           economics.  So at that point to say, gosh, you know,
           we had quite a good design for commercialization. 
                       And, please, the next one.  And that
           basically what happens.  And what happened was that we
           started building a consortium of organizations where
           they're interested in joining IRIS.  So the first
           thing we did was to have a colorful logo, and then
           after that we went to work.
                       Next one please.
                       DR. KRESS:  Is that Latin?
                       MR. CARELLI:  Yes, that's Latin.  From the
           Italian, what do you expect?  This is a Latin motto,
           and I think even the translation has to do with
           nonproliferation.  Believe it or not.
                       So what we did, we had the initial team
           was from Westinghouse, two U.S. universities,
           California Berkeley and MIT, and from Milan.  We
           wanted the work published.  We started having phone
           calls other people wanted to join.  And what you have
           here is chronologically.  This is the organizations
           that joined IRIS in time.
                       At the beginning, it was mostly
           development.  Then what we did recently in the last
           few months, we added an organization as a supplier
           site because we had the design that is moving very
           well along.  Now who is going to fabricate, who is
           going to be the manufacturer and so forth?  So we have
           additions to the size -- which from the very
           beginning, an addition like Ansaldo, Spain and Brazil
           to do the components.  
                       And now what you see now is that we have
           also team members from developing countries.  IRIS is
           very attractive for developing countries and, in fact,
           I'm coming back from Cairo and had a very, very good
           reception from developing countries.  It's 100 to 300
           megawatts and it doesn't clog up the -- of developing
           countries like 1,000 megawatts does, so this is quite
           attractive.  Next please.
                       Now, you heard the question this morning,
           John.  It said what is a dedicated enthusiastic team? 
           Yes, you have.  You have a dedicated enthusiastic team
           that's designing IRIS and it's very enthusiastic that
           this is the money we're getting from the UE.  This is
           the money over three years from Westinghouse,
           California Berkeley, and MIT.  This is the money that
           the other participants are putting in on their own. 
           This is in kind contributions.  People they're putting
           to work.  They're working on.  Right now we're running
           around this.  So that's enthusiastic when you put out
           that type of effort.  Next.
                       Okay.  One of the questions was what's the
           schedule?  The schedule was at the end of the first
           year, this is the end of our first year of life, we
           wanted to assess the key technical and economic
           issues.  Basically rather than going through the old
           thing, we just pick up the key issues and resolve
           them, and we have done that.  Right now we're filling
           in the blanks.  We're doing the conceptual design and
           the preliminary cost estimate and at this point is the
           end of the NERI grant in 2002.  At that time, we're
           going to have the preliminary design completed, the
           preliminary cost estimate completed.  Sometime in
           between now and then there is the pre-application
           submitted to NRC.  We're in the preliminary stage now,
           we have been talking with the staff a few weeks ago. 
           I'm talking with you now and it's in the process.
                       I put a question mark because really I
           can't say it's going to be July, August or so.  But
           it's going to be definitely soon that we're going to
           talk.
                       Now here is where lightning is going to
           strike.  At the end of the first three years, the
           consortium is going to sit around the table and say,
           okay, now we have a design, we have a market, are we
           going to proceed with commercialization?  Right now
           every indication is that the answer is yes but at that
           point then it goes on a quantum step in terms of
           effort.  It's no longer $8 million or $12 million. 
           It's going to be quite a lot more.  So if that happens
           -- right now, of course, we're not doing this for the
           fun of it.  We are working assuming that is going to
           happen.
                       Then our schedule calls for a complete SAR
           by 2005, design certification by 2007 and first-of-a-
           kind deployment beyond this.  And I'm going to have
           some discussion on these dates at the end.  Next
           please.
                       DR. KRESS:  Would your SAR follow the SAR
           process that we use now for light water reactors?
                       MR. CARELLI:  Yes.  When the issue is
           safety, I think it should be simplified.  Should be a
           simplified SAR.  We'll see.
                       Okay.  Here now the cores.  Originally we
           worked on this.  The proliferation resistance -- the
           idea is you have a core and you put in no shaft and no
           refueling.  The host country doesn't have access to
           the fuel.  The longer you keep there, the more
           proliferation resistance you have.  So we found that
           eight years we could have burn-up around 70,000 -
           80,000 and we worked two designs with UO2 and MOX
           interchangeable so essentially with the same IRIS
           design exactly the same, you can put whatever fuel
           core you want.   So that's what we have done.
                       But then what you have, you have IRIS
           requires eight percent enrichment.  Right now we don't
           have a licensed eight percent production facility and
           we don't have the database for the burn-up and so
           forth of the eight percent.  What we said at that
           point, we say why do we want to complicate the life
           and let's say the first core with a five years design,
           same thing straight through for five years, same
           principle, nothing different.  But this is 4.95
           percent enrichment.  
                       Our facility in Columbia can fabricate it
           to model as exactly the same design and the same
           configuration as the PWR assembly.  So if you say that
           you can't recognize the difference between a regular
           PWR and an IRIS assembly.
                       It's well within the state of the art
           because the average burn-up we're projecting is around
           45,000.  So at this point with this we have taken out
           completely any licensing issue because this is a PWR
           assembly.  The only thing we are doing different,
           instead of shuffling every three months, we let it
           cook for five years.  That's it.
                       At the same time, we are going to look at
           this and we have here our university team members that
           keep working on this and we're going for the licensing
           extension while we're working on and eventually we ask
           for licensing for this in the time frame of 2015 to
           2020.  So right now I want to say this is the IRIS
           core.  That's what we're focusing now.  Next please.
                       The configuration.  This is the 300 mega
           version, 335 actually.  You see here is the steam
           generator and this is different from the pass outs
           because in the last couple of weeks we changed the
           pumps.  What we have now, we have a pump which is
           called a spool pump is inside the vessel and there is
           no penetration.  The only thing it takes is a couple
           of inch line for the power, and that's about it.  It's
           already inside the vessel, high inertia and actually
           I was told this morning there has been examples of
           this with insulation.  It doesn't even need cooling. 
                       Now, the point is why we didn't have this
           in regular reactors.  Why this coming out of the
           woodwork for the first time?  And there is an answer. 
           This pump works with 18 PSI head and in present loop
           reactors you never have an 18 PSI.  In IRIS with the
           very open core and the open configuration we have, our
           pressure drop is less than 18 PSI.  So in IRIS we can
           take advantage of this thing, eliminate the
           proliferation device and all of the stuff associated
           with the pumps, LOCA -- and so forth is all gone
           because we have a design that can take advantage of
           this.  I think IRIS take advantage.  
                       These here are internal shields.  What you
           have here, you have here the core, here the steam
           generators and you have a design rate of nothing.  If
           you put shields which doesn't cost much, just a bunch
           of plates maybe with some boron carbide or even steel,
           whatever.  Next slides, please.
                       This is what you have.  It's a gift of the
           integral configuration.  You get busy for free.  The
           rate outside the vessel is this.  Is nothing.  You can
           touch the vessel.  The vessel is cold.  It has two
           advantages.  One, if you had to send the workers in
           the containment, you don't need to put scuba diving on
           them.  They can go in there in t-shirt because there
           is no radiation outside the vessel.  The other thing
           is simply -- decommissioning because you take out the
           fuel and everything inside the vessel remains there
           and the so the vessel is like a sarcophagus and this
           is especially important if you want to deploy IRIS in
           developing countries.  You take IRIS in.  At the end
           of life, you take it back.  And there is no
           decommissioning, no cost left in the host country. 
           Next.
                       DR. KRESS:  When you change out the core,
           do you also change out the steam generator?
                       MR. CARELLI:  No.  I'm coming to the steam
           generators.  The steam generators, what we have, we
           have this nice lady which you can see, but is in
           Italian, and this is a picture at Ansaldo.  Ansaldo
           built the helical steam generators for Super Phoenix
           and they tested the steam generators and this in fact
           is a huge steam generator.  I think it's a 20 megawatt
           -- steam generator.  They tested it.  In next slide I
           have what they tested.  But what I wanted to give you
           here because the steam generator, the perception is we
           have so much trouble with steam generators now.  This
           crazy guy wants to put the steam generator inside the
           reactor and this makes even worse.  And there are
           things you have to think.  
                       First of all, if you put a steam generator
           inside, now the primary fluid is outside the tubes so
           the tubes are in compression instead of traction.  And
           so now you don't have any more of the tensile
           distress, corrosion, so forth.  Our IRIS doesn't have
           a bottom so the chemistry is much better.  Okay.  The
           other thing is you don't have -- so the bottom of the
           deposit of the steam generators is the bottom of the
           vessel.  So there are a bunch of things that the steam
           generator has a different environment in an integral
           reactor versus a loop reactor.  So don't think I have
           all the problems of the loop, I am compounding them. 
           This is a different animal.  We're talking different
           animals.  
                       Now, what they did in Ansaldo, they tested
           the steam generators.  Next slide, please.  First of
           all, there is experience with Super Phoenix and the
           MFBR experience.  In terms of LWR, as I said before,
           the auto-on was running on helical steam generators. 
           The one you just saw in the picture before.  So they
           fabricated, tested, they confirmed the performance
           with all the performance we have and by some stroke of
           luck, our device is such that we can put eight steam
           generators practically identical to the models Ansaldo
           has fabricated.  So now we have one thing and that
           thing is important.  What we have now, we have eight
           steam generators for 300 megawatts.  So we're not
           talking redundancy.  That's exactly what we want to do
           because the steam generator have a very critical
           safety function and you are going to see in a second
           what it is.
                       Next.  That's the safety by design.  Next,
           please.  Okay.  Now on the safety by design.  Just
           doing a little bit of background.  The way we see on
           the philosophy.  You take a Generation II.  You have
           an accident and you have cope with active means, like
           you have a loss of coolant accident and you dump --
           emergency coolant system and make up water, all that. 
           On Generation III you do the same thing like you do
           with passive means.  So inertia is going to help you. 
           But still you are doing something to handle the
           consequences.  On Generation IV what we looked at is
           rather than coping with the consequences, since we
           have this new geometry, let's take advantage and
           prevent the accidents through safety by design.  Next,
           please.
                       And that's basically what we've done.  We
           spent quite a long time looking at the integral
           configuration and saying how can we exploit this?  How
           can we exploit the IRIS characteristics which is the
           integral configuration long-life core to eliminate the
           accidents from occurring.  Number 1.  Two lessen the
           consequences and three, decrease their probability. 
           Next.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If you physically
           eliminate the accidents, aren't you decreasing their
           probability?
                       MR. CARELLI:  No.  No, no.  Yes.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Are there different
           accidents?
                       MR. CARELLI:  That's different.  Go back. 
           Could you please go back.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I understand.
                       MR. CARELLI:  What I'm saying is that of
           course the first thing you eliminate.  You do that. 
           Fine.  End of the story.  Second, if you can not do
           that, you decrease -- you lessen the consequences. 
           Fine.  If you can not do that either, you decrease the
           probability.  So this is a kind of -- Next.
                       What we did, this is the one, we're not
           passing out -- kind of messed it up and I'm not going
           to this in detail because otherwise you're here until
           midnight.  But what we have on this column is
           essentially the design characteristics.  These are all
           the design characteristics of IRIS.  Just look at the
           geometry, long-life core, all this stuff.  Then I say
           here what is the safety implication of this design
           characteristic?  Okay.  I can't read it.  This is --
           and what happens here?  
                       Now, the first thing is the most obvious. 
           You don't have the large LOCAs and it doesn't take
           much -- you don't have any piping going from the
           vessel to the steam generators, so no piping, no large
           piping, no large LOCA.  That's obvious.  Everybody
           does that.
                       But then we went to other steps and one
           thing that we worked on, and I think this is something
           that is interesting, is the small LOCAs.  I still have
           the two inch pipe break, could have, and historically
           the large LOCA has never been a problem.  All the
           problems came from the small LOCAs.  Next.  Sorry. 
           Before doing that, out of that table we said, okay,
           what happens now to the Class IV accidents that were
           handled for AP600?  And we look with the IRIS approach
           of safety by design and we can eliminate the LOCAs. 
           We can eliminate the range of the actual accident if
           we put the control rods and CDRMs inside the reactor
           because then you have nothing to shoot out.  
                       And all the others really, because of the
           combination of the integral configuration, the steam
           generators in compression, all this stuff, could be
           reclassified as a Class III.  
                       The only one we have left is the refueling
           accidents.  It's still a Class IV but the probability
           is between one-third to one-fifth less.  So that's
           what I'm saying here.  First you say you eliminate,
           then you lessen the consequences and, for this, you
           lessen the probability.  So essentially out of eight
           Class IV accidents of AP600, with IRIS you're left
           with one and even that one with less probability. 
           Next.
                       DR. KRESS:  But you're only going to
           handle this fuel once every eight years.
                       MR. CARELLI:  Yes.
                       DR. KRESS:  Doesn't that give you an
           additional margin, rather than just this one-third and
           one-fifth lower probability.  The time gives you much
           less risk due to fuel handling because you're not
           doing it as often.
                       MR. CARELLI:  Yes.  The other thing, too,
           and as I said, I didn't want it to stretch, but the
           other thing, too, when you're fuel handling, you start
           moving things around.  You move this assembly from
           here to there and you drop one or drop the other one
           and so forth.  In the case of IRIS, you don't move
           anything.  You take the old tank and the block -- not
           the full tank.  We try not to move each assembly at a
           time because they are pressure resistant, we like to
           have them in big chunks.  So you can count.  Big
           chunks.  
                       So then you don't move one assembly at a
           time.  You move chunks.  So as you said, you're
           absolutely right.  Reduced probability even more.  I
           think I had a very good story so I didn't want to
           really stretch it any further.  But it is.
                       On the containment.  This is the best
           part.  The containment we have, first of all, it
           performs a containment function like every good
           natural containment.  But we're doing an additional
           thing.  Since we have the containment, we make the
           containment working together with the vessel to
           essentially eliminate the other LOCAs, the small
           LOCAs.  So the small to medium LOCAs in IRIS are gone.
                       Now, how that comes.  If you think why you
           have a LOCA?  You have the vessel and you have a break
           and you have high pressure here, low pressure here,
           and that differential pressure drives the coolant
           across to the hole.  Right.  Now, if I decrease the
           pressure in the vessel and I increase the pressure in
           containment, I have a zero delta P and nothing comes
           out.  And that's exactly what you can do in IRIS. 
           First of all on the containment.  We can increase the
           pressure because we have a smaller containment.  It's
           about half the size of AP600 which gives a factor of
           two on tensile stress.  It's vertical which gives
           another factor of two.  
                       So now we have a factor of four.  So for
           the same thickness, for the same stress, you can have
           four times the pressure in IRIS that you have in
           AP600.  Increase the pressure in the containment.
                       In the vessel what you have, you have,
           first of all, a larger volume which means less
           pressure.  Also you have heat removal from the steam
           generated inside the vessel which means a lower
           temperature.  So higher volume, lower temperature
           means lower pressure.  And that's exactly what
           happens.  If I can have the next one.
                       These are the pictures of the
           containments.  These are pictures inside the
           containment.  This is IRIS containment for 100
           megawatts, this is the IRIS containment for 300. 
           Three hundred is about the maximum size you can have
           with IRIS.  You're not going to see an IRIS of 500
           because there is a point where the thermodynamics
           breaks and 300 is about the largest size you can go. 
           Next.
                       DR. KRESS:  The trade-off on having the
           smaller more compact stronger containment is you have
           to pay more attention to the normal leakage rates
           through penetrations?
                       MR. CARELLI:  In the containment?
                       DR. KRESS:  Yes.
                       MR. CARELLI:  Yes.  That's what we have to
           look at.  And again, it's high pressure containment. 
           Yes, that's something you have to look at.  But the
           economics is terrific because you have much smaller --
           and besides, besides the economics, with our
           containment, it chokes off the LOCA.  That's a key
           thing.
                       What we have done to prove that, we have
           performed an IRIS with different break size, different
           elevations, and this is no water make-up, no safety
           injection, and we ran three codes.  That's the beauty
           of having an international team.  We ran one at
           Gothic, at Westinghouse, one by POLIMI, Milan and we
           provided code and there was one at University of Pisa,
           FUMO.  All three codes predicted the same results. 
           Next one.
                       This is the pressure differential across
           the vessel.  What happens is after the first quick
           build-down, for about an hour in the early part of the
           transient the pressure in the containment is higher
           than the pressure in the vessel because I'm removing
           heat like hell inside the vessel while the containment
           is cooled by air.  And so essentially containment
           temperature goes up.  So essentially the pressure and
           containment is higher than the pressure in the vessel
           and actually the steam condenses and is pushed back
           through the break.  This is kind of quick.  Okay.  I'm
           not counting on this but it's kind of quick for the
           100 megawatt, actually for a part of the transient. 
           You have a coolant going back into the vessel.  
                       But the bottom line is the next one.  This
           one shows that after two and a half days this is the
           level of the water in the core with a 4" break, 12 1/2
           meters high, which is the worst place where you can
           have a break, and we didn't do anything.  No core
           make-up, no emergency coolant system, nothing.  In
           fact, IRIS does not have an emergency core cooling
           system.  What we have in IRIS, we have a bunch of
           tanks which are used as pressure pools because you
           have to keep essentially the pressure in the
           containment up to a point and those, if necessary, can
           be used for core make-up.  But this analysis was done
           without a core make-up.
                       So the 72 hours essentially for the LOCA
           in IRIS, it goes and you do nothing.  So I think we
           have a very good study in terms of LOCA.  So for all
           practical purposes, LOCA for IRIS are gone.  The next
           one.
                       This is very important because there is
           people still that doesn't know what are the advantages
           of an integral reactor.  This is a quote that I took
           from Nucleonics Week, actually was in the article two
           weeks ago.  It was the lead article.  Second one was
           a presentation of IRIS for NRC.  Basically they're
           saying that the pebble bed can meet its challenge on
           having all these things missing but you can not do
           that for LWR.  The point here is not to compare IRIS
           with pebble bed.  It's comparing the LWR.  
                       What the perception is, with LWR you can
           not take a loss of coolant, a loss of residual heat
           removal system, and also measures the core cooling
           system.  That is true until you know IRIS.
                       In case of IRIS, IRIS can do that because
           the loss of coolant accident is resolved by the safety
           of the design.  Large LOCAs do not happen, small LOCAs
           are taken care essentially with no consequence.  For
           the residual heat removal system, we have a three
           independent diverse system.  We have the steam
           generators, we have the residual heat removal
           interchangers and we have the containment because the
           containment is coupled thermodynamically with the
           vessel so removing the heat from the containment
           essentially goes on removing for the vessel.  And the
           containment is cooled both by air and water, depending
           on the size.
                       In the case of the emergency core cooling,
           core cooling is not needed.  We don't have any CCS. 
           What you really want is, anyhow, the gravity make-up
           is available.  So that shows that really IRIS is a new
           breed of a light water reactor with a much, much
           better safety.  It's a new dimension.  Next, please.
                       Maintenance is the next thing.  In the
           case of IRIS, since we're refueling every four years
           or so or five years, eight years, it doesn't make much
           sense to stop and make maintenance refueling every
           three months.  Economically it doesn't make any sense. 
           Besides, it provides access to third world country
           proliferation resistance.  So what we looked at is to
           say let's have maintenance shut down synchronized with
           the refueling which means every four years, every 48
           months.  Next.
                       This was work done by our team member from
           MIT and basically this is the philosophy on the
           surveillance.  "Defer if practical, perform on-line
           when possible and eliminate by design where
           necessary."  Next one.
                       Essentially, what we look at is be
           accessible on-line or do not require any off-line
           maintenance and the first thing is have high
           reliability.  So this is the beauty of doing the
           design now from scratch.  We're designing all our
           components to have on-line maintenance or a
           reliability that exceeds the 48 months.  That is built
           in our design.  It's not done after.  We're doing that
           now.  Next, please.
                       In the case of the MIT work, a couple of
           years ago they looked, actually, it was five years
           ago.  They looked at PWR and BWR to extend it to 48
           months and this is 18 month cycle.  These are the on-
           line, off-line.  What they did, they say let's go to
           48 months. What happens is you're increasing the
           number of on-line.  These are the ones off-line that
           can be extended beyond the 48 months.  And they had 54
           they couldn't handle.  So 54 could not be handled for
           regular PWR in either way, either on-line maintenance
           or extended off-line.
                       When we look at IRIS, these are regular
           loop of PWR.  Now let's do for IRIS.  Fifty four
           became seven.  So we now have seven items of
           maintenance out of 4,000.  We have seven items.  If we
           resolve them, we have maintenance every 48 months. 
           And we are working on that.  We have several members
           of the team are working on that.  Next.
                       This is the one I really wanted to talk
           because I gave a very brief rundown.  I cut out a lot
           of stuff.  I'd be happy to answer all the questions
           either now or later on.  But this is our approach. 
           The first one is important.  We do not need a
           prototype.  When people say, when are you going to
           have the IRIS prototype, I hit the roof.  I don't need
           a prototype.  A prototype is for new technology.  A
           prototype of a ship import or the prototype for the
           leaking matter reactors.  IRIS does not break any new
           technology.  it's light water reactor technology, it's
           only good engineering.  All you need is good testing, 
           not a prototype.  
                       So what we have in IRIS is a first-of-a-
           kind and, again, we believe that around 2010 or soon
           after we can deploy the first of a kind.  Future
           improvements can be implemented in Nth-of-a-kind. 
           What we have with IRIS is not a static design.  A
           module doesn't cost that much.  You're talking a
           couple of hundred millions or so we're not talking
           billions.  So we can easily put improvements in next
           modules.  For example, the extended core reloads will
           be in a second or third module.  Next.
                       So you ask, what are licensing challenges
           and opportunities versus the Gen IV reactors?  First
           of all, the first fuel core is well within state of
           the art.  So we have no challenge whatsoever.  It's
           just a regular PWR.  The reloads and higher enrichment
           fuel and they have to be handled through a licensing
           extension.  We're talking post-2015.  So it's not an
           issue now.  That will come later.  IRIS does have a
           containment and this containment, in addition to the
           classic function, is thermal-hydraulically coupled and
           chokes off the LOCA.  You've seen that.
                       The safety by design eliminates some
           accident scenarios like the LOCAs, if we have internal
           CRDMs and diminish the consequences of others.  So
           here is a chance for significant streamlining.  When
           I say the SSAR, simplified safety analysis, I hope I
           don't have to go through -- of LOCAs because that's a
           waste of time.  So that's something that we have to
           discuss.  How can we simplify because some things do
           not happen?
                       And here is a risk informed regulation. 
           Commissioner Diaz said this morning one thing that it
           just hit me.  He said it was deterministic,
           experimental and probablistic.  But the first word was
           deterministic.  Deterministically, our accidents for
           LOCAs is zero deterministically.  So we are starting
           with IRIS, we are starting from a very strong basis. 
           So if we take the safety by design basis of IRIS and
           we put on top the risk informed regulation, I think we
           have a very, very good safety study which means that
           with improved safety we can improve the licensing
           position and we can really have that zero emission or
           so that we are talking for Generation IV.  It was a
           lofty goal for 2030.  
                       I believe with IRIS that goal is in the
           next 10 years so when we are able to build one because
           with this, I think we have a very good chance to go
           with no evacuation of the staff.
                       And here is one question.  Our maintenance
           is every 48 months rather than 18 months.  There are
           some regulations that are tied into 18 months.  So we
           say are there regulatory changes necessary to
           accommodate extended maintenance?  That's just a
           question.  I don't think it's a measured thing.  And
           there are things that was already mentioned before
           with the PMBR.  We had modules with common parts like
           control room and so forth which, of course, have no
           intention to be the one control room for each module. 
           So we've got to have one room for several modules and
           so those are things that has to be addressed.  Next,
           please.
                       The other question you had was what is
           approach to licensing, construction and operation
           versus Gen II?  First of all for licensing.  We do not
           see at this time any unique major changes.  It's
           simplification, streamlining.  We don't see any major
           changes.  There is, however, one thing.  The testing
           to confirm IRIS unique traits.  For example, the
           safety by design and the LOCA is great, is based on
           first principle.  We have three codes independently
           producing the same results but we want to have
           testing.  We want to have experimentally confirmed
           data.  We do not have to have prototypic testing. 
           That doesn't make any sense.  
                       We can do scale testing and properly
           scaled testing with the proper parameters and so forth
           and look at the parameters.  That's something that has
           to be done as soon as possible because that takes
           time.  That's a long lead item.  
                       So the safety of the design, the integral
           components like the stem generators and some of those
           have already been tested, maybe some of the tests have
           to be done for the IRIS conditions.  But most of the
           tests have been already done.  
                       The maintenance optimization, the
           inspections.  Again, we have the components in the
           core for 48 months or so where inspections are
           required. 
                       In terms of construction, IRIS is modular. 
           It's modular fabrication.  It's modular assembly.  So
           it's a different ball game from the Generation II. 
           You have big items on-site and so forth.  Bechtel is
           one of our team members and Bechtel has the most
           advanced of the EPC tools and we're going to take
           advantage of Bechtel EPC for doing our construction. 
           We've already been talking.  Bechtel is already
           planning on putting that to full speed on IRIS.
                       Here is one thing that's interesting.  It
           is the multiple parallel suppliers.  What we have with
           IRIS, we have several suppliers all over the world. 
           For example, out steam generators can be fabricated by
           Ansaldo, by Ansel, by MHI.  Three different countries. 
                       So what we have here, we have redundancy
           of suppliers and something that obviously is an
           advantage.  If properly managed, it's definitely an
           advantage.  We have a staggered module construction. 
           Cost-wise, it makes a lot of sense.  What we did --
           economically for three IRIS modules and three years
           stagger it.  Basically, when we started building the
           third one, the first one already is producing
           electricity and has return.  So with the module
           reactor you can do that.  It's nothing different.  No
           pebble beds to sit in, any modular design is a logical
           thing to do.  We stagger it.  
                       In terms of operation, we have an extended
           cycle length with a straight burn and we have the
           maintenance no sooner than 48 months.  That is
           different, of course, from Gen II.  And we have
           refueling shutdowns.  Right now it's five years. 
           Eventually after the reloads we can push up to eight
           to 10 years.  
                       These things combined means there's a
           reduced number of plant personnel.  We're not going to
           have 1,000 people at IRIS.  No way.  You're probably
           talking one-tenth of that.  So it really has quite an
           effect on O&M costs.  And we have a multiple modules
           operation which again is different from Gen II.  And
           I'm not talking a twin you may think a part of three,
           five or more IRISes.
                       Next, please.  Now what about the
           schedule?  This was your question.  Okay.  The two key
           dates for the 2005 SAR.  A little more important is
           the 2007, 2007 is an ambitious objective.  
                       Now how can we meet that?  Several things
           have to happen.  First of all, the lead testing we are
           to initiate by early next year.  The testing takes
           time.  If we don't start at least the planning, the 
           analysis, all of that by early 2002, essentially this
           date is going to slide to 101 because obviously we can
           not have signed certification until we have the test
           results.  In testing, you can't accelerate this up to
           a point.  So this is one key thing.  
                       The second key item is the consortium at
           the end of next year is to decide yes, give the
           blessing and go ahead with commercialization.  The
           third thing is a continuous NRC interaction.  Having
           an SAR by 2005 means that we interface with NRC and
           ACRS from beginning in a few months continuously.  So
           when we plop the SAR on your table, you already know
           what it is.  It's not something, good reading when you
           go to bed for the first time.  
                       That way it only takes two years, 2005 and
           2007.  If this you see for the first time, no way you
           can do it in two years.  We'll see each other in five
           years.  We had that experience with AP600, so we're
           learning from experience.  So what we want to do, this
           is critical, to have an interaction immediately and
           continuously.  And achieving the deployment, of
           course, is the date that you saw this morning to have
           a U.S. generator interested by 2005.  So those are the
           things.  Next one.
                       So in conclusion, IRIS was designed for
           Generation IV.  Modularity and flexibility addresses
           utility needs.  Our first customer was DOE.  At the
           same time we have something that is also commercial,
           as I went through.  Enhanced safety through safety by
           design is a trademark of IRIS.  All integral reactors
           have that.  I think we are the one that really look
           and took advantage and I'm sure that what we have done
           will be now in other integral reactors because it just
           comes out of the geometry.  Just comes out of that. 
           It's physics.  It's not clever design.  This is
           physics.
                       It's proven LWR technology and again, I
           can't stress enough.  We have to start testing in 2002
           on selected high priority testing.  Our first test
           will be the coupling of diversity containment just to
           show what you what are the predictions.  That after
           two and a half days, you're core is still under two
           meters of water.  I believe this is it.  Thanks for
           your attention.
                       DR. KRESS:  I will entertain a couple of
           burning questions if you have any since we're running
           really behind.  
                       MR. LEITCH:  The reactor vessel in the
           drawing looks as though it's large enough to
           facilitate internal control rod drives.
                       MR. CARELLI:  Absolutely.  Thanks.  When
           I look at that geometry, it is a waste of a prime
           estate to have that room inside of steam generators
           full of control drives.  The internal CRDMs are set
           for integral reactor.  Absolutely.
                       MR. LEITCH:  Just let me understand.  The
           CRDMs are going to be internal?  Has that decision
           been made?
                       MR. CARELLI:  The CRDMs, yes.  I want to
           have CRDMs internal.  That geometry shows the CRDMs as
           regular CRDMs.
                       MR. LEITCH:  Okay.
                       MR. CARELLI:  Because the CRDMS, there are
           essentially two designs now.  One is electromagnetic
           driven internal CRDMs dome by the Japanese.  MHI is
           the one that's been testing for 10 years and again,
           MHI is one of our team members.  The other one is
           hydraulically a controlled rods.  And that is a
           solution chosen by the Argentinean, by Curum, chosen
           by the Chinese and actually they have a reactor in
           Beijing that is running right now, is operating with
           internal CRDMs.  
                       So both of them and the Japanese are
           planning the internal CRDMs for their MRX vessel.  So
           both of them are not a far fetch.  There's been a
           reactor already operating or being designed.  What,
           right now, I do not know is which one is best or
           better.  There are two.  So I have to decide which
           one.
                       MR. LEITCH:  But if they're external, you
           haven't eliminated the rod ejection problem.
                       MR. CARELLI:  Absolutely.
                       MR. LEITCH:  If they're internal, you have
           introduced some new technology.
                       MR. CARELLI:  Yes.  You're absolutely
           right.  There's a fine line between a deployment by
           2010 and 2012 or internal CRDMs.  The point again, the
           point is we're not starting from scratch.  It has been
           done.  There has been 10 years, 15 years work on that. 
           What I need is about one or two years to look at
           critically, make a decision.  At that point, we'll see
           how long does it take to implement.  Can we make for
           2012 or not?  That will be the decision.  
                       MR. LEITCH:  Okay.
                       MR. CARELLI:  But eventually IRIS is going
           and Curum has it, the smartest thinking about for the
           integral reactor is a shame to have regular rods.
                       MR. LEITCH:  Thanks.
                       DR. KRESS:  I think we'd better move it on
           now.  Mr. Carelli will be available for answering
           other questions if you have them I think tomorrow. 
           He'll be here tomorrow.  So let's move to the next
           speaker which is General Atomics.
                       MR. PARME:  My name is Larry Parme.  I
           think most of you are new.  I don't recognize you. 
           Perhaps a few I do.  But I've been working on gas
           cooled reactors for about 25 years, primarily at
           General Atomics but I've spent time in Germany and
           have worked on pebble bed reactors as well, the THTR
           in particular, and also have worked with the Japanese
           in the early stages of their high temperature test
           reactor.  
                       What I'd like to do over the course of the
           next 45 minutes, and if I can make it slightly
           shorter--
                       DR. KRESS:  Please do.
                       MR. PARME:  I will try.  Next slide,
           please.  I'll talk about the design description on the
           gas turbine modular helium reactor, some background to
           it, and then go to the key safety features, talk about
           the licensing approach and then the design status and
           deployment schedule.  
                       As far as challenges we face in licensing,
           I'll point these out as we talk about the safety
           features and the licensing approach, and there are
           several challenges though I believe most of those that
           affect the GTMHR have already been brought up.  Next
           slide.
                       The U.S. and European technology, and I
           don't have it listed here but I should probably also
           mention the Japanese as well.  But primarily the U.S.
           and European technology gives us almost four decades
           of experience which the MHTGR is based.  
                       One of the things mentioned in the earlier
           experimental and demonstration plants built in the
           U.K., Germany, the U.S. and the THTR, all of these
           when they were built, the vision of the future was
           scaling up gas cooled reactor technology in the same
           direction that water reactors had gone.  That is, to
           very large, high temperature gas cooled reactors. 
           Particularly we in the late '70s had PSARs prepared
           for Fulton and Delmarva.  The Germans were looking in
           the same direction and Framatome themselves were
           looking in that direction.
                       But about that time, that is the end of
           the '70s going into the '80s, the same technology that
           had been developed out of these various reactors, we
           had a change in paradigm and took a second look at the
           design and decided that rather than scale up to --
           Fulton might have been -- I believe it was about a
           3,000 megawatt thermal plant and you can figure out
           the electric power would have been just under 40
           percent efficient.  Rather than go that way, we saw a
           different way to optimize the characteristics of the
           gas cooled reactor and in the U.S. we developed the
           modular high temperature gas cooled reactor.  
                       This is a steam cycle plant, the same as
           these demonstrations plant and the same as the large
           HTGR would have been, but much smaller.  The MHTGR
           design was developed to early and preliminary design
           in the mid '80s when we developed a preliminary safety
           information document and a risk assessment on the
           design and went for a pre-application review with NRC
           and also presented the design to the ACRS.  
                       GT-MHR is an extension of that. 
           Basically, it builds on the technology of the MHTGR.
           I  can say there was an equivalent German design, I
           believe.  Doctor Slabber mentioned it.  The HTR module
           of Germany.  But the U.S. design was a 350 megawatt
           core.  What we've done is taken that, enlarged the
           core somewhat and replaced the steam generator with a
           direct cycle gas turbine, a Braten cycle loop in the
           other vessel.  But it just builds on where we were in
           the mid '80s.  Next slide.
                       You can look through your slides and you
           can read some of the writing yourself.  I want to
           point out some of the main features.  I guess what
           I'll do is you've heard about gas cooled reactors
           direct cycle turbines, and I'll try to point out what
           differences are between this and the PBMHR.  
                       First of all, a reactor size is worth
           noting.  It's 600 megawatts thermal.  We'll talk more
           about that size.  Electrical output is 285 megawatts. 
           The entire primary system, that is the reactor and the
           turbine equipment, are all located within a below
           grade silo.  This silo or reactor building will
           contain fission products or other releases, but it is
           not a pressure retaining structure.  It is designed,
           if you pressurize it with your helium, to vent that
           helium out and, in so doing, what you do is --later
           when I talk briefly about some of the accidents -- is
           you eliminate the driving force that could exist to
           later carry off fission products when they do come out
           of this reactor during accidents.
                       The other thing I wanted to point out, and
           I have to apologize for the lack of detail here to
           show it, but within the silo and around the reactor is
           a reactor cavity cooling system.  You've heard about
           the concept on the PVMR.  The idea is similar here. 
           The vessel is un-insulated and any heat radiates off
           the vessel rather than heating the concrete structures
           here is carried off to the environment.
                       On the GT-MHR the design of this system
           could be water or air or current reference design. 
           It's an air-cooled system.  It's naturally
           circulating.  It operates all the time.  Heat loads
           during normal operation are actually higher than the
           heat loads during accidents.  But you can continuously
           monitor it and you know it's working normal operation.
                       Next slide.  Could you use the
           transparency I have, blow this up a little bit.  I can
           see the power point slide better.  Why don't you go
           back to that.  The colors that are sharper there
           helps.  Taking a look at the overall design, I think
           the first thing you notice about the GT-MHR is the
           whole power conversion system is integrated into one
           large vessel.  All of the rotating machinery is
           located on a single shaft.  That includes the exciter,
           the generator, the turbine and high pressure and low
           pressure compressors.  The shaft is for taking it
           apart and doing maintenance.  The shaft is separable
           at this point below the generator so you don't have to
           lift the entire assembly at once.  But it's on a
           common shaft.  Surrounding the rotating machinery then
           is the heat exchangers.  
                       Up above there is a compact, high
           efficiency recuperator and below that a pre-cooler and
           an inner cooler.  It's an inner cooled cycle. 
           Connecting the power conversion system to the reactor
           is a small vessel with an inner duct for carrying the
           hot gas from the reactor to the power conversion
           system and then returning the cold gas back to the
           reactor.  I have a plan view of the reactor and I'll
           show you that in a moment, which will give you a
           better idea, but reactor is basically an assembly, a
           10 block high core with reflector above and below
           built of large, hexagonal graphite block identical to
           throe used at the Ft. St. Vrain.  
                       One feature that I wanted to bring up is
           not for decay heat removal in a safety sense but for
           the convenience of maintenance and operation, the GT-
           MHR like a steam cycle MHTGR in the '80s, has a shut
           down cooling system, a small circulator and heat
           exchanger located in this vessel that allows us to
           keep force circulation on the reactor core if one is
           doing maintenance or repair on the power conversion
           system.
                       Next slide, please.  The annular core is
           a key design feature of the U.S. designs, and a couple
           of things to note.  First of all, the biggest single
           thing for the annular core, what is it doing for us? 
           Why do we do it?  It keeps us as we have upped the
           power from first 200 to 250 to 350, then 450 and
           finally 600 megawatts, it allows us to keep the
           surface to volume ratio or the surface area of the
           vessel, the outside edge of the core.  That ratio to
           the power develop constant.  It also assures us a
           relatively small conduction path between the inner
           most heat producing rings and the vessel.  
                       A couple of other things to note on the
           design is there are two sets of control rods.  There's
           a set of start-up control rods which from here I can't
           read but they should be located just in the inner ring
           of active core.  These are pulled out before
           operation.  They're not used.  They stay out.  They're
           not used in scram.  However, the normal operating
           control rods are located in the reflector.  They're
           not in the active core.  There's also 18 channels for
           reserve shut-down materials and the reserve shut-down
           material is just to divert shut-down mean similar to
           what's been used in Ft. St. Vrain and also there's a
           parallel in the pebble bed reactor and it's just
           material.  It's pellets, boronated carbon that can be
           dropped in the core.
                       I want to mention a couple of other
           things.  You'll notice there are a core barrel holding
           the core here.  With that there's riser channels.  The
           gas that returns to the reactor is not swept up the
           side of the reactor.  It's not against the reactor
           wall.  The reactor wall is exposed to it but in fact
           the return gas comes up this channel and is then put
           into the upper plenum.  There is a desire to keep that
           away from the core.  The return gas is just over 900
           degrees Fahrenheit.  It is a high temperature vessel. 
           It does not use LWR materials.  A nine chrome vessel. 
           Yes, nine chrome does need to be qualified for ASME
           but the data is available.
                       Next slide.  Shouldn't be any surprise
           here.  Key to both the economics and the safety of the
           GT-MHR is coated particle fuel.  I hope I can go
           through this quickly, but I'm going to go over it
           because it is so key to the gas-cooled reactor. 
           You've heard about the coated particle fuel, whether
           it be uranium oxycarbide or UO2 fuel laced in a buffer
           and then multiple layers surrounding it.  I want to
           emphasize.  These little particles are really tough
           things.  They'll stand up to internal temperature
           pressures of about 2,000 PSI.  You've heard about the
           temperature capabilities.  I remind you.  The case of
           our reactor, those particles about the size of a grain
           of salt or sugar are compacted with graphite pitch and
           then that's baked and formed into rods.  The rods are
           placed into alternate holes in these fuel elements and
           then the fuel elements are stacked up to make the
           core.
                       Next slide, please.  Just a couple of
           words on the overall cycle.  I mentioned it's a gas
           turbine cycle.  Exit temperature from the reactor is
           850 degrees Centigrade.  About 1,560 degrees
           Fahrenheit.  It's quite hot.  With the fuel, we're
           able to use these temperatures and it's quite
           beneficial in the Braten cycle.  The temperature and
           the pressure is dropped by about a factor of two going
           through the turbine.  The turbine is a 600 megawatt
           turbine.  About 300 megawatts is going to the
           generator to produce electricity.  Roughly 300
           megawatts is going down to the turbo machinery to
           bring the pressure back up.
                       When the gas exits the turbine, it's still
           rather warm.  About 900 degrees Fahrenheit.  Rather
           than send that to a heat sink or try to compress it at
           that temperature, it's passed through the recuperator. 
           At the recuperator we bring the temperature down to
           just about 250 degrees Fahrenheit.  At that point it
           passes through a precooler where it's brought down to
           room temperature.  At that point we can more
           efficiently compress the gas.  You go through the
           first stage of compression where not only do we raise
           the pressure but we also heat the gas.  Again, to keep
           the efficiency of compression down, we take the
           temperature back down in the intercooler, pass it
           through the high pressure compressor and bring it back
           up to the core inlet temperature of just 1,000 PSI.
                       At that point, we take the gas back, pick
           up the heat that we took out of the turbine exit gas,
           not waste it, and then pass it back through to the
           reactor.  Notice that when I've come down here I've
           picked up the 300 megawatts that I passed down the
           shaft.  You're looking at the heat balance here. 
           There's 300 megawatts that's lost out the heat sinks,
           300 to the compressors and the turbine.
                       Moving on to the safety, the next
           viewgraph.  I wanted to emphasize again the
           fundamental change in design philosophy that came
           about for these modular reactors in the early '80s. 
           If you look at the history of gas reactors built in
           the U.S., be at Peach Bottom, Ft. St. Vrain, or the
           large HTRs that were in the design stage, you'll
           notice one thing in common with all of them.  They
           have an L over view ratio of about one.  It's
           efficient neutronically.  It's also felt to be
           efficient economically and keeping the vessel down and
           cost down.
                       The penalty that was being paid as these
           things were scaled up is you can see that the maximum
           core temperature and a loss of cooling, loss of
           coolant accident is you've got ever rising fuel
           temperatures to the point where Fulton peak
           temperatures predicted were just under 4,000 degrees
           Centigrade.  What we've done is we scrapped the idea
           of trying to gain the economics in that scaling. 
           Instead, if you look at what the modular reactor is,
           you see a very long thin core and then if you think
           about the annular core, too, you'll realize just how
           much the geometry has changed and, in fact, the
           economic penalty that could be paid.
                       However, what the thought is with a design
           where we're assured that regardless of the accident or
           the accident conditions that keeps the fuel below the
           temperatures at which you'll get gross fuel failure. 
           The idea was to gain the economics, keep the costs of
           the plant down by simplifying the safety systems, the
           complexity of plant operation, making it simple.  
                       Next slide.  I think you may have seen the
           same figure cast somewhat similarly, but it's a
           summary of tests that have been run in primarily the
           U.S. and Germany.  There's also some Japanese test
           data in my figure.  What you see is all the test data
           on these TRISO coated particles show that for
           temperatures below 2,000 degrees Centigrade, there's
           just no experience of these things failing at those
           temperatures.  The question was asked earlier, what
           about the ups and downs, the transients in normal
           operation?  The test data have looked at Ft. St. Vrain
           fuel.  Going up and down in temperature here has no
           effect on failing.  Repeated cyclings at low
           temperatures do not affect these results.
                       We have established, and I notice PBMR has
           established similar goals.  For a design goal but not
           actually a safety limit per se, but as a design goal,
           we've elected to keep the accident temperatures below
           1,600 degrees Centigrade. But I want to make it clear
           that 1,600 degrees Centigrade is not a magic
           temperature.  You don't go to 1,601 or 1,650 or even
           1,800 degrees Centigrade and these particles to burst
           or anything like that.  There's a time and temperature
           effect that occurs as you start going to higher
           temperatures.  The time is not very long when you get
           up to temperatures well in excess of 2,000 degrees C. 
           But below 2,000 degrees Centigrade, it's a time and
           temperature effect with degradation of the silicon
           carbide.  
                       You notice the maximum peak temperature is
           well below that 1,600 degrees and, in fact, the
           average core temperature is below 1,000 degrees C.
           during normal operation.  Next slide.
                       Just summarizing where the design takes
           us.  You can look for what I would consider to be
           worst case accident.  You're starting with a maximum
           temperature of 1,200 degrees Centigrade and if you
           assume we lose the coolant circulation, we don't have
           a lot of redundancy in coolant circulation.  If you
           lose that, there's a sudden drop in the maximum
           temperature and that's just the drop in the profile
           you get from fuel at power where there's a heat flux
           going out to the coolant.  You had a quick drop in the
           maximum temperature and then there's a slow rise as
           the fuel heats back up.  You get natural circulation
           within the blocks.  You redistribute the heat.  You
           eventually heat the vessel back up and you reach a
           point at which you just are radiating the vessel to
           the cavity cooling system.
                       If you postulate that in addition to the
           loss of force cooling that you also lose all the
           coolant, same effect occurs.  First, the fuel
           temperature drops.  Then it slowly rises and then over
           a period of days it continues to rise in the center,
           but you reach a point at which the heat is just
           conducted through the graphite blocks booting the
           reflector.  There's radiation across the gaps to the
           core barrel in the vessel, and then that heat is
           radiated again to the reactor cavity cooling system. 
                       Even if you assume that the reactor cavity
           cooling system fails, the effect on core temperatures
           is rather minimum, at least for a period of days.  The
           vessel gets hotter, the surrounding structures get
           hotter, and I'm not claiming that loss of that cavity
           cooling system is something I'd want to deal with on
           a design basis event, but the fuel temperature is
           relatively insensitive to it as you heat up the
           structures that surround the vessel.
                       Next figure.  In summary, the real safety
           approach on the GT-MHR is keeping the fission products
           right within the particles.  Worse case fuel
           temperatures are limited by the design features of gas
           cooled reactor and really the properties that we've
           got, the low power density, the low thermal rating per
           module, the annular core and then passive heat removal
           to outside the vessel.  
                       Finally, and something I didn't bring up. 
           Okay.  I'm sure that any number of reactors can shut
           down without rod motion.  All I'm mentioning is that
           the thing has  a negative temperature coefficient,
           like any other commercial reactor in -- I hope -- the
           world today.  But there's something special about
           this.  In the gas cooled reactor, there is such a
           large margin between the normal operating temperature
           of 1,000 degrees Centigrade average core temperature
           and the point at which the fuel starts to fail that we
           really have the ability to utilize that negative
           temperature coefficient and, in fact, if you just flip
           back to the preceding viewgraph, at least up until
           about 35 hours, at which point you start to get xenon
           decay, the effect of inserting the rods or not
           inserting the rods is not noticeable on the graph. 
           The transients are exactly the same.  The maximum
           temperatures.  In fact, all temperatures are the same. 
           The reactor just shuts itself down.  
                       If you could flip two forward.  I want to
           talk briefly about the licensing approach.  I think
           this is something that we and PBMR share in common, a
           concern with the licensing approach.  I tried to make
           the point that we've taken a fundamental change in the
           whole design philosophy.  The large HTGR, the PSAR we
           are preparing for Fulton and Delmarva, the licensing
           at Ft. St. Vrain follow the framework that was used
           for water reactors and then rarely with just some
           exceptions and it was small.  
                       But this approach is so different that
           going through the list of general design criteria or
           all the precedents for LWR is frustrating, it's
           counter-productive and there is no guarantee that it
           is either necessary or that it's sufficient and picks
           up the important things for the GT-MHR.
                       In the mid '80s on the MHTR, our steam
           cycle plant that I referred to, with DOE sponsorship,
           both in the design and the licensing approach, we
           started with a clean sheet of paper.  The approach
           used.  It says PRA.  I want to make it clear.  It was
           PRA techniques.  Yes, we had a risk assessment of the
           plant, too.  But it was using risk assessment
           techniques to systematically study what was important
           in the plant, what were the safety functions?  What
           safety functions were needed to satisfy what goal? 
           And reconstructed the licensing bases.  This approach
           underwent pre-application review by the NRC and was
           also viewed by ACRS.
                       Some of the main points of it were, first
           of all, we looked and revisited.  What are the
           criteria, the safety goals, top level regulatory
           criteria that we're striving to meet in the first
           place?  I'll come back to that topic in a moment
           because it's key to be able to go through the rest of
           the steps.
                       In addition, what we did, even though this
           was using PRA techniques, we wanted to come up with
           bases that were familiar to the NRC, things like
           licensing bases events or design bases events, if you
           will, equipment safety classification, the design
           conditions that go with our safety equipment, and then
           design criteria, if you will.  And I'll talk about
           these in a moment.  But rederive them for the MHTGR. 
           Next slide.
                       Top level regulatory criteria.  When you
           go, if you're a gas cooled reactor person, when you go
           to the body of regulatory guidance there is, it's
           confusing, it's frustrating, in fact.  We went back
           and looked at the various statements and tried to find
           things that really said how safe is safe enough? 
           Somebody doesn't like the term safe enough.  Choose
           your own, but we're trying to find some benchmarks to
           work for.  We looked for direct statements of
           acceptable consequences or risk to the public or the
           environment.  We tried to find statements that were
           quantifiable.  We needed something that we could say. 
           Hey, either we were that good and we were that good
           with margin, and it should be statements that were
           independent of the plant design.  Don't tell me that
           I need an emergency core cooling system to back this
           up.  It doesn't help me much and it doesn't mean much
           to my reactor. 
                       These are not all the top level criteria
           that we uncovered in the '80s, but they were the
           limiting criteria as far as the design of the plant. 
           I'll come back to these criteria in a couple of
           moments.  Next slide.
                       Also, having gone through this evaluation
           of the plant and starting with our clean sheet of
           paper, we had gotten a handle on the safety functions
           that were important to the gas cooled reactor.  We
           understood what criteria we were trying to meet and
           then we developed licensing basis events that were
           basically off normal or accident events used for
           demonstrating design compliance with these criteria. 
           What we were doing is we were looking at the safety
           functions, we were looking a range of phenomena and a
           full range of frequency and trying to find what were
           challenges to our safety functions that would
           challenge staying within the regulatory criteria and
           then defining using our PRA entries, if you will, the
           types of challenges you could have and construct these
           events.  This was done and something that would be
           very similar, do a water reactor.  You could almost
           look at them after the fact as deterministic events. 
                       After that, we collectively analyzed in
           the PRA all those events to show compliance with the
           safety goals.  The licensing basis events encompassed
           anticipated operational occurrences, design basis
           events and then something we call emergency planning
           basis events and we'll come to that in just a moment. 
           Next slide.
                       I think this figure gives you a better
           idea of what I'm talking about.  What we did is I have
           a frequency versus consequence, and this is whole body
           gama dose, plot and what we did is plot the various
           criteria we saw.  We said 10 CFR Appendix I.  That
           applies to anticipated releases so we should said it
           should apply to basically a frequency corresponding
           down to once in a plant life time.  So we said once in
           40 years.  That was our design life time.  Then we
           said 10 CFR 1000.  Those are your design basis events. 
           We presented arguments why the reasonable range for
           that is perhaps between once in a plant life time and
           down to 10-4 per year.
                       Also practice said that for higher
           frequency events rather than the full 25 rem of 10 CFR
           100, some fraction of 10 CFR 100 is more important so
           I believe I have 10 percent of 10 CFR 100 there. 
           Finally, for lower frequency events, we said the
           guiding regulations are the safety goal but you'll see
           something else here.  The protective action guides for
           sheltering the public, and you'll see that plotted
           there and it really makes 10 CFR 100 safety goals non-
           issues.
                       We were trying in the '80s and I expect we
           would do the same thing in a future application to set
           our emergency planning zone at the exclusion area
           boundary.  So a design criteria for us was to show
           that there would be no doses even for rare events,
           emergency planning basis events, that would exceed the
           protection action guides.  So that's the lines here,
           the criteria, that's these frequency ranges we had
           proposed.  Finally you see, using the PRA, how we had
           defined these events.  These are not quite all the
           events.  
                       The only other thing I want to point out
           so you understand our use of PRA and our what I would
           say is a risk informed decision but still putting it
           in an appearance that looks somewhat deterministic. 
           You notice all these accidents here and they actually
           have zero dose.  Those are not just the next order of
           magnitude down.  One of the key things in the risk
           assessment that was done for the modular reactor was
           done early in preliminary design and we were trying to
           set our licensing basis with it, so it wasn't just a
           matter of quantifying those event sequences that led
           to releases.  We assessed every phenomenological
           challenge of importance and defined as events not only
           those that had the highest releases but those that
           represented unique phenomenological challenges to our
           safety functions, and we felt that was an important
           part of putting the framework together that the NRC
           could live with.
                       Next slide.  There's a viewgraph floating
           around, if anybody is interested, that goes much
           further than this but it didn't show up on the screen. 
           I thought there's no point in putting it up.  But for
           safety-related systems, looking again at what should
           be safety-related, we said it seems from practice that
           in general what's done is safety-related items in
           water reactors are those items that are required for
           your design basis events.  Those items that are
           necessary to show that you meet 10 CFR 100.  We took
           the same approach with this start of our safety
           functions and then building down further we derived
           those items in the GR-MHR which we claimed were
           safety-related and would be subject to the same rules
           as safety-related components in other reactor types. 
           Next slide.
                       So I've been talking about something that
           was done in the mid '80s.  How does this apply to the
           GR-MHR?  Well, the process is absolutely generic and
           should be directly applicable to the GT-MHR.  Our plan
           is to pick up where we left off before.  The prior
           application of this to the MHTGR did not show any
           great sensitivity to what happened in the steam cycle,
           the power conversion equipment there.  I wouldn't
           expect a lot of changes when we apply this method to
           the GT-MHR but there might be some differences in the
           licensing basis events and perhaps safety-related
           equipment.
                       Specifically, there's a potential for new
           initiating events because of the large and higher
           energy rotating equipment that we have within the
           primary coolant.  Certainly recognize that.  There's
           some potential for different consequences because of
           the higher core rating.  Even though it stays within
           1,600 degrees Centigrade, the same maximum
           temperatures the MHTGR had, it's nearly twice as
           large.  
                       Finally, water ingress events in the MHTGR
           were a primary contributor to release.  In that
           assessment, we would expect that our licensing basis
           events involving water would be very unlikely and
           probably be much less risk important.  Next slide.
                       The GT-MHR is now being developed in an
           international program.  This is being done in Russia,
           primarily centered in Nishni Novagrad under U.S. and
           Russian federation agreement and for the purpose of
           destroying weapons grade plutonium.  Program is
           sponsored jointly by the U.S. DOE and Minatom, but
           it's also supported by Japan and -- that should be
           France rather than the entirety of the European Union. 
                       The conceptual design is completed and we
           expect to have preliminary design complete by early
           2002.  I was just in St. Petersburg a couple of months
           back and it's quite impressive.  A dollar goes a long
           way in Russia.  There is a large staff, and they're
           moving along aggressively.  Next slide.
                       The program is set to design, construct
           and operate a prototype module by 2009 in Thomps.  We
           would also in Russia design, construct and license a
           plutonium fuel fabrication facility in Russia.  The
           first four module plant would be up and operating by
           2015 with a total plutonium consumption of 250
           kilograms a year.  
                       Just as a point of interest about GT-MHR
           in Russia.  Fuel contains no fertile material.  It's
           pure plutonium, weapons grade plutonium.  This is not
           like burning plutonium with MOX or anything.  There's
           no fertile material to make more plutonium, so it
           destroys it and in a burn up you get better than say
           on the order of 90 percent or better plutonium 239
           consumption.  Next slide.
                       Obviously, plutonium 239 and plutonium
           cores are not of interest here in the U.S. to our
           commercial program.  So how does this international
           program relate to the commercial reactor that I'm
           talking about?  It's basically designing a uranium
           fuel core in the U.S. to replace the Russian plutonium
           design.  Next viewgraph.  That's really the big
           picture, but there are a few other things.  We are
           working with potential users of the technology to
           define the requirements appropriate to the U.S.  We
           would anticipate doing the safety analysis and, of
           course, the licensing submittal would be done out of
           the U.S. but we would imagine doing the safety
           analysis ourselves, even though we may well build on
           analysis done by the team in Russia.  Any performance
           assessments would also be done here in the U.S.
           Construction could begin with an aggressive schedule
           in as little as five years here in the U.S.  Next
           slide.
                       I have a schedule here that hopefully you
           can read at your place.  It doesn't look too clear up
           on the board.  It relates the two programs.  I'm going
           to have to move away from the microphone.  I hope you
           can still hear me because I can't read it from there. 
           I think the key thing to note here is the relationship
           between the two programs.  Right now the intent is
           that the Russian program sets and covers the cost of
           design but in more than design, it especially gets
           much of the component testing we want done.  
                       Construction license is looked for in
           Russia in about 2005 and the first prototype is built,
           completed 2009.  If you look down at the U.S., we're
           talking about -- and this is the aggressive schedule--
           but we've looked at it and bellevue that we can have
           the construction and start up by just about a year. 
           Much of the safety analysis was already done in the
           early '90s.  Actually a 600 megawatt core was analyzed
           by General Atomics in San Diego.  So we're really not
           starting from scratch.  Much of the work was done in
           '92, '93, '94 time frame.  Putting that together and
           putting it together with information we would get from
           the Russians leading to a first plant by the end of
           the decade.  
                       Particularly vague in this is the question
           of construction, combined operating and construction
           license and credifiction.  The goal here is clearly to
           get a certification for the design. The current
           thinking though is the application and that's key to
           the program -- but that the application up front would
           be for a combined operating and licensing license with
           the eventual goal of design certification, but that is
           one of the things we're looking to discuss in the pre-
           application discussions with the Commission staff.  
                 The other thing we're very interested in and is
           unique to this program and we wish to discuss with the
           staff is the question and possible pitfalls of
           bringing what was once U.S. technology back to the
           U.S. from Russia and one of the things we need to
           watch for.  Clearly, the more we can bring back from
           the Russian Federation, the more smooth the path for
           this program.  I will say the Russians are not off
           working on their own.  The program is managed by DOE
           and they are very interested in potential market
           applications and are looking at, if not using, U.S.
           codes and standards in the design of the components
           and are continually asking us about U.S. safety
           regulations so that this could go back.
                       Last slide.  In summary, GT-MHR is rooted
           in several, almost four decades of international
           technology and it builds directly out of the 1980s
           MHTGR experience.  It represents an optimization of
           characteristics inherent to gas cooled reactors or at
           least high temperature gas reactors going for both
           high thermal efficiency with the Braten cycle, the
           ability of an all refractory core to go to throe kind
           of temperatures, but also uses those characteristics
           to have, I believe, simple, easily understood, assured
           safety. And finally, international program facilitates
           near-term deployment of this.
                       DR. KRESS:  Thank you. I think I'll
           exercise the prerogative of the chairman and ask the
           first question.  For light water reactors, the safety
           goal that you have of 5 X 10-7 for early fatalities. 
           You hear statement like well, that's for light water
           reactors because we can live with that number because
           we have some idea of what the uncertainty is in the
           determination of it.  But because those uncertainties
           are pretty big, we hear statements like well, we're
           going to not let you do that all with preventing the
           core damage.  We're going to make you have a
           containment because of uncertainties.  There's no
           quantification in my mind of what that uncertainty
           level is where you no longer have to have a
           containment.  How are you going to deal with that
           concept in the regulatory arena?  
                       MR. PARME:  I've heard that.  I've heard
           those kind of questions multiple times.  In the '80s,
           what we submitted first of all is we argued that the
           goal of the NRC should be to assure the safety of the
           public, environment if that be also the case, but the
           criteria for the top level regulatory criteria and
           going and giving me a criteria on core melt or core
           damage is not really telling me anything about how
           safe you want the public.  I will admit they didn't
           full accept that response, but in the case of the high
           temperature gas cooled reactor, I'd come back in a
           second.  Perhaps it's not such a concern if something
           like that were imposed on me.  
                       In all of the accidents -- and some of the
           accidents I plotted up there.  You'll notice all of
           throe things are less than a rem and typically they're
           on the order of tens of millirems.  Some of those
           things include assuming that in the steam cycle plant
           we had lost all electric power on one module, took a
           break in a steam generator, lost our forced cooling,
           started pumping steam from one module back to the
           others for hours on end with nobody taking action. 
           Those are still the kind of doses we got.  There's no
           damage to the core.  
                       However, I will add, we mistakenly in the
           mid '80s said, what do you mean by core damage? 
           There's no damage.  The graphite will stand up to
           5,000 degrees Fahrenheit or more before it starts to
           sublime.  It won't be damaged.  There's nothing here
           you can get temperatures like that.  Well then they
           started redefining it as a dose over 100 millirem or
           something like that.  
                       I think the argument is tell me how safe
           you want me to be.  If Generation IV or if these newer
           reactors are supposed to be quantitatively safer --
                       DR. KRESS:  If I tell you how safe I want
           you to be at some confidence level, will you be able
           to give me the uncertainties in your determinations?
                       MR. PARME:  I can certainly try it.  In
           fact, the submittal I will give them, the accidents we
           submitted to NRC on MHTGR were not quote
           "conventionally conservative analysis."  They were run
           statistically and we used Monte Carlo methods to give
           them.  I think we said what do you want?  They didn't
           know.  We gave them 95th percentile confidence on the
           results we give them.  If you want more confidence
           than that, I can do it.  Most of these accidents are
           simple enough to analyze that I can actually --
                       DR. KRESS:  That's the problem.  I don't
           know what confidence I want.  I don't know if anybody
           does.  
                       MR. PARME:  I don't know but I think we
           can perhaps talk and work to what amounts.  At this
           point in time, what would give you reasonable
           confidence?  And this whole method I went through
           quickly but it does include -- classified events and
           meeting the goals.  Confidence in the answers.
                       DR. KRESS:  I'm quite pleased to see your
           frequency consequence curves because some of us on the
           ACRS think that's a good way to go, particularly when
           you don't have core melts.  
                       The other question I wanted to ask you
           that may come up, I don't know.  Chernobyl had a lot
           of graphite and it apparently burned.  You have an air
           cooled cavity where you're encouraging natural
           convection.  Is there an issue there?
                       MR. PARME:  Let me say a couple of words.
           In the NRC interactions we had in the '80s, we did do
           some analysis of broken vessels, failed vessels, and
           air ingress.  First of all, reactor grade graphite in
           the U.S., H451 for pebble bed modular reactor.  I'm
           not sure what the grade is but typically the German
           graphites.  They will not burn in the sense of a self-
           sustaining chain reaction.  Coal has --
                       DR. POWERS:  Why do you say that?
                       MR. PARME:  I will say that exactly as
           follows.  Coal will burn, charcoal will burn because
           of its impurities.  Reactor grade graphite -- and
           there's been tests done at Oak Ridge where an
           oxyacetylene torch was placed on the graphite.
                       DR. POWERS:  It's a totally ridiculous
           test.  You're talking of the difference between a
           point ignition and a homogeneous ignition.
                       MR. PARME:  Okay.  In the case where we
           analyzed air going into the core,  and here I'll speak
           only of the blocks, the reaction rate is driven by
           temperature that is held up by decay heat.  The heat
           generated from oxidation of the graphite was about--
           and it's been 10 years -- but on the order of 10 to 20
           percent of the total heat generated was -- in fact, 10
           percent or less was due to oxidation.  Also the
           reaction then becomes oxygen-limited as the air passes
           up the channels.  We did an analysis assuming a vessel
           failure in that cross vessel that connects the two
           vessels and then assumed that the silo was open and
           you could get air in that.  What you would get was air
           coming in the hot duct, going up through the core,
           down through the vessel and out the return duct.
                       We did the analysis for about 24 hours and
           I think we did it beyond that but, once again, I'd
           have to go back and look at the calculations, though
           it is in Appendix G, I believe it is, to the
           preliminary safety information document that was
           submitted.  I think you see there's no increase in
           particle failures, but what you do is you are getting
           releases.  They're pretty substantial because they're
           a driving force and the releases you're seeing and the
           doses that come with it are due to picking up the
           contaminants that are within the graphite.  As you
           oxidize the graphite, there are contaminants there.  
           They were -- I want to be careful about quoting the
           doses.  I rather doubt that they stayed within the
           protection action guides for that accident.  However,
           they were well within the limits of 10 CFR 100.  
                       My comment on combustion was implying just
           primarily that the reaction is driven by decay heat. 
           It's not as if you had a charcoal pile there.  But you
           will oxidize.  There's no question you will oxidize
           graphite.
                       Incidentally, in the large HTGR, the
           approach to that, if you got a break and the primary
           cooling system got air in the system, it's a coolant. 
           What you do is if you've got a circulator, you turn
           the circulator on and you cool the core with air. 
           Once the core temperature is down, it will not oxidize
           so you just run the circulator.  That was the design
           approach for the large HTGRs.  If you had a circulator
           running, that's how you do it.  You just turn the
           circulator on, blow the air around and cool it off.
                       DR. POWERS:  I'll also comment that you
           need to be very careful about reaction kinetics and
           graphite.  They are catalyzed and they catalyze by the
           impurities he speaks of.  One of the most effective
           catalysts that I know of, by the way, is cesium.  
                       MR. PARME:  It is effective.  You're quite
           right about that.  Fortunately, while dose-wise it's
           a major contributor, a fairly small amount of it
           that's in the graphite, but you are correct.  It's a
           very capable catalyst.
                       DR. KRESS:  I think with that, even though
           we're running considerably behind, that I'll take a 15
           minute break.  So please be back at 4:15.  
                       (Off the record at 3:59 p.m. for an 18
           minute break.)
                       DR. KRESS:  Can we resume our meeting,
           please.  I think we're on the agenda where we're going
           to hear a presentation on the advance liquid metal
           reactor ESBWR from General Electric.  
                       I would like to note for the record that
           our member Peter Ford, who shortly was an employee of
           General Electric, has a conflict of interest on this
           subject and this is a formality we have to do for the
           record.  With that noted, I'll turn it over to our
           next speaker.
                       DR. RAO:  My name is Atam Rao.  When I
           joined General Electric Company after doing my Ph.D.
           at Berkeley 27 years ago, they said that nuclear was
           going to come back in five years.  Still waiting for
           that.  I hope when it comes back there'll be nothing
           but a slew of ESBWR orders followed by B.S. prism as
           we run out of fuel with the light water reactors. 
           Next slide, please.
                       ESBWR is a design that is based on the
           SBWR which was a 600 megawatt design and the ABWR.  It
           basically uses a lot of the components from the ABWR. 
           It's a natural circulation reactor.  It's got a lot of
           the ABWR components but a lot less of them.  It's got
           passive safety systems which were reviewed by the NRC
           for the SBWR program.  We have done a significant
           optimization of the building and the structures to
           improve the overall economics and the construction
           time.  It's been an eight year international design
           and technology program, and the goal of that program
           was to improve the overall performance, safety and the
           economics.  We did stop the SBWR program because at
           that time we realized that it would not meet the
           market conditions of overall economics.
                       The major regulatory issues are right here
           on this first chart for the ESBWR.  How much use can
           be made of the ESBWR review done by the NRC?  We've
           done an eight year testing program.  Is that enough? 
           We've done an eight year testing program before that
           for the SBWR.  So there's an extensive test program
           which has been reviewed by the NRC.  
                       However, I'm not going to tell you how
           long it's going to take to license this plant.  A lot
           of the previous speakers did tell you that.  In fact,
           that is our biggest question at GE.  We know that our
           experience with the last round of certifications was
           that it took eight years.  I think the AWBR took 10
           years.  And the question is really how high is the
           hurdle and will the bar be being raised every time as
           you go along.
                       We believe for this plant design we have
           done all the testing.  The design and the technology
           is complete.  How long it'll take to get it through
           the certification hurdle is still an open question.
                       The next charts shows that General
           Electric Company had a steady program of evolving the
           designs, improving the reactor designs.  All the
           actual designs started from the initial submarine
           reactors and we have been simplifying the design. 
           It's interesting to see that a lot of the advanced
           designs that were presented earlier are either called
           integral design or direct cycle designs.  We've had
           that for quite some time.  Those were Generation I
           reactors for the boiling water reactor.
                       The one that I would like to mention is
           the ABWR.  The plant is licensed, designed and
           operating.  When it comes to regulatory challenges, we
           still believe that the issue of COL and ITAACS is an
           issue that needs to be addressed.  Very generic to all
           of the plants, whether they come up for application in
           the U.S.  The ABWR, we believe, hopefully will be the
           first in line to go through that process.  The ESBWR
           evolved as we further simplified the ABWR.  Next
           chart.
                       We also had an evolution of the buildings. 
           There is not enough time to, like Rodney Dangerfield,
           I guess, if you're from California, you get little
           respect.  You're last.  You only get half the time to
           present each one of your reactor designs, but that's
           okay.  They are so simple, it doesn't need much time. 
           The ESBWR design has evolved over the years.  We have
           evolved containment building also.  The ESBWR followed
           from the ABWR, the SBWR and we had an earlier design
           of the ESBWR and now we are in the process of changing
           the building design.
                       The next chart is direct cycle, boiling
           water reactor.  You pull the control rods, water
           starts boiling and turns that steam turbine.  Fairly
           simple design.  Couldn't get any simpler than that. 
           Next chart, please.
                       This shows a comparison of some of the key
           parameters, just to put it in perspective.  I have
           shown the SBWR in the middle there and the ESBWR on
           the right, the ABWR on the left.  It's basically the
           same power level as the ABWR, like I mentioned.  In
           fact, one of the reasons we chose that power level was
           we wanted to keep the components the same, the reactor
           vessel is the same diameter.  We wanted to make sure
           we came up with a practical design.  Our emphasis is
           on something that's practical that commercially
           viable.  It is an -- circulation reactor so the fuel
           height is three meters compared to the 3.7 meters for
           a traditional boiling water reactor, and we have about
           10 percent more fuel bundles, about 1,000 bundles.  
                       We have reduced the number of control rod
           drives which are an expensive component of the design,
           and the bottom line is that last item bullet there
           which talks about the building size.  The cubic meters
           from megawatt electric.  Like I mentioned earlier, the
           ESBWR is the ABWR, just less components.  And that
           shows up in that final number.  What we have is any
           less systems which results in an overall smaller
           reactor building and containment.  Next slide, please.
                       Like I mentioned, ESBWR is a program
           that's an extensive program.  In fact, it's been going
           on.  We have not talked about it much publicly.  It
           had four elements.  One was the overall requirements,
           design, the technology and what we were doing relative
           to licensing.  The requirements were based on utility
           requirements.  We've had a utility steering committee
           running this program for the last eight years.  We
           have been making major changes in the overall design
           to improve the economics, improve the margins and
           improve the performance.  We've had an extensive
           technology program with a lot of testing.  We extended
           technology beyond that.  
                       For the SBWR there was a major test
           program called TEPSS and this one NACUSP and TEMPEST 
           is ongoing and basically the reports that were
           produced for the SBWR program as a result of the
           additional testing done in support of the ESBWR.  The
           ongoing program, Phase 3, is a program where we are
           improving the overall plant margins, completing some
           of the testing and completing the technology reports. 
                 Next phase would be the safety analysis report,
           SAR preparation and, like I mentioned earlier, the
           thing that we can define accurately at GE is how long
           it takes to produce it, how long it takes to review
           it.  Next slide, please.
                       The ESBWR design is based on the SBWR.  
           Shown on that chart is the SBWR safety analysis
           report.  So there's a lot of paper that's been
           produced, a lot of design that's been done, and it's
           also using a lot of the ABWR components.  Next chart.
                       It's a natural circulation reactor which
           is standard BWR technology.  It's really hard to
           imagine an integral vessel where you pull the control
           rods out and the steam is produced at the top.  It's
           hard to imagine anything much simpler than natural
           circulation BWR vessel.  7.1 meter vessel.  It's about
           27 meters tall.  Next chart, please.
                       The safety systems are inside the
           containment.  The safety systems are fairly simple. 
           Up on the top right hand corner, the blue is what we
           call the water make-up system.  It's 1,000 cubic
           meters, fairly small.  You don't need much water. 
           You've got a standard suppression pool.  You can see
           the quenchers from the safety relief valves filling up
           there in green.  It is raised off the base mat.  It's
           the same size as a standard boiling water reactor.
                       The interesting thing about this design is
           that all the safety systems are inside the containment
           and the decay heat removal heat exchangers are setting
           on the top off the drive wheel above that pool up
           there.  Next chart.
                       This shows what we've done over the last
           eight years, a comparison of the reactor and
           containment building of the 600 megawatt SBWR and the
           1360 megawatt ESBWR.  You can see that the buildings
           got much smaller.  We have done significant
           optimization of the building and the systems.  Next
           chart, please.
                       ESBWR design philosophy compared to the
           SBWR has been to increase the margins.  Even though we
           doubled the thermal power, the overall margin, both
           flow -- next chart, please.  What we did was we also
           did an extensive test program.  In the handouts are
           actually more charts than I'm using in my
           presentation.  There are about twice as many.  They
           give a lot more detail on the background of the
           additional testing that was done.
                       What I mentioned earlier was the overall
           design philosophy has been to increase the performance
           margins.  On this chart out here is shown some key
           typical parameters for the plant performance.  The
           natural circulation flow rate, whether or not the
           safety relief valves open following a transient,
           whether minimum water level is falling in accident and
           what the containment pressure is following an
           accident.  And generally the results show that ESBWR
           performance has been improved over the SBWR design. 
           So even though we went up in power level, we were able
           to increase the margins which was a significant
           improvement of the overall design of the passive
           plant.
                       Next chart, please.  People have been
           using terms like minimizing initiating events.  What
           we've done in this basic design is that the ESBWR has
           no safety relief valve opening following a reactor
           isolation, for example.  This shows the reactor
           pressure following a reactor isolation.  Next chart.
                       We have adopted passive safety systems,
           not as a religion.  Passive safety systems were
           adopted only if they simplified the plant design. 
           It's interesting.  The idea of the optimized plant
           design would be where the plant systems and buildings
           were set by normal operation and you got the safety
           systems for free.  When we looked at the cost of the
           safety systems, we found that they are reduced so much
           on the ESBWR compared to the total plant design that
           we've essentially gotten it for free.  So it seems
           that it'll be not possible to optimize or reduce the
           cost of a design like the ESBWR much further.
                       This shows a schematic of the safety
           systems, and there's not enough time to go into how
           the safety systems work, but let me just mention,
           since some of you might have heard about the SBWR. 
           The safety systems are essentially the same as the
           SBWR.  Here's what I call the water make-up pools
           which run the reactor vessel and when you depressurize
           the reactor vessel.  These are decay heat removal
           condensers up on the top out here.  This is for
           removing the decay heat following a reactor isolation. 
           On the left side you find the passive containment
           cooling system, heat exchangers similar to the SBWR. 
           The design is the same.  The components are the same. 
           We are using the same basic design philosophy as we
           had for the SBWR.  So if someone were to ask me how
           long would it take for the NRC to review this, my
           guess is maybe a couple of weeks.  As long as it takes
           to read the reports because there is not anything
           that's new  and it's been backed up by additional
           testing.  Next chart, please.
                       This just shows another plot of the water
           level following a loss of coolant accident.  Again,
           the key thing that I want to leave you with, the
           message I want to leave you with is that this was the
           SBWR.  This is the top of the active fuel.  This is
           functional time.  The water level above the top of the
           active fuel.  The ESBWR water level is higher than
           that for the SBWR, so we have improved the margins so
           it should be easier in the review process.  Next
           chart, please.
                       Extensive test program was done for the
           SBWR.  This shows some of the test facilities.  This
           is the depressurization valve.  This was the ground
           water-driven cooling system test facility, and it's
           all real stuff.  Parts of full size components were
           tested.  Next chart, please.
                       The decay heat removal, similar to the
           SBWR design.  No change in the overall philosophy. 
           Several diverse means of decay heat removal.  Next
           chart, please.
                       Again, this is where we did a lot of
           extensive new testing.  The SBWR and ESBWR Phase I
           test programs are listed out here on the left side. 
           We have completed some additional testing  in the
           Phase 2 program which was completed in '99, and we are
           doing some additional testing which should be
           completed by the year 2002.  Again, these are all
           confirmatory testing and we don't believe there's
           anything that's left out there.  In fact, some of our
           technology partners kept asking us to define
           additional testing that could be done, and we just ran
           out of ideas on anything that could be done.  So we
           don't think there's anyone who can think of anything
           else that needs to be done, but we may be wrong.  Next
           chart, please.
                       This is a prototype of a vacuum breaker. 
           I just put these charts in there to show you that this
           is a program where there's been hardware that's been
           tested.  Next chart, please.
                       Again, there's not enough time to go over
           each one of these, but in your handouts there's a
           description of some of the test programs that we used
           to qualify the new features of the SBWR design.  Next
           chart, please.
                       The TEPSS program was a program that was
           performed in Europe which was a three part program to
           extend to the SBWR database to the ESBWR.  What we
           tested were some innovations that we made in the
           design and also the different scale for the SBWR. 
           Next chart.
                       We have an ongoing design program to
           improve the economics of the plan further and to
           improve performance margins.  That should warm the
           hearts of regulators as we are improving both the
           containment pressure margins and also addressing some
           of the issues that some of our European utilities are
           concerned about.  But at the same time, we are fairly
           practical.  Our overall goal is to improve the
           economics, and we hope to be reducing the cost of the
           buildings by 30 percent more while increasing the
           margins at the same time.  Next chart, please.
                       We have ongoing technology programs also
           which should be completed by 2002 and they should
           provide further data for qualification of the computer
           codes.  And finally, I wanted to leave you with just
           an overview just to whet your appetite for the ESBWR. 
           It is an eight year design program where we have
           reduced the components in systems to further simplify
           the design.  We have reduced the structures in
           buildings which we believe will simplify the design. 
           But our goal has always been to increase the margins. 
           As I showed you in some of the plots, we have
           increased the margins. 
                       The technology program basically shows
           that what we've done is increase the margins over the
           SBWR and we have qualified the computer codes for the
           incremental changes that we made on the ESBWR. 
           Challenges for the coming year.  This is the one, the
           BC is the biggest challenge, is how do we cross the
           regulatory mine field?  We think we've done everything
           that we could possibly do that would be needed for
           getting this plant licensed, certified.  We have the
           experience with the SBWR and the experience with the
           ABWR.  We have two safety analysis reports sitting on
           our desk.  We have done the testing.  The tests were
           completed with our partners who were involved in the
           SBWR program and we can not put a number on how long
           it'll take, what effort it'll take, to complete
           certification effort.  
                       In summary, we've completed the extensive
           technology program and we believe that the SBWR and
           ABWR experience should ease the regulatory challenges. 
           Again, the number that I didn't have in the charts. 
           One of the reasons for embarking on the ESBWR program
           was to improve the overall economics of the passive
           plan compared to the SBWR design and we have increased
           the power by a factor of two and have also improved
           the economies by a factor of two which is sometimes
           hard to do.  Economies of scale don't let you do that,
           but there are some innovations that we've done which
           have allowed us to do that.  So that's the ESBWR.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What are the most
           dangerous mines in the mine field that you feel we
           ought to be working on?
                       DR. RAO:  Our experience on the last go
           round was that the fact that it was -- I'll say again
           -- it's a time and material effort.  So there tends to
           be no closure when you're having NRC review of the
           licensing submittals, whether it's with the national
           labs which are consultants to the NRC staff or the NRC
           staff.  So there is a minimum incentive for closure of
           some of the items.  That was our experience with the
           SBWR in the past.  
                       We don't think there are any technical
           issues that are there because we've had -- I haven't
           emphasized the international part of our meetings. 
           Typically we meet twice a year and have 30 or 40
           people from national labs and people from all
           different parts of industry.  So we don't think
           there's any technical issues.  It's just bringing the
           NRC staff up to the same state where we are.  That's
           one thing.  
                       The other question is do the people who
           reviewed the SBWR in the NRC staff, are they still
           there?  I think some of them are still there.  That
           would make it go faster.  The process of someone else
           coming up to the same level of understanding as those
           who worked on it is, I think, one of the major
           challenges we faced in the SBWR.  I remember -- I
           don't know whether it was Ivan Catton or someone on
           the ACRS.  It took several years before we got people
           to appreciate how simple our passive containment
           cooling system was, for example.  It was actually not
           a natural circulation system.  It was a -- circulation
           system. And so if the same members of the NRC staff
           are not there, we might have to go through that same
           process again.  
                       So it's those kind of institutional
           issues, I think, which will be a harder challenge for
           us.
                       DR. POWERS:  Is what you're saying that
           you can't write this thing up so that people can
           understand it clearly?
                       DR. RAO:  No.  I am just saying that
           someone starting fresh sometimes has some preconceived
           notions or concepts about systems work and it does
           take some time for people to appreciate it.  That's
           just human nature.  I think it takes time for people
           to come up to speed.  There is that learning curve.
                       DR. KRESS:  I think the speaker will find
           that the climate at NRC now is somewhat different, and
           they are quite interested in closure and such things
           in spite of the fact that you're from California. 
           You'll find them quite interested in not dragging out
           reviews and getting them done in an efficient manner. 
           So you may be quite pleasantly surprised if you come
           in with an application today.
                       DR. RAO:  You might notice this is our
           first coming out also.  We have also sensed that there
           may be a change and that's why we've been working on
           this for quite some time and this is our first coming
           out on this design.
                       DR. KRESS:  In fact, your system looks
           enough like reactors that NRC is used to that it
           almost fits into the regulatory system as it now
           exists and may be an easier task to get one of those
           licensed.  
                       With that, I'll ask if there are any
           questions from the audience or from other members. 
           Everybody is anxious to get us moving on.  Good.
                       DR. RAO:  There is one other issue that I
           wanted to mention that's mentioned out here. 
           Resources.  It's still our position that in the near
           term what we believe where the resources should be
           focused, you know the NRC.  It's getting the plants
           that are already certified through the ITAACS and the
           COL.  I mean if there was a choice of where the NRC
           spends its resources, that's where we would see
           resources being spent.  This would come after that.
                       And after there've been 100 ABWRs built in
           the near term and 200 SWBRs after that, the answer to
           what you do when the fuel -- next chart, please.  What
           happens when you run out of all the uranium?  We have
           something for you for that also.  That's the S-PRISM. 
           It's a liquid metal reactor which is the next
           presentation.  Next chart, please.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  How many did you say? 
           Two hundred?
                       DR. RAO:  How many?
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.  Did you just say
           200?  In the United States?
                       DR. RAO:  No.  I was just kidding.  I
           don't know how many it'll take before we start running
           out of fuel, but this next chart addresses that
           question right here.  I think NEI said 50.  Fifty by
           2020.  Isn't that right?
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I have a more serious
           problem.  The safety goals are stated in terms of
           rates per year and if you have 200 units in addition
           to what we have now, I'm not sure that the goal should
           stay the same, which is now creating a new problem, I
           think.
                       DR. POWERS:  George, if you doubled the
           number of units that we had operating, it's a factor
           of two.  We know the safety goal so precisely the fact
           two makes a difference one way or another.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  A couple of 100 I can
           live with but if it's a couple of hundred of this, a
           couple of hundred of that, as you know, pretty soon--
                       DR. RAO:  The actual numbers, you know, I
           think the NEI goal was stated as 50 by 2020.  In the
           U.S. all plants.  We'd like to see them all be ours
           but we're realistic.  
                       When you look at this chart of the fuel
           availability, it's really interesting to see why we
           need the fast reactor.  We don't think it's needed
           today, but it's a design that we've worked on at
           General Electric for many years.  Next chart, please.
                       Not only does it help in extending the
           availability of the fuel cycle, it also reduces the
           toxicity of the waste and the spent fuel.  Next chart,
           please.
                       I'm going to go through these fast.  Okay. 
           Basically, it supports the geological repository
           program and it reduces the environmental and diversion
           risks, and that's why we think some time in the future
           there will be the need for a reactor like the S-PRISM. 
           What I'm going to do is give you an overview.  Next
           chart, please.
                       What I'll give you is a brief overview of
           the design and the safety approach.  I'll also give
           you a little bit on the description and how it's
           competitive, the previous licensing interactions and
           the planned approach to licensing the S-PRISM.  Just
           to put it in perspective.  What's different about this
           liquid metal reactor compared to the ones that have
           seen the light of day earlier?  This one, we believe,
           is commercially attractive.  Next chart, please.
                       The key features of the design.  It's a
           compact pool-type reactor with modules of about 300
           megawatts electric.  It's got a passive shut-down heat
           removal system, a passive containment cooling system. 
           The nuclear safety envelope is limited to the nucleus
           team supply and located in the reactor building. 
           We've also designed in seismic isolators so the
           complete nucleus steam supply system.  To achieve
           conversion ratios less than or greater than one.
           Next chart, please.
                       The design description.  Next chart,
           please.  The power train is shown in this chart out
           here.  What you've got is a reactor module, the steam
           generator, intermediate steam generator, and you've
           got reactor vessel auxiliary cooling systems similar
           to the cooling system that was mentioned for the gas-
           cooled reactors where you have air cooling of the
           reactor vessel.  
                       The power conversion system is high grade
           industrial standard and it's like any of the typical
           plants which don't have direct cycle.  Next chart,
           please.
                       Next chart shows some of the key design
           parameters.  It's 1,000 megawatt thermal reactor
           module and the power block consists of two reactor
           modules.  Its gross net electrical output is about 800
           megawatts electric.  And the overall plant could be
           put together as different modules and you could end up
           with about 2,200 megawatts electric, depending on the
           number of modules you put together.
                       The next chart shows a picture.  On the
           left hand side is the reactor module out there.  It's
           an integral design.  That's a new word that I'm
           picking up.  It's sort of fairly standard for several
           liquid metal reactor designs.  This is the reactor
           module out there.  This is what are the passive vessel
           cooling systems and this is the intermediate heat
           exchanger on the left side there.  
                       The number of fuel assemblies in the next
           chart shows it's 138 fuel assemblies and it's fairly
           standard fuel for the liquid metal reactor.  Moving on
           to the next chart, what I was going to show you was
           some of the numbers and the reason for considering the
           S-PRISM compared to some of the earlier designs of the
           liquid metal reactors.  Next chart, please.
                       What it shows is that earlier designs were
           what we call monolithic plants and this is a modular
           plant.  What it shows is that the cost is
           significantly improved, partly because of the learning
           curve.  Skip the next chart, please.  And skip the
           next one, also.  And put that one up.
                       This shows a comparison of the Clints
           River -- reactor which is a 350 megawatt electric
           plant.  This shows the footprint.  That was followed
           by an ALMR plant which was 311 megawatts and, since
           then, GE has worked on the design we call the S-PRISM
           which is a 760 megawatt electric plant.  What it
           basically shows is significantly smaller.  Produces
           twice as much power as Clints River and it's a lot
           simpler.
                       Next chart, please.  This design has had
           previous interactions and what I show you on the next
           chart is what the design and licensing history has
           been of this liquid metal reactor.  GE PRISM program
           was GE funded in the years 1981 to 1984.  That was
           followed by a DOE program of about $100 million where
           the PRISM design was developed and the ALMR program
           was one of the designs that came out of that effort.
           Finally, when that program was completed, GE continued
           developing the liquid metal reactor design and
           developed the S-PRISM.  What we have out here is a
           multi-year program.  For almost 20 years we've been
           working on this design.  Spent $100 million.  
                       And what we have is, on the next chart,
           the ALMR which formed the basis for the S-PRISM was
           reviewed by the NRC in '93-'94.  There was a pre-
           application safety evaluation of the ALMR.  It
           included the staff for the ACRS agreement concludes
           that no obvious impediment to licensing PRISM design
           have been identified.  So what we believe is that the
           design out here where, again in your handouts, there's
           almost a 50 page handout which goes into a lot more
           detail of the design which there wasn't enough time to
           cover out here.  The design is fairly well advanced
           and the approach for licensing the plant is shown in
           the next couple of charts.
                       Next chart, please.  Land approach to
           licensing the S-PRISM would be shown on the next chart
           which is basically a detail design, construction and
           prototype testing.  This shows the schedule for that. 
           It is a fairly long schedule which would take up to
           about 15 years, but again, as we mentioned earlier,
           the need for this basically arises once we start using
           a lot more waste or using up a lot more of the
           uranium.  
                       So basically in the next chart, the key
           issues in a safety review would be looking at the
           containment, looking at the core energy potential,
           analysis of design basis, team generator leaks, ESA,
           nuclear methods, hydraulic methods, validation of the
           fuel database and, of course, efficient product
           treatment and disposal.  There has been extensive
           experience with sodium-cooled fast reactors and -- are
           expected.  But the key issue has always been
           commercial viability.  We believe this design, when
           you look at the compactness and the overall design of
           this design, we don't think there's much that's not
           known in terms of the overall physics.  The main thing
           is to build it, test it and test out a prototype and
           make sure it operates as planned.  
                 What I'd shown earlier was the overall licensing
           approach to getting one of these plants through the
           licensing process.
                       And the last chart is component
           verification and prototype testing.  This shows the
           basic approach that would be needed for licensing this
           kind of a plant for testing of a prototype reactor
           module.  Thank you.
                       DR. KRESS:  Questions, anyone?  Comments
           or speeches?  No speeches.  Seeing none, let's move on
           then to what might prove very interesting.  Some of
           the NRC reactions to all this and activities they have
           ongoing.  So I'll turn it over to whoever on NRC wants
           to carry the ball.
                       MS. GAMBERONI:  I'll begin.  Good
           afternoon.  I'm Marsha Gamberoni, the acting Section
           Chief in the Future Licensing Organization.  You might
           have heard the acronym FLOW in NRR.  We've a panel of
           project managers here today from FLOW to discuss the
           issues in our May 1 response to the Commission's
           February 13 SRM.  The panel members include Nannette
           Gilles, Tom Kenyon, Alan Rae and Eric Benner.
                       Our agenda this afternoon, if you can go
           back to the previous slide, includes discussion of the
           future licensing and inspection readiness easement,
           early site permits, the construction inspection
           program, status of the AP1000 review, and regulatory
           infrastructure issues.
                       The next slide shows our organization.  We
           were established late March/early April of this year. 
           Majority of the group is on rotational assignments,
           but we're currently working on permanent staffing. 
           Our SES manager, currently Richard Barrett, reports
           directly to the Associate Director for Inspection and
           Programs, Bill Borcher.
                       Close near term objectives are to identify
           the steps needed to prepare for future licensing
           reviews, to determine the necessary resources and
           technical skills needed to perform these reviews and
           to identify the areas for improvement so that the
           reviews can be completed in a predictable time frame. 
           I'd like to mention that we're working closely with
           two other organizations in the NRC, the Advanced
           Reactor Group in Office of Research which you'll hear
           from shortly, and also the Special Projects Branch in
           the Fuel Cycle  Safety and Safeguards Division in
           NMSS.
                       I just wanted to mention two meetings that
           we have upcoming before I turn the presentation over
           to the project managers.  We're meeting with the
           Commission on July 19 on future licensing issues, and
           we are also planning a workshop in late July on future
           licensing issues.
                       MR. GILLES:  My name is Nannette Gilles. 
           I'm what is commonly referred to as the FLIRA lead and
           FLIRA stands for the Future Licensing and Inspection
           Readiness Assessment.  The staff was directed to
           perform this assessment by the Commission in their
           February 13th SRM, and we were asked to assess the
           staff's technical, licensing and inspection
           capabilities and identify any enhancements that would
           be necessary to ensure the agency would be prepared
           for any future licensing activities that would be
           ongoing.
                       This assessment will evaluate a full range
           of licensing scenarios.  We will be looking at all of
           the processes identified under 10 CFR Part 52, the
           early site permit process design certification, the
           combined license process.  We will also be looking at
           custom designs and also be addressing the reactivated
           plant licensing scenario because we do know that there
           has been some interest in that area.  
                       The assessment will also look at the
           staff's readiness to review applications and perform
           inspections and specifically we are going to look at
           staff capabilities, and we are in the process of
           assessing critical skills needed to perform these
           actions and which areas we may be lacking resources in
           some of those skills.  We are going to be looking at
           schedules, external support from this committee and
           from contractors and our external stakeholders, and we
           will be looking at the regulatory infrastructure, both
           at current rulemakings that are ongoing and we are be
           planning for possible future rulemakings that will be
           identified during this process.  In addition, we'll be
           looking at regulatory guidance.  
                       We will be making recommendations in many
           of these areas to the Commission, in the area of
           staffing, training needed.  Obviously there will be
           training needed in some of the new technology areas. 
           We've been making recommendations with regard to
           contractor supports, schedules, and again,
           recommendations with regard to needed rulemakings and
           updating for regulatory guidance documents and
           inspection plans.  And the schedule currently is that
           we will complete this assessment and submit it to the
           Commission by September 28th of this year.
                       I'll turn it over to Tom Kenyon for early
           site permits.         
                       MR. KENYON:  My name is Tom Kenyon, and
           I'm working as a project manager on our early site
           permit efforts.  Although 10 CFR Part 52 was
           promulgated back in 1989, the staff has not received
           an application for an early site permit as yet. 
           However, talking to NEI and other industry
           representatives recently, we expect to receive one by
           mid 2002, which is why we're in the process of
           preparing for that eventuality.
                       Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 52 allows an
           applicant to obtain approval to build multiple classes
           of nuclear plants on a particular site, independent of
           a specific plant review.  And so that allows the
           applicant to bank the site for future use for 10 to 20
           years.  This reduces the licensing uncertainty by
           resolving site specific issues early on in the process
           before the applicant has to commit large amounts of
           resources for the effort. 
                       An early site permit review consists of
           three separate reviews.  The first is site safety. 
           Another review is in the area of environmental
           protection and the third is in emergency preparedness. 
           When the staff performs a site safety review, we look
           at site characteristics that are specific to the site
           such as the seismology in the area, the hydrology,
           meteorology, and the population demographics.  The
           staff looks at these site characteristics to determine
           whether or not any of them would preclude building a
           nuclear plant on the site.  
                       Then staff also performs its environmental
           review.  They perform it in accordance with 10 CFR
           Part 51 and the requirements of the National
           Environmental Policy Act of 1969.  NEPA requires that
           all federal agencies use a systematic approach to
           consider environmental impacts of certain decision
           making proceedings.  In this case, building a nuclear
           plant on the site.  So the staff looks at the
           potential environmental impacts of constructing and
           operating a plant there so it can make an informed
           decision as to whether or not it is acceptable from an
           environmental standpoint to build the plant.  
                       The staff reviews the emergency
           preparedness to look for potential physical
           impediments at the site to see if there's anything
           that would make it difficult or impossible to develop
           and implement an acceptable emergency plan.  They're
           going to be looking at things such as the population
           in the area, ingress and egress routes to the site,
           support capabilities and facilities in the area, and
           any other things that could affect the emergency plan.
                       Staff will be working with Federal
           Emergency Management Agency and other federal, state
           and local authorities to make sure that the emergency
           preparedness submittal is acceptable.  The staff will
           be interacting with the public in the form of public
           meetings at certain stages of our review and the
           public will be given the opportunity to participate in
           the hearing on the application.  
                       Subpart A 10 CFR Part 52 is the regulation
           governing the reviews of our early site permits.  We
           have a regulatory infrastructure in place now to do
           these reviews.  We have regulatory guides.  We have a
           standard review plan.  We have a recently revised
           environmental standard review plan, and we have other
           guidance to support our review.  We've been talking
           with industry representatives and other stakeholders
           about the upcoming applications.  
                       We've recently had a couple of meetings
           with the NEI Early Site Permit Task Force to discuss
           regulatory issues as well as guidance questions, and
           we've been told, as I said earlier, that the first
           application is expected to come in mid 2002 with two
           more coming in 2003 and, despite what the slide says,
           there's only one expected in 2004.  I apologize for
           the misprint.  So staff right now is in the process of
           preparing for these expected reviews by looking at
           resources and skill requirements.  We're going to be
           looking at what kind of training is necessary to make
           sure the staff is ready for the application review.
                       Next slide, please.  The second topic I
           was going to discuss is our construction inspection
           program.  In order to prepare for the actual
           construction of the plants, staff is reactivating
           earlier efforts that it had in revising its
           construction inspection program.  The staff was
           revising the program to incorporate lessons learned
           from our construction inspection activities back in
           the 1970s and '80s and also to incorporate any changes
           that are needed to support inspections of plants
           licensed under 10 CFR Part 52.  
                       The staff has been looking to see what
           needs to be done to enhance the program, and we're
           going to be doing such things like ensuring that
           there's a continuous NRC presence at the site during
           the construction of the plant.  We're going to make
           sure there's a better match of inspector expertise to
           the construction activities that are underway and,
           very importantly, we're going to be making sure that
           the acceptance criteria is more clearly defined for
           what the staff is to be inspecting to.  
                       Another issue that's going to be
           incorporated involves developing procedures for
           inspecting plant components and modules that are built
           at fabrication sites that are off site from the
           facility and then, after they're constructed, they'll
           be brought in and installed at the site.  And of
           course, we're going to be developing a training
           program to train the next generation of nuclear
           inspectors.
                       Most of our focus has been on looking at
           the construction activities and inspection activities
           of new plants that are going to be coming down the
           pike over the next decade, but we recently met with
           Entergy Northwest to talk about the feasibility of
           reactivating the construction permit at their WNP-1
           site in Washington state.  They're in the process of
           performing a feasibility study that's going to be
           completed in August of this year, after which they're
           going to make a decision whether or not it's
           economically and practical to resume the construction
           activities.  Of course, the staff is going to have to
           be prepared in the eventuality that they decide they
           want to come back in and resume construction and so
           we're going to have to have our construction
           inspection procedures and training programs in place
           in a time frame to support that kind of activity.
                       The last bullet is identification of an
           industry concern regarding the inspections test
           analysis and acceptance criteria that's required of
           plants licensed under 10 CFR Part 52.  There is a
           concern as to whether or not the license applications
           need to have an ITAAC on operational program such as
           the quality assurance program and their security and
           training program.  The staff is currently in the
           process of discussing this issue with the industry and
           other stakeholders and we expect to resolve this issue
           within the next several months.
                       That ends my discussion on the
           construction inspection program.  
                       MR. RAE:  Good afternoon, everyone.  My
           name is Alan Rae.  I'm the AP1000 project manager
           within the Future Licensing Group.  I'm actually from
           Great Britain.  I worked for the nuclear safety
           regulator in Britain which is the Nuclear Installation
           Dispatcher but I'm here working with NRC nine months. 
                       In contrast to the bulk of this seminar
           which has been about activities for the medium and
           perhaps even looking forward towards the long term,
           the AP1000 project is a current short term project. 
           The AP600 design certification was completed by NRC in
           late 1999.  What we're working on at the moment in
           AP1000 is to look at how the design certification can
           be translated into potential design certification for
           the extended operation of the AP1000.
                       It was decided that this will be carried
           out in three phases.  Phase I is about complete and
           was carried out under review by the staff at the end
           of which a letter was issued identifying six key
           issues that could impact the AP1000 certification.  Of
           these, four were taken forward into Phase II.  They're
           listed in the middle of the slide.  The other two
           issues which was decided would not be taken further at
           the moment.  First, the PRA that had been done for the
           AP600 certification.  Westinghouse felt that there
           were no significant new issues there and they didn't
           need any further advice from staff before making the
           AP1000 application.
                       The second was the review of the key areas
           of the design certification document, as it's known. 
           That is the case, the justification which underwrites
           the AP600, looking at which were the main areas that
           would have to be changed as this was taken forward to
           AP1000.
                       Phase II scope then was four key issues. 
           Westinghouse is seeking further detail from the staff
           on the applicability of the AP600 test program to the
           AP1000 design, the analysis codes, the acceptability
           of the use of what are called design acceptance
           criteria.  These are forward commitments given at the
           time of design certification which will actually be
           completed as part of the first of a kind or as part of
           a subsequent program.  And lastly, the applicability
           of exemptions granted at the time of the certification
           of AP600.  For that, you can read the reconciliation
           perhaps between the codes that existed at the time
           when the design was developed and the certification
           that was eventually given.  
                       Of these, the major item was always going
           to be the AP600 analysis codes and how these were
           developed.  Westinghouse presented a report on this
           code development supplied to NRC in May.  There's some
           work been done by staff getting themselves
           familiarized with the issues within that report. 
           There's a meeting later on this week at which
           Westinghouse will present the contents of that code
           report and hopefully dialogue on how we're going to
           get the regulator assurance that's required to
           complete this stage of the review.
                       Phase III of the AP600 review will be a
           conventional design certification and it's expected
           that Westinghouse will come forward with that in 2002. 
           Thank you.
                       MR. BENNER:  And lastly, I'm Eric Benner,
           the Regulatory Infrastructure lead for Future
           Licensing Organization.  My blanket statement on this
           is what I'm about to discuss are known to-dos.  These
           are things that were either already being worked
           before the creation of FLOW or have been brought to
           our attention subsequent to the creation of FLOW.  The
           readiness assessment being performed by Ms. Gilles and
           her group is doing a more thorough scrub of the
           regulations to see what changes would be necessary to
           support future licensing activities.  So we'll have a
           more detailed picture when that's complete.
                       The first item that we have going on is a
           rulemaking to update 10 CFR Part 52.  You've heard a
           lot of references to 10 CFR Part 52.  That was put in
           place as an alternative licensing method and it
           discusses combined licenses whereas the previous
           licensing contained in Part 50 dealt with the
           construction permit and operating license.  10 CFR
           Part 52 discusses a combined license which really
           wraps those two items together.  It also makes
           provisions for early site permits, which Mr. Kenyon
           spoke of, and design ,certifications which is
           basically when you take a design and certify it not to
           license to operate but for someone to just manufacture
           so that someone else could license it at a later time. 
                       This rulemaking is basically to clean up
           some loose ends after Part 52 is issued.  After three
           design certifications were done, there were some
           lessons learned from that.  That'll be incorporated. 
           There'll be some deletion from Part 50 of repetitive
           appendices now that Part 52 is established.  There
           will also be some incorporation of general provisions,
           licensing provisions, under Part 52 from part 50 that
           again, on a look back, it seemed like the general
           provision should carry forward.  
                       Basically, where we're at now is there was
           a preliminary letter that went out some time ago
           asking for some comments on this, and the staff
           intends to issue a proposed rule package in September
           of this year.  
                       There are also two other rulemakings
           ongoing.  They both involve some of the NRC's
           environmental regulations.  The first is a rulemaking
           on alternative site reviews.  Basically, 10 CFR Part
           51 is how the NRC incorporates the National
           Environmental Policy Act.  One of the keystones of
           that act is the assessment of alternatives to any
           action that's being taken.  The NRC has narrowed it
           down to look at one of the alternatives that should be
           looked at is, hey, you're planning on putting this
           power plant at this site.  What alternative sites
           should you look at?  
                       In the past, that was a little easier task
           because you had utilities that had distinct service
           areas.  So the alternative sites could reasonably be
           limited to that utility service area.  Now with both
           deregulation and consolidation, you get to a point
           where you could look at alternative sites much more
           broadly.  So the staff is currently looking at how
           that should be dealt with.  That's very preliminary at
           this point.  We're anticipating an initiation of
           rulemaking mid fiscal year 2002.
                       The last rulemaking is environmental
           regulations.  Tables S3 and S4 in Part 51.  What these
           tables basically list are ramifications of the nuclear
           fuel cycle.  It lists things like average effluence
           for reactor, any land and resource uses, and there are
           some comparisons for each of these aspects to coal
           power plants.
                       Part of the changes that have to be done
           are because all those tables, all the data in those
           tables are referenced solely to light water reactors. 
           So obviously you've heard today about a lot of lot on
           light water reactor technologies, so there could be
           considerable work to be done there.  
                       There's also going to need to be an
           assessment done of the fact that some of these new
           technologies use higher enrichment uranium, so all
           these tables do have some bounding uranium enrichment
           that it deals with.  Again, at this point, that's
           preliminary activity and, again, I think we're talking
           about initiation of rulemaking some time next year. 
           Next slide, please.
                       Also at this time, we're not talking about
           implementing any of this by rule change, but instead
           some of it deals with interpretations of rules are the
           NRC's financial-related regulations, specifically
           anti-trust, decommissioning and modular plant
           requirements.  That's specifically to Price-Anderson. 
           That last one, basically the Price-Anderson Act talks
           about retroactive liability and it imposes a financial
           burden per facility and if you look at the modular
           plant design, say you have 100 megawatt module,
           currently if you just looked at how our regulations
           are structured, we equate a reactor to a facility.  So
           you could have 100 megawatt module paying the same
           amount as 1,000 megawatt light water reactor.  There
           is some assessment going on now as to what is truly
           fair, and I can't presuppose what the answer will be
           there, but we understand there are some concerns.
                       The anti-trust and the decommissioning
           funding requirements.  Some of throe questions again
           come about because of deregulation of the electric
           power industry.  There's assessments as too -- again,
           in the old days, the utility owned the plant, owned
           the transmission lines and what not, so there were
           more concerns about anti-trust.  Now licensees are
           coming and talking about making argument.  The
           merchant plant arguments say, hey, we're building one
           of these plants to provide supply in the competitive
           market.  There should be no anti-trust issues there
           when you're looking at that.
                       Some future activities that we have
           earmarked, and I understand that some of this is going
           to change.  The Nuclear Energy Institute has talked
           about a petition for rulemaking for a generic
           regulatory framework performance-based, risk-informed,
           a pretty large scope activity.  I understand now that
           the mechanism for that may change from a petition for
           rulemaking just because there are restrictions on the
           interfaces that the NRC can have with petitioners but
           suffice it to say that that would be a large scale
           activity as to how to risk inform the licensing
           process.
                       The last thing on my slides is really just
           a mechanistic thing.  There's been a lot of talk now
           about schedules and regulatory hurdles and mine
           fields, I believe was the word.  We understand that
           rulemaking by its very nature can be a long process. 
           Some of these advance technologies don't fall nicely
           into our current licensing schemes because they are
           all geared towards light water reactors.  The beauty
           of the design certification process is long-term, that
           the design gets incorporated into 10 CFR Part 52. 
           That's a very clean, open process, but it is time
           consuming.  It does take some time.
                       In the short term, we have licensed non-
           light water reactor technology in the past.  You've
           heard of some of the examples.  Fort St. Vrain and
           what not.  Basically the mechanism would be to use the
           current regulations and for those areas where
           regulation intent may not apply, there would be an
           exemption granted if the argument was made and in
           those areas where the regulations may not be
           sufficient, then the NRC can use license conditions to
           incorporate other requirements.  So that's just kind
           of plug for where we're at.  That's the end of my
           presentation.         
                       MS. GAMBERONI:  That concludes our
           presentation.
                       DR. KRESS:  Okay.  I think we'll entertain
           questions on this part of the presentation.  
                       MR. LEITCH:  Question about early site
           permits.  Where a site was approved for multiple
           reactors and only one was built, does that other unit
           have to go for an early site permit or is that site
           for a potential second unit considered banked?
                       MR. KENYON:  I'm not sure.  Are you saying
           under the old Part 50 licensing?
                       MR. LEITCH:  Yes.  In other words, they
           had approval to build two units but only built one.
                       MR. KENYON:  Under Part 50.
                       MR. LEITCH:  Yes.
                       MR. KENYON:  That's not really banked
           under the Part 52 rule.  What's occurred is that when
           we license that plant, say we approved it for two
           nuclear plants, that was licensed to a specific plant
           design.  I'll just pick on a BWR design, for instance. 
           Therefore, although the construction permit and the
           license that they had would only allow them to build
           the same plant on the site.  So if they wanted to
           build an ABWR there, they would have to come in for a
           different permit.
                       MR. LEITCH:  My question really was if
           they wanted to resume their original intent.
                       MR. KENYON:  To build the older design?
                       MR. LEITCH:  Yes.
                       MR. KENYON:  I'll defer to Mr. Jerry
           Wilson who's our PAR 52 expert.
                       MR. LEITCH:  I was specifically thinking,
           I guess, of I think it's Perry.
                       MR. WILSON:  Jerry Wilson, NRR staff. 
           Your question gets to whether or not the original
           construction permit is still in effect.  Assuming that
           it was in effect, they could use that construction
           permit and build another one of that design, although
           the designs we're talking about are quite old at this
           point and I'm not sure that anyone is interested in
           doing that.
                       MR. LEITCH:  Okay. Thank you.
                       DR. KRESS:  Okay.  Let's move on to the
           presentation from NRC Research.  We'll do a little
           musical chairs here, I guess.
                       MR. FLACK:  My name is John Flack.  I am
           the Acting Branch Chief in the Office of Research,
           Regulatory Effectiveness and Human Factors Branch. 
           This branch will become the focal point of advanced
           reactor activities in the Office Research.  We have a
           small group.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And human factors, you
           said?
                       MR. FLACK:  Yes, human factors.  Did I
           miss that one?  We're in the process of transitioning
           to pick up the advanced reactor work, so what I'll do
           is I'll briefly go over the activities that are
           ongoing now in the office and the more specific
           activities with respect to the pebble bed Stu Rubin
           will cover.
                       Historically, the office has been involved
           in pre-application reviews that go back to the 1980s. 
           This was on the MHTGR, PRISM, SAFER.  In many ways, it
           enhanced the understanding of the concepts and really
           set the stage for licensing applications.  There's
           really, I count up about five important areas and
           features of the pre-application review and the
           outputs.  First, it all starts with promoting
           regulatory effectiveness by identifying early safety,
           policy, licensing issues, and then the basis for the
           follow-on resolution of those issues.  
                       It also provides important feedback to the
           Commission and the stakeholders involved in
           entertaining an application for the advanced design. 
           It also helps to generate Commission guidance on
           regulatory approaches that differ, sometimes
           substantially, from light water reactors.  It
           identifies infrastructure needs, in-house expertise,
           and it also allows us to hold workshops and interface
           with the ACRS, which is one of the important items on
           our list.  Again, the Advanced Reactor Group that's
           being formed in the Office of Research is in the
           Division of Safety Analysis and Regulatory
           Effectiveness.
                       On the next chart.  Advanced reactors have
           greater reliance on new technology and that indicates
           the needs for new safety licensing criteria as we move
           toward risk-informed performance base initiatives. 
           The pre-applications give us the introduction, you may
           say, to entertaining these new ideas.  In an EDO memo
           issued in November, 2000 the Commission articulated
           the responsibilities of these advanced reactor reviews
           and in the next three bullets that I have on the
           viewgraph, NRR has the lead with research support for
           the light water reactor, advanced reactor pre-
           application initiatives, NMSS with the fuel cycle
           transport and safeguards, and Research has the lead
           for the non-light water reactor, advanced reactor,
           pre-application initiatives with longer range new
           technology initiatives that would essentially
           establish the infrastructure for the follow-on
           licensing application.  
                       The memo also identified Research as
           having the lead on the South Africa PBMR in
           coordination with NRR to plan and implement work in
           that area.  Recent industry requests for pre-
           applications are listed there.  Westinghouse with the
           AP1000 last year 5-4-00, Exelon with the pebble bed
           came in December.  The next two, General Atomics  GT-
           MHR. We've met with them and essentially responded to
           them leaving the door open for follow-on discussions
           on pre-applications.  And then there's the
           Westinghouse IRIS.  We had a meeting with them on 4-6
           of this year.
                       In addition to throe pre-application
           interactions, there is the NEI risk informed framework
           for advanced reactor licensings which we are waiting
           the review.  Next chart, please.
                       I'll briefly go through the PBMR.  Stu
           will focus more on the details of that review, but
           basically we're engaged with Exelon on that review. 
           There was a plan developed that was put out in SECY-
           01-007 but at the moment I'm not aware that it's
           publicly available, but it will be any day now.  Pre-
           application work is under way and with again the
           objective identifying issues, infrastructure needs and
           framework for the PBMR licensing.  
                       The GT-MHR.  Again, we just met with them
           and really we're just saying that the door is open. 
           WE're waiting for them to take the next step on that. 
           We're thinking about time frame 2002 for initiating a
           pre-application review.  Next slide, please.
                       IRIS is similar.  This was a design
           developed under DOE, an area program which I
           understand you heard about earlier today.  We met with
           them on 5-7-01 and again we are expecting a pre-
           application review, possibly in next fiscal year.  
                       Generation IV is an area where we've been
           observing.  It's an international activity coordinated
           by DOE.  It's a longer term effort.  We're thinking of
           designs out to 30 years, but basically we've just been
           gathering information and passing that on to the
           Commission and staff to keep abreast of those ongoing
           activities.
                       And the last activity that we're involved
           in or anticipating being involved in is the NEI
           developing proposal on the generic framework, of
           course, that leading to the need for NRC to establish
           an effective and efficient risk-informed and
           performance-based licensing framework.  
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  John, I'm a bit
           confused.  If someone comes to you using Part 52, is
           there anything there that says that you need the risk-
           informed performance-based system?
                       MR. FLACK:  There's nothing in Part 52
           that says that we need to have a risk-informed
           performance-based licensing approach.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So they could approach
           the licensing issue without using risk information. 
           Could they?
                       MR. FLACK:  Yes, I would expect that would
           be the case.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Is there anything that
           gives you the authority to request risk information?
                       MR. FLACK:  Other than the requirements on
           the PRA.  I think Jerry Wilson might be the one to
           answer questions regarding the PRA under Part 52
           requirements there.
                       MR. WILSON:  Jerry Wilson, NRR.  The Part
           52 licensing process is just that.  It's a licensing
           process, and so it references back to parts 20, 50, 70
           and 100 for the actual safety requirements.  So
           whether or not those safety requirements remain as
           they are or change as a result of some risk-informed
           process, it will use whatever is the requirement
           that's currently in place.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I mean the slide said
           need for NRC to establish an effective and efficient
           risk-informed licensing framework.
                       MR. FLACK:  That's an internal processing.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What if the industry
           doesn't want to use risk information?  What if they
           just want to use existing regulations with exemptions
           or changes and maybe they feel that going to a risk-
           informed system adds an impediment because we have to
           understand it and do it.  It's new.  And try to go
           with the existing system and maybe a PRA would be an
           assessment at the end if you guys request it but maybe
           it will be a good idea not to bring it up at all.  Why
           is that the need?
                       MR. FLACK:  I think it would be to their
           advantage to come in that way.  Stu.
                       MR. RUBIN:  Stu Rubin, Office of Research. 
           I would point out that the Commission's advanced
           reactor policy statement that was issued in the '80s
           does allow, if not encourages, applicants or pre-
           applicants for advanced reactor designs to submit
           along with their designs proposals for new kinds of
           regulatory frameworks, frameworks that are less
           prescriptive than the current basis of looking to Part
           50 and looking at exemptions.  
                       So it is an option on the part of any
           applicant to go with the existing framework or to
           propose a new approach to licensing for their design. 
           So it is very much an option for them, and there's a
           decision that needs to be made whether or not it's an
           attractive option to try to plow new ground to develop
           a new framework or go with existing framework which we
           all know has significant burdens associated with it.
                       DR. POWERS:  George, it seems to me that
           the Commission has made it clear that when the staff
           thinks they want information, they can ask for risk
           information.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think they have to
           give some argument though that issues of adequate
           protection are involved.  Isn't that correct?
                       DR. POWERS:  No.  They have to give an
           indication that there's substantial risk associated
           with the idea, whatever concept is put forward.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Which comes close to
           touching on adequate protection. 
                       DR. POWERS:  Shouldn't be terribly
           difficult to come up with those ideas.  It's an
           interesting thing because risk has been notably absent
           in our discussions today.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.  I mean we keep
           talking about risk-informing the regulations and yet
           major regulatory decisions right now are being made
           without risk information.  For example, license
           renewal.  I believe the power operators do not use
           this information.
                       DR. POWERS:  Within this context of
           advanced reactor codes.  I guess it surprised me how
           little risk information has seemed to be involved in
           those designs.
                       MR. FLACK:  You seem to support the
           bullet, the need for it.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No.  I just was
           wondering whether there's a real need.  I think there
           is a need.
                       MR. SHACK:  This relates to the NEI
           proposal.  NEI sees the need.  You can ask them why
           they see a need.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But again, the NEI may
           propose an option.
                       MR. FLACK:  Moving right along, the last
           slide that I am about to present is the --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  John, before we go on. 
           How hard do you think it would be to satisfy this
           need?  Are we talking about a 10 year effort or are we
           talking about maybe a year or two?
                       MR. FLACK:  I think the need is to improve
           it.  Where you stop, I don't see there's any clear
           cut-off where we'd have enough of it.  I think it's
           something that continues to grow and you develop. 
           Maybe more sometimes than another but I don't see any
           specific cut-off on it.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, it depends.  I
           mean if one wants to get rid of their notion of design
           basis accidents and use instead the PRA, then it's not
           obvious how one would do that.  So that would a very
           ambitious task.
                       MR. FLACK:  We use the PRA to pick the
           design basis.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, that, too.  That
           would be -- okay.  Fine.  Thank you.
                       MR. FLACK:  The last slide which I'll
           present is on significant technology issues, and
           obviously we could spend a lot of time looking at
           these issues one by one.  I just put it up to get a
           feel for the kinds of areas that are highlighted and
           need for NRC to really understand with confidence the
           advanced reactor designs when pushing forth these
           regulatory changes.  
                       If there's no other questions, I'll turn
           it over --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, there is one.  We
           heard today from several speakers, I think, that
           they're trying to reduce involvement of the humans. 
           Do you think that the human performance issue will be
           as important here as the current reactors?
                       MR. FLACK:  I've discussed this at length. 
           I don't know whether we can say it's going to be less
           important.  I mean it's going to be a different
           environment which that human operates in, and one has
           to understand that environment and what's changing in
           that environment.  So it's something that one has to
           look at very carefully.  So it's hard to say.
                       DR. POWERS:  It seems to me that the
           change is really entertaining and in the direction
           that's most difficult for us because as they design
           the plants to be less and less dependent on the human
           operator intervening, seems to me we become more and
           more worried about the fact that the operators are not
           going to sit there and do nothing and they will
           intervene and the potential for them to intervene
           incorrectly in a system that's designed to operate
           with rather minor low head forces operating on it.  
                       So you get into the problem of errors of
           commission that we are most incapable of addressing. 
           It's a subtle problem.
                       MR. FLACK:  Yes.  The environment changes
           and you don't really have as much data as you wish
           you'd had to go on.
                       I want to turn it over to Stu Rubin.
                       MR. RUBIN:  Thanks, John.  My name again
           is Stuart Rubin.  I'm a Senior Technical Advisor in
           the Office of  Research and I'm also the PBMR Project
           Manager.  First meeting with Exelon with on April 30
           and our second meeting is scheduled for next week, so
           we're just starting our review.  Can I have the next
           slide, please.
                       This next slide summarizes the objectives
           for the pre-application review.  First of all, the
           objective is to evaluate the information that we're
           going to be receiving from the applicant on their
           design and their proposed new technologies and their
           regulatory process and framework for planned
           licensing.  From that review we will identify where
           the information and the proposals appear to meet our
           expectations and needs for licensing of PBMR but we
           also intend to identify where there are gaps, gaps in
           the information on the design or design basis.  gaps
           in the technology basis or the demonstration of that
           technology or the plans, therefore, and shortcoming
           that may have existed in their proposals for a
           licensing framework.
                       From those differences, we will endeavor
           to lay out the guidance and requirements that the
           staff and the Commission feel needs to be in place in
           terms of additional information and additional actions
           that will be  needed to allow the design technology
           and framework to be acceptable as a basis for
           licensing.
                       The second objective is to develop an NRC
           core technology capability and capacity to conduct an
           actual licensing review.  We are not doing a licensing
           review.  We're doing kind of a feasibility licensing
           review.  But should that feasibility prove positive
           and there is a decision to move forward, then the
           staff needs to be ready.  So we will gain that
           capability from this work that we're now embarking on
           as well as additional training and the development of
           contractor capabilities, et cetera.  Next slide,
           please.
                       This next slide identifies the significant
           review guidance and references that will be used to
           conduct the review.  First of all, very important high
           level guidance and expectations for such a review and,
           for that matter, a licensing review are contained in
           the Commission's policy statement on advanced reactors
           as well as there is an additional NUREG document 1226
           which provides additional staff implementing guidance
           for that Commission policy.
                       In general, the policy encourages
           innovative designs and innovative safety criteria but
           you still need to satisfactory consider such
           traditional aspects of our regulations, the
           application of the Commission's philosophy on defense
           and depth, safety goal policy, severe accident policy,
           application of industry codes and standards.
                       Also in the case of  innovative designs,
           new technologies, demonstration testing, a prototype
           plan is particularly encouraged.  Additionally, we
           will draw upon previous pre-application review
           experience as well as a safety evaluation report, a
           draft safety evaluation report, that was completed for
           a similar advanced HTGR design that was proposed by
           DOE in the mid 1980s.  When one looks ta that design,
           one sees that the passive design features and safety
           characteristics of that plant are in many respects
           quite similar to the PBMR design and safety
           characteristics.
                       I would mention that kind of an underlying
           foundation for this entire effort will be an emphasis
           on traditional engineering and traditional design
           analysis viewpoints.  The quality of design,
           conservatism of the design and analysis assumptions
           and safety modules.  Again, our key objective is to
           identify the key issues that need to be addressed at
           the licensing stage.
                       Next slide, please.  This next slide is
           intended to convey the broad scope that we have
           planned for the review.  For example, in the fuels
           area we plan to carefully at the experience base and
           the analysis basis for the fuel design and to assess
           the fabrication processes and manufacturing plans for
           the production fuel.  We also plan to look at the
           operating experience program and plan fuel performance
           demonstration and testing programs, not only on
           prototype fuel but that which would apply to fuel
           manufactured in a production facility as well as
           looking at plans for monitoring performance of the
           fuel in reactor.
                       Just to mention a couple of others in the
           nuclear design area, for example.  Since the PBMR is
           designed to have passive shut-down characteristics, we
           intend to clearly assess how this will be demonstrated
           and, among other things in the nuclear area, we'll
           assess how well power distributions can be predicted
           for the PBMR -- moving fuel pebbles.  In the thermal
           area, since the reactor there too is designed for
           passive, in this case, accident decay heat removal,
           we'll evaluate the effectiveness of these design
           features and, among other things, assess the
           capability to analyze temperature distributions during
           events as well as there are plans for verifying these
           tools including plans for using any prototype testing
           to benchmark the codes.
                       Just to mention a few others.  The full
           scope testing plans that may be conducted we'll be
           looking at extremely carefully to look at what is to
           be included and what credits can be allowed by that
           testing.  The planned PRA and there is an expectation
           that a PRA at some level will be provided for the
           plant.  Certainly we'll need to get that kind of
           information in looking at any proposed framework for
           determining regulatory requirements. 

                       Another important area will be the
           postulated events that will be applicable to the
           design.  Certainly if one puts in or takes out certain
           events, it can affect the seriousness of the impact on
           fuel behavior.  Next slide, please.
                       This next slide summarizes the overall
           process.  My understanding is that we're not going to
           get an up front design package or, you might say, a
           preliminary safety analysis package from Exelon and so
           our plans are to kind of roll out the review on a
           month to month basis so a plan is to conduct monthly
           meetings with Exelon and the purpose of each meeting
           will be to allow the staff to get introduced to
           different topics through presentations from Exelon and
           subsequently to have that information provided
           formally on the docket and then to have the staff
           review that information and feed back its needs for
           additional information.  
                       Again, we had our first meeting on the
           30th at which Exelon discussed its plans for
           submitting formal proposals and basis for those
           proposals to mitigate or to eliminate certain
           requirements in the licensing process that they view
           as burdensome to a potential PBMR licensing.  Those
           formal docketed proposals and bases have been
           submitted and staff is now reviewing those.
                       With regard to the proposed framework for
           determining regulatory requirements, that was
           discussed.  We do have a description of that framework
           and the staff has developed its questions on that
           first proposal and fed that back to Exelon and we'll
           continue to dialogue at our next meeting which is next
           week.  Again, future meetings.  We're going to discuss
           traditional engineering design and design analysis
           areas such as nuclear thermal  design.  We plan to
           have meetings on fuel cycle safety and plant PRA,
           classification of SSCs and the like.  Prototype
           testing is certainly going to be a major topic.
                       Again, we'll identify additional
           information after each of these kick-off meetings, you
           might say, that we'll have on a periodic basis and
           then that information will be documented and we will
           review that.  So we will kind of continue our reviews
           and at some point, in addition to these public
           meetings, these meetings are intended to allow
           stakeholder comments at the end of each topical area
           so we can get some input from stakeholders on an
           ongoing basis.  But in addition to that, we also plan
           to have a workshop that's specifically intended to
           invite in stakeholder comments on any and all areas. 
                       We also clearly will be meeting with the
           ACRS and ACNW as we have completed our preliminary
           assessments to obtain advice and input and ideas that
           we need to consider before we go final and also as we
           progress through these reviews, we will inform the
           Commission in SECY papers of our findings and the
           staff positions and recommendations in various areas
           and then we'll feed back.  Once we get Commission
           feedback sa guidance, we'll notify DOE and Exelon as
           to our positions and guidance in these various areas.
                       I would mention that as far as the
           Commission is concerned, in those areas where we view
           Commission policy decisions as necessary to establish
           licensing requirements such as in the containment
           design requirements or emergency planning requirements
           or a number of licensing process issues and legal and
           financial issues, the SECY paper will be a Commission
           policy decision paper.  The staff will present its
           findings and recommendations and then we will obtain
           Commission decisions and guidance and then, following
           that, we'll be back to Exelon on the NRC's
           requirements in these areas.  
                       The next slide, please.  This next slide
           lists the technical resources and regulatory expertise
           that the review will utilize.  Our strategy basically
           is to draw upon the best expertise that's available
           within the agency in both power reactor licensing and
           applicable HTGR design and technology expertise and to
           supplement it where possible, where resources allow,
           with additional outside expertise and experience.  In
           each area, we intend to form a group of one to several
           part-time staff who will review that area and, if
           possible, to supplement it with contractor support.  
                       For example, in the assessment of Exelon's
           risk-informed framework for making licensing decisions
           or establishing licensing requirements, we formed a
           review group of research staff and NRR staff as well
           as OGC staff and we do have contractor support
           identified familiar with risk-informing processes here
           in the agency.
                       I should point out that some members of
           the staff who will be working on this review also
           participated in the previous pre-application review of
           the DOE-sponsored modular HTGR in the late '80s.  We
           also have the benefit of a rather complete draft
           safety evaluation on that review and that provides
           good resources as to the issues that one would want to
           take a look at and kind of a template for going
           through this review.
                       The design and operating experience of
           Fort St. Vrain will also be factored into the review,
           and we also plan to meet with NRC's foreign partners
           with HTGR design and operating experience, especially
           those with expertise and experience in coated fuel
           particle design and fabrication, radiation and testing
           experience and those who have design and possibly
           operating experience with the passive design features
           and safety characteristics.
                       Finally, in addition to Exelon input,
           we'll endeavor to get stakeholder input from federal
           workshop and to get ACRS and ACM input.  Next slide.
                       This next slide lists some of the design
           and technology in regulatory areas where we expect
           there to be significant challenges in developing the
           guidance and the requirements for licensing of PBMR. 
           A significant area will be the development of the
           guidance on information and actions for adequately
           demonstrating acceptable fuel performance and fuel
           integrity and demonstrating fission product retention
           capabilities over the life of the fuel and over the
           life of the plant and over severe event conditions.
                       One of the key points in all of that, as
           I mentioned, will be consideration of what are the
           design basis events and, beyond design basis events,
           that the fuel will need to be analyzed.  Another area,
           just to mention one, is the guidance and requirements
           that the staff will look to develop for assuring
           acceptable performance of the core graphite components
           and reactor system pressure boundary metal components
           at the operating temperatures and levels of neutron
           flows are expected over the life of the plan.  Again,
           the effectiveness of the design features, the passive
           design features, what kind of guidance we will need
           for adequately demonstrating.  That will be another
           area that we'll be looking at.
                       Among the Commission policy issues, and
           I've tried to identify those with asterisks, the needs
           we believe will require a Commission policy decision
           are, for example, the possible use of a mechanistic
           approach to the source term.  What are the postulated
           design basis events and, beyond design basis events,
           we need to postulate.  The need for a leak tight
           containment.  Whether that's what will be required or
           whether a confinement type structure with controlled
           and filtered release would be acceptable.  That's
           clearly going to be a Commission policy decision.
                       And again, this question of using risk
           information to determine licensing requirements.  That
           is new and we feel that that ultimately will require
           a Commission policy decision.  Next slide, please.
                       I'd like to review our scheduling plans
           for the PBMR review.  I would like to mention there
           are a couple of corrections on this slide.  First, the
           third bullet should read "feedback on selected
           processing issues" and the fourth bullet should read
           "feedback on regulatory framework, financial issues
           and remaining licensing process issues."  
                       As I mentioned, we kicked off the review
           on the 30th and we plan to complete the entire review
           in 18 months which would put it out to around October
           of next year.  We're going to have monthly meetings
           with Exelon.  We intend to get written follow-up
           documentation on what's presented and we plan to
           periodically feedback, as I mentioned, to Exelon our
           policy and positions on these topics.  Again, we also
           plan to meet with the ACRS before we do all that.
                       So in just going through these feedback
           milestones, by this August or September time frame, we
           will endeavor to provide Exelon, to the extent we can,
           the staff's guidance and it's positions on the
           licensing process questions involving the early site
           permit proposal, combined license and design
           certification for initial PBMR facilities.  Also by
           the end of this year, we will endeavor to provide
           Commission policy decisions and guidance on the
           proposed risk informed approach for making licensing
           decisions and the legal and the financial issues and
           the balance of the licensing process issues.
                       Within 12 months, we expect to feedback
           non-Commission policy level positions involving the
           technical and the regulatory and technology areas and
           then finally by the fall of next year, we will intend
           to provide the results of the Commission policy
           decisions on these major design and technology issues
           to the containment design requirements, emergency
           planning, source term, et cetera.  Next slide, please.
                       This is kind of a repeat of what John
           talked about.  Again, an objective and a by-product,
           if you will, of this review is to develop the
           infrastructure to effectively and efficiently conduct
           an actual licensing review on a PBMR.  These kinds of
           development activities are fundamental to the role of
           research in supporting the agency's review of advanced
           reactor licensing.  And so we plan to develop a
           training course with the support of contractor in HTGR
           technology.  Our first class is hopefully going to
           take place this fall.  We will be developing
           analytical tools for the analysis of designs such as
           the PBMR.  
                       Also, hopefully going to have as an
           outcome a regulatory framework for conducting a
           licensing review of PBMR and possibly one that
           involves a risk-informed approach for making licensing
           decisions.  And the other thing is we will identify
           where we might need independent testing and
           experiments on things such as the fuel performance and
           possibly the need for additional industry codes and
           standards for designs such as the PBMR.  That's all. 
           Thank you.
                       DR. KRESS:  Thank you.  Any questions?
                       DR. GARRICK:  This is probably the
           question that I was half asleep on when George asked
           the question about the risk assessment.  But you
           mentioned that on the PBMR you're going to get a risk
           assessment.  What's the nature of that?  Has that been
           requested?
                       MR. RUBIN:  We have urged Exelon to
           provide as much information on the current risk
           assessment that they've done for the plan to support
           our review of this risk-informed framework for making
           licensing decisions.  I wouldn't call it a risk-
           informed regulations framework as the extent of wholly
           replacing Part 50 but we think we now understand that
           this framework is not quite going to do that but will
           through risk insights be able to identify systems
           requirements for mitigation, prevention, the level of
           redundancy in those systems, which systems should be
           designated as safety significant and also things like
           what are the special treatment requirements on the
           system.  But we're not talking about a regulations
           framework which covers all of Part 50.
                       But to answer your question, we have asked
           for that and we've also asked, to the extent possible,
           that we get information on the design itself.  We have
           not yet, except for these kinds of viewgraphs that
           we've seen today, gotten what I would call a
           significant design description and principles of
           operation document from Exelon.  I think the staff
           would very much like to get both a PRA and a design
           description so we have a context for reviewing this
           framework.  It is on our schedule.  We talked about
           that.  It's not now but it is later.
                       DR. GARRICK:  The thought is that it seems
           to me there's a possibility of a very much missed
           opportunity here.  If you're talking about gearing up
           to license for advanced reactors, I can't imagine,
           given the history of pushing for performance-based,
           risk-informed approach here, of not being further
           along than you apparently are in establishing an
           infrastructure for doing that and, if there was ever
           an opportunity and a place to start it, it would be
           with the advanced reactors.  I'm kind of shocked at
           the words I'm hearing.  Possibly, maybe, a list of 500
           other items here, 400 of them would be in a good PRA. 
           I'm just kind of struck by this passiveness that comes
           across, to me at least, with respect to getting
           serious about practicing what you're preaching.
                       MR. FLACK:  I agree with you.  The PRA is
           an important piece that we still need to get.  A lot
           of the underlining structure of that PRA is going to
           be in a sense driven by the success criteria, as you
           know, and the cost of fuels in this context is going
           to be extremely important.  So you're absolutely
           right.  We're ultimately going to have to put all this
           in perspective, and we're sort of going into it step
           by step.  We had pushed the fuels issue up though
           because a lot of -- you know, understanding that is
           going to play out in PRA.  
                       So I'm not too concerned that we don't
           have it right at this moment because in a sense it's
           going to take a while before I think they come up with
           a good one.  I mean they probably will give us one,
           but I don't know how good it will be if we ask for it
           right now anyway.  So I don't think it's holding us up
           any.
                       DR. GARRICK:  Well, I made my point.
                       DR. WALLIS:  Can I try to make a similar
           point?  I listened to NRR and RES.  Both parts of the
           agency are looking at what capabilities they need to
           develop to respond to a new design like GMR.  So
           there's a tooling up.  There's assembling expertise,
           there's building up infrastructure and all kinds of
           details.  Seems to me that you're always going to be
           playing a long game of catch up with industry unless
           you have some other framework which is inherently more
           adaptable to any new technology and it seems to me
           that this framework has to be more based on risk
           information.  It has to have a structure which puts
           risk in the forefront.  Otherwise, you're going to be
           going through and building up a tremendous amount of
           deterministic type stuff which is then particular to
           every design, and it's going to take too long.
                       MR. RUBIN:  Yes.  I would absolutely agree
           that the time is now right to move forward quickly, as
           quickly as we can to develop this kind of a framework. 
           Eighteen months ago, if someone were to propose what
           we're talking about now, you'd get a yawn from them
           because we did not know that there were such an
           interest that was going to be around the corner.  But
           now that it's here, we agree that it's --
                       MR. THADANI:  Stu, if you don't mind,
           pardon me for interrupting you.  But I think we need
           to recognize that Part 52 for design certification
           requires the applicant conduct a probablistic risk
           assessment to provide that information to the agency
           to learn what the insights are to utilize those
           insights in the design.  The only difference would be
           that under Part 52 it does, as Jerry Wilson said
           earlier, it does take you back to Part 50, Part 20 and
           so on.  Now what we're talking about is an opportunity
           to really start with a clean sheet of paper and to
           build in risk insights up front.  But anyone coming in
           under Part 52 design certification would be required
           by regulations to conduct a PRA.  There are a whole
           host of other issues.  Maybe we'll get into these
           issues later on during panel discussion.  But I think
           there should be no misunderstanding what the
           Commission's expectations are.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But the PRA the way
           things are now could probably be one input to an
           integrated decision making process, would it not?
                       MR. THADANI:  Again, it depends on what
           level of design information you have and the quality
           and robustness of the PRA.  You could establish, it
           seems to me, a conceptual approach which would use
           probablistic thinking and then you could get into some
           design specific considerations driven by the level of
           information available.  How far you can satisfy some
           conceptual set of requirements.  We're not there.  
                       One of the points I wanted to also say was
           we need to understand that while we talk about this
           small group that  John Flack mentioned, we're just
           getting started and we're very sensitive to make sure
           before we go too far, we have Commission approval
           before we expend any significant resources.  So all
           you're hearing is reporting to you on some of the
           meetings that have taken place and not really
           intensive thinking that is necessary.  We will go
           through that process once the Commission does approve
           what John was talking about under SECY-0070.  
                       So all these questions and issues you're
           raising I believe will be part of the process that
           we'll go through.  The most significant being I think
           most of us are in agreement with what's being said. 
           We want to try and maximize risk-informed thinking up
           front, clean sheet of paper kind of approach, rather
           than be overly influenced by existing structure.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Maybe we're getting into
           the panel debate here but I must say that I second
           Dana's observation earlier that we've heard very
           little about PRA today, and I'm under the impression
           that there is a gap between the staff's thinking and
           the industry's thinking.  I mean most of the industry
           people who made presentations said, and we will do a
           PRA, whereas here we are saying we want the risk-
           informed and performance-based system and so on, so
           I'm not sure that the industry and DOE appreciate how
           important risk-oriented thinking is in both the design
           and licensing of these reactors.
                       I'm sure they will say no, they do realize
           it, they do know and so on, but it didn't come across
           from the presentations.  I'm talking about
           quantitative risk assessment.  Don't tell me that
           we're thinking about safety and we're designing
           against that.
                       MR. PARME:  No, absolutely not.  I want to
           make it clear.  You were out of the room at the time,
           but we made it very, very clear that our intent on GT-
           MHR is to pick up where we left off in the mid '80s
           and I spent some time going through exactly that using
           risk assessment techniques and a risk assessment to
           build up our safety case.  We believe that had to be
           done for a new reactor type and was the direction we
           planned on going.  I understand you're busy and may
           have been out, but I want to make it clear that
           industry agrees with you completely.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I'm happy to be
           corrected.  Thank you.
                       DR. KRESS:  It sounds like we're almost in
           a panel discussion.  I'd like to take a five minute
           break before we do the actual panel discussion to give
           us time to do some musical chairs and reorient.  So
           five minutes.
                       (Off the record for a nine minute break at
           6:16 p.m.)
                       DR. KRESS:  Let's please come back to
           order.  This is the time to ask questions and to make
           comments and get your points in.  We don't have a
           particular protocol.  I don't think we're going to
           have each member make preliminary comments.  I'll just
           open it up for questions and let anybody who wants to.
                       MR. THADANI:  Since we're talking about
           the PRA, it seems to me that the way we talk about PRA
           right now is being mentioned in a way that -- because
           first of all, it seems to me we are looking at these
           new designs with old criteria.  They were talking
           about new PRA -- design and using some of the criteria
           here to get -- additional burden and I feel that
           unless we -- try to set a different kind of
           performance measures, for example -- we're going to
           simply -- requirements which may not be necessary.
                       DR. KRESS:  Does anybody on the panel want
           to respond to that?
                       DR. BONACA:  Certainly the Commission has
           been very clear, I think, in articulating its
           philosophy and moving more and more towards risk-
           informing regulations even for the operating reactors. 
           So it's very clear that when we're going to these new
           advanced designs, you're exactly right that risk-
           informed thinking has to come in up front, recognizing
           some limitations.  One has to be careful that one
           understands what the uncertainties might be.  We have
           a tremendous opportunity now to start with that
           thinking up front such that it can then identify
           potential areas where we need additional information. 
                       For these new technologies, I would expect
           we would put together a number of panels to look at
           phenomenon, see what the important phenomena are,
           identify those, rank then and rank them understanding
           what the risk implications might be.  And it seems to
           me that would be a good way to define not only the
           kind of testing programs that would be appropriate but
           also to make sure that the tools, the analytical tools
           that we have are robust enough to give us that
           analysis capability which can then be turned around
           back again trying to understand what the risk
           implications are.  
                       So I would expect we would go through that
           process.  Clearly, it's a policy issue.  You heard
           earlier about potential petition coming in from NEI. 
           I don't think they are thinking petition option any
           more, but I'm not certain.  But we are as part of our
           plan that we've been talking about that we've sent to
           the Commission, this is one of the issues and I would
           fully expect support.  That's the way we would
           proceed.
                       DR. BONACA:  The reason why, just to
           complete the thought process, my sense, from what I've
           seen and we're going to have maybe an SAR coming in
           with Chapter 15 with all the traditional analysis
           coming in.  Okay.  That's the understanding I got from
           the presentation.
                       MR. THADANI:  I think we are open, up
           front to what I described as conceptual model pretty
           much will have to take into account more than the
           Commission's safety goals because the surrogates that
           we use from Commission safety goals have two points
           essentially:  core damage frequency and large early
           release.  Clearly, we need the whole spectrum which
           means you do have to have the whole sort of CCDF, the
           complimentary cumulative destruction function.  If you
           start out that way, the questions that we would then
           face would be is that the level at which you can say
           that's technology neutral safety -- so to speak.  And
           then if you were to go design specific considerations,
           is that when you come up with general design criteria
           or something else?  
                       It is at that point that that information,
           seems to me, ought to help us come to grips with what
           are the design basis events.  They need to be driven 
           by this safety philosophy that has to be let out up
           front and which, in my view, is more than what the
           current safety goal policy statement says.
                       MR. PARME:  Let me add, in response to
           your question, whether it's a burden.  Going back to
           the DOE submittal of the 1980s.  The PRA that we used
           at that time was not a significant addition to our
           task.  In fact, it was the forerunning analysis.  The
           PSID, preliminary safety information document, which
           accompanied the PRA and had deterministic analysis,
           was pulled out of the PRA.  The PRA gave us the
           uncertainties and the understanding of this up front. 
           Obviously, two documents cost more than one but, in
           fact, having started -- and in fact, I can recall in
           1982 working with the Germans, having evolved our PRA
           with our design and the first cut being I think it was
           a 25 page memo and having evolved that through the
           early '80s as we had the design, it was not a large
           incremental cost on the thing.  
                       The only thing that became a burden was
           having gone to the Commission and having a rationale
           for why we did all these things and then to have the
           Commission come back.  It was a good interaction but
           when the Commission came back at times and you got a
           response, we don't agree, and the reasons were often
           there was no point to discuss why they didn't agree
           with what we had done.  That was frustrating.  That
           was a burden and that cost more money than doing the
           PRA.
                       DR. POWERS:  Ashok, you bring up
           phenomenology and I'm delighted that you did because
           I don't think it's possible to do technology
           independent regulation.  Sooner or later you have to
           get down to how the system really works.  I think
           that's going to raise a real headache for the NRC
           because you don't have the wealth of phenomenological
           information about these new designs that you have for
           your existing designs.  Seems to me that indeed
           frequency consequence curves look like an appropriate
           approach to go.  That means you have to go to
           something like a level 2 type analyses and you're
           going to have to make a decision along that way at
           which point you have to do your own confirmatory
           experimentation, your own confirmatory codes.  
                       It looks to me like in the past we've done
           that on a catch as catch can basis, but if there are
           indeed going to be these multiple kinds of designs
           coming to you for at least consideration of licensing
           if not actual certification kinds of applications,
           we'd better start putting in some sort of a process by
           which we can make these confirmatory experimentation
           and analysis decisions in predictable kinds of
           fashions.  That just seems like a priority that the
           ACRS and your organization needs to start kicking
           around outside of the more formal structures because
           it's going to be necessary in spades.  You're going to
           have lots and lots of head knocking taking place where
           licensees presenting test results that say, gee, I
           present you these results because I have assumed that
           coated particles failure only depends on temperature. 
           And that's a fine assumption to make but you're going
           to want validation of that.  
                       The question is do you get that validation
           or does the licensee get validation?  It's a question
           that's going to have to be answered some place.
                       MR. THADANI:  I agree.  First of all, I
           think it's very clear -- and I brought this report
           just to really make a point I think fits in nicely
           with what you said.  This is work we did on AP600 in
           cooperation with Jerry in Japan.  It was at ROSA
           facility and I can tell you it was extensive
           involvement.  I think we did 20 separate experiments. 
           Some of the work that was done here led to actually
           changes in design and impacted schedule in a positive
           way because we were able to use this information to
           respond to many of the ACRS questions, as a matter of
           fact.  
                       My own opinion on NRC's need to do
           independent testing comes from the fundamental view
           that you get deep understanding by doing things, not
           just by reviewing other people's work.  That's a
           fundamental point.  Second, there are some areas in
           the fringes which are not necessarily required by
           regulations requirements.  I personally think it's
           appropriate for a public health and safety agency to
           sort of poke and probe at the fringes.  Try to
           understand where the thresholds might be.  That would
           be independent testing.
                       In terms of confirmatory work, it's clear
           to me that there are some very crucial areas.  Fuel or
           fuel cladding may be very crucial from the metal
           things to safety.  It's the most important barrier
           we're talking about.  I think it's appropriate for the
           agency to do some independent confirmatory testing,
           even if the industry were doing some testing in that
           area.  It's amazing sometimes how much you learn by
           conducting such testing.  How certain issues come to
           surface that really get you to go into a fairly
           challenging dialogue sometimes as to how one would
           proceed.
                       Analytical tools.  Historically we have
           really gained a great deal by our ability to do
           independent analyses.  And so I personally again am
           very much in support of making sure we have those
           analytical tools that we can employ and when we get
           results, try to see if there are differences and sort
           of hone in on what they key issues might be.  
                       So basically I do agree with you but
           that's why I think PIRTS are going to be very
           important for us to know where should we focus really
           our attention in this area?
                       DR. POWERS:  I think the program you've
           carried out in high burn up fuel has shown you that
           the PIRT technology has applications for getting your
           staff up to speed beyond the thermal hydraulic area. 
           At some point we're going to have to come down to
           pretty hard and fast decisions on where to
           investigate.  I think you're right.  Fuel is going to
           be a head ache here because we just lack the kinds of
           experience with this kind of fuel that we're going to
           have to have to feel comfortable.
                       DR. KRESS:  I partially think the time
           frames are such that to get the kind of data you want
           on particularly these coated particle fuels, that is
           a difficult task because we're talking about a fuel
           that's radiated to some burn up level and get
           appropriate statistics for 15,000 per thing, it has to
           be put in a reactor, it has to be run through the
           temperature transient that you're dealing with and
           you're looking for two things.  You're looking for
           fuel quality in the first place and then you're
           looking for what do the transients do to the fission
           product release and what sort of model can you put on
           that fission product release to get a source term out
           of it?  
                       I just don't think we have the time to do
           confirmatory research in that area.  So I think NRC is
           going to have to decide on how they're going to deal
           with those particular issues.  I think they'll have to
           rely in this case on existing data and existing
           fission product release models and existing analytical
           tools.
                       DR. POWERS:  Stun me if you could, Tom. 
           I mean we've got basically models based on chemical
           diffusion and poor diffusion in a situation where
           thermal diffusion is going to be dominant.
                       DR. KRESS:  Exactly.
                       DR. POWERS:  I just don't think you can. 
           I think you're going to have to do tests and it's the
           classic story of --
                       DR. KRESS:  I'm not even sure we have the
           reactors to radiate these things.
                       DR. POWERS:  It's the classic story of
           planting trees.  The best time to plant a tree is 20
           years ago.  The second best time is right now.
                       MR. SPROAT:  Let me just say in this whole
           area of particle fuel testing, there's no doubt in my
           mind that the application of particle fuel and pebble
           bed application if we go forward here in the U.S.
           clearly will have to have a well-documented fuel
           testing qualification program that answers some of
           these questions.  However, there is significant data,
           both operational data and test data, that exists on
           particle fuel including naval reactors, and I would
           severely question the need to go back and replicate
           and duplicate at great expense and great delay all of
           that information.  I think it's incumbent on both us
           as the applicant and I think it's incumbent on the
           regulator to be able to go back, extract the relevant
           data out of the existing vast bodies of data,
           determine where the gaps are and focus the additional
           testing on those gaps and not reinvent the wheel.
                       DR. KRESS:  Is the naval reactor --
                       MR. SPROAT:  To some extent, yes. 
           Absolutely.
                       DR. KRESS:  --  How do you see the role of
           a prototype test in this respect in terms of
           validating the codes and the assumptions that go into
           it?
                       MR. SPROAT:  As we took a look at trying
           to license the PBMR here in the U.S.  Clearly, I think
           I said in my presentation, we can't go for
           certification first in this country.  We have to go
           for a COL first.  We fully expect that as we go
           through the licensing review process here with the
           NRC, there will be a number of technical issues that
           will be unresolved or open as we go through the review
           process which will need to be resolved during the
           start-up test program of the demonstration plant in
           South Africa.  
                       It's one of the great advantages we have
           with the program, at least as it's currently
           envisioned, which is with the demonstration plant in
           South Africa leading whatever we do here in the U.S. 
           We'll be able to utilize that demonstration reactor to
           reduce significantly a number of the uncertainties
           associated with the codes, with the codes, the fuel
           performance, that type of thing.  
                       So what we would like to do ideally is to
           get far enough through the review process with the
           staff here so that the key unresolved issues are
           identified and then we can jointly figure out with the
           staff and with the South African project how the South
           African start-up test program needs to be modified
           with the appropriate acceptance criteria so that the
           appropriate testing is done during that one year
           start-up test program that's in the schedule for the
           South African reactor and put those issues to bed
           before the license is issued for here.  We think
           that's a reasonable approach.
                       DR. GARRICK:  Has this data that you refer
           to been documented and peer reviewed, et cetera?
                       MR. SPROAT:  I'm not a fuel expert, and I
           personally have not reviewed the fuel data.  But the
           Germans spent over several billion Marks on particle
           fuel testing and the ABR.  They had their experience
           in the THTR.  Obviously, in the U.K. gas reactor
           program, particle fuel was also tested there and
           utilized, and we have the naval reactor programs here
           in the U.S. and over in the U.K.  
                       In addition particle fuel is currently
           being fabricated in China, Japan, Russia.  I mean
           there is a significant amount of international data on
           this fuel.  Now, does it all necessarily envelope the
           exact operating conditions of the PBMR as we're
           designing it?  Personally, I'm not sure and clearly,
           if we were to go forward with the licensing process,
           we do need to make sure that it's appropriately
           enveloped, see where the gaps are and design the
           testing qualification programs to cover that.   But I
           think we'd be amiss if we walked out of here today and
           left the subcommittee with an impression that this
           particle fuel stuff is all new and there's not a lot
           of information about it because that's not the case.
                       DR. FORD:  I'd love to hear the opinion of
           the panel about the whole question of materials
           degradation, time-dependent degradation, especially
           with a risk-informed regulatory environment we're
           going into.  I heard no one talk at all about it. 
           Every one of the designs that we've been talking about
           in other countries, Southern Korea to the advanced gas
           reactors in Britain and light water reactors in this
           country, of course, have all undergone cracking or
           embrittlement problems of some type or other.  You
           mentioned the -- chrome situation.  For the IRIS, I
           didn't see anything at all in that design to say that
           you would minimize the frequency of cracking events. 
           You may influence the impact them but not the
           frequency.  Could someone address this?
                       MR. SPROAT:  Let me start off and just
           talk about the PBMR materials.  Clearly, one of the
           areas we've looked at very closely in our involvement
           in the project is materials because you're looking at
           core outlet temperatures of 900 degrees Centigrade. 
           The ABR in Germany ran the bulk of its career at 950
           degrees C. core outlet temperature.  If you're
           familiar with gas reactor technology at all, clearly,
           you know that graphite aging under irradiation and
           temperature is a an issue and how graphite reacts
           under long-term irradiation where it first shrinks and
           then re-expands is a phenomenon that's known but it's
           very much specific graphite material dependent.
                       So my answer to your concern is, #1, that
           it's absolutely a valid concern.  #2, that it needs to
           be addressed in detail during the detail design and it
           needs to be addressed via the appropriate materials
           testing qualification program during the design phase
           and the development phase of the particular technology
           that you're talking about.  We've been working with
           the South Africans to try and make sure that their
           thoughts about what needs to be done in their
           materials testing development program coincides with
           ours, based on what we know are issues we'll have to
           look at.  As part of our application if and when we
           come in, we would have a materials test and
           development program in there. 
                       Right now, just to give you an idea,
           graphite is clearly one area.  Some sort of carbon
           carbon composite insulation material that we use in
           the hot duct piping is clearly another area.  Fuel
           we've already talked about.  The material we'll use in
           the high pressure compressor blading for the turbo
           compressors is another.  But again, we're in that
           preliminary design stage where those issues and the
           limiting conditions for each of those key materials is
           just now being identified, developed and a mitigation
           strategy put together for them.
                       MR. PARME:  Let me add to that.  Forty
           five minutes is kind of tough to cover all the
           subjects when you describe a design, but if you pull
           up the plan view of the prismatic block core, you'll
           see that both replaceable and permanent reflector
           elements are noted in there from the experience
           through the '70s and '80s and radiation experience
           with graphite type of age and radiation and who's
           changed the block is known, and that's designed for. 
                       Right now in our program in Russia, one of
           the primary things it's looking at is overhaul of the
           turbines.  We're well aware the turbines will not last
           the life of the plant.  In fact, nowhere near that. 
           And it's designed to come out.  It's designed to be
           serviced and currently we're looking at various
           alloys, alloy possibilities for the blade but also the
           possibility of whether we should go to turbo machinery
           replacement or is it possible -- mind you, these
           turbines, there's some plate out of activity on them,
           especially the turbine itself -- whether we can go in
           there though and change the blading out.  So there are
           a number of these things being looked at but, as I
           say, I wasn't the materials expert.  They sent me, the
           systems engineer and safety.  They said that's what
           they'll want to hear about.  But these things are
           being looked at as the design proceeds and certainly
           I think the industry experience says you need to look
           at that up front.
                       MR. CARELLI:  You asked about the IRIS. 
           Again, IRIS is the youngest design here and, very
           honestly, I didn't look at the materials because right
           now this is not a top priority.  In the case of the
           light water reactor, we rely on what it is the body of
           the light water reactor.  There are two things with
           IRIS -- light water reactor and the first one is our
           power rating is much lower.  We are talking probably
           half of the power rating of LWR.  Actually, we'll do
           even in AP600.  So a neutral environment is more
           benign.
                       The other thing is what I showed you
           earlier, the capability of putting internal shields. 
           For example, the vessel.  We don't want to put numbers
           but the vessel in IRIS should last a lot longer than
           the vessel we have in the present LWRs because
           basically there is no radiation in the vessel.  So
           there is no question that the materials is an issue
           and, in the case of IRIS, will be especially an issue
           on what is new.  Like the steam generators, the pumps
           that are going inside the reactor.  Those are the ones
           we'll be focusing on.  We already started already
           looking for the steam generators.  In the case of the
           pump, I mentioned the spool pump we have.
                       The only reason we've been holding on
           putting that as a reference design is because of
           materials issue of the bearings at high temperature. 
           So definitely we're going to look into that.  Again,
           it is the kind of thing that we can not look at other
           materials once we have a design.  Our first emphasis
           is to have a design.  Now we have a design and we're
           going to look at the materials.
                       One thing we've done, for example, for the
           extended life time core, the one that reloads, the
           cladding most probably is going to be a stainless
           steel.  So we've been looking at those issues.
                       MR. THADANI:  I just wanted to make sure. 
           John Flack gave us some idea of the issues.  High
           temperature material issues are amongst the top
           issues, particularly when we are talking about getting
           temperatures of 900 C. to 1,000 C.  Not only
           degradation, aging would be an issue, but we're also
           going to be looking for some other kinds of challenges
           such as thermal shock external to the vessel, for
           example.  What are the potential impacts of things of
           that sort when you have material at such high
           temperatures?  So it's going to get a fair amount of
           attention from us as well.
                       DR. FORD:  I guess as a follow-up
           question, Doctor Thadani, you weren't here when I
           asked the question this morning.  That's all very well
           and good, but you've got a severe weight limiting step
           with the number of people who can do this job
           adequately in the time that you have.  I think you've
           got a major problem.  We all have a major problem in
           that particular area.
                       MR. THADANI:  It's a challenging task, I
           agree.
                       MR. RAE:  Let me add my two bits to it. 
           The devil's in the details.  At least we at G.E.
           believe that materials are a big issue and we have
           tried to keep the design within the range of all the
           experience base that we have right now.  We have a
           second line of approach which is to make sure that the
           internals are removable, so we are making the internal
           designs such that they are easily removable in case
           whatever you taught us we didn't learn properly.
                       Finally, on the sodium reactor. 
           Unfortunately, I can't answer that question.  That's
           a little further out in time.
                       DR. KRESS:  I hope I made it clear that
           people in the audience are welcome to enter into this
           debate also if they want to make a burning comment or
           question.  
                       I have a question for you, Ashok.  You
           mentioned one possibility for frequency consequence
           curves could cover most of the regulatory objectives
           and I'm confident you can derive the end points for
           those using the safety goals.  I'm not sure you can
           get slopes, but you can get the end points.  
                       The question I have is in view of the
           advance reactor policy statement which has an
           expectation, I think, of a better level of safety,
           what safety goals are we talking about?  Are we
           talking about the ones in the utility requirements
           document or the ones we have now that we use in 1.174?
                       MR. THADANI:  Remember, 1.174 is only
           looking at deltas.
                       DR. KRESS:  No, it looks at -- also.  But
           it's debatable.
                       MR. THADANI:  Yes.  I go too far.  But I
           think I learned from experience, as we all do.  When
           the EPI requirements document was submitted to NRC, it
           had some objectives for designers.  One of the
           objectives in that was that the core damage frequency
           shall be equal to or less than 10-5 per reactor year
           of mean value.  Let me be clear.  And so on.  At least
           at that time, the guidance we got from the Commission
           was very clear that it was driven by the statements in
           advanced reactor policy statement.  
                       The view was the Commission expects these
           new designs to be safer.  Expects these new designs to
           be safer.  But that doesn't mean that we should
           establish requirements that make them safer.  Their
           view was that we should not go beyond what the
           Commission safety goal policy statement says.  That's
           the only background I have to go on at this stage.  
                       Now we're embarking on some really quite
           significantly different arena.  At that time, the
           Commission's decision, I'm sure, was driven by
           understanding what the margins were and what the
           various levels of defense that were provided.  I think
           we will have to go back to the Commission.  We'll have
           to go to Commission regardless. It's very clear to me
           that the one end point of the safety goals is not
           enough to develop risk-informed -- that's just not
           enough.  
                       So we'll have to go back to the Commission
           and seek their guidance on how much farther we can go. 
           At this stage, I can only tell you what we've been
           told up to now.
                       DR. KRESS:  In that same respect, take,
           for example, the modular pebble bed reactor.  They,
           I'm sure, show they can meet something like the early
           fatality safety goal with lots of margin.  The
           question I have there though is -- and they could
           probably meet some sort of frequency consequence curve
           that you might establish to cover the full regulatory
           set of objectives.  The question I have is how in that
           arena, how would you deal with defense in depth? 
           Where does defense in depth come into play when you're
           asking someone to just meet a frequency consequence
           curve?
                       MR. THADANI:  That's why I said that you
           can establish in a conceptual sense that you can't
           really answer these questions you're raising about
           defense in depth until you get to a specific design
           and until you understand where the uncertainties are
           to make some decisions.
                       DR. KRESS:  You would relate it to the
           uncertainties in the --
                       MR. THADANI:  It seems to me that's the
           most logical.
                       DR. KRESS:  I certainly --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  In this respect, would
           it be crazy to look at past history and say, boy, we
           were surprised four times in the last 20 years and
           we're going to be surprised again.  The prudent thing
           to do is to really require defense in depth in which
           case, of course, extra measures of defense in depth,
           in which case you reduce the significance of the PRA. 
           I wonder whether that's just an academic exercise or
           it's something real?  The reactor safety study under-
           estimated significantly the importance of external
           events and design end point study show that these were
           very important.  We were not paying much attention to
           the human element until Three Mile Island.  
                       So this feeling that we are dealing with
           a new design, new concepts, we're doing the best we
           can with the PRA, we'll use it to the maximum extent
           we can.  There's always this uncertainty about things,
           metaphysical things that we don't know about.  Would
           it be prudent to add an extra layer there at the risk
           of making the design uneconomical?  I think that would
           be a major issue, a major challenge, and I really
           don't know how to handle it.
                       DR. GARRICK:  But, George, you do agree,
           do you not, that one way to address defense in depth
           is in the way in which you express your confidence
           about the parameters?
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I do agree with that. 
           What I'm saying is that my confidence may not be what
           the analysis shows.  For light water reactors, it
           really took us what? a good 20 years to reach a mature
           representation in terms of risk matrix and so on.  I
           don't think that anyone expects that tomorrow there
           will be a risk assessment for an LWR some place that
           will come up with something fundamentally different
           the way Indian Pain and Zion did or other studies
           later.  It's mature now.  We have reviewed it
           1,000,000 times.  We understand it.  We have a
           significant experience and so on.  
                       When you start with new concepts, I wonder
           whether that kind of thinking should play a role.  I
           think that was the thinking in fact behind defense in
           depth to begin with, that we could not quantify.  I
           guess I'm talking about something that you don't like,
           John.  Unquantified uncertainty.
                       DR. GARRICK:  You're right, I don't like
           it.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I know you don't like
           that, but it's a fact that this thing is there.
                       MR. PARME:  Let me suggest there is one
           way of possibly -- I don't claim to have an answer. 
           It's a difficult question to answer, but one of the
           things that we were thinking about.  If you look at
           the '80 submittal it basically says below 5 X 10-7. 
           There's nothing else bounding us.  There was no reason
           to analyze things below there except to sum up risk. 
           But one of our thoughts -- we had the same question. 
           Finish with conceptual design.  You know there's a lot
           of uncertainty in the work you did and it's new
           design, too.  
                       But I think one of the things that built
           our confidence was we just took them all to the worse
           case and made some simple assumptions at the bottom
           and what we did then with the risk assessment though
           is we could see what were, in a sense, not so much
           from a frequency point of view but phenomenologically. 
           How bad could things go on us?  We had that on the
           table on paper.  We had the calculations that showed
           us.  Once we understood that, we suddenly were not
           quite as worried, have we missed a frequency here by
           some amount?  Have we misunderstood this?  If the
           worse case reactivity accidents were only so bad and
           took three days before you really heated things up or
           if pumping steam from the other nearby reactors for
           several days into a scrammed reactor.  I mean it's
           absurd but we could see what happened.  And it sort of
           gave some feeling for what were the chances that we
           have missed something important?  
                       Of course, our argument to the NRC was
           that's in the PRA.  It's not frequency of concern.  We
           don't want to be judged against this.  But my hope was
           they could read the same document, too, and determine
           how comfortable they were or were not with the
           uncertainties that are bound to exist.  As I say, I
           don't think it's a complete answer but it was one of
           the ways we tried to address it and I think it has
           merit.  Just understanding what's sitting there --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I agree.  I agree.  I
           mean if that argument can eliminate all this
           uncertainty that I'm talking about, then great.
                       DR. KRESS:  That, in essence, is a kind of
           uncertainty.
                       MR. PARME:  It is.  Yes.
                       DR. POWERS:  I think that's something that
           we do too little in this field is to go look and see
           how bad things become if everything goes wrong.  I
           will remind people that a lot of defense in depth
           comes about by asking the question, what if you're
           wrong?
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  On the other hand, you
           can't really push that argument too far because you
           end up with traditional deterministic --
                       DR. POWERS:  You and I have written a
           paper in which we said don't push it too far.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  Good.
                       DR. POWERS:  Push it to the first level
           and stop, as I recall.
                       DR. BONACA:  I was curious about this. 
           This morning we heard a presentation from Doctor
           Slabber in which you were mentioning, for example, on
           fuel integrity, you are designing for anticipated
           transients, 10 X 2-2 and then to the range of 10-2 X 2-6
           for licensing basis events and beyond that is
           analogous.  Are you using PRA behind this analyses in
           licensing efforts?
                       DR. SLABBER:  Yes.  To answer your
           question, we are using generic values at the moment to
           get into the ranges.  What we do and then
           deterministically we calculate the consequence and, in
           general, it doesn't take you out of the range which is
           prescribed by the licensing authority.  So even if
           you've got some error bands which are quite large, it
           still, with this type of reactor, it keeps you way on
           the low consequence level so it doesn't really impact. 
           But the question is yes, we're using generic--
                       DR. BONACA:  And so you can use that PRA
           as a basis for justifying your analysis that you
           submit into the licensing area?
                       DR. SLABBER:  Yes.
                       DR. KRESS:  Ted, did you have a comment
           you wanted to make?  You've been standing there a
           while.
                       MR. QUINN:  Okay.  I have a question. 
           It's Ted Quinn.  It has to do with process.  To set
           the stage, a number of the vendors, the applicants
           today, have discussed the importance of the pre-
           application process.  I'd just like to ask the ACRS or
           panelists.  The going forward part of the next year or
           two as we look at it, in the pre-application process
           Stu Rubin put up a list of items that are very
           important, for example, to the PBMR.  Any one of the
           applicants could have that similar list.  As you go
           forward, they've also stated that the results of the
           pre-application review are very critical to their
           management or the process of going forward after this
           is done because some of the key issues that are being
           presented, some of which are technical and some are
           policy, can get decided as part of this process.
                       Is it clear to you, the ACRS, that
           sufficient information can be developed as part of
           pre-application that the staff can review it, that the
           ACRS can weigh in and that the Commission can approve
           policy issues such as EPZ and definition of some of
           the key issues as part of this so that the companies
           can go back and go forward with a detailed design?
                       DR. KRESS:  Anybody want to take that one? 
           I'll give my opinion.  I've seen preliminary designs
           for most of these reactors.  I've seen safety analyses
           for most of them and looked at some of the
           competitional tools that they've had.  I think the
           answer is yes, that you can.  I don't know.  That's
           just a personal opinion.
                       DR. GARRICK:  I think that there's a model
           for this with respect to Yucca Mountain.  Why do you
           laugh?
                       DR. POWERS:  Doesn't sound like a
           promising model.
                       DR. GARRICK:  But a model from a process
           standpoint.  Your question was a process question, and
           the question that is being tackled now with respect to
           licensing Yucca Mountain, is there a sufficient basis
           for there to be an application for a license?  So
           that's an inherent part of the process, to establish
           that there is a basis for going forward with the
           license application.  And it's a very systematic,
           deliberate and detailed process.
                       MR. THADANI:  If I may.  Certainly we
           think we can do it in 18 months.  I just want to be
           sure that there's clear understanding of what it is
           that we will deliver.  It's sort of what I would call
           some key technical issues or key policy issues.  It
           would a roadmap basically to lay out what will it
           take, the kind of information, data, the need for
           tools and so on, what will it take for us to resolve
           throe issues?  It's not that we have developed all the
           information and resolved, clearly not.  It's just that
           laying out a roadmap as to what is it that we need so
           there's a clear understanding like the PBMR, there's
           a clear understanding of what the expectations are and
           for Exelon then to make some decisions.  
                       So I think it's a good process.  It really
           is.  It not only helps Exelon.  I think it helps us.
           It helps our reviewers as well.  Anyway, so I think
           it's doable.
                       DR. KRESS:  I think we're getting tired
           and hungry.  So I think at this point, unless someone
           wants to make a final comment, I'll recess this
           meeting until tomorrow morning.  We start again
           tomorrow in this same room I think at 8:30 instead of
           9:00.  So the same room tomorrow at 8:30.  We stand
           recessed.
                       (The committee recessed at 7:13 p.m. to
           reconvene tomorrow at 8:30 a.m.)
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, February 12, 2014