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Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment - July 11, 2000

                       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                     NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
               ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
                                  ***
                MEETING:  RELIABILITY AND PROBABILISTIC
                            RISK ASSESSMENT
     
                              USNRC
                              11545 Rockville Pike, Room T2-B3
                              Rockville, MD
     
                              Tuesday, July 11, 2000
     
               The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:00
     p.m.
     
     MEMBERS PRESENT:
               GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS, Chairman, ACRS 
               MARIO BONACA, Member, ACRS
               THOMAS KRESS, Member, ACRS
               DANA POWERS, Member, ACRS
               WILLIAM SHACK, Member, ACRS
               JACK SIEBER, Member, ACRS
               ROBERT UHRIG, Member, ACRS
               ROBERT SEALE, Member, ACRS.     PARTICIPANTS:
               MICHAEL T. MARKLEY, ACRS Staff Engineer
               ERIC HASKIN, RES
               T. KING, RES
               MARY DROUIN, RES
               BOB CHRISTIE, Performance Technology, Inc..                            C O N T E N T S
     ATTACHMENT                                              PAGE
     Proposed Schedule                                        4  
     Introductory Statement                                   4  
     Risk Informed Part 50 Framework                          6  
     SECY 98-300 Option 3 Framework                         128  .                                                      [1:00 p.m.]
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The meeting will now come to
     order.  This is a meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on the
     Reliability and Probablistic Risk Assessment.  I am George
     Apostolakis, Chairman of the Subcommittee.  ACRS members in
     attendance are:  Mario Bonaca, Tom Kress, Dana Powers,
     William Shack, Jack Sieber, Robert Uhrig, and Robert Seale.
               The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the NRC
     framework for risk informing 10 C.F.R. Part 50, described in
     SECY 0086 and related matters.  The Subcommittee will gather
     information, analyze the relevant issues and facts, and
     formulate proposed positions and actions as appropriate for
     deliberation by the full committee.
               Michael T. Markley is the cognizant ACRS staff
     engineer for this meeting.  The notice of this meeting was
     not published in the Federal Register in sufficient time to
     inform the public properly.  Therefore, we will keep the
     transcript record open for ten additional days subsequent to
     the availability if this transcript to the public to enable
     persons desiring to have written comments and oral
     statements entered into the official record to do so.  A
     transcript of the meeting is being kept, and will be made
     available as stated in the Federal Register notice -- as it
     is usually stated in the Federal Register notice. 
               It is requested that speakers first identify
     themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so
     that they can be readily heard.  We have received no written
     comments from members of the public regarding today's
     meeting.  However, Mr. Bob Christie of Performance
     Technology, Incorporated has requested time to make a
     presentation concerning the staff's proposed framework for
     risk informing 10 C.F.R. 50, Option 3, and the proposed
     revision to 10 C.F.R. 50.44.
               We will now proceed with the meeting, and I call
     upon Mr. Tom King of the Office of Research to begin.
               MR. POWERS:  Bob, before we begin, I need to point
     out that I'll have an organizational conflict of interest
     over the discussions of 50.44.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So noted.
               MR. KING:  Okay.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  For
     the record, I'm Tom King from NRC's Office of Research. 
     With me at the table are Mary Drouin, section leader in the
     PRA branch in research and Eric Haskins, who's I believe a
     subcontractor to Sandia, who's one of our prime contractors
     on the whole Option 3 risk informing Part 50.
               We prepared a presentation to walk you through the
     framework, but I know when we set this meeting up, you said
     you had a number of questions on it, and I didn't know what
     the best way to proceed is.  If you want us to just start
     through our high level presentation and you bring your
     questions up at the right time, or do you have another way
     you'd like to proceed?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Unless the members have a
     different opinion, I think that would help us focus our
     attention.  So, we can start with the prepared slides.
               MR. KING:  Okay.  What we prepared was sort of at
     a high level to walk through what is the framework, what are
     the key elements of it, particularly things like defense in
     depth and the risk guidelines, and when we get to the end,
     some of the key issues, particular the policy issues.  So,
     Mary will take the lead and walk you through the
     presentation.  Thank you, Mary.
               MS. DROUIN:  Thank you, Tom.  I'm not sure if it's
     thank you.
               Starting with the framework at high level, in
     putting together the framework, we put it together such
     that, you know, it was going to apply when we looked at the
     regulations to risk inform them, but it would go beyond just
     the actual regulations, but also to help us when we looked
     at the regulatory guides and look at DBS's, et cetera.  It
     was to help us both screen and formulate the technical
     requirements.
               When I talk about screening, to decide whether or
     not a particular technical requirement should be in the
     regulation, whether it really had any risk significance, and
     then looking at the concern that was on the table and in
     formulating the regulation, how should that particular
     requirement be formulated from a risk informed perspective.
               So, given that kind of where we were heading, we
     put together a framework.  We feel it's what we call a risk
     informed, defense in depth approach.  Then you ask well,
     what do we mean by that, and that kind of leads into the
     next bullet.  That is based upon the strategies of
     prevention and mitigation.  In looking at those particular
     strategies, we were mapping those directly from the
     cornerstones from the plant oversight, the cornerstones for
     safe nuclear power plant operation.  I don't know if I've
     quoted that directly, but we wanted to be consistent with
     the cornerstones, and so we're looking at prevention and
     mitigation.  We'll come a little bit later because there's
     strategies for prevention and mitigation which we will also
     tie back to the cornerstones.
               Then looking at prevention and mitigation, what do
     you do with these?  We also came up with what we call
     tactics, and that would go about telling you how you would
     implement those two strategies.  The analysis under which
     you were going to formulate your requirements would also
     take into consideration both your design bases and your
     severe accidents so you were able to focus on, you know,
     your risk significant accidents.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Maybe this is a good time to
     raise some comments.
               MS. DROUIN:  Sure.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I'll try to also give you
     comments on the document.
               MS. DROUIN:  Right.  We have copies of the
     document with us.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Which I understand you have
     already updated, but I'm sure the comments apply.
               MR. KING:  Yes, this has been a living document
     from the March version to an updated version, and ultimately
     in August, we hope to send the Commission sort of a final
     revision.
               MS. DROUIN:  You have the update.  We gave you the
     updated last time, so I don't know which one you're going to
     be talking to.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I'm going to be talking to the
     one before, but I will give you the section numbers.
               MS. DROUIN:  Okay.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  As I started saying at the
     previous Subcommittee meeting -- that was a Subcommittee
     meeting, right?  It seems to me this is really what we call
     in the paper from the ACRS the preliminary proposal.  It's
     not just defense in depth.  It's defense in depth at the
     high level, but then it's rationalist at lower levels.
               I believe the document itself says this because in
     chapter two, you do have discussion of the structuralist
     model, but then in chapter four, under the question number
     three, how will uncertains be accounted for in risk
     informing existing regulatory requirements.  I think that
     survived.      You have, in the paragraph there, decisions
     regarding lower level defense in depth in the form of
     redundancy or diversity are generally well suited to this
     type of analysis, and that refers to PRA, which is
     rationalist approach.  
               The other point, when I read chapter two, I mean,
     there was this discussion of the structuralist approach and
     that this is a high level defense in depth.  There is sort
     of a vacuum there.  It doesn't tell you what to do after
     that, okay?  However, if you go to chapter four, realize
     that the rationalist approach is at the lower level.
               So, I was wondering whether the discussion in
     chapter two can be edited to say look, this is structuralist
     at the high level, and rationalist to the extent possible at
     lower levels, which is a preliminary proposal, okay?
               MR. KING:  Yeah, I think --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, that's all my -- I mean, it
     sort of leaves it hanging there, and then you realize, you
     know, two chapters later that it's really rationalist at
     lower levels.  I don't know if anybody -- Dr. Kress will say
     that it's rationalist all the way.  The point is that the
     structuralist at the top, because of the uncertainties, are
     very large, but we don't want to push it that far.
               The other thing about the structuralist, the
     discussion in chapter two, there is a lot of discussion
     that's borrowed again from the ACRS letter, but it seems to
     me that the primary point which should be made is that we
     have always tried to handle uncertainty, but before 1975, we
     really didn't have quantitative measures of uncertainty. 
     So, defense in depth and safety margins was a way to handle
     them.  After that, we've quantified uncertainty, so now we
     can use some quantitative measures to evaluate how good
     these defense in depth measures are.
               I think we need a little paragraph here, somewhere
     in Section 2.2, the defense in depth approach, explaining
     that.  It would fit very nicely because it says here defense
     in depth has evolved since the first research reactors were
     designed in the 1940's, you know, and go from there.  Then
     it jumps too quickly into the rationalist instruction. 
     Before that, we can say that it was a way of handling the
     uncertainties that people knew existed in these analyses,
     but they could not quantify it.
               MS. DROUIN:  George, have you marked up a version
     with these comments that we could --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               MS. DROUIN:  And you will give those to us?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I usually don't, but I will turn
     to my cognizant federal official here.
               MR. MARKLEY:  George, you can share your comments
     with the staff.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I am sharing my comments with
     the staff now.
               MR. MARKLEY:  But did he share his mark-up with
     the staff.  Well, as much as you can share in a public
     meeting.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Can I share it with my friend,
     Mary, offline?
               MR. KRESS:  We have done this in the past.
               MR. KING:  We have done it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I have no problem sharing. 
               MS. DROUIN:  That would help us.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You would probably need to call
     me to decipher some of these things here.  These are what
     intended to be personal notes.
               MR. KRESS:  Well, you have to delete all the swear
     words.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, some of it is in Greek.  No,
     no.
               MS. DROUIN:  I have a Greek dictionary.
               MR. POWERS:  The ones of high praise for the
     senior author.
               MS. DROUIN:  No, I mean, I'm taking notes, and of
     course, there's a transcript.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I understand.
               MS. DROUIN:  But it does help to have your
     handwritten.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  We can easily run a copy, in
     fact, right now so you have it in front of you as we talk.
               MS. DROUIN:  That would be even --
               MR. MARKLEY:  We can do that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.
               MR. BONACA:  Can I get --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, there is --
               MR. BONACA:  I would like to make a comment to
     that?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               MR. BONACA:  I have no objections.  I as a member
     don't particularly care about this discussion of
     structuralistic position, at least in this document.  I
     mean, I understand where we're going.  We're discussing at
     length.  It sounds as if the world is divided into two type
     of people that think differently.  I believe there are
     historical reasons why regionally people have structuralist
     thought, because they didn't have risk analysis.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's what I just told you.
               MR. BONACA:  Yeah.  I'm saying that the way this
     has developed --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It was a matter of handling
     uncertainty.
               MR. BONACA:  -- you know, somewhat makes you
     believe that, you know, like two different religions.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, that's why we need this
     bridge.
               MR. BONACA:  Yeah, and I believe I'm in both
     religions.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.  The reason was, you know,
     essentially handling uncertainty, and in the first 20 years
     or so, we didn't have the benefit of quantification.  So,
     people resulted to these two principles.
               MR. BONACA:  I don't think that we should
     encourage almost a conflict today, just recognize the
     reality of where we can from.  We didn't have risk analysis. 
     We didn't have the ability of evaluating that.  So, that's
     all I wanted to say.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, there's no conflict.  The
     point is that even after risk analysis came along, there are
     still big holes.  So, you have to go back and revert to the
     original approach of defense and depth in margins. It's very
     simple idea.  We're not talking about anything which is
     deeply philosophical here.  I think it's important,
     especially for people who haven't seen these things before. 
     You have one paragraph explaining.
               MS. DROUIN:  I agree.  Let me translate what I
     think I'm hearing, and if what I heard is incorrect.  I
     mean, what I'm hearing is that at a basic level, in the way
     we have developed this framework with this structuralist and
     this rationalist, that the concept is not in question.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No.
               MS. DROUIN:  It's a good explanation of how we've
     done it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right.
               MS. DROUIN:  So, I welcome any comments that helps
     clarify and explain that better.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.
               MS. DROUIN:  But I'm not hearing that there's a
     basic disagreement with the concept of how the framework has
     been --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  There will be some more comments
     as we go along, but fundamentally you're right.  
               MS. DROUIN:  Okay.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I mean, you're not going to hear
     no, throw this out of the window, at least not from me. 
     Subcommittee member, of course, may have different views,
     but I thought, and I believe the committee itself had seen
     the overall framework months ago.
               MS. DROUIN:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And there was praise.  So, you
     can certainly change your minds today, but it's not my
     comment.
               MR. BONACA:  My only comment was, again, that on
     page two.  Maybe there is, would be a full recognition of
     the fact that there are historical reasons why, I mean,
     there were more structuralists before and there are more
     rationalists today.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  They agreed to do this.  That's
     what Mary said.
               MR. BONACA:  That's all I wanted to point out.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The historical reasons is the
     lack of quantification of uncertainty.
               MR. KING:  There are a number of places in here
     where I think some additional explanation would be useful,
     some better packaging.
               MS. DROUIN:  Yes.
               MR. MARKLEY:  I'd just like to say one thing.  The
     version that George has is the same one that was issued for
     public comment.  So, anyone that's referring to it from the
     transcript discussion as best we can reference the sections,
     it would help people better understand that because that
     particular document is available in the PDR.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay, that's what I'm using.
               MS. DROUIN:  But the only difference between the
     version that was in the SECY and the May version is chapter
     five.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
               MS. DROUIN:  Any differences in chapters one, two,
     three and four would have been editorial.  Maybe we caught
     typos, but it didn't change.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If I bring up a point that you
     have already responded to, just tell me and we'll go on. 
     The only reason I haven't read the new version is I was out
     of the country the last week, so I didn't have time to do
     it.  So, basically that was my comment, that chapter two,
     especially 2.2, where we talk about the defense in depth
     approach.  Actually -- yeah, it should be edited to
     accommodate, you know, my comments, Mario's comments, and
     create a better package.  The other question --
               THE COURT:  Can I ask one more question?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               MS. DROUIN:  Because I got a sense at our last
     meeting, and maybe that was incorrect, that even the
     organizations from chapters two and chapter three to chapter
     four could really be completely repackaged.  It wasn't just
     adding paragraphs here and there.  I got the sense that
     certain things and certain chapters, whole parts of it
     should come out and be moved elsewhere.  I just wanted to
     revisit if that was --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Ask me which ones.  I wouldn't
     be able to tell you right now, but I didn't find that
     problem when I read it.
               MS. DROUIN:  Okay.
               MR. KING:  Well, you mentioned we overemphasized
     that, you know, we're not to rely too much on the numbers. 
     We kept saying it over and over again.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, there were editorial
     comments throughout.
               MR. KING:  That kind of thing.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.  I mean, starting right
     away in Section 2.1, however, quantitative objectives would
     not generally appear in specific regulations, and then
     that's repeated every chance you get.  So, immediately I
     thought of a common cause there.  I mean, there must be a
     reason.  Somebody was scare that numbers might appear
     someplace and commit a cardinal sin.
               MR. KING:  Like NEI.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Huh?
               MR. KING:  Like NEI.
               MS. DROUIN:  Well, NEI had the exact opposite
     interpretation.  They read it saying numbers were going to
     appear in the regulation, so it may be in the eye of the
     beholder.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Before we leave the issue of
     defense in depth, I realize some of these things come from
     our paper, and I suspect that paper is not perfect.  The
     structuralist says here, or traditionalist model asserts
     that defense in depth is embodied in the structure of the
     regulations and in the design of the facilities built to
     comply with those regulations.  
               I've heard many people tell me that this is a
     lousy definition.  If you want to define the structuralist
     approach, you are not doing it.
               MR. KRESS:  That's a description of it, not a
     definition.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's a description, really of
     why it was.  So, I think in the context of the historical
     context of lack of quantification and handling uncertainty
     by adding successive compensatory measures, I think that
     would go a long way towards explaining the structuralist
     approach.  And then it was embedded into the regulation.  We
     did that everywhere.  Okay?  You see that paragraph?
               MR. KING:  Yeah.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The other thing that's missing
     here, and I think that's a more important point.  Do you
     want to say anything about safety margins, because defense
     in depth and safety margins were really the cornerstones
     handling uncertainty the traditional system, were they not? 
     Not just defense in depth.  So, the question might come up,
     why is this new approach an overemphasizing defense in depth
     and not safety margins?
               MR. KING:  To me, safety margins are an element of
     defense in depth, and maybe we'll talk about that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You can view them as such. 
     There's no question.
               MR. KING:  At the high level, it's defense in
     depth.  Safety margins are maybe a tactic.  We call them
     tactics, to implement defense in depth and to account for
     uncertainties in some things.  I mean, to me, safety margins
     really are more applicable when you're talking about I want
     to do a deterministic calculation and meet some acceptance
     criteria, but I've got some uncertainty in how good my code
     is, and I've got some uncertainty in how good my acceptance
     criteria are, so I throw some margins in there.  I back off
     on the acceptance criteria.  I do a conservative
     calculation.  I do 95 percent confidence.  When you're
     getting into things like reliability and availability, the
     term safety margins to me doesn't fit that well.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, it doesn't.
               MR. KING:  And then you're getting into
     redundancy, diversity, that kind of stuff.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, the whole point is that in
     regulatory guide 1174, as you know, safety margins have
     their own box.
               MR. KING:  Right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Alongside with defense in depth. 
     So now, this new document takes margins and puts them under
     defense in depth, which is fine with me, but maybe we should
     say that.  I don't know, maybe we shouldn't.
               MR. KRESS:  The safety margins I'm familiar with
     mostly apply to success criteria, which deal with, in an
     uncertainty sense, very well in PRA's.
               MR. KING:  Right.
               MR. KRESS:  So, you know, that's why we have
     safety margins, because you -- but maybe you could tie it in
     that sense together.
               MR. KING:  But George is right in that in 1174,
     they're sort of two equal separate things.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah.
               MR. KING:  But in the framework, they're not
     separate.
               MR. KRESS:  I don't think they should have been
     equal in the 1.174.  I like them better being part of
     defense in depth, actually.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I have no problem with that.
               MR. KING:  I mean, to some extent, the framework
     represents an evolution of thinking since 1.174 was put
     together.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And I think it would be
     perfectly all right to say that because, you know, not
     everyone is up to speed, you know, with these documents as
     you guys are.  Just explaining, I mean, when you say 2.2
     defense in depth, maybe somewhere there you say that by the
     way, defense -- I mean, safety margins are considered an
     element of defense in depth.
               MR. KING:  Yeah.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So the last comment on 2.2 is
     this, you know, bring back the rationalist at lower levels
     with the uncertainties, which is as I say, the preliminary
     framework we purport.  In section two on -- I just saw my
     notes -- there is a problem that I think we have to resolve
     once and for all, though.  
               The first paragraph on the right-hand column --oh,
     boy.  This is not the new version, right?
               MR. KRESS:  I've got the old version.  What page
     are you on?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The NRC has established safety
     goals.
               MS. DROUIN:  What page are you on?
               MR. KING:  Yeah, what page are you on?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Section 2.1.
               MR. KING:  Okay.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, the revision dated May,
     2000.  Actually, the paragraphs starts on the left-hand
     side.
               MR. KING:  We found it, yeah.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Although licensees are not
     required to demonstrate that they meet the quantitative
     goals, comparisons of PRA to IPE results to the goals are
     common.  Okay, my problem is that okay, then it goes on and
     says it is proposed in this document that quantitative
     objectives be used to provide guidelines for risk informing
     existing regulations.
               The first paragraph of this section talks about
     the Commission referring to this standard as either the
     adequate protection or the no undue risk standard.  What are
     we talking about, goals or undue risk, and what should the
     numbers be, the ones that are being used in the framework? 
     Should they be goals or numbers representing in some sense
     adequate protection?
               MR. KING:  They're not numbers representing
     adequate protection.  They're guidelines for the staff to
     use when they take a look at the existing regulations and
     have to decide are there holes in the regulations?  Are
     there things in the regulations that are overkill and really
     aren't contributing much to safety?  There are sort of
     guidelines for what's the baseline of safety that we're
     shooting for where we can quantify that.  The fact that
     they're based upon the Commission's safety goals means that
     they're really written at the level of how safe is safe
     enough.  
               They're not intended to define adequate
     protection.  They're not something that we expect licensees
     to come in and have to demonstrate compliance with either. 
     That was an issue NEI raised.  They looked at the framework
     and said my God, am I going to have to as a licensee do some
     analysis to show that I meet this framework?  No, the
     framework is for the staff.
               MR. KRESS:  I think it's entirely appropriate that
     you write your regulations in a sense that you're trying to
     meet the safety goals and stay away from adequate
     protection.
               MR. KING:  Yeah, you don't have to deal with the
     adequate protection question.
               MR. KRESS:  You don't have to deal with it that
     way.
               MR. KING:  And besides --
               MR. KRESS:  I don't think we have to resolve
     anything.  I think that's what safety goals were intended to
     be.
               MS. DROUIN:  Well, the other thing, by having a
     guideline, you certainly don't want to write a requirement
     that's going to be more stringent than the safety goals.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, you certainly don't want to do
     that.
               MS. DROUIN:  And so, by having the quantitative
     guidelines, that kind of gives us the measure so that we
     know that we aren't going past the safety goals.
               MR. KRESS:  The problem I may have with it is that
     the current regulations have objectives that are more than
     just safety goals.  They're objectives of limiting fission
     product releases, and most of your quantitative guidance has
     to do with core damage frequency and conditional containment
     failure probability, and you don't deal with fission
     products at all.  I have a little bit of a problem handling
     that because I don't think you can get away from fission
     products altogether.
               MR. KING:  And there are things --
               MS. DROUIN:  I don't think we did.
               MR. KRESS:  Well, I didn't see anything that
     would, say, deal with something like 10 C.F.R. 100 because
     it's not a risk dominant concept.  It's just a way to limit
     the releases of certain levels of fission products to
     certain frequencies, in my mind, that's what it is.  But
     those aren't risk dominant, and they don't involve
     containment failure.  They do involve some level of core
     damage frequency.
               MR. KING:  It's the same issue as anticipated
     operational occurrences.  They're not risk dominant, but we
     don't want to throw away the concept.  We still want plants
     to be able to ride through those without any damage.  So,
     there are things like that that we have to deal with.
               MR. KRESS:  And I guess you still deal with those
     by maintaining the design basis accident concept somehow.
               MR. KING:  We can deal with those at the
     structuralist level.  See, there are some things, and we'll
     get to a viewgraph on that.  There are some things --
               MR. BONACA:  I mean, although you're not looking
     really at those goals numerically as criteria that you have
     to meet, you're still using this as a way of looking at
     possible gaps in the fabric of regulation.
               MR. KING:  Right.
               MR. BONACA:  Okay.
               MR. KING:  And particularly severe accident gaps.
               MR. BONACA:  Okay, so you're looking at it, yeah.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  In the past, thought, when the
     staff wrote regulations, you had in mind adequate
     protection, didn't you?
               MR. KING:  No, number regulations were based upon
     safety enhancement, station black-out.  You had to do cost
     benefit analysis.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.
               MR. KING:  That's not adequate protection.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right, but you had to do a cost
     benefit analysis.
               MR. KING:  Yeah.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And now we're talking about the
     framework, the regulatory framework which will actually not
     be based on adequate protection, and there will be no cost
     benefit evaluations.
               MR. KRESS:  Voluntary.
               MR. KING:  Well --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It is voluntary.
               DR. SHACK:  Well, there is a question of how you
     apply cost benefits.  Is it regulation by regulation, which
     is the way we do it now, or is there some overall kind of
     cost benefit?  That seems to be the --
               MR. KING:  The whole issue f backfit cost benefit
     is a policy issue the Commission's going to have to deal
     with, and it could range anywhere from maybe since this
     whole thing is voluntary and we're just providing an
     alternative to an existing regulation, maybe we don't need
     to do any backfit analysis.  Or, maybe we do need to do some
     backfit analysis, and if we do, is it piece by piece within
     a regulation, or do you bundle all the changes within a
     regulation together and do it?
               MR. BONACA:  Again, it's interesting, but still,
     for example, say that you have a generic safety issue that
     you raise.  Okay, you could bring it through this process,
     and then through that determine that we have adopted the
     regulation for the specific issue.  Then you can use a
     criteria like ten to the minus six cut off point to
     determine whether or not you should do something about that.
               MR. KING:  Yes.
               MR. BONACA:  So, you're still not looking at the
     absolute, you know, CBF nerve, but you're possibly using
     criteria of that type to determine whether or not you should
     go ahead with that enhancement.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think I'm a little
     uncomfortable with this, and I wonder if there can be -- I
     mean, is the industry aware of what you're doing, of the
     distinction between adequate protection and goals and they
     have agreed that what you're doing is okay?  I've heard them
     complain that this is becoming too risk based, but that's
     not the same complaint.  That's their usual whining.  The
     question is do they fully understand that you are using
     numbers that were meant to be indicators of safe enough
     rather than adequate protection?
               MR. KING:  We met with the industry, discussed
     this issue specifically with them, among other issues, and
     they did not object.  They seemed to understand.
               MR. KRESS:  As long as you're not trying to force
     each individual plant to meet those numbers, I don't think
     they'd have any problem with it.
               MR. KING:  Again, we're making generic changes to
     the generic set of regulations.  We're not asking each
     licensee to come in and demonstrate that he meets these
     numbers.
               MR. KRESS:  They shouldn't have any problem with
     it because I suspect they feel that the bulk of the plants
     already meet them anyway.
               When you go to the Commission with these policy
     issues like funneling cost benefit and selective
     implementation, are you going to make your recommendations
     to them as to which way you'd like for them to go, or are
     you just going to leave it to them and say tell us what you
     want?
               MR. KING:  I think we ought to make a
     recommendation.  That would be my view.  
               MR. KRESS:  Do you want some input from us on
     those particular kind of issues then, or is that something
     for later?
               MR. KING:  These are going to be issues we're
     going to have to address in our August paper.
               MR. KRESS:  August paper.
               MR. KING:  Yeah, I would like the Committee's
     views, and we have a timing -- since you don't have an
     August meeting, there's a timing issue about how we get
     that, but yes, I would like to get those views.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think the Commission also
     should be presented with a clear statement that this is
     different from adequate protection.  This is what we're
     basing it on for a certain reason.  The center for strategic
     -- CSIS, asked that the Commission define adequate
     protection.  My concerns is that if we start doing things
     like this, pretty soon before you know it, simply because
     these are the only numbers that are available, they will
     become measures of adequate protection.
               MR. KRESS:  And I would wave the flag and say good
     for them.  They won't because nobody's going to define
     adequate protection, and nobody's going to put numbers into
     the regulations that each individual plant has to meet, not
     while I'm still on the Committee they probably won't.
               MR. BONACA:  These plants were not really licensed
     on the basis of this goal.  They were licensed on the basis
     of meeting the regulation, whatever regulation was in place
     at the time.  I don't think that there is an ambiguity
     there.
               MR. KRESS:  There's not much of an ambiguity
     because you can write the regulations, but they have to be
     read in such a way that they can be met in a variety of
     ways, so that some plants will exceed the goals and some
     plants won't.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Let me put it in a different
     way.  If Option 3 is based on these numbers, and by the way,
     there was a lot of discussion later of some other subsidiary
     numbers that are even more stringent for certain reasons. 
     Are we de facto ratcheting up the regulation?
               MR. KRESS:  Well, we've always had this in the
     regulations.  It's in the cost benefit rule and the
     regulatory analysis rule.
               MR. KING:  The reg analysis guidelines are in
     effect based upon the safety goal numbers.
               MR. KRESS:  And you have a safety goal policy
     statement that says policy is to write the regulations so
     that they try on average to achieve those kind of things, so
     it's been there.  Actually, they show up in 1.174.  It's the
     same numbers there, basically.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No one has the same concerns.  
     It's not an objective.  It's just a --
               MR. KRESS:  I've always been concerned that
     adequate protection has never had a quantified value to it
     because I think it's a little bit strange that we have such
     a concept and don't have a quantified number associated with
     it, but I think that's a different problem than this one.  I
     think it's a different issue.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So the least we can do then is
     in Section 2.1, maybe at the paragraph explain the number we
     are about to use are not protection numbers.
               MR. KING:  I think the document ought to be clear
     as to what these numbers represent in the relation to
     adequate protection.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Before we go on, I've been
     advised that it would be best at the end of this meeting you
     return the copy that we just gave you.  Feel free to copy
     anything you want right now.
               MS. DROUIN:  We can't read it anyway.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I suspected that.
               MS. DROUIN:  I mean, the Xerox wasn't good enough.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But you can ask me to explain. 
     That's during the meeting.  Mario?  I thought you had a
     question.  Okay.
               So, I think we beat this to death.  Yes?
               MR. POWERS:  A question.  When you focus your
     examination of the regulations on risk analyses, you usually
     have available to you things like core damage frequency and
     maybe even things like large early release frequency.  I'm
     wondering what about late small release frequencies, which
     also has to be a part of public protection.  How do you get
     measures on that to look at?
               MR. KRESS:  That was one of the things I had in
     mind when I said they didn't focus on some of the
     objectives, and that was one of them.  Late small releases
     would be something I would worry about.
               MR. POWERS:  I just made that up because it's --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Late small?
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah.
               MR. POWERS:  It's the opposite of large early
     release.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, and normally you can get it out
     of a PRA or some measure of it, but not very good.  The
     regulations deal with those things, some of the ones that we
     have now.  So, yeah, that was one of my concerns.  How do
     you deal with those kinds of things?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think they have something on
     that in the document somewhere.  It specifically deals with
     latent cancers.
               MR. POWERS:  Containment failures.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  A quantitative objective of less
     than .1 containment failure probabilities proposed, yeah,
     for a late large release in a core damage accident.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, but that's a late large.  We're
     talking about a late small.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Late small?
               MR. KRESS:  And I would worry about early smalls
     also due to some of the bypass accidents.
               MR. POWERS:  I guess what I'm asking about is here
     are some numbers that I don't see usually coming out of the
     PRA's.  I don't know that it's not possible to get them, but
     for instance, PRA's usually, in the past at least, ones I'm
     familiar with usually said all accidents are over at 24
     hours, whether they are or not.  
               When I look at the regulations and I see things
     that seem to suggest that you've got to maintain control
     room capability with outside intervention for seven days and
     30 days and things like that, these are numbers that are not
     addressed by the PRA, and I'm wondering how you handle that
     kind of issue.
               MS. DROUIN:  When you go back and you look at the
     IPE's, there were certainly a select group.  I don't recall
     how big the group was that terminated the accident at 24
     hours, regardless of where they were.  You did have analyses
     that went through the whole progression.  We certainly have
     numbers from the IPE's on late releases.  
               What you don't see out of the IPE's in terms of
     numbers are numbers associated with small releases.  We
     don't have those kinds of quantitative numbers from the
     PRA's.   That's not to say we don't have them.  We just
     don't have them.  Data that we have all tend to center
     around your large releases both early and late.  Then some
     of the late stuff, you know, is not consistent because of
     how they define late and how far they took the analysis. 
     So, on the late you kind of have a mixture.
               MR. KING:  Where we don't have risk information,
     seven days or something like that, we're going to have to
     make judgment using something else, or we leave that piece
     of the regulation alone.
               MR. KRESS:  A conditional containment failure
     probability could address if it's the full conditional over
     a whole time period.  Do you limit the conditional
     containment failure probability to conditional early
     containment failure, or is it the whole conditional?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think that's what I read,
     recover late, but also large.
               MR. KING:  It covers late, but what does late
     mean?  Is late 24 hours?  Is late -- I don't think late is
     seven days.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think it's late, the opposite
     of early.  Early is I think, the way I understand it, about
     three hours, is it not?
               MR. KING:  The neighborhood of four to six hours
     kind of thing.
               MS. DROUIN:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Then late must be after that.
               MR. KING:  But there's a cut-off.  I mean, you
     don't carry the analysis for 30 days.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, no.
               MR. HASKIN:  By the same token, small is a
     complement of large.  I mean, if you have the large and you
     have your PRA, you could extract the small release, but we
     haven't established it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I'm going to be confused now by
     my colleagues because the two colleagues that have been
     speaking for the last ten minutes were the ones that
     objected to using frequent -- well, not so much the one to
     my right -- frequency consequence curves and the CDF and
     LERF point values were good enough.
               MR. KRESS:  I like frequency consequence curves. 
     I just think -- 
               THE COURT:  But what happened?  I mean --
               MR. KRESS:  Well, CDF and LERF happen to be a very
     convenient, in my mind, is a convenient representation of an
     FC curve, if you draw lines correctly between them.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, and the argument that --
               MR. KRESS:  And if you use the whole LC part of
     that and not just the end parts.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But in terms of early
     fatalities, I thought that was the argument that, you know,
     which is what really counts.  CDF and LERF point values were
     good enough.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, and that was based on the
     concept that early fatalities generally dominated.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right.
               MR. KRESS:  That if you covered those, you've
     covered the goals you would have for late, and there are no
     goals for that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, what are we talking about
     today?
               MR. KRESS:  Well, basically the same issue there,
     and that's what -- in my mind, when I talk about goals that
     involve small releases or late releases or late small
     releases, I'm talking about frequency consequence curves
     because that --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, Dave probably doesn't.
               MR. KRESS:  Well, that's what I had in mind when I
     talk about them.  You have a frequency limit on fission
     product releases of any magnitude, and it deals with the
     whole range, the small, early.  So, I'm certainly not
     opposed to FC curves.  I think they're a good concept, and
     they can come out of the PRA if you do it correctly.
               THE COURT:  Well, and the other question is
     whether you need 84, as Dana was arguing, or you can pick
     one representative, like cesium.
               MR. KRESS:  Oh, yeah, I think that's an issue, but
     if I were going to pick one representative, I'd probably
     pick cesium.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You would or wouldn't?
               MR. KRESS:  I would, probably, yeah, because in my
     mind, I can generally correlate the iodine release with
     cesium.
               MR. POWERS:  You can if you persist in believing
     the releases are driven by the high temperature component. 
     You can't if they're driven by the aquus chemistry
     component. 
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, then you have a problem.
               MR. POWERS:  In late, you're very likely to lose
     that correlation.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, you'd have to do something else
     with the late part, and if you had an error ingression
     problem, cesium may not be the -- you'd have to have a
     different cesium curve.  You could still use cesium,
     probably.
               MR. POWERS:  And of course, you have at least one
     member of the committee that believes you always have an
     error ingression problem.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, or maybe two.  Maybe two members
     in this Committee.  Huh?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What advise are we giving this
     time?
               MR. KRESS:  Well, I don't know.  I think the
     advice is that we think CDF, CCFP or LERF --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  They like CCFP.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, are fairly good things to use
     because they're practical and they do incorporate things,
     but we believe they're limiting.  There are other objectives
     in the regulations that they want us to think with and deal
     with, and we just don't want them to forget those when they
     do this.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I'm under the impression the
     Commission decided recently on the safety goal issue that
     plant contamination ought to be part of the revision?
               MR. KING:  That's right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, if that's the case, then why
     are we discussing this?  Did they say anything about late
     releases and consequences?  My impression was, as I recall,
     that they like things as they are now.
               MR. KING:  It's basically approved updating the
     policy to be current with the practices that are in place
     today.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, there isn't an issue
     anymore.  The policy issue has been resolve.  I mean, we
     could choose to write a letter to the Commission, but I
     don't think they're staffing writing Option 3.
               MR. KRESS:  The staff is concerned in building a
     policy, I think.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But this is not the right forum. 
     Before we leave 2.2, which is really an important section in
     my view, from page 2.3, there is a discussion of the
     paragraph that starts in applying the strategies, good
     engineering practices will be maintained.  The general
     design criteria of providing many concise statements of good
     engineering practice.  For example, negative prompt
     feedback, emergency AC power.  I never considered those as
     good engineering practice.  This is not what I understand by
     good engineering practice.  I mean, these are deliberate,
     rationalist measures that have been imposed on nuclear
     engineering.  In the west and in the United States, you
     would not design a reactor with a positive feedback option. 
     Not you will have emergency power.  I mean, to call these
     good engineering practices seems to me you're stretching the
     meaning of the term.
               MR. KRESS:  It's not my usual determination of
     that term either.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.  Then I read on in this
     paragraph, requirements that the fuel design limits not be
     exceeded in anticipated operation occurrences, and that the
     extent of fuel damage be limited in design basis, accidents
     will be maintained.  Now, why do you want to make this, to
     commit yourself to the fact that design basis accidents will
     be maintained?  What if later on we become wiser and we come
     up with something better?
               MR. KING:  No, this is not intended to say we're
     going to stick with today's definition of design basis
     accidents.  I mean, I think clearly one of the things we may
     do is come up with a new set of design basis accidents that
     reflect risk consideration.  What we were trying to say here
     is we're not going to go in and make the acceptance
     criteria, core melt, for example.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think you've made it very
     clear earlier that you're not going to put the numbers up
     there.  In my view, this paragraph more hurts than helps. 
     Would you lose anything if you just deleted it?
               MR. KING:  In reading it now, I think clearly it
     needs to be modified, but I would like to come back to this
     issue of good engineering practices because I don't agree
     with everything you've said.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  Well, good engineering
     practice, we've heard those words a lot from South Texas in
     the context of quality assurance.
               MR. KING:  To me, there's an element of good
     engineering practices that fits under the structuralist
     label, and I would put prompt negative feedback coefficient
     as one of those.  I mean, that's not something you're going
     to decide based upon risk information.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, no.
               MR. KING:  I mean, that's something you want in
     the plant. I don't care what the PRA says.  That's what you
     want.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I wouldn't call it a good
     engineering practice either.
               MR. KING:  What would you call it?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I don't know.
               MR. KRESS:  A general design criteria.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, I mean, it's a design. 
     Good engineering practice usually means, you know, I will
     pick a better quality pencil, given the option, and you
     know, that kind of low level stuff.
               MR. KING:  I think use of codes and standards to
     me would be a good engineering practice.  You're not going
     to decide that based upon your PRA.  You're going to say
     hey, I'm going to design stuff to the ASME code or whatever.
               MR. BONACA:  But I think it's more than good
     engineering practice in a certain way.  I mean, for example,
     look at the word containment.  I mean, containment.  Maybe
     it's a good example to talk about.  Containment, would we
     eliminate containment if we could demonstrate that you don't
     need it?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If you convince me that you
     don't need it, yes.
               MR. KRESS:  Yes, thank you.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I want to be on record that I
     would.
               MR. KRESS:  Thank you, George, thank you.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  This seems to be a sacred cow,
     like this -- we don't want it to be risk based.  It has to
     be risk informed.  I mean, come on.  Yes, if you can
     convince me, why should I have it.
               MR. BONACA:  Remember that the Titanic didn't have
     enough life boats because it was unsinkable.  
               MS. DROUIN:  Maybe one way to look at these things
     is that they're the outcomes of your good engineering
     practice.  If you want to go in and say maybe your good
     engineering practice is to have diversity redundancy, and
     how do you go about achieving that.  Well, you have a
     containment, you have multiple barriers.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I know, but even you in here,
     you know, you say the general design criteria provide many
     concise statements of good engineering practice.  For
     example, negative prompt feedback, emergency core cooling
     containment, are all called for in the GDC's and deemed
     essential to the defense and depth approach.  So, you are
     going now from good engineering practice to defense in
     depth.  I don't know, I think most people don't pay
     attention to these things, but I don't --
               MR. KRESS:  I would be tempted, George, just to
     call that a good defense in depth approach.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right, that's what it is.  
               MR. KING:  I'd say these defense and depth
     measures will be maintained no matter what.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But I wouldn't call them good
     engineering practice.
               MR. POWERS:  I agree with that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's the structuralist approach. 
               MR. KRESS:  They're structural defense in depth.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It the structuralist defense and
     depth.
               MR. BONACA:  And I believe the uncertainty issues
     to the issue.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But the negative prompt feedback
     is not defense in depth, is it?
               MR. KRESS:  Not at --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I mean, it's a matter of
     controlling the thing.
               MR. KRESS:  Not traditionally, but --
               MR. BONACA:  No, but there's a preventative
     defence in depth concept.
               MR. KING:   I tell you, that's an important
     fundamental aspect you want your design to have.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But you want to control it.
               MR. KING:  It's because you don't want to rely on
     a control system to do it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, inherently.
               MR. KING:  So, I mean, it's an inherent defense --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's not what I'm saying, that
     I believe that if you delete this paragraph and maybe other
     few lines that make clear the stuff we just discussed, like
     yes, there are essential elements of defense and depth that
     will be maintained.  Then I don't know what you want to say
     about the GDC's, but --
               MR. KING:  I agree.  This paragraph needs some
     work, but I think basically what we're trying to say is
     reflected on our slide four in that there are some elements
     of defense and depth that are going to be implemented
     regardless of what the risk analysis says, and there's going
     to be others that are going to be dependent upon the risk
     analysis.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You don't have to put it that
     way.  You don't have to put it that way.  It will be
     maintained.
               MR. KING:  All right, and I think we ought to try
     and list those, or list examples of those.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And then there is this
     discussion here that goes into detail that the reader, you
     know, for example, it's been suggested that the number of
     regulatory requirements have led to the fuel design limits
     during normal operation could be eliminated, because the
     intent of GDC 10 is being met for commercial reasons so the
     requirements are not risk significant.  I mean, I probably
     have to read the whole report to understand what this means.
               MR. KING:  Well, it means we found some things
     that don't have any risk implications and you really don't
     need them as requirements to keep the fuel intact.  So,
     those are candidates for removal.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay. If you put it that way,
     it's a general statement that I understand, but referring to
     GDC 10 and so on.
               MR. KING:  Like I said --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  There are too many thoughts in
     this paragraph.  I mean, it's really loaded with thoughts
     that somebody obviously is a veteran of regulatory wars.  
               Now -- oh, you're now in your tactics.
               MR. KING:  Well, we put that up because you
     brought up the issue of negative power coefficient.
               MS. DROUIN:  Our viewgraphs, George, do not
     necessarily follow the outline of the report.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
               MS. DROUIN:  I like the way we're going through
     the report.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay, great.
               MS. DROUIN:  I mean, to me, this is very helpful.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  On 2.5, off the old and the new
     one -- maybe that's what I can do, huh?
               MS. DROUIN:  So you like 2.4?
               MR. KRESS:  You can't assume that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Silence means -- I think the
     strategy was all right.
               MS. DROUIN:  There's not a 2.5.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Page 2.5.
               MS. DROUIN:  Oh, page 2.5.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's still section 2.3.  The
     four high level defense in depth strategies on the left,
     paragraph on the left.
               MS. DROUIN:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The four high level defense in
     depth -- you don't have that figured.  Do you have a
     transparency of the figure?
               MR. KRESS:  It's figure 2.1.
               MS. DROUIN:  Yes, we do.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, but I mean to show it up
     there.
               MR. KING:  It's not in your hand-out.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right, right, right.  So the
     four high level defense in depth strategies are
     intentionally more focused than the reactor safety
     cornerstones.  Now, the reactor safety cornerstones are
     initiating events, right?
               MR. KING:  Yeah, the four that are up there.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Why are these more focused?
               MR. HASKIN:  Basically, we're not dealing with
     fuel handling, fuel storage, rad waste storage tank rupture,
     those types of requirements in this pass-through.  We're
     concentrating on the core damage frequency.  You don't get
     core damage from rad waste tank rupture, for example.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So these, don't worry about
     these things.  You don't have those here, do you?  These are
     just reactor?
               MR. HASKIN:  As we proceed to the quantitative
     goals, yes.  I mean, it doesn't show on this viewgraph.  If
     you read the cornerstones, they're concerned with accident
     prevention no matter what the accident is, whether it can
     lead to core damage or not.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But isn't the original statement
     from the Commission on QHO's referring to operations at the
     nuclear power plant?  They don't really distinguish between
     reactor accidents and other kinds of releases. 
               MR. HASKIN:  Right.  I think this is an insight
     that we obtained from risk assessment, is those types of
     accidents really aren't the risk dominant ones.  Hence, our
     focus on core damage.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But you could have public --
               MR. HASKIN:  Conceivably, there could be
     regulations dealing with those types of accidents that could
     impose excess burden.  If they did, we'd take a look at
     them.  You know, our framework strategies and quantitative
     objectives, we didn't feel that that was the appropriate
     place to focus.   
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  The paragraph in
     describing the cornerstones, the strategies to break this
     down?  I suggest you delete everything up until containment
     failure for all conceivable accidents.  Then you say, the
     use of all four strategies constitutes a high level defense
     in depth approach, which compensates for the limitations of
     the individual strategies, and assures that the risks to
     public health and safety will be low and consistent with the
     top level objectives.  Everything else is not needed.
               I'm a little bit uncomfortable the way this is
     going, though.  I mean, do the other members of the
     subcommittee feel this is a good Subcommittee meeting?
               MR. POWERS:  I think you're belaboring individual
     comments.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, we are hitting big and
     small here, but we have had no other opportunity to discuss
     this report, which is one of the most important reports the
     staff is going to release, and I'm not allowed to give them
     my comments in private.  So, I don't know how to do it.
               MR. MARKLEY:  George, what we could do is if you
     have some higher level comments, we could provide them to
     them in like a memo or something of that nature, which we
     could also, you know, make available to the public.  I think
     that would be the better way of doing it, the editorial type
     things, unless they have a real major impact.               
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The editorial I agree.
               MR. MARKLEY:  yeah.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  At the high level, no.  We
     should discuss them now.
               MR. MARKLEY:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, there is a table 2.1 on page
     2-6.  Tactics and examples of related regulatory documents. 
     You say that the safety goals under PRA's IPE's is a tactic? 
     I thought that was the top objectives that was driving
     everything.  See safety goals under PRA's, IPE's?
               MR. KING:  Yeah, I see it.             
               MR. KRESS:  I think it's out of place in this
     thing.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's completely out of place,
     isn't it?
               MR. KING:  Yeah, I tend to agree.  I'm not sure
     why that's there.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And then next to special
     treatment, there's a parenthesis, non-scope.  I don't
     understand what that means, non-scope?  You see special
     treatment in the same column?
               MR. KING:  Uh-huh.
               MS. DROUIN:  I can't answer why the word non-scope
     is there.  It doesn't make sense to me.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Fine.  You will look at it later
     and take action.  
               Now there is something that's a little bit more of
     substance.  At the beginning of 3.0, quantitative objectives
     for the framework, the second sentence of the first
     paragraph.  The intent is to develop requirements which
     retain deterministic characteristics in such a way that
     compliance will provide reasonable assurance.  Now, why do
     you want to insist that they will be deterministic?  I mean,
     in the maintenance rule, not all requirements are
     deterministic, and it's already out in the street.  The
     revised oversight process certainly uses frequencies for
     initiating events,  unavailabilities for protective systems
     and other things.  Not all requirements will necessarily be
     deterministic.
               MS. DROUIN:  I think all we're trying to say
     there, and it was probably a misuse of the word, is that a
     defense in depth characteristics.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, this comes back to my
     earlier comment that you're protesting too much various
     places.  You know, we will never use probability numbers as
     part of the regulation.  I saw this as being consistent with
     that approach, which there is no reason.  I mean, some
     numbers come naturally in some places, like the frequency of
     initiating events, or unavailabilities, the maintenance
     rule.
               MR. KING:  Well, we sort of went into this with
     the ground rule that we wouldn't put the risk numbers in the
     regulations themselves.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think you mean higher level. 
     You mean core damage frequencies.
               MR. KING:  Or damage frequencies.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, and I agree with that
     because the whole framework, as you say correctly here, will
     make sure that if you meet those lower level requirements,
     then you meet the top.  I don't think you should be so
     absolute as to say that even at the lower levels, the
     probability risk numbers are out of the question.  There's
     no reason for that.  You already have regulations that use
     them.  Maybe there should be a distinction of some sort.
               MR. KING:  I don't think we have regulations that
     use them.  I think we have reg guides and SRP's that use
     them, and I think in our -- in this effort --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, maintenance rule is a
     regulation, is it not?
               MR. KING:  Well, reg guide is a one way, one
     acceptable way to meet the regulation.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, but the maintenance rules.
               MR. KING:  Oh, is a regulation.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Regulation.
               MR. KING:  Yes, that's a regulation.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It doesn't have numbers itself,
     but it asks the licensee to specify such a number.
               MR. KING:  Yeah, and that's reasonable.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And that's reasonable.
               MR. KING:  And in this effort, it might be
     reasonable to have a reg guide or something that has numbers
     in it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's right, but also in this
     effort, you should say that, you know, you will try to have
     deterministic requirements as much as you can, but in some
     instances, at low levels, you know, some unavailabilities or
     frequencies would be natural to use, e.g., see maintenance
     rule.  So, people would not be shocked, that it's something
     that they have already done.
               MS. DROUIN:  No, it is very conceivable that in
     the implementing documents of a regulation, you could
     certainly see numbers, but we're just talking about the
     actual requirement in the regulation.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But I mean, the way I see it,
     Mary, is that you are taking an extreme position.  You are
     saying we will not produce anything that will be
     probablistic.  They will all be deterministic
     characteristics, and that's not what you intend.
               MS. DROUIN:  No, that's not what we intend. 
     That's not what we're saying.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.  Now, in the next column,
     you go into the details of how the average individual risk
     is determined by dividing the number of fatalities to one
     mile, weighted by the frequency of accident and so on and so
     on.  I didn't think that that was part of the regulation. 
     This is just what happened.
               MR. KRESS:  That's a part of the definition in the
     safety goal policy.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Is it in the safety goal policy
     statement, that you should do it that way?  I thought you
     were postulate an individual being there 24 hours.
               MS. DROUIN:  I'm sorry, George.  What was your
     comment?  I missed it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The bullet on the right.  It
     starts the individual risk.
               MS. DROUIN:  Correct.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Towards the end, it describes
     how the average individual risk is determined.
               MR. KRESS:  My understand is this is exactly how
     you do it.
               MS. DROUIN:  This is --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, this is how you do it, but
     is it how it is stated in the QHO statement?
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah.  
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I'm not sure.
               MR. KRESS:  Somewhere it's stated that way.  I'm
     not sure it's in the QHO.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I'm not sure it's in the QHO's.
               MR. KRESS:  But that's been my complaint for a
     long time.  What this does is treat all sides the same. 
     That means an accident that kills 100,000 on one site is
     treated the same as an accident that kills 10,000 people on
     another site.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Because you are exacting the
     societal aspect.
               MR. KRESS:  I'm saying they don't have a real
     societal vote.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  They don't have societal, but
     I'm objecting to even describing how the average individual
     risk is calculated.  It seems to me --
               MR. KRESS:  Well, I think this is my understanding
     of how it's done.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Does anyone know?
               MR. KRESS:  I'm sure this is how it's done.  
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.
               MR. KRESS:  I'm not sure where it tells them it's
     done.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's where my question is.
               MR. KRESS:  And I thought it was in the safety
     goal policy statement.
               MR. HASKIN:  It's a direct quote, but I'm not sure
     it's --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I'm sorry?
               MR. HASKIN:  It's a direct quote.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  From the goal?
               MR. KRESS:  I've read it somewhere.
               MR. HASKIN:  Because I tried to write it a
     different way.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  From the safety goals --
               MR. KRESS:  I've read it somewhere, and I think
     it's in the safety goal policy statement.
               MR. HASKIN:  I don't confirm that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That statement needs to be
     defined.  Now again, here is a defensive thing.  The
     right-hand column near the bottom, the QHO's and related
     subsidiary objective set forth in the section applied to
     mean risk measures.  Unfortunately, the QHO's are difficult
     to apply.  Simply replacing existing regulations with the
     QHO's would be an entirely risk based approach, heaven
     forbid, which you would not assure defense in depth.  I
     mean, gee whiz, we are grown people, guys.  Come on.  I
     mean, it's again, this fear of risk based and trying to
     soothe somebody because they're bound to explode.  
               I don't think you need statements like that.  Take
     them out.  This is what we're doing because it makes sense. 
     It's a rational way to do things.  To try to apologize --
     and then on the next page you say that the subsidiary
     quantitative objectives are developed from the QHO's and are
     generally consistent with subsidiary goals.  Well, we have a
     report from a former fellow that says that's not true for
     the CDF.  A CDF of ten to the minus four, in fact, is not
     consistent with the QHO's.  It's much more stringent.
               MR. KRESS:  That's why they put the word generally
     in.
               MR. UHRIG:  That's with a factor of ten?  Well,
     but the subsidiary goals, the Commission gave us the ten to
     the minus four back in 1990.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But then --
               MR. UHRIG:  I mean, that's a subsidiary goal.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Do you have your figure 3.1 in a
     transparency?  Can you put it up?
               MS. DROUIN:  Yeah.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  So, one question that was
     raised earlier is under mitigate, condition of probability
     of early containment failure, right?  Why don't we have
     late.  Is that a question that you guys raised?
               MR. KRESS:  That was one of them, yeah.
               MR. POWERS:  Another question Dr. Kress frequently
     raises and might be raised in connection with these figures,
     is suppose that I have done an analysis and persuaded myself
     that my plant has a core damage frequency of less than ten
     to the minus four per year.  I think Dr. Kress might well
     ask gee, at what confidence level do you think that you have
     met that criteria on ten to the minus four per year?  I
     wonder if you have a confidence level in mind for these
     things?
               MR. KING:  We have a mean value in mind.  Maybe we
     ought to go to our viewgraph.
               MR. KRESS:  You can also have a confidence level
     associated with the mean.  Even just saying the mean, to me,
     implies a 50 percent confidence level in the mean, but I'm
     not sure that's what you mean or not.
               MR. KING:  No.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  They mean that mean value is
     calculated in a PRA.
               MR. KING:  Right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So the curve that gives you the
     core damage frequency until you find the mean value.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, and if you put uncertainties --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  On the curve?
               MR. KRESS:  On the curve, you get a confidence
     level in the mean.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, but nobody --
               MR. KING:  No, but no PRA does that.
               MR. KRESS:  You won't get it out of the PRA, but
     that's the way you do --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You don't get it out of
     anywhere.
               MR. KING:  The reason we selected the mean was
     simply because that's what the safety goal would -- that's
     what would be consistent with the safety goal.  The safety
     goal is essentially based on the means.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Perhaps what you need here,
     Eric, is a similar statement like the one in 1.174, that if
     the mean values are close to these limits, there ought to be
     increased management potential as to the issue of
     uncertainty.
               MS. DROUIN:  But remember, we're not applying
     these numbers on a plant specific basis, and I think that's
     a very important --
               MR. KRESS:  There's no way of knowing whether the
     mean value approach is there or not.
               MS. DROUIN:  -- difference here that comes into
     play.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, what are we applying them
     to?
               MR. KRESS:  How they write the regulation.
               MS. DROUIN:  How we write the regulation
     generically.  We're not writing a regulation to a specific
     plant.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's true.
               MR. KRESS:  And in fact, I'm not sure how you
     translate these numbers into the regulation unless you do it
     like the intent, and that's looking at limits on the
     anticipated initiators and frequent initiators.  Unless you
     get down with that level, you are actually -- you know, you
     actually have to write the regulation in such a way that you
     meet these frequencies.  I don't know exactly how you do
     that, and that's kind of an interesting --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Generic business.  I mean, let's
     say the 19 PWR's have a greater damage frequency, so none of
     these regulations would apply to them.
               MS. DROUIN:  I'm sorry?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  We have right now, as you point
     out right now, as you point out in the report under ID's, 19
     PWR units where CDF is greater than ten to the minus four. 
     Some would say there are many more because they have not
     included a number of other contributors, but you look at
     numbers, I mean, the reports right now, it says 19.
               MR. KING:  Then we ought to look at what's causing
     that.
               MS. DROUIN:  What's causing that.
               MR. KING:  Look at the 19 and say what's causing
     that.  If there's some generic item that's causing that to
     happen, maybe we ought to think about a change to the
     regulations to take care of that generic item.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Say it's not generic.  With the
     regulations you produce here, then it should not be
     available to these people because they're already above the
     limit.
               MR. KRESS:  This won't appear in your regulations. 
     They'll have something else in the regulations.  This very
     well could meet those regulations, even as they are now and
     not meet these numbers.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's not clear to me what the
     use of these would mean.
               MR. KRESS:  It's not to me either.  I'm not sure
     how you translate this into a regulation.
               MR. BONACA:  Well, the interesting thing about
     this table is that the column on the left, anticipating the
     issue, et cetera.  That is exactly what you have in the core
     licensing basis.  Even those frequencies in the aggregate
     are consistent with what is using the standards that goes
     into the current accident analysis.
               MR. KRESS:  The DBA.  These are the DBA's.
               MR. BONACA:  Exactly, the frequency.  Now, the
     only thing that didn't exist then was then the condition or
     core damage probability, et cetera.  Now, what you're
     looking at then is specific requirements implemented that
     would address conditional core damage probability for an
     anticipated initiator and how in the aggregate they would
     contribute ten to the minus four.  That's what you would be
     looking at, right?  You would be looking at the effect of
     requirements imposed to deal with conditional core damage
     probability for a set of anticipated initiators.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, I was guessing they would use
     these numbers, just like they do now, in designing a set of
     design basis accidents, and in describing the
     characteristics, you have to go into the medium.
               MR. BONACA:  Before you can link it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But would these design base
     accident apply to the current generation of reactors or the
     generation four?
               MR. KRESS:  It would apply to any reactor that
     volunteers to use the risk base.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I mean, my plant has already
     been designed against it.
               MR. KRESS:  So, that's the whole question of the
     backfits.
               MR. BONACA:  But no, taking the example of the
     loca.  You know, you go to the frequent initiator.  Why
     don't we just talk about an example to make it clear to all
     of us.  If I would put the loca inside the frequent
     initiators, right?
               MR. HASKIN:  Yes.
               MR. BONACA:  Less than ten to the minus two, the
     reactor in the aggregate of all infrequent initiators.  Then
     I would look at the effectiveness of these is yes.  I would
     have to demonstrate that the requirements should impose, you
     know, that the conditional core damage probability resulting
     would be less than ten to the minus two.  That would be a
     criterion to impose the expectation on this is yes,
     performance.
               MR. HASKIN:  Right, but you can take that example
     a little further, and you can say well, there's a certain
     class of large locas, large pipe break locas, which may
     actually have frequencies of ten to the minus six per year. 
     Then we ought to be looking at eliminating those as design
     events.
               MR. BONACA:  Exactly, so what you would be looking
     at is, you know, whatever you have in excess.  Then there
     would be a way of trimming whatever you do not have in
     excess, so you're lacking.  You may have new considerations.
               MR. HASKIN:  Right, and I think in retrospect in
     practice, we'll wind up applying this more to accident
     classes than to the three classes as we've, you know,
     enumerated from here.
               MR. KING:  I think there's two aspects.  There's
     the aggregate aspect.  There's the overall core damage
     frequency LERF number.  Are they being met, or is there some
     class of plants that isn't meeting it?  Then there's the
     looking at individual accident classes.  There we've chosen,
     you know, one-tenth of the numbers in this table as sort of
     a guideline to look at individual acts and classes.  You
     don't want one accident class to chew up the whole --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Which brings me to another
     thing.  I mean, this seems to be a very severe application
     of the concept of defense in depth.  You start out with
     defense in depth.  Because of defense in depth, you have
     prevention mitigation.  Because of defense in depth, you
     have the four columns limiting the figures of initiators and
     so on.  So, you have a multiple application of defense in
     depth there.
               MR. KRESS:  Even down to the ten percent.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And then in the footnote, you're
     throwing a bomb.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, that's a real one there.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's really a big one.  You're
     saying even for each one of these, no individual accident
     sequence should contribute more than ten percent of the
     goal, which is -- the first time I saw that was in Sizewell
     B.
               MR. KRESS:  That's a very interesting concept.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The question is why.  I don't
     think it's even discussed in the text.  Even if it is
     discussed, I mean, the question is why did you feel that
     there was a need for such a multiple application of defense
     in depth?
               MR. KRESS:  And then my comment in the
     subcommittee meeting on that was why just ten percent on the
     contribution to the main?  Why not a percentage applied to
     the -- related to the uncertainty also?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That would make it even worse,
     but you see the point, Tom?
               MR. KING:  I understand your point.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  There's this little thing that
     says when applying the quantitative guidelines.  In smaller
     font in the note, it really is a major constraint.
               MR. KING:  And I'm probably largely responsible
     for putting that in there.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well --
               MR. KING:  I mean, it seems to me what this table
     is doing is trying to say what's the balance we'd like to
     see when we employ defense in depth?  I mean, we always talk
     about prevention and mitigation, but this is an attempt to
     quantify what's the balance between prevention and
     mitigation, and even cut it a little finer, looking across
     initiating events, prevent core damage and so forth.  But it
     doesn't seem unreasonable to say okay, even if you achieve
     this balance, I don't want one accident to chew up the
     whole, you know, the whole segment of that balance I'm
     trying to achieve, and therefore, I took it a step further
     and said let's, you know, let's look and see if we do have
     one accident like that.  Let's have some criteria in here
     that will force us to take a hard look and maybe make some
     judgment that even that's too much.
               MR. KRESS:  This is our whole argument we had in
     the joint subcommittee on risk allocation.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.
               MR. KRESS:  And I was advocating this risk
     allocation, but I was advocating that you also have to
     factor into it the uncertainties, contribution due to each
     of these sequences.  You can't just use the ten percent.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  In essence, that's what Tom is
     doing.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, but --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  He says based on what I know
     about the uncertainties.  I think a ten percent value is
     reasonable, I mean, without becoming explicit.  
               MR. KING:  If you're concerned that this might be
     too rigidly applied --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Let me give you what my concern
     is.  First of all, as I say, the first time I saw this was
     in the context of the Sizewell B debate, and I was very
     impressed by it.  At that time, I happened to be advised in
     the director of the new production reactor, DOE.  Everybody
     thought it was great until we actually did some
     calculations, and the seismic risk was way up there.
               MR. KRESS:  And there wasn't anything you could do
     about it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And there is nothing you can do
     about it.  I mean, unless you are willing to double your
     budget to bring down the seismic stuff, there's nothing you
     can do about it.  So, it's not always feasible.  I think you
     can find -- that's one argument, and I think you can find
     different words that express the same thought without
     sticking the ten percent there.  Maybe you want to say that
     it would be desirable to have a balanced design in the sense
     that no accident sequence unduly dominates something like
     that.  So now, if you have this thing with the seismic where
     you can't do much about it, at least you can say well, it
     says unduly, it says this, you know, that kind of thing.
               The second point here is that again, because
     you're using -- see, I come to my earlier comment.  You are
     using goals, not adequate protection.  I mean, how far down
     are you going to go?  You have defense in depth already
     twice.  Now you are adding another defense in depth measure
     on a goal, which is good enough.  I understand doing that on
     adequate protection numbers, but not on the goal.  But
     that's more of a philosophical objection.  I think the other
     one is more practical.
               MR. KING:  Yeah.  I understand your first line. 
     It's a good point.  Maybe we ought to -- it comes across too
     rigid.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.  That was, in fact, the
     compromise and then --
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, we had to compromise.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- the letter that Dr. Kress
     referred to, that we kept referring to a balanced design,
     balanced -- not allocation, balanced defense in depth
     concept.
               MS. DROUIN:  But I do think that you need to at
     least have a starting point.  I agree that I don't think you
     should have -- you shouldn't apply it rigidly, and I think
     you're going to need to take it on a case by case.  
               Personally, I don't like words like unduly.  I
     don't know what that means.  Does that mean ten, 50, 60, 70? 
     You know, you ask ten people, ten people will give you a
     different answer.  I do think that you ought to have
     something that you start from.  You don't apply it strictly. 
     You know, you go in there, but at least, you know, that's
     the ballpark of where you're at.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think, Mary, you're going to
     have that problem with a lot of risk informed regulatory
     documents, that you have to be deliberately fuzzy, because
     the moment you put numbers down, you know, why 60 percent? 
     Why not five percent or ten percent.  I think it means you
     would like to see it sort of an equal distribution, but
     you're willing to accept something else, and you're willing
     to listen to arguments.  That's what it means.
               MR. KING:  Yeah, I mean, this is a level of detail
     one step below what's in 1.174 in terms of having another
     layer.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, that's right.  This is the
     first time we're using this.
               MR. KING:  Right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And I also would recommend that
     you take it out of the note, or leave it there but also
     discuss it somewhere else, because it's really an important
     thing.  In fact, raise Mary's concern in that we recognize
     that, you know, you can't have --
               MS. DROUIN:  We took the concepts from 1.174 that,
     using your words, are fuzzy, and tried to come up with some
     working definitions, recognizing they were just working
     definitions, that it was a place to start.  They weren't
     absolutes, but at least it was something that, you know, we
     could put our hands on.  Then, as you look at it on an
     individual basis, does it make sense to use a two percent. 
     Maybe for this particular case, a 50 percent is better, but
     absent anything else, what's your fallback position?  I
     think, you know, you owe it to people to tell people what
     you mean.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You'll get into trouble with ten
     percent.
               MS. DROUIN:  That's my personal opinion.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I bet you.  Go back and look at
     the IPE's.  It's a routine.  It's a routine that one or two
     initiators dominate everything else.
               MR. SEIBER:  Cold pump seal failures.
               MR. KING:  Yeah.
               MS. DROUIN:  Yeah.
               MR. SEALE:  I can just see you now going through
     and de-rating the quality of your design so that you've got
     some competition.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  This was not the intent.
               MS. DROUIN:  But I think that if you go to the
     point where you don't want something to unduly dominate,
     then you owe it to explain what you mean by that.
               MR. POWERS:  My understanding, Tom, of your idea
     behind your phrase there was it might really be that if I
     have a ten to the minus seven plant, that it's nine times
     ten to the minus eight of that is one accident sequence, and
     that's fine.  You don't have any troubles with that.  That
     it's only if I have a ten to the minus -- I have a nine
     times ten to the minus fifth plant.  If you don't want to
     see eight times ten to the minus fifth of that coming from
     one sequence.  Is that my reading of it?
               MR. KING:  Yeah.
               MR. POWERS:  So, no, I don't think that you're
     going to run into a problem.  I don't think this phraseology
     leads you to de-rating things to get competition because I
     think we do have plants in the IPE's where because of the
     way they did things and the way they've been things, there
     are dominant accident sequences that make up big fractions
     of the total, but it's a small total.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, but that concept doesn't come
     across here, I don't think, that you know, that was one of
     my argument I tried to make with those, that if the overall
     risk number of a plant is very small, I don't care if it's
     completely dominating the one accident if it's very small,
     and any uncertainties are dealt with, but if you're up there
     near the margins, then I worry about one accident dominating
     it, but that makes it a sliding scale, in essence.  You
     know, a flat ten percent doesn't capture that sliding scale
     concept to me very well.
               MR. POWERS:  Well, okay, maybe there's some
     language in there, but I'm saying how I read it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think there is also an issue
     here of cost benefit because I think even if it is, you
     know, one accident that says, that has about 70 percent of
     the core damage frequency, and you are close to ten to the
     minus four, if that accident is, as I say, as was the case
     with NPR, and it would nearly double your budget, just to
     bring that down by a factor of three or four or five, would
     you do it, since you are already meeting the goal?
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, that's the concept.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, I think the phraseology
     should be vague enough to allow for flexibility but also
     send a message that really a balanced design would be highly
     desirable, balanced in the sense of nothing really
     dominates.  The reality is that the one or two things will
     always dominate.
               MR. POWERS:  I would encourage the language to be
     specific enough to allow some flexibility rather than vague
     enough to be.  
               I wonder if I could come back to something Eric
     said.  You said gee, we might find some LOCA's that have ten
     to the minus six probabilities and less that we should think
     about getting rid of from the regulations.  My mind turns to
     the issue of reactivity control accidents.  I don't think
     they -- I'm not familiar with any PRA where reactivity
     control accidents dominate a risk.  The reason they don't is
     the plants are designed by all these other regulations and
     by Appendix A largely, so that that doesn't happen.
               MR. HASKIN:  Yeah, as a matter of fact, I agree
     with that.  Then our preliminary screening of DBA's that was
     an accident that appeared high on our list of things that
     would deserve risk informing.  What we found from the
     industry feedback was not too many complaints in terms of
     excess burden of no overwhelming feedback from industry in
     support of that being one of our early regulations to look
     at risk informing, or DBA's to look at risk informing. 
     There was much more concern about the Part 46, but I think
     we did a ranking of DBA's, and that was one of the top three
     to look at from a risk informed perspective, specifically
     the rod ejection accident.
               MR. POWERS:  I guess what I'm saying, the question
     I'm asking is you have a probablist analysis tool or an
     intuition on probablistics that's based on plans to comply
     with a bunch of regulations that are addressing systems, but
     you don't address those accident anymore because they so
     completely eliminate the concern.
               If you use that tool to say should I complete have
     eliminated that concern or not, you come up with the answer
     no, I shouldn't have deleted it because it's so low in risk,
     I should not be regulating this.  You don't have a mechanism
     to say now, if I don't regulate it and they do start
     creating, doing things in the plant that cause reactivity
     control problems that yes, it will show up high on my risk
     analysis, it's not built into the tool.  It's not built into
     your tuition right now.
               MR. HASKIN:  Right, and that was another reason
     for not pursuing that one from the outside because as you're
     aware I'm sure, as you go to high burn-up fuel, there's a
     set of questions in terms of fuel performance that comes up
     that I don't think anybody has fully analyzed yet.  We just
     felt we were in a better position to start with 46 rather
     than -- and it was more important in the overall scheme of
     things.
               MR. POWERS:  Might have a little visibility on.
               MR. HASKIN:  Yeah.
               MR. POWERS:  Let me ask another question.
               MR. KING:   I don't totally agree with your
     premise on the previous question, by the way.
               MR. POWERS:  Oh, okay.  Maybe you could tell me
     more about that.
               MR. KING:  If it turns out the design basis
     reactivity insertion actions is and the PWR's are rod
     ejection, you're right.  On a risk assessment, it doesn't
     show up.
               MR. POWERS:  It barely shows up.
               MR. KING:  Barely shows up, but if for some reason
     that is causing operational pen at least and would make
     sense in terms of a burden reduction, would really remove
     some unnecessary burden.  I mean, the question is one, what
     would you replace it with and two, what's your basis for
     saying that the probability is low enough that yeah, it
     falls below, you know, the things we worry about on this
     table of frequency.
               MR. POWERS:  If you replaced it, do you still fall
     below the place where you'd worry about it?
               MR. KING:  I mean, you'd replace it with something
     that would fit within this framework of frequencies here.  I
     think the real question is how confident are you that the
     designs and the other regulations really insure that the one
     that's in there today is going to stay low.  It's not going
     to pop up again if you change the regulation.
               MR. POWERS:  Yeah, that is the question.
               MR. KING:  That's the real question.
               MR. POWERS:  Uh-huh.
               MR. KING:  And I think, and even though Eric said
     yeah, this is not number one on the industry's list of
     things to change, we may eventually get to that one.
               MR. POWERS: Well, the question is now, suppose you
     -- I don't know what you change, but suppose you change
     something, and an all knowing PRA says that became a ten to
     the minus third event.  How do you find that out?
               MR. KING:  You mean the rod ejection all of a
     sudden becomes ten to the minus three because you changed
     the regulations?
               MR. POWERS:  By hypothesis it does, and I'm asking
     the question how now -- you've come through and you've said
     gee, the regulations I've got now that keep the rod ejection
     accident down low are just an unnecessary overwhelming
     burden, that it's silly to do this.  It's preventing people
     from using fuel to high burn-ups, and there are lots of
     society benefits I can find for using fuel to high burn-ups. 
     Tangible benefits to the public, regardless of what the
     economics is to a plant.      Now, what do you do?  Do you
     have a mechanism that allows you to go back and say okay, I
     now incorporate this change into my PRA tool?  I don't know
     what you're using.  Maybe you're using some unpeer reviewed
     thing or maybe it's a wonderful thing.  I have no idea, and
     see whether the probability came up?
               MR. KING:  I think what you do is you say I'm not
     going to keep the rod ejection as my design basis accident
     anymore.  I think you'd make sure the regulation has enough
     teeth in it that the design permits rod ejection accidents,
     whether it's, you know, you put some design requirement on
     the control rod housing or you know, maybe you already have
     something in place that does the job, but I think you'd have
     to look at the regulation and see, you know, the frequency
     of that is very low today.  What in my requirements keeps it
     very low, and if it's already in there, fine.  If it isn't,
     you might want to put something in that keeps it very low. 
     I mean, that's my approach to that.
               MR. POWERS:  I guess I'm still puzzled by that,
     but I'd like to ask another question that puzzles me.  One
     of the questions that's come up recent years has been gee,
     our steam generator tubes and PWR's are suffering a certain
     amount of degradation.  Do we have the possibility that as
     accident progress, we fail those tubes, and that's a problem
     for us because it creates a bypass of the containment and
     risk numbers usually result.
               People have done a variety of analyses and
     whatnot, and they come back and say gee, there's these
     wonderful natural convection phenomena that show up that
     cause the system to rupture someplace else first.  So, we
     don't have any problem with that.  When you ask them, how
     much of that phenomena that they're hypothesizing, were they
     able to see at TMI?  They respond by saying well, no, there
     was no heating in the peripheral regions of the core at TMI. 
     You're a little bit surprised, and you say gee, are we
     analyzing accidents in our PRA tools or the associated
     analyses that are stylized to the point that they're not
     giving us good information on details of regulations.  
               So, I guess what I'm asking you is do we know that
     the analyses that we're using are, in fact, sufficiently
     detailed to address some of these questions of details of
     engineering?
               MR. KING:  That's a generic question that applies
     to more than steam generator?
               MR. POWERS:  Yeah, I just used that as an example
     to motivate my question.
               MR. KING:  I'm not sure there's a -- I'm not sure
     the framework addresses that, and I'm not sure that we can
     answer it at this meeting.  I think one of the things I know
     Mary and I have talked about is in the PRA standards effort,
     what are they saying about making sure we have verified,
     validated analytical tools that we're using to calculate the
     phenomena.  You may have the best vent trees, fault trees in
     the world, but if your, you know, thermohydraulic tools
     aren't any good, your PRA isn't any good.  I'm not sure we
     have a complete answer to that question.
               MR. HASKIN:  I think as we get into risk informing
     the individual regulations, things like that are going to
     appear.  In fact, we've already seen some of those in Part
     46.  We're just going to have to deal with them as we go. 
     Whether that means that people are going to have to revise
     PRA's or we're going to have to do some internal work, we
     haven't progressed far enough to determine, but there are
     biases both in the deterministic analyses and in risk
     assessments that overlook certain phenomenologically
     plausible scenarios.  So, you just -- we simply have to be
     aware of those to the extent that we can as we're proceeding
     with the risk informing.
               Now, certainly if it's a matter of, you know,
     group A says an accident's going to progress one way and
     group B says an accident's going to progress another way,
     that's an uncertainty that has to be dealt with.  Maybe that
     precludes us from doing something in risk informed space
     because it's an uncertainty that's either unresolved or not
     resolvable within the time frame that we're looking at.  I
     think the only way to address that is on a regulation by
     regulation basis as we go through these things.
               MR. POWERS:  I guess I would feel more comfortable
     if those kinds of issues were spelled out a little more
     clearly.  Just say that that phenomenological activity needs
     to become part of the overall strategy here.
               MR. KING:  I agree.  I think that's a good point. 
     In fact, one of the things we've talked about doing, since
     most of the industry PRA's are based upon the map code, how
     well do we understand the map code, its strengths, its
     weaknesses, so we can ask these kinds of questions, and
     we've kicked around the idea of doing a review of the map
     code so we could get some idea of the strengths and
     limitations.  For a number of reasons, that hasn't started
     yet, but it's right to the heart of your question.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Can we take a break now until
     2:50?
               [Brief recess.]
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay, we're back in session. 
     Anything else that the Subcommittee members have on this
     figure 3-1, which would you please put back up?  It's very
     important.
               You know, a big question in my mind is how does
     one use a figure like this to actually write individual
     regulations, but I guess we're going to see examples at some
     point.
               MR. KING:  Yeah, I mean, we use this in 5044,
     which we went through with the Subcommittee a week or so
     ago.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.
               MR. KING:  And since it was really talking about
     containment performance, we really only use the numbers in
     the one column, but we basically took risk information for
     the cross section of plants that we had.  We looked at how
     well the conditional containment performance was under
     hydrogen combustion type events.  We found some cases where
     those numbers were met and some cases where they weren't,
     and then the question is okay, for those that weren't, what
     would it take to eliminate the problem that's causing the
     performance issue, and that's where we talked about, for
     Mark III's and ice condensers during station black-out,
     maybe the igniters ought to have alternate power supply
     because that was really the thing that was driving that. 
     So, I mean, that's the way it worked.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay, anyone has a comment on --
               MR. KRESS:  So, the regulation would say Mark
     III's and ice condensers need alternate power supplies to
     the igniters, something like that?
               MR. KING:  Something like that.
               MS. DROUIN:  No, no.  The regulation would say
     that we want them to have a hydrogen control system that is
     capable of meeting their risk significant accidents.  Now,
     they can come in and either show that station black-out as
     an accident is not contributing, or if station black-out is
     contributing, they can deal with it.  So, we are not
     prescribing that they have to have D.C. power back-up, but
     we have analyses, you know, that show for some ice
     condensers and for some Mark III's that they're having
     relatively high conditional containment failure
     probabilities against our guideline, and we're saying okay,
     that's a concern.
               MR. KRESS:  That's not necessarily a risk
     significant accident.
               MR. KING:  If station black-out is very low
     frequency, as Mary said, and somebody could come in and make
     that case, then that would be good enough.
               MS. DROUIN:  That would be good enough.
               MR. KING:  But if it isn't, if it's a fairly
     dominant contributor, then they're going to -- how do I deal
     with hydrogen combustion and hydrogen control under station
     black-out conditions?  Mary's right.  The way we're -- the
     alternative we're developing is allow some flexibility on a
     licensee to come in and say this is how I'm going to do it. 
     It doesn't say well, you'll hook it up to, you know, the 1-E
     batteries or something like that.  It's not that specific.
               MR. BONACA:  I have just one more question on the
     figure which we raised during the Subcommittee meeting when
     Mr. Christie made a presentation.  He had some concepts, you
     know, similar.  The issue is here you're looking at, for
     example, containment failure probability, and there you're
     really introducing a criteria that is used typically in
     probablistic risk assessment.  I mean, you're looking at the
     ultimate capability of containment, which is not really what
     the units are committed to in core design.  It would be to a
     different kind of volume.
               So, you're really introducing an interesting
     mixing of criteria there, isn't it?  
               MR. KING:  You're saying, for example, you're
     worried about aging concerns and maybe that containment is
     strength is not the same?
               MR. BONACA:  Now, clearly you're talking about
     LERF here, so LERF is a large early release, but I'm just
     wrestling with that a little bit because you're taking now,
     for example, 5044, and you're running it through the process
     of this type.  In doing so, you're now -- 5044 included a
     number of criteria, okay, within 5044 that included, for
     example, a certain containment capability, which had to do
     purely with the design pressure of the containment, which
     was somewhat a very conservative estimate of the capability
     of the containment.  It allowed for aging of the
     containment.  It allowed for uncertainties of all kinds, and
     to credit only for one-third of the pressure capability.  
               Now, you're running the same regulation through,
     but you are using different criteria to make a judgment on
     the performance of the containment.  Now, you may do the
     same without the criteria that pertained to the condition of
     the core damage probability, for example, best capability or
     piping rupture that you'll assume and so on and so forth.
               MR. KING:  You're right.  
               MR. BONACA:  Maybe you're right.  I just --
               MR. KING:  Using ultimate strength in containment,
     for example, not design pressure.  You know, how much has
     that ultimate strength eroded by things like corrosion over
     time.  That's not factored into the analysis.
               MR. BONACA:  Because I mean, again, in current
     evaluations, you are taking credit for what the utilities
     are committed to, which is a conservative assumption of
     that, and here you're now -- all right.
               MR. KRESS:  Let me ask another question.  These
     regulations that you're redoing, if DOE or some
     representative of DOE comes in with the Gen IV reactor,
     would these regulations still apply, or were they flexible
     enough that they can fit that kind of a different concept
     into them?  Let's assume that Gen IV turns out to be an
     HTGR, and they come in and say well, we don't really need a
     containment, so we don't need to meet this ten to the minus
     one because we don't have any such thing as a LERF anyway. 
     This is so low that forget about it.  Will they accommodate
     that, or will you just have to do a special view of it?
               MR. KING:  Well, my own view is the framework
     would accommodate that.
               MR. KRESS:  The framework?
               MR. KING:  The framework would accommodate that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If you replace a conditional
     early containment failure probability by conditional early
     radioactivity release probability, then I don't need to go
     there.
               MR. KRESS:  That's right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If they can demonstrate that
     it's less than this.
               MR. KRESS:  At a certain probability --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  This assumes you have a
     containment, but you really --
               MR. KING:  Or confinement.  I mean, it doesn't
     have to be the traditional containment building.  It could
     be a confinement building like Fort St. Vrain had.  They
     didn't have a containment building.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's really the release you're
     interested in.
               MR. KING:  Yeah.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Not so much a structure.
               MR. KING:  Large early release.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, another point I want to
     raise here is the issue of external events.  I remember that
     somewhere in the document we're saying that some initiators
     cannot really be handled in a neat way like, you know,
     frequency, condition or core damage and so on.  Then you
     move up, right?  Like an earthquake is shaking the whole
     plant, and it's not really very meaningful to talk about the
     condition of core damage probability separately from the
     containment failure probability.
               In fact, I'm not even sure.  You can talk about
     prevention versus mitigation.  You have to go even higher
     than that.  The goals themselves perhaps, or the release.
               MR. KING:  I think you can still talk prevention.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  As one package, the release of
     radioactivity.  So, you have ten to the minus five or six,
     whatever you want, because the same event affects both
     prevention and mitigation, doesn't it?
               MR. KING:  But I think you can still talk the two
     separately for an earthquake because --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The question is whether you want
     to have a goal for separate, I mean, if you have such a
     major event.  Now, you classify them as rare events a little
     later, as rare initiators.
               MS. DROUIN:  That we did.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right?
               MR. KING:  Right.
               MS. DROUIN:  Yes.
               MR. HASKIN:  There were some things that are going
     to be low on frequency or not going to regulate.  I mean,
     we're not going to require people to design for rare events,
     but as Tom mentioned earlier, if there's something that
     needs to be done to assure that a low frequency event stays
     a low frequency event, that may be within the purview of the
     regulatory arena.
               MR. KING:  Yeah, that's a good point.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What does it mean that you do
     not require them to design for rare events?
               MR. KING:  It depends on what you're talking
     about.  If you're talking about, you know, vessel rupture,
     the reason we're confident the vessel is going to hold
     together is because of the design requirements.
               MR. KRESS:  Well, let me throw in my example for
     that one.  I hate to bring it up now, but the spent fuel
     pool, the problem with the fire and the loss of cooling or
     the loss of inventory.  It's a rare event.  It falls in that
     category in terms of frequency.  The problem I may have with
     your table is that you probably assume it's already
     conditional of early containment failure probability of one. 
     You forget about the containment.  So, the question is is
     this ten to the minus -- the value of the product of the
     conditional core damage and the initiator frequency, is it a
     sufficient criteria to guide a regulation on a spent fuel
     pool?  
               I would say it's not, and that's because this goes
     back to my original concept that you're not really dealing
     directly with fission products here.  You're dealing with a
     source term related to the reactor.  You get a different
     source term for the spent fuel pool.  You might get a
     different LERF value for the prompt fatality goal.  So, I
     wouldn't apply this table directly to the spent fuel pool,
     because I would have a different set of criteria.  I'm
     hoping that that doesn't happen just because this table
     exists.
               MR. KING:  Your point's a good point in that the
     LERF value we're using here, and we're using 1174, was
     derived from a reactor --
               MR. KRESS:  Arrived from a reactor, yeah.
               MR. KING:  -- accident, a single core.  A spent
     fuel pool could have several core loads of fuel.  The timing
     is different.  You know, the air oxidation or whatever is
     different.  LERF could be different for a spent fuel pool to
     meet the same safety goals.
               MR. KRESS:  Right.
               MR. KING:  But the concept of a table like this
     could be developed.
               MR. KRESS:  Could be developed specifically for
     the pool.
               MR. KING:  Yes.  I mean, we didn't have the spent
     fuel pool in mind when this was put together.
               MR. KRESS:  But when you come to a regulation that
     involves the spent fuel pool, you would keep the concept of
     the actual quantitative goal in mind close to these numbers
     here.
               MR. KING:  You could develop quantitative goals,
     back them out consistent with the overall safety goal
     objectives.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So if I were to do a seismic
     analysis -- of course, I can have a spectrum of earthquakes,
     so some of them would be infrequent initiators and some of
     them will be rare initiators, and I would have to look at
     the analysis and judge whether I met the various criteria
     there?  Is that how it's going to work?
               MR. KING:  I think in principle that's how it
     would work.  I don't think we've gotten into a seismic event
     yet.  I don't know.  Mary, have you thought anymore about
     it?
               MS. DROUIN:  Not beyond what we have here.
               MR. KING:  But in principle, that's the way it
     would work.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, these things tend to
     dominate risk.
               MR. HASKIN:  Other than the fact that we are
     getting into that as we proceed with Part 46, we'll
     obviously have to consider that aspect of risk.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Anything else on this figure?
               MR. BONACA:  Just I would like to add one thing. 
     I raised an issue before containment.  Clearly what was
     making me somewhat uneasy was the fact of not linking it to
     the uncertainty section, to the section that later on talks
     about this, you know, regarding uncertainty.  That should
     take care of it.  Simply, I'm still thinking about the fact
     that most PRA take credit for, you know, that capability of
     containment.  This is an example of what to take credit for. 
     I'm not sure that the uncertainty analysis recognizes, for
     example, aging the way we have seen it in license renewal,
     where the capability of the containment is significantly
     reduced.  It seems to be, at least.
               MR. KRESS:  Well, once again, it's a sort of a
     success criteria.
               MR. BONACA:  Yeah.
               MR. KRESS:  And PRA's don't deal well with
     uncertainties and success criteria.  I think that's
     something.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, there are model
     uncertainties, and I think you see more and more concern
     about model uncertainties.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, but they rarely show up in the
     success criteria, though, even the model.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, but we will start pushing
     for that.
               MR. KRESS:  Yeah, well we need to deal with it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And one of the reasons why I
     don't like the word best estimate code.  The thermohydraulic
     arena is that I think they should make a statement of the
     uncertainties due to modeling approximations to the extent
     they can.  It's about time we started doing that and forget
     about the best estimate.
               MR. BONACA:  Yeah.  I guess we got to see some
     examples of how they run through this table.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  This is not cast in stone.
               MR. BONACA:  Oh, no, no, no.
               MR. KING:  You raised a good point.  Maybe the
     uncertainty chapter ought to touch on that.
               MR. BONACA:  No, and I think certainly that
     actually attaches on the issue in general.  Maybe some
     specific discussion of how you resolve some of these issues
     will be helpful, if you know already how to get there.
               MR. KING:  At least pose the question.  When
     you're going through this, you'd have to think about those
     kinds of things.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay, I have a few more comments
     after this figure.  Anyone wants to continue debating the
     figure?  Okay, page 3-3.  There is a series of bullets on
     the left-hand column.  The last one says no quantitative
     objective is proposed for conditional individual fatality
     probability because existing PRA's demonstrate that the
     QHO's can generally be met through the preceding three
     quantitative objectives.  For individual -- conditional
     individual fatality probability.
               MR. KRESS:  That means they just didn't use the
     QHO's directly.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  QHO's don't talk about
     conditional probabilities.  They talk about absolute, one
     tenth of one percent.
               MR. HASKIN:  What we're saying is we didn't
     establish a goal for column four.  We were just using the --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Then it says however, off site
     protective actions are essential to protect the public.
               MR. KRESS:  This is conditional on the other three
     things happening, the conditional only.  It's conditional on
     the other three things, yeah.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  On the other three, yeah.  But
     do you agree with the last sentence?  Off site protective
     measures are essential to protect the public?
               MR. KRESS:  You can't meet the safety goals
     without it.
               MR. KING:  The risk calculations --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  See, that's what bothers me
     about this business of individual risk.  It's not individual
     risk, because if we're individual risk, whether we evacuate
     or not should be relevant.  The way it's calculated, by
     calculating societal and dividing by the number, why that's
     not individual.  That's a misnomer then.
               MR. KRESS:  It's a misnomer, but it's --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's a misnomer.
               MR. KRESS:  It's too late to do anything about
     that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Individual means you take an
     individual like in the Yucca Mountain thing, and you put
     them there, and you say 24 hours, they're there.
               MR. KRESS:  That's why it's always given the
     average individual.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, it's a representative
     societal risk.
               MR. KRESS:  No, it's not that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Societal normalized by the
     number of people.
               MR. KRESS:  No, it's societal risk at all.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's normalized.
               MR. KRESS:  It's normalized.  That's why it's not
     a societal risk.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But it's a measure because if
     you evacuate, you effect really the societal risk, not
     individual.  Can we do something about it, though?  Is there
     any place where we can -- this is not individual risk
     because individual risk should be independent of whether you
     evacuate or not.  That's the whole point, that you assume
     the guy's there.  Probability of death of an individual
     who's 24 hours right there.  Unless, again, like the
     unavailability business, we are using terms that are not
     used by the wider community.
               MR. KRESS:  I think we are.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think we are.
               MR. KING:  Early versions of this framework table
     did have numbers in that fourth column, the emergency
     planning column.  We decided that didn't make sense for a
     couple of reasons.  You know, one is if we're talking
     regulations that deal with design and operation, the
     emergency planning column doesn't deal with that.
               MR. POWERS:  Why doesn't emergency deal with
     operations?
               MR. KING:  Operating the plant?
               MR. POWERS:  Yeah, plant, the plant operations. 
     Activities of the operator.  The operator sees conditions in
     the plant.  He's called upon to make judgments that activate
     various aspects of the emergency procedures, or the
     emergency planning activities.
               MR. KING:  Yeah, but I think in effect what you're
     saying is independent of the design, we want that emergency
     planning capability.  You want the ability to have off site
     evacuation.  That's independent of the design.
               MR. KING: ...minus fifth CDF doesn't matter
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's a defense-in-depth
     measure
               MR. KING: Defense-in-depth measure --
     structuralist defense-in-measure.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But this is different from
     saying that it essential to protect the public.
               MR. KRESS:  It is.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: It may happen in some cases to be
     but I would be much more comfortable saying it is a
     defense-in-depth measure than saying it is essential.
               MR. KING: Except remember the LERF value that we
     backed out,
     the 10(-5th) LERF value that was backed out of safety goal
     calculations.  Those safety goal calculations made
     assumptions on evacuation.  So that LERF does have a
     built-in assumption that evacuation takes place.
               MR. KRESS: Absolutely.
               MR. KING:  And if you didn't make that assumption
     you would have a different LERF value.  So in that respect
     it is --
               MR. KRESS: Now you have a (inaudible) on the book
     associating the siding -- (inaudible) siding.
               MR. KING: Yes.
               MR. KRESS: And those, some aspects deal with
     population distributions around the plant or --
               MR. KING: Population centers.
               MR. KRESS: Population centers, basically. And I
     presume, those sort of regulations would be considered
     defense-in-depth and you won't try to touch those with risk
     informing them.  I mean, I can see how you could do some
     risk informing of that but --
               MR. KING: Part 100 is not high on our list of
     regulations to
     look at in risk informing.  I won't say it will never be
     looked at, but it is not in the top ten.
               MR. KRESS: What is your point?  But you know what
     it does it limits -- limits the number of sides (inaudible)
               MR. KING: (inaudible) top 10.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Would you say that for a plant
     that is relatively modern, like South Texas Project, has a
     very low core damage frequency. That that side protected
     action are essential to protect the public?
               MR. KRESS: No.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: So I suggest you change the
     words.
               MR. KRESS: It is very plant specific.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: It is very plant specific and the
     word "essential" -- I think essential --
               MR. KRESS:  Well, if you are talking about on the
     average for the whole population of plants, generically it
     is.
               MR. KING: But I think what is fair to say is that
     our LERF value is based upon calculations that make
     assumptions on evacuations.  Therefore, --
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Then on the right-hand side
     column, we have again the same political statement that
     would not be prudent to simple replace existing regulations
     with a quantitative objectives. Compliance with, you know,
     it is the same like in page 21, so.  
                    Then on the next page, unless somebody has a
     question, 3-4: "Anticipated initiators are either expected
     to occur or may well occur."  Seems to me that is a
     (inaudible).  Something that is expected, turning out I'm an
     English expert.  Something that is expected to occur --
               MR. SEALE: May well occur.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: May well occur, right.
               MR. KRESS: Where are you reading at?
               DR. SHACK: Second column, second paragraph.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Anticipated initiators is way
     down bottom, that's right.  I mean, it is not essential, it
     just struck me.
               MR. KRESS: Yeah, it is a little strange.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: It is the same thing.
               DR. SHACK: Give it to your tech editor.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Now, in the text, of course, the
     initiators are placed in -- according to their frequency in
     equalities in the table, you just have the upper bond it is
     understood, I suppose. The lower bond is the upper bond of
     the next category.
     "Even when common cause failures and human errors are
     accounted for most plants can meet the proposed plant state
     of objections."
                    I guess he means no power, huh?  There is a
     sentence I don't understand on page 3-5.  So, "The
     defense-in-depth approach does not ignore rare events,"
     okay.  Righr-hand side column.
               "Tactics such as research, and so on, are applied
     to validate the low frequency of rare initiators. 
     Generally, however, a risk informed regulation will not
     require plant structure systems and components be
     specifically designed to cope with rare initiators."
                    I don't know. I mean, do you really know
     that?
               MR. KRESS: Unless it changes the initiators
     (inaudible) frequency itself. I mean, by (inaudible)
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Sometimes it is rare because of
     the design, right?
               MR. KRESS: Maybe.
               MR. KING: Well, I mean, we don't design for
     meteorites. We don't design for huge earthquakes.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Meteorites, we don't.  But LOCAs
     we have a lot to do with, even big earthquakes.
               MR. KING: Well, this initiator there are the ones
     you just do not worry about like meteorites because they are
     so right. But then there are the others that Eric was
     talking about the reason they are rare is because the design
     is so rare.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: The classic example in California
     is that an earthquake of a certain magnitude occurring in
     Los Angeles, and occurring in Guatemala has very different
     consequences.  So our designs must have something to do with
     the rare initiator and its consequences, right?
               MR. KING: But if you are building a plant in
     Florida you are not going to design for the big earthquake
     in California.  You would design for whatever you think
     makes sense for Florida.
                MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Right. And that is what you are
     saying here?
               MR. KING: Yes.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: That components be specifically
     designed to cope with a rare initiator?
               MR. BONOCA: Because you conceive that the
     earthquake in California to be (inaudible) in Florida?
               MR. KING: Yeah. There are some things that are
     sight specific: earthquakes, hurricanes.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: But that is not the fear. I mean,
     that is something that comes naturally for risk inform the
     regulation the regulation.  A risk informed regulation will
     not require plant (inaudible) to be specifically designed to
     cope with rare initiators.
               MR. BONOCA: It is general (inaudible)
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: I think a risk informed approach
     would look at all spectrum of all possible accidents and
     take measures. 
     Now if what --
               MR. SHACK: If all he is saying is that the
     initiator has a low enough frequency you don't design for
     asteroids, because the --
               DR. POWERS: But that question has come up before. 
     I am trying to have things that are risk significant, but if
     I only compute frequencies, how do I know what is
     significant?  I mean, clearly to my mind there must surely
     be some frequency below which I am not concerned. I am not
     concerned about the meteorite.
               MR. KING: Yes.
               DR. POWERS: I mean, I refuse to let myself be
     concerned about that --
               MR. KRESS: Yeah, because then (inaudible) the
     whole inventory in the core and then -- as a release and
     still meet the goals, yeah.  So small.
               DR. POWERS: Is that the reason that some how I
     know that if I smack this thing with an asteroid and I
     explode out of it the entire core inventory plus the spin
     fuel, that even then multiplied times the probability that
     the asteroid -- I know that is some intuitional --
               MR. KRESS: I would guess so. That would be the
     only logical way, yes.
               DR. POWER: I would guess that that is the only way
     I would do it.  Now I ask myself what is that number that
     allows me to quit calculating frequencies?
               MR. KRESS: It ought to be calculable.
               DR. POWERS: It ought to be estimatible.  They
     ought to be able to put that down on a piece of paper --
               MR. KRESS: I never seen it actually.
               DR. POWERS:  -- and look at it.  I don't know what
     that is.
               MR. KING: Wouldn't that be the safety goal
     numbers.  The early fatality numbers?
               MR. KRESS: Oh, yeah. But he just wants to know
     what the frequency is.
               DR. POWERS:  Yeah, I want to know -- I got a
     safety going risk but it is a big chore to go from
     frequencies to that risk number, because Dr. Kress would get
     all over my case because I used the wrong force term, or
     something like that.  And Dr. Powers would climb on because
     I used the wrong dispersion code.  And there are a lot of
     funny people in on this committee, they are very difficult
     to get along with. And so, it would be a lot easier if you
     can tell me if your frequency is below this thou shalt
     forget about it.
               MR. HASKINS: The number we are currently using is
     10(-6th).  That is the number that has been used for
     aircraft impact, for example.
               DR. POWERS: So you actually have a number that you
     would like to use as 10(-6th)?
               MR. KING: Yes.
               MR. HASKINS: That is the number we are currently
     using, and that number appears in the standard review plans.
     Yes.
               MR. KRESS: Now the question you have is, why? 
     What is the basis of it?
               DR. POWERS: I don't believe that number.
               MR. KRESS: It seems a little high, doesn't it?
               DR. POWERS: Yes
               MR. HASKINS: The number is based on ten percent of
     10(-5th). The ten percent came from the earlier discussion
     and the 10(-5th) comes from the figure.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: But not in the standard review
     plan, because there were not thinking that way.
               MR. HASKINS: No, but also it was consistent
     (inaudible)
               MR. KRESS: See that number has to be different for
     aircraft impacting the thing versus my asteroid impacting
     that.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: My question here is, isn't this
     an issue handled naturally by the existence of safety goals. 
     Why do I have to worry about it?  I mean, that is the
     residual risk.  
               MR. KRESS: Well, from the point --
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: And later on in fact it says, "To
     focus on reducing risks associated with rare initiators
     would draw attention away from, and potentially increase
     risk associated with more likely initiators."  
                    Why do you have to worry about it?  I mean,
     you have their goals; you met them.  There are always
     initiators that are much less frequent, you know.
                    MR. KRESS: That's because the goals are not
     revealed into the -- aren't explicit in the regulation. 
     They are only implicit.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: But not with this document. They
     would be very implicityly, right.
               MR. KRESS: They will be implicit; they won't be
     explicit.  That is the problem.  In they are implicit which
     means you don't have to really meet them.  You might meet --
     the probability of meeting is very good.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: There must be a better way of
     handling it though.  Because, I mean, that is the whole idea
     of a goal.  I am recognizing explicitly -- acknowledging
     explicitly that there is such a thing as a residual risk.
               MR. KRESS: But the only way to deal with that is
     to have the numbers actually built in explicitly in your
     regulations.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: That is worst.
               MR. KRESS: Which is a no-no, right now.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: But then it is risk based. We
     will all go to hell.
               MR. KRESS: Oh, yes.  Then it's a no-no.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Oh, no, no, no.  No risk base
     here.
               MR. KING: No risk base.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: So you guys agree that this crazy
     ideology makes sense?
               MR. KING: We can look at it again, but the idea is
     there are some things that are below concern and frequency
     is one way to look at them.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: All right, anything else here
     from anyone else.  Next page; Additional Thoughts on
     Quantitative Objectives."  Again, I don't believe that some
     of your subsidiaries want (inaudible) objectives.  
                    I mean it says, that there are no risk
     arguments for setting subsidiary quantitative objective most
     stringent. Second paragraph from the left. And I think we
     made it clear that CDF is more stringent, 10(-4th), is it
     not.  The CDF 10 (-4th) goal is more stringent then one
     would derive from the QHOs. independently of what the
     commission said.
               MR. KING: Actually, that word is --
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: And that is (inaudible)
               MR. KRESS: Yeah, that is definitely true.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: But in several places this
     document says, "That the subsidiary goal should not be more
     stringent the QHOs." And I think that language should be
     softened because some things are more stringent.
               DR. SHACK: How about more stringent than the
     commissiion safety goals?
               MR. KING: Then is should be the subsidiary
     objective.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: The 10(-4th) is still there?
               MR. KING: The subsidiary objective 10(-4th) was
     endorsed by the commission.
               MR. KRESS: It is still there.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Later, though.  Not in the
     original statement, as I recall.
               MR. KING: Not in the original statement.  In the
     1990 SRM.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Oh, well. Okay.  So we have
     elevated it, then.
               MR. KRESS: Well, in the defactor.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Now there is another statement in
     the next paragraph why there is no basis for being more
     stringent than the QHO's both defense-in-depth and
     uncertainties, which tend to grow as postulated accidents
     proceeding time, influence, blah, blah, blah. "The uncertain
     extent to grow as postulated accidents proceed in time."  
                         Is this something you all agree on.
     Okay. Since we do, it is just that it is a new thought that
     is thrown in there as a secondary clause that says --
               MR. HASKINS: You can look at 1150 in that 
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Yeah, yeah, yeah.
               DR. POWERS: I mean, it is the whole basis for
     being reluctant to go beyond Level 1 kinds of PRAs, because
     we can't get technical consensus on the Level 2.  I think if
     we could get it on Level 2's it would not be hard to get it
     on Level 3.  Level 2 is a challenge for us right now.
               MR. HASKINS: You will still have a problem
               MR. KING: Level 3 is a challenge.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Page 3-7 guidelines for each
     strategy
     suggested to leave the table, it's motherhood and apple pie.
     It really doesn't say anything. How do limit the frequency
     of accident initiators.  Provide assurance of the combine
     frequency less than one per year; provide assurance that the
     combine frequency, I mean, sure.  It is almost a
     (inaudible).  I think the table does not provide any
     (inaudible)size should be limited.  Limit the probability of
     core damage.  How do you do that?  By providing assurance of
     the probability of core damage is less than 10(-4th). Is
     that the same thing?
               MR. KRESS: Well, it just expands on 
               MR APOSTOLAKIS: It is assuming.
               MR. KRESS: So it is an expansion of -- what do you
     mean by that.  It is an expansion of what you mean by the
     word imit.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS:   It restates the figure.  It
     really does not add anything.
               MR. KRESS: Yes, it does.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: It does.
               MR. KRESS: I mean it restates the figure, yes.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Does the staff members feel
     otherwise, strongly, to keep it?  You think about it. Take
     it into advisement and you make a decision in the proper
     time.
               MR. KRESS: In the statement under strategy four
     does add some stuff.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: I'm sorry, four?
               MR. KRESS: Yes.  It talks about this (inaudible).
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: It is probably the only one that
     goes a little beyond.
               MR. KRESS: Yes. It goes a little beyond what you
     are talking about.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: But if you look at the first --
     at the top of the page on the right, Table 3-1 provides a
     list of guidelines.  That is not what that is.
               MR. KRESS: It is not guidelines.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: It is not guidelines.
               MR. KING: We will look at it.
               MS. DROVIN: All Table 3-1 was meant to do was to
     take the information and summarize it from the text. So if
     you wanted to go to a Table and see it all without having to
     go through the text, that is all it was meant to do. Just
     and aide to the reader.
               MR. KRESS: I did have a question on page 3.6,
     George.  3-6, in right-hand column, second paragraph and
     this is the old version.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Yes.
               MR. KRESS: And the underline to specifically deal
     with latent cancers a quantitative object of Point 1 is
     proposed for the probability of a late large release in a
     core damage accident. 
                    Now the Point 1, and I am not sure where it
     comes from, and I am not sure why the latent cancers is
     relegated strictly to late large releases of -- I guess you,
     the rationale is that your guideline is already on large
     early release.  Deal with that part of it.  Now you are
     talking about the residual, the late part, and if you set
     conditional containment probability on that, covered the
     whole spectrum, I am not sure where the Point 1, how it had
     just derive from thinking along those lines and then going
     to the quantitative help objective on latent cancers.
               MR. KING: Well, the Point 1 is just a parallel to
     the Point 1 for large early -- or conditional containment
     failure probability for large early releases.  We call it
     large early release which derived from --
               MR. KRESS: I just -- what my question was more
     specifically, because I am not sure if I started from the
     latent death quantitative health objective and worked
     backwards to get these conditional containment (inaudible).
     That I would actually get this number.  You know, I have not
     seen that exercise done as of now.
               DR. POWERS: I don't think we went through that
     exercise.
               MR. KRESS: So my question is, is the Point 1 the
     right value to use?
               DR. POWERS: It is a good question. It is one we
     pulled out to be parallel to the early --
               MR. KRESS: And I am not sure that parallel is as
     applies here.
               DR. POWERS: I don't know, Mary or Eric may want to
     say more about that.
               MR. KRESS: Yes.
               MS. DROVIN: You have a different recommendation.
               MR. KRESS: No, I haven't done the exercise either. 
     But I was starting from the latent death quantitative health
     objective, and do something like you did to get a LERF and
     show that the --
               MR. HASKINS: Let me just say one thing. There are
     source terms that can be, and have been, postulated and
     purees, for late containment failures where you have core
     concrete interactions going on in the absence and overlying
     pool that can be some very bad source terms that could
     actually result in fatalities beyond the ten miles zone. 
     Certainly, we would want to have a consistent goal for those
     types of things.  Now if the driving force turns out to be
     lightened cancers then there may be a more appropriate
     numerical goal. We simply put that down as a strawman at
     this stage.
               MR. KING: I think it is a fair question.  We ought
     to think about it some more.
               MR. KRESS: If it is a strawman, it is all right. 
     But I would want to see a technical basis for it based on
     the thinking if you went to it alert.
               MR. KING: Okay.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: I think on page 3-8, you are
     given some thoughts on the core damage of containment
     failure that do not make sense there, but they make sense
     after I read page 4-1, where you make a distinction between
     the risk assessment perspective and the design bases
     perspective.
                    For example, on 3-8, there is a risk -- the
     second paragraph on the left, "A risk significant level of
     core damage found that is specified in the ACC as acceptance
     criteria.  ACC has accepted criteria to permit only 1
     percent."
                         I am sitting here, you know, everything
     I have read so far has something to do with risk.  Now you
     are throwing in these new ideas. But then when I read later
     on the Safety Margins definition, and so on, that makes more
     sense.  So, editorially, I think some how you should make it
     clear.  Maybe shift this discussion to the next chapter,
     statement of uncertainties because I think we are mixing the
     two.
                    And my second question is, isn't it
     inconceivable that at some point that the whole frame work
     that you have presented can naturally can be used to define
     safety modules that was to move now from risk to design
     bases?  Seems to me that would make sense that you may need
     additional guidelines for better ability and so on.  I mean,
     this thing of a one percent of a (inaudible) being allowed
     to be oxidized, I don't know if that could change but that
     is just an example.
                    And working backwards, one should be able to
     do that; shouldn't one.
               MR. KING: Like working backwards to what?
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Backwards from the top ladders
     that you have.  Is that written down.
               MR. KING: You mean to the actual QHOs themselves
     and the --
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: The QHOs I go down to prevention
     mitigation; go down to (inaudible) initiators; condition of
     core damage probability.
               MR. KING: And then see what kind of QHO you get
     and compare that to the safety goal QHOs; is that what you
     are talking about?
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: No, no, no.  What I mean, as I
     move down now, and I am going to the conditional containment
     failure probability, and I can derive a number, given that
     have core damage frequency of a initiator, cannot I say from
     there, "Gee, the safety margin that I want in terms of
     probabilities from my containment, is this."  Rather than
     come from the outside and give the safety margin and do just
     an assessment.
                    I mean safety margins defined on the next
     pages are  probability that the designer process will
     perform an intended function.  Can I do that?
               MR. KRESS: I don't think so. Because you are
     dealing with means already and that is --
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: I can make contributions of
     distributions. I mean civil engineers do that all the time,
     don't they?  I can play with the distribution of the
     strength, distribution of the strengths. Some nice
     mathematics and say, "This is the number."  They are too
     strong right now, aren't they?
               MR. KRESS: Maybe.  I have a different question on
     that same page short.  Similar to yours.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: Which page, 3-8?
               MR. KRESS: 3-8.  Into my view the (inaudible) for
     50.46, dealing with the ECCS acceptance criteria is the only
     risk component I see to that is that the acceptance criteria
     gives you a level of assurance and when you turn on the
     ECCS, and when I say terminate the accident, and not lead to
     an uncoolable geometry later on. So you have these safety
     margins in there to deal with the fact of how well the ECCS
     has to work.  It is a statement of how good the ECCS has to
     be in order to assure a coolable geometry that doesn't get
     you in trouble later on.  That to me is -- I don't see how
     you risk inform that because you have to ask yourself, well,
     what probability am I willing to live with that this doesn't
     actually terminate the accident like I thought it was going
     to.  It doesn't lead to bowing and the swelling of the clad
     and uncoolable geometries later on. It leads me back into
     the accident.  
                    And I don't know how you deal with that in a
     risk informed regulations, because what you have to have
     there is some probability that you would live -- or
     frequency or willing to  live with on this thing and I don't
     think we have defined any criteria like that in here.
               MR. APOSTOLAKIS: You are absolutely right.  I mean
     it is always some conflict conceived.
               MR. KRESS: So, it is a defense-in-depth concept to
     me that I don't see how you can go in to say Appendix K and
     K 50.46 and change anything, because you don't have a risk
     informed way to change that.
               MR. SIEBER: Well, I think you have to go beyond
     that. 50.46, to my memory can avow as a settlement of a
     lawsuit and it concerns scientist.  The final acceptance
     criteria came out and so, being that there is an element of
     the legal basis in there, it is not clear that you now can
     lateral say that I am going to risk inform 50.46, because
     then the basis of the law suit settlement --
               MR. KING: Jim, I am not sure about the legal
     aspects --
               MR. KRESS: I think the voluntary aspect, you have
     to get around the legal, but --
               MR. BONOCA: It is very significant for them to
     (inaudible) standard. Let me give you an example what is
     significant.  We have seen a number of power plants, PWRs,
     recently, where they have found that the MPHS under certain
     conditions was inadequate.  The condition was literally and
     open containment.  Apathetic conditions, which means in the
     limiting design conditions in which you design a
     containment, you may have entrainment and you may have
     essentially a problem with PSH.  But for all other ranges, I
     will see that coming through and risk inform regulation that
     particular condition may be almost eliminated because how
     did it get there.
               MR. KING: You get there with failing containers.
               MR. BONACA: So if you design for a more realistic
     range of conditions, you will find that all containments had
     in fact recirculation capability. See that is a fundamental
     change and maybe is the right change, but I think without
     implication, that absolutely, because now we have perform
     PRAs or power plants which were designed with (inaudible)
     material to meet certain limiting conditions that may not be
     realistic. In the future, we will be using PRAs to evaluate
     PRA designed plants, which therefore, have different success
     criteria, maybe.  Maybe that is what is going to be
     reflected and what (inauible)but isn't this an important
     issue.
               MR. KING: Let me get back to your question on
     50.46. I mean, it seems to me you can risk inform.   You can
     risk inform it in two ways.  One is the large break LOCA
     still makes sense and all the assumptions that go with it,
     given probability and risk arguments. You can take a look at
     it from that respect. You can also look at -- I mean, I
     think clearly you want to maintain coolable geometry that is
     the ultimate goal.  If you have a LOCA you don't want to
     loose coolable geometry.  But is the 2200 degrees and the 17
     percent oxidation are they the right numbers to do that. 
     Maybe they are very conservative.
                    Have you new information that says, no, there
     are better numbers that will help you achieve that.  You
     know, maybe they'll be more restrictive, less restrictive. 
     To me that is also risk informing in the sense that you are
     trying to take the best available.  Maybe do some best
     estimate calculations and then you got to figure out what
     margin you want to account for uncertainties, but to me that
     is part of misinforming the regulation. So I think you can
     get into all aspects of 50.46.  Either from probability risk
     or, you know, best technology.
               MR. KRESS: Yeah, I would have to agree with you. I
     think those are risk informed concepts.
               MR. KING: It won't be easy.  Eric has been heavily
     involved and working with Westinghouse.
               MR. KRESS: You know, I kind of view the concept of
     the large break LOCA as also adding margin, and I don't know
     how you deal with that versus the margin you have in the
     temperature, the peak clad temperature thing.  Because I
     view just requiring this thing to deal with the large break
     LOCA as it sits there a margin concept.
               MR. KING: It adds margin for LOCA but what does it
     do for PTS?
               MR. KRESS: Not very much.
               MR. KING: It may make it worst. You have high
     capacity pumps that shove a lot of cold water in,
     particularly under a small break LOCA when you are still
     pressurized, you know?
               MR. KRESS: Yeah.
               MR. KING: Maybe that is not a good idea.
               MR. SIEBER: Small break LOCA --
               DR. POWERS: I think this discussion on the
     oxidation and the 17 percent raises a question, I am not
     sure how you deal with it.  And I am not sure how general
     the situation is but the specifics of the 17 percent
     oxidation and the use of baker adjust kenitics for
     calculating that oxidation
               And you say, gee, I want to do a more realistic
     analysis here.  Baker Just, I know how he got his numbers,
     he threw balls in the water and things like that to get
     those numbers, they are not applicable.  I have got better
     things, Cathcart, Paul, and a couple of guys at the PNL did
     some better work.  A couple of guys from Germany have done
     better work on those kinetics.  And I can go apply those and
     if I do, I will get much lower oxidation levels.
               But that presumes that the temperature history of
     a LOCA is this very benign history which is a rampup to a
     specified temperature and a hold for a certain period of
     time.
               If, in fact, the temperatures, as they probably
     do, go through a rampup to a peak, they drop back down and
     then rise up to a hold point, then you put thermal stress,
     create thermal stresses in that oxide so it spalls, you get
     breakaway oxidation and it goes much, much faster than
     Cathcart, Paul or Hobson, or any of those other people,
     because they were looking at planchettes that were flat. 
     They didn't have the curvature problems of clads and things
     like that.
               All of these things that people understood when
     they set up, when they were looking at 50.46 in setting it
     up, and they said, gee, we will try to bound all those
     effects by using Baker Just.  And so, if you try to do
     something more realistic there, then you have to take these
     more realistic scenarios on the temperatures, and it gets
     into a complicated nightmare that is very troublesome.
               When you look for sections to risk-inform, do you
     go back into that history far enough to know what kind of
     cans of worms that you are opening up in looking at these
     things?
               MR. HASKIN:  There has already been some work done
     on those sorts of replacements in the Appendix K
     calculations, and the answer is, yeah, you have kind of got
     to go back.  Norm Lauben is the one that is doing that work,
     and he has got enough historical perspective that he has an
     appreciation for most of those things.
               But you are right, the point is as you start
     trying to make Appendix K calculations less conservative in
     some respects, you have got to look at what the original
     intent was, because you can't have your Appendix K
     calculations becoming less conservative than what you would
     get with the best estimate in 95 percent, for example.  And
     you can easily get yourself into that situation if you just
     start relaxing Appendix K assumptions right and left.
               So, he has got a procedure that he is going
     through to make sure that that doesn't happen.
               MS. DROUIN:  If you take 50.44, for example, and
     we had just said, let's just look at the rule and bring risk
     insights, it would have been a much easier process to deal
     with.  But I don't think, in all fairness, you can do it
     that way.  I think you have to go back and look at the
     technical basis.  Why did it come around the way it did? 
     You know, what were all the assumptions and everything?  And
     that was the difficulty.  I mean, so that when you finally
     do get to here is your alternative for risk-informing this,
     you know, you haven't dropped something, for example,
     because of other reasons that were in there, that you just
     had no idea about.
               So, on all of these, be it 50.44, 50.46, part of
     our process is going back and understanding the technical
     basis.
               DR. KRESS:  But is that spelled out in the
     framework document somehow, that that would be part of the
     framework?
               MR. KING:  It is spelled out in the plan we sent
     to the Commission before we even wrote the framework
     document, that we have to go back in and look at the
     technical basis.  That was back in November last year.
               MS. DROUIN:  It was in the plan.
               DR. KRESS:  Now, I remember, you had to actually
     add those words.
               MS. DROUIN:  And I don't know in the version you
     have how well that was explained.  In the May version of
     Chapter 5 that is talked to very explicitly, that you have
     to go back and look at that.  You have to see how these are
     tied to the other regulations.  And maybe you did something
     in this regulation, you know, you backed off on it because
     it is covered elsewhere. 
               So that is very explicitly in the newer version of
     the framework.  I don't remember, in the version you have,
     how well that was explained.
               MR. KING:  It is not an easy task.  I mean in
     50.44, it took so long precisely because of going back and
     looking at all the places that hydrogen issues show up, and
     looking at things like, well, was the analysis just for
     in-vessel hydrogen generation or did it consider ex-vessel
     hydrogen generation?  And, you know, how long did the
     generation take place, and all that, and it took a long
     time.
               I mean I expected 50.44 to proceed much faster
     than it did, but then Mary clued me in on what was going on. 
     And, you know, it is not an easy task.
               DR. POWERS:  You always bring back news.
               MR. KING:  Yeah.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. KRESS:  Yeah, I see in Section 5, you actually
     have a whole section on assessing the technical basis of the
     regulations in relationship to other regulations.  I guess
     that is where it is dealt with.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  First of all, let me
     understand how this works.  Mr. Christie is supposed to
     present his views at 4:00.  Now, this is not going to be
     done by 4:00.  Should we interrupt, tell Mr. Christie make a
     presentation and then we will come back to the document?  Or
     we -- 
               DR. KRESS:  If they can accommodate that
     arrangement, I think that would be the way to do it.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Because a schedule is a
     schedule, right.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Can you accommodate that?
               MS. DROUIN:  I have to leave.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  What time?  What time do
     you have to leave, Mary?
               MS. DROUIN:  I have to leave by quarter of 5:00
     today.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  And Eric?
               SPEAKER:  I have got an 8:00 flight.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, 8:00 is fine.
               SPEAKER:  I am taking Metro.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Do you think you guys can
     handle it without Mary?
               MR. KING:  It will be tough.  We will try.
               MS. DROUIN:  They can handle it.  I am scared what
     they are going to agree to without me that I am going to
     have to live with.
               [Laughter]
               DR. SEALE:  Well, you can handle it.
               MS. DROUIN:  I can handle it.
               DR. KRESS:  This is our chance.
               DR. POWERS:  Now is your chance, Tom.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, I don't expect it
     will be much longer.
               Mr. Christie, are you going to stick to your time
     schedule, 15 minutes, or you will need more?  It depends on
     the question.
               DR. KRESS:  It depends on what we ask.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Anyway, we will try to be
     reasonable.  Okay.  We will try to be reasonable, but I
     think we should start at 4:00 with Mr. Christie, because
     that is the scheduled time.
               So maybe we can go on for another five minutes and
     then break for five, and then come back with Mr. Christie.
               Anything on 4-1?  Yeah, I do.  The first paragraph
     on the left says NUREG-1489 provides a more tutorial
     discussion in terms of methods in uncertainty analysis. 
     This reference is from 1994.  I would rather have you cite
     Regulatory Guide 1.174, which reflects the more recent
     thinking.  There is a lot of discussion on uncertainties
     there and how to handle them in the context of that
     Regulatory Guide.
               Then on the next page, 4-2, it says, for example,
     compliance with the ECCS acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46
     can be demonstrated using best estimate codes provided that
     uncertainty is accounted for.  I don't think a best estimate
     code means anything.  How do you account for uncertainties
     in a best estimate code?  It seems to me you have to have a
     quantitative statement of how accurate the model is.
               DR. KRESS:  I don't know if we have a good
     definition of what a best estimate code is.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  There is no definition. 
     Yeah, I think the whole thing has to be revisited.  Now, I
     can see how, by having a distribution of the output of the
     code, one defines acceptance criteria in such a way that in
     the future, all you have to do is run the code with point
     estimates, because you don't want to do uncertainties all
     the time.  Right?  And then you compare with the acceptance
     criteria which have now in them, built into them, the
     uncertainties in the code.
               MR. KING:  But I think you are right, a best
     estimate code, for it to work, you have got to have an idea
     of what the uncertainty band about the estimate is.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  So, would you please
     rephrase this to make sure that it is not offensive.
               DR. BONACA:  I have a question on this, however. 
     Doesn't the NRC right now allow for what they call a best
     estimate?
               MR. KING:  Yes.  Yes.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.
               DR. BONACA:  So there is a definition of it.
               MR. KING:  But you have to know the uncertainty
     band.
               MR. HASKIN:  There is a Reg. Guide that governs
     how you do that.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  That does what?
               MR. HASKIN:  This is an option under Part 46.
               DR. BONACA:  There is a definition right now in
     place for a best estimate LOCA now.  Yes, there is.
               MR. HASKIN:  Yeah, there is a Reg. Guide that
     governs what it is.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  What does it say?  What
     does it say?  It says use best estimate codes.
               MR. KING:  But you have to quantify the
     uncertainty.
               DR. BONACA:  You have to quantify the uncertainty,
     compare it to the Appendix K.  You have -- it is a very
     elaborate process.  Now, how best estimate it is, I cannot
     tell you, but -- 
               MR. HASKIN:  And including looking at the biases
     in the code modeling.  So, I mean there is a whole Reg.
     Guide that deals with this.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
               DR. KRESS:  On that same page, George, they have
     this intriguing paragraph at the end of the second column,
     "As in considering a change to the existing regulatory
     requirements, it is important to estimate the overall impact
     on the actual plant changes that would ensue."
               I think that is not only important, I think it is
     mandatory to do a good risk-informing job.  But I don't know
     how you are going to do that.  And my question is, how do
     you implement that requirement?  Is this an iterative
     process where you will make a rule and then go to the plants
     and say, now what will you change based on this rule?  Or
     will you guys try to guesstimate what they will change?
               MR. KING:  We would have to make some estimate of
     what the changes would be.  I mean we have to have something
     in mind.
               DR. KRESS:  And then estimate what the effect is
     on -- 
               MR. KING:  Estimate what the effect is on risk.
               DR. KRESS:  But isn't that plant-specific? 
     Wouldn't you have to do it for each plant and see if, on the
     aggregate, you still meet your goals?  Yeah, it is just the
     implementation of this, I am not sure how you are going to
     go about doing it.
               MR. KING:  I mean it is no different than when we
     modify a regulation today.  We have to basically do the same
     thing.  Pick an estimate of what the change is risk is.
               DR. KRESS:  When you make a regulatory analysis.
               MR. KING:  Yeah, regulatory analysis based on what
     we think the licensees are going to do to comply with that
     regulation.
               DR. KRESS:  So this would be similar to a normal
     regulatory analysis.
               MR. KING:  Similar to a regulatory analysis.  We
     don't look at 103 plants, we pick a few representative
     plants.
               DR. KRESS:  Pick out, you will out enough of them
     that you have got it covered.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  The righthand side, top of
     the page, there is a sentence that I think is great.  "To
     the extent possible, revised and new deterministic
     parameters will be based on probabilistic considerations." 
     This is really a very good statement.  I think it should
     have been stated much earlier as well.
               And I think the statements that I have been
     complaining about, you know, about not using probabilities
     and risk measures in the thing, can be combined with this to
     give a nice little paragraph that explains where you are
     coming from, because this really is the essence of it.
               MR. KING:  Yeah, this is the main them of this
     whole document.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, this is the essence.
               But, again, revised or new deterministic
     parameters, that does not exclude the possibility of having
     some of these requirements use probabilistic language, like
     unavailabilities, the maintenance rule and so on.
               MR. KING:  So if we are not risk-based, George?
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Huh?
               MR. KING:  As long as we are not risk-based. 
               [Laughter.]
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  This is awful.  Can you
     believe that?
               MS. DROUIN:  We now know what button to push.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  To be vigilant not to
     become risk-based, because then -- I suggest that we stop
     now for a few minutes.  I don't think there are too many
     comments after that, but I think we should take a short
     break and then allow Mr. Christie to present his views.
               I take it you don't have anything.  It says here,
     status of proposed revision to 10 CFR 50.44.  You can do
     that?
               MR. KING:  We covered that at last subcommittee
     meeting.  We will cover it at the full committee tomorrow.
               MS. DROUIN:  Tomorrow.
               MR. KING:  Tomorrow.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  We will cover in the full
     committee, yes, that is true.
               Okay.  So we are recess for seven minutes.
               [Recess.]
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  We are back in session.
               Mr. Robert Christie has the floor.
               DR. KRESS:  Would you introduce yourself so we
     know who we are -- 
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I think Mr. Christie is
     well known to the committee, and it is late in the day.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  My name is Bob Christie.  I am the
     owner of a firm, Knoxville, Tennessee consulting firm called
     Performance Technology.  I have been in the commercial
     electric power business, nuclear and some other things, risk
     and reliability related, for about 26 years.  And I think
     that today what I would like to start out with is a couple
     of corrections administrative in nature.
               One is, George, I am not talking about hydrogen
     50.44 today, that is tomorrow.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Okay.  The second is there is,
     again, brought up in the discussion today, this statement
     that I am supposedly to have made that when we proposed
     something in 50.44, we were talking about ultimate
     containment capability.  And I just want to go back again on
     the record, during the meeting last week on the 29th, you
     know, I will just read what I said.
               I don't see anywhere in that proposed rulemaking
     that says we are using the ultimate capability.  We are just
     saying that the large drives are going to check their
     containment capability.  We don't use ultimate capacity.  We
     just say for high probability events, check your containment
     capability.  Whether you use design, whether you use
     ultimate, whatever you do, that is for the people at the
     plant to decide how to do that, and they have done that in
     their previous works.
               The last thing I would like to check, the staff
     has stated today that no one has objected to the framework
     document, and that is definitely untrue.  In the February
     meeting that we had to talk about the framework document,
     which isn't exactly the same as what we have had today, and
     we had probably one of the most, as I stated in our March
     1st meeting, the most contentious meetings I have ever been
     to with respect to the interactions of the industry and the
     NRC. 
               So, there were violent objections to the framework
     document in that meeting.  We came to you and we went on the
     record on the March 1st.  We provided you documentation
     that, you know, put down our objections to what the
     framework document is.  And then last, I guess, last week,
     you know, you called me up and asked me, did you hear what
     they said to me, and do you agree to that, you know, et
     cetera?  I said, no, I don't agree to that framework
     document.
               So, it is not true that the industry has not
     objected to the framework document.  That is not true at
     all.
               Okay.  What I would like to talk to -- those are
     just to clarify some other things.  I would like to talk to
     you today.  I would like to, you know, just quick, five
     subjects, adequate protection, the policy statement on
     safety goals, the June 15th, 1990 staff requirements, goal
     allocation and summary.  And I don't think we have to spend
     a lot of time on it.  This is, again, the primary basis -- I
     mean primary responsibility-wise with the people running it,
     and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the adequate
     protection, public health and safety.
               The definition that is generally used, and we will
     talk about that, if a nuclear power plant is in compliance
     with the regulations, it is presumed that nuclear unit
     provides adequate protection of public health and safety.  I
     think that is pretty well straightforward.
               DR. KRESS:  Except what do you mean by presumed?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  I have no idea.  I am just quoting
     from what the NRC puts in their paperwork.
               DR. KRESS:  Okay. 
               MR. CHRISTIE:  I am just saying that is the
     definition.
               DR. KRESS:  Okay.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Okay.  We have the 1986 Nuclear
     Regulatory Commission policy statement on safety goals for
     the operation of nuclear power plants.  It consists of two
     parts.  Basically, the qualitative part having to do with
     individual members of the public, and then the societal risk
     to life and so.  We have seen those before.
               From the qualitative goals, we go down to what is
     known as the quantitative health effects objectives.  And
     here we see the .1 percent rules.  .1 percent rule means .1
     percent of the background.  For accident fatalities, that is
     called the top fatality goal, and then we have got the
     latent cancer fatalities, which, again, is .1 percent.
               Where do the numbers come from after that?  It is
     pointed out in the staff presentation, you figure out the
     numbers and so you get approximately 100,000 accidental
     deaths per year in, you know, 200 million.  So it comes to
     one in 2,000.  For latent cancers, it is 400,000 per 200
     million, and it is one in 500.  Okay.
               I think, you know, that is pretty straightforward.
               I want to talk to you now about this document that
     has been referred to a couple of times, and I don't know
     whether you have read it or not.  I have read it millions of
     times.  But this is the -- you know, the document defines
     how safe is safe enough in adequate protection.  And the
     first statement that is in here is that the Commission
     agrees that it must not depart from or be seen as obscuring
     the arguments made in court defending the backfit rule. 
     Okay.  These arguments clearly establish that there is a
     level of safety that is referred to as adequate protection. 
     This is a level that must be assured without regard to cost
     and, thus, without invoking the procedures required by the
     backfit rule.
               Beyond adequate protection, if the NRC decides to
     consider enhancements to safety, costs must be considered
     and a cost benefit analysis required by the backfit rule
     must be performed.  
               The safety goals, on the other hand, are silent on
     the issue of cost, but do provide a definition of how safe
     is safe enough that should be seen as guidance on how far to
     go when proposing safety enhancements, including those
     considered under the backfit rule.
               And on your point, Tom, where did we get the bit
     about -- read the footnote on a related point.  The
     presumption is that compliance with our regulations provides
     adequate protection.  I don't know what presumption means. 
     I don't like the definition, but that is something else.
               Okay.  What the Commissioners, to me, clearly said
     in that, that there is a level of adequate protection
     somewhere, and there is also a thing called -- how safe is
     safe enough?  And the quantitative health objective is to
     find, how safe is safe enough? 
               So, let's take the individual, which, you know,
     everybody generally agrees is the most restrictive.  And you
     look at it and you take the background as one in 2,000, and
     you go to .1 percent, and it comes out to be one in 2
     million.  And below that point, the NRC is not to impose
     requirements even if cost beneficial.  That is pretty clear
     to me in the safety goal policy statement.
               Okay.  Now, they said somewhere above that line
     lines something called adequate protection.  Okay.  And this
     is my curve from my Delphi Process, where I asked everybody
     that I knew, including the members of the ACRS, to
     contribute to the Delphi Process to see if we could get this
     curve defined with adequate protection.  And as I told you
     before, we didn't get a heck of a lot of response.  No one
     from the NRC, including no member of the ACRS, responded. 
     We got a limited from the industry, and it turns out that
     most of the people are coming in between 1 and 10 percent,
     with kind of a mean, you know, somewhere 3 to 5, as I have
     told you before.
               So, now, if that were true, this would be the
     curve that would be used to define adequate protection. 
     Above that line, the NRC imposes requirements without regard
     to cost, between the adequate protection line and this "how
     safe is safe enough?" that we would be using the 10 CFR
     50.109.  Why do I have 10 CFR 10.109 on there?  Sorry about
     that.  I just caught that.  
               And in there, we would be using the 200 person-rem
     conversion factor based on the $3 million value for health
     detriment.
               DR. KRESS:  So your Delphi Process would say
     currently, today, adequate protection is like a factor of 10
     above the safety goals?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  I would say 30 to 50, but a factor
     of 10 for sure.
               DR. KRESS:  Just go out to the -- 
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Three to 5 percent versus .1. 
     Adequate protection over here is about 3 to 5 percent.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Of what?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Of background.  Which is an order
     of 30 to 50 more than .1 percent.
               DR. KRESS:  But this was just a Delphi Process.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Right. 
               DR. KRESS:  So it is -- 
               MR. CHRISTIE:  You know, again, I have had a
     conversation with Dr. Joe Murphy about this, and Joe says
     people don't think in terms of 3 to 5 percent, they think --
               DR. KRESS:  In terms of 10.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Ten.  
               DR. KRESS:  Ten.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  So, you know, what he recommends is
     we go -- well, he doesn't recommend, but he said it would be
     more logical if they used just 1 percent.
               DR. KRESS:  Yeah.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  For adequate protection.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  For adequate protection.
               DR. KRESS:  That would be the factor of 10.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Of what, 1 percent of the
     background?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  1 percent of background.  
               DR. KRESS:  It is a factor of 10.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Everything is -- 
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  10 to the minus 6 then.
               DR. KRESS:  Yeah.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  No.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  It would be if you used 1 percent. 
     For me, it would be 5 times to the minus per year.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Right.  So, an order of
     magnitude above the safe enough.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Right.  
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  And in that region between 1
     percent and .1 percent, we would be using the backfit rule.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, this is a three
     region approach we have asked for several times, right?
               DR. KRESS:  That is exactly what it is.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  And the staff and the
     industry are against it.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  The staff and what industry?  I am
     for it.  I know that the next head of the ANS is for it.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  NEI was against it.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Well, I am just telling you that
     there are -- you know, industry is not represented entirely
     by NEI.
               DR. KRESS:  The staff actually uses this approach.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  This is like risk-based.
               MR. KING:  This is, in effect, what the staff
     uses.  We are not against it.
               DR. KRESS:  This is, in effect, what the staff
     uses.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I'm sorry?
               MR. KING:  This is, in effect, what the staff
     uses, a three region approach.
               DR. KRESS:  I mean whether it is spelled out or
     not, that is what they use.
               MR. KING:  I mean we just haven't -- 
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  That is what we said in our
     letter, Tom, that, in effect, people are using it.
               MR. KING:  Exactly.  We just haven't put a number
     on adequate protection.
               DR. KRESS:  Right.  
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  And, of course, we did it
     in the context of CDF and you might object to doing that for
     the CDF.  I know you -- 
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Depending on which CDF is chosen.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  You like the risk?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  We will get to that point in a
     minute, George.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, I never doubted that,
     Bob.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Okay.  And you have heard me
     before.  The best requirements are those that define a
     criteria to be met, do not specify how to meet.  The
     criteria should lead to a comprehensive approach to the
     whole plant, defining the overall criteria is better than
     defining a set of lower criteria.
               All right.  And then, again, we get to the
     problem.  The public health risk is different for each unit,
     and it changes with time.  All right. 
               DR. KRESS:  What happens if you cure all the
     cancers?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  We have been through that last --
     two years ago, Tom.  If you cure all the cancers, the latent
     doesn't even appear anymore and we are down to the
     immediates.
               DR. KRESS:  No, no, the latent then becomes
     dominant.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  No, the latents is zero.  You can't
     have a latent cancer fatality anymore.
               DR. KRESS:  Yeah, but you have got -- 
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Zero is zero, Tom.
               DR. KRESS:  -- .1 percent of zero that you meet
     that.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  No, Tom, zero is zero.  1 percent
     of zero is zero.  100 percent of zero is zero.
               DR. KRESS:  It is hard to meet zero is what I am
     saying.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  But if they cured cancer, then we
     wouldn't have latents. 
               Okay.  Now, the staff is in here.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  And this is what we, you know,
     again, we object to this pretty vehemently.  I mean it is
     such a complicated affair.  Just think about writing your
     PRA three times now.  You are going to run your PRA for --
     what do they call them? -- anticipated initiation.  You are
     group all the ones that are, you know, somewhere between 10
     to the minus 2 and 1, and you are going to run it again
     between all the ones that 10 to the minus 5.  You can do all
     you can all your conditions, containment capabilities.
               DR. POWERS:  I guess I am lost.  Why do you have
     to run them multiple times?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  How are you going to separate out
     the transients that are between 10 to the minus 2 and 1?  If
     you just run it once, all of them are lumped together and
     all your event trees, et cetera, et cetera.
               DR. POWERS:  No, they are not.  No, not my PRAs,
     they aren't.  All spit out nice and separately.
               DR. KRESS:  And when you say -- 
               MR. CHRISTIE:  No.
               DR. KRESS:  When you say you are going to have to
     do this, do you think this is going to be the licensees
     having to do this?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Absolutely.
               DR. KRESS:  Oh, I thought NRC was going to do
     that.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Well, what code is it is going to
     do, code is the NRC going to use to do this for a
     plant-specific PRA that varies individually from plant to
     plant?
               DR. KRESS:  The same ones that they use now for
     regulatory analyses is what I was told.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Right.  Right.  And do you think
     they are going to get accurate results?
               DR. KRESS:  I don't know.  Accurate enough for
     making regulations maybe.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Anyway, this is a very -- 
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Your argument, Bob, is that
     what really matters is the bottom box, quantitative health
     objectives, is that your argument?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  No.  What matters to me is adequate
     protection of public health and safety.  That is my limit.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I thought you are objecting
     then -- this is a clarification.  You are objecting to two
     things that the staff is doing.  First, they are going
     deeper than just the quantitative health objectives.  You
     have always argued that that is the only thing that matters.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  No.  I have never argued it is the
     only thing that matters.  I have always argued -- 
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  You have argued this for
     years.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  I have always argued that adequate
     protection of public health and safety is the standard to
     which plants are licensed and the thing that counted.  And
     if you want to go below that, then you can go down to the
     backfit rule.
               At the time I was saying it might be easier if all
     we did was demonstrate we are below the quantitative health
     objectives, because then we wouldn't even worry about the
     backfit rule.  But the standard that I am held to today, at
     every license in the in the United States, is adequate
     protection of public health and safety.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  So you are -- I mean that
     is why I raised the issue three hours ago.  Would the fact
     that we are using the goals create any problems?
               DR. SHACK:  You have to meet the regulations. 
     Now, the regulations give you adequate protection, but
     nobody pretends that they are based solely on adequate
     protection.  They clearly include safety enhancements that
     go beyond adequate protection.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  If you use the backfit rule.
               DR. SHACK:  Yeah.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Right.  That is the scheme that all
     of us are licensed to, and the scheme that is embedded in
     the law.  And if you want to change that scheme, you have
     got to go back and change the law and go through the
     Congress and go through the courts.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I'm confused.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  That's the way life is, George, in
     licensing a nuclear power plant.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I understand that.  I am
     trying to understand your objection to what the Staff is
     doing.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  I am objecting that the standard
     that they are now setting to us is how safe is safe enough,
     which to me is --  not only they are not setting it as how
     safe is safe enough, they are even setting it below.
               They are not even going to write rules for
     adequate protection in a risk-informed rule.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  So they are -- you are
     objecting --
               MR. CHRISTIE:  They are changing the Atomic Energy
     Act.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  You are objecting to their
     use of the goals to write regulations without looking at the
     backfit rule?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Right.  Absolutely.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Which is something we
     discussed earlier.
               The second one, which you surprise me today, I
     thought you have always argued that what really matters is
     ultimate public health and safety -- fine, and not CDF and
     conditional core damage and conditional --
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Absolutely.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  So you are also objecting
     in terms of that figure to all the boxes they have above
     the -- that talk about prevention versus mitigation?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Absolutely.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, now I understand.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  You have got your letter from Dr.
     Seale to Chairman Jackson, you know -- we all know that.  If
     you choose a core damage frequency of 10 to the minus 4, you
     are more conservative than the quantitative health
     objectives.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  But the Staff told us today
     that the Commission has blessed this.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Well, I will talk about that in a
     minute.  As a matter of fact, here's the next slide.
               The Staff says in the June 15th memorandum from
     the Commissioners to Staff that they gave them permission to
     use the 10 to the minus 4, and let's start looking at what
     they say in that memorandum.
               It says implementation and safety goals may
     require development and use of, quote, "partition
     objectives.  In general the additional objectives should not
     introduce additional conservatism.  The Staff should bring
     its recommendation on use of each subset of the area
     objectives to the Commission in the context of the specific
     issue for which it will be useful and appropriate and
     explain its compatibility with the safety goals."
               Then they go on to say, "For the purposes of
     implementation the Staff may establish subsidiary
     quantitative core damage frequency and containment
     performance objectives through partitioning of a large
     release guideline. These subsidiary objectives should anchor
     or provide guidance on minimum acceptance criteria for
     prevention and mitigation and thus assure an appropriate
     multibarrier defense-in-depth balance in design. Such
     subsidiary objectives should be consistent with the large
     release guideline and not introduce additional conservatisms
     so as to create de facto new large release guideline."
               And as we know, in the safety goals they couldn't
     even come up with the large release guideline.
               They said a core damage probability of less than
     one in 10,000 per year reactor appears to be a very useful
     subsidiary benchmark in making judgment about that portion
     of the regulations which are directed toward accident
     prevention.
               Okay?  Now how are you going to get that and still
     be, quote, "not introduce some additional conservatisms" is
     the dilemma that I have with a problem with.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Would you say these SRMS is
     not self-consistent?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  I would say that statement is not
     self-consistent.
               DR. KRESS:  Do you know what core damage frequency
     the current regulations were designed on an average to
     achieve?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  I have no idea -- it would depend
     on each individual plant would have its own specific core
     damage frequency that would meet the regulation.
               DR. KRESS:  Well, and that could vary.  On the
     average, this might be the number they were shooting for
     with the current regulations and still use it --
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Could be.
               DR. KRESS:  -- and might not add any more
     conservatisms.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Could be, but if I again look at
     the fact that I am working off the QHOs and a 10 to the
     minus 4 QHO -- I mean 10 to the minus 4 core damage
     frequency drives me down below the quantitative health
     objectives, then obviously this is inadequate protection
     because adequate protection according to this document is
     above the quantitative health objective.
               DR. KRESS:  If it drives every plant down below,
     then maybe on the average.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  So in the average it is all right
     to have half of the plants get more restrictive, to pick the
     10 to the minus 4 as the core damage frequency --
               DR. KRESS:  Yes, that's what you mean by that.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  It's great that half of the plants
     don't meet that -- couldn't meet the QHOs, don't meet the
     CDF?
               DR. KRESS:  Right.  I think that's what you mean
     by it.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  I'm sorry.  I'm not going to have
     half of the plants in the United States not meeting a
     subsidiary objective -- 
               DR. KRESS:  So you would rather have a fixed
     number that they all have to meet?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  I would like for them to meet
     adequate protection, which I hope some day to be able to
     define in terms of background.  I would like for them, below
     that, to go with the backfit rule, and I would like for them
     not to have to meet any NRC regulations --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  What you are asking, Bob,
     is really for the Commission to define adequate protection
     in terms of some frequency number, some risk number.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  It would solve a lot of problems. 
     But, you know, again, that's their -- now go look at the
     next statement however.  The Commission has no objection to
     the use of a 0.1 containment conditional failure probability
     for the evolutionary design -- for the evolutionary design.
               Now there's some thought that when they put this
     in the same paragraph and partitioning that they also meant
     the core damage probability of less than one in 10,000 per
     year to be for the evolutionary designs also, because the
     Commissioners in 19 --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  1990 --
               MR. CHRISTIE:  -90, when they were writing this
     knew that the existing plants didn't meet the 10 to the
     minus 4.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  And they were not aware of
     Rick Sherry's work I don't think at the time.
               DR. SEALE:  But they were aware of the criteria
     that were in the utility requirements document for the
     evolutionary designs that talked about 10 to the minus 5th.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  That's correct.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Again, I am just going off what is
     stated here in the document.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  So what is your point from
     all this?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  I just want one more slide on the
     large early release frequency because I want to --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  By the way, just as a
     clarification, Tom, when you told us earlier that an SRM
     would confirm the 10 to the minus 4, you are referring to
     this one?
               MR. KING:  Yes.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay, thank you.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Okay -- and Tom Kress and I will go
     over it again.
               On the large early release frequency of 10 to the
     minus 5, you got the statement in the SECY that says, hey,
     we took the 1150 plants, we raised them all up to a certain
     level, we added a whole bunch of stuff up, and we picked the
     10 to the minus 5 on the basis of those that are closest to
     the QHOs, okay? -- and Tom said, no, that's not exactly what
     we did is we drew a line, a kind of median, and so basically
     half of the plants if we choose 10 to the minus 5, choosing
     10 to the minus 5 is more restrictive for half of the plants
     and maybe not that restrictive for the other half to meet
     the QHOs.
               DR. KRESS:  I don't think either of those is what
     has actually happened.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Do you believe that there are
     plants in the United States who have a large early release
     frequency in your definition let's say of a 10 to the minus
     4 and still meet the QHOs?
               DR. KRESS:  10 to the minus 4 and still meet the
     QHOs?  There may be some limited sites --
               MR. CHRISTIE:  So some plants in the United States
     could have a large early release in 10 to the minus 4 and
     still meet the quantitative health objectives?
               DR. KRESS:  It's possible, depending on the sites.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Okay, so again picking a 10 to the
     minus 5 means that there's some plants in the United States
     that's more restrictive than the quantitative health
     objectives?
               DR. KRESS:  Probably yes.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Okay.  That's what I think too --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Let's look at summaries. 
     Let's look at the summaries.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  All right, summary.  And here's --
     so we know where we are at.
               Staff is proposing requirements for risk-informed
     regulations for the existing nuclear units far beyond the
     standard of adequate protection, okay?  They're saying this
     is voluntary, so if we stick in the existing deterministic
     rule the standard is adequate protection.  If we go over
     into the probabilistic world, the standard is how safe is
     safe enough.  Oh, boy.
               Number two, the Staff is ignoring the requirement
     of the backfit rule when the Staff wishes to go beyond
     adequate protection.  The Staff is ignoring the express wish
     of the NRC Commissioners in the thing where they said not
     only said use it, but don't give any appearance of not using
     it.
               Three -- the Staff is proposing subsidiary
     quantitative objectives for existing plants that the NRC
     Commissioners said were applicable to the evolutionary
     plants -- to .1 for containment conditional probability is
     for evolutionary plants, new plants.
               The framework they are using today uses .1.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  But not the 10 to the minus
     4, as Dr. Seale pointed out.  They were aware of the 10 to
     the minus 5 --
               MR. CHRISTIE:  I don't know what that 10 to the
     minus 4 meant.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I think it was an allowance
     for the existing plants.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  But at least to .1 is for the
     evolutionary plants and now the Staff is applying it to
     existing plants.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I must say that I am really
     troubled by the first bullet -- I mean the first comment
     there, as I stated earlier today.
               I think we are using quantitative health
     objectives that were meant to indicate safe enough without
     using them in option three, which is intended to be for
     adequate protection.
               I think Bob is right.
               DR. KRESS:  I don't think so, George.  I think
     we're mixing up the concept of requiring individual plants
     to meet their goal versus writing the regulations so that on
     the average they can meet the goal.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  But the individual
     regulations will be imposed upon the individual plants --
               DR. KRESS:  As they are now, and I think they had
     the same goals in mind when they wrote the --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, that's where we don't
     know.  We don't what the goal was --
               DR. KRESS:  Now we don't know.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  -- when they were writing
     something in 1973.
               DR. KRESS:  I know we don't know that.
               DR. SHACK:  Any new regulation will have to meet
     the backfit rule.
               DR. KRESS:  That's right.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I don't understand that. 
     If you use option three, it won't.
               DR. KRESS:  They will probably do the backfit
     anyway, even if it's volunteer.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Wait a minute, wait a
     minute.  If I use option three, and it is finished, okay? --
     and the NRC writes a regulation --
               DR. KRESS:  Right.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  -- then they will have to
     use the backfit rule to justify it?
               DR. KRESS:  They won't have to, but they will
     because it's sort of standard procedure nowadays.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  What do you mean, they
     don't have to but they will?
               MR. KING:  That is one of the issues that we are
     going to raise to the Commission.
               There is a line of thought that when we propose an
     alternative, a risk-informed alternative, if that
     risk-informed alternative adds additional requirements there
     ought to be a backfit analysis to show that those would pass
     the backfit test.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  But you don't have to ask for the
     policy statement.  The policy statement already exists --
     June 15, 1999 the Commissioners told you that in the
     implementation of the safety goals you use the backfit rule. 
     Don't even be perceived as not using the backfit rule.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I am afraid we are
     ratcheting up the regulations if we use the goals.
               DR. KRESS:  I don't think we know that.
               DR. BONACA:  I don't think we do.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  You don't think we do what?
               DR. KRESS:  Look at the plants now.  Where do they
     fall as a spectrum of plants on a safety goal plot?  I don't
     know where they fall, but I'll bet you most of them meet the
     safety goals and that is because --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Not according to the
     gentleman to my left.
               DR. KRESS:  Well, you know, we can debate this
     issue, but I would say --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, let's take the
     subsidiary goals.  You know they don't.
               DR. KRESS:  Most of them probably do.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Most of them do but --
               DR. KRESS:  That is why you write the regulations
     so that the average meets them and if most of them meet it,
     well, the average meets it.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I am very uncomfortable
     with that concept, that on the average if I look at the
     population they meet it, because all they need is one
     accident.
               DR. KRESS:  I've always had --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  An accident on the
     average --
               DR. KRESS:  I have always had a problem with that.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  That bothers me.
               DR. KRESS:  I have always had a problem with that
     too, George.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. KRESS:  But that is the way the system is said
     to be designed.  I have had a problem --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  We're supposed to fix the
     system.
               DR. KRESS:  Okay, but that is a different issue.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I don't understand that. 
     When we issue a particular rule --
               DR. KRESS:  To fix that issue you have to go to
     saying each plant has to be required to meet a particular
     CDF or a particular LERF, and the Commission has just over
     and over said they are not going to do that, so, you know, I
     would like to change that, and I have fought to change that,
     but we are not getting very far with it.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  But that doesn't mean that
     I can develop a new approach to Part 50 that has some
     fundamental if not flaws, fundamental questions embedded in
     it.
               DR. KRESS:  I think there are questions but I
     think we disagree on whether or not this is actually a
     ratchet or not.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I am willing to be
     convinced otherwise, guys, but right now I think we are
     ratcheting up.
               DR. KRESS:  Well, the question of the ratchet is
     what does the current set of plants meet in terms of the
     safety goals.
               How many of them meet it?  How many of them don't?
               I think you would say then with the new
     regulations are we requiring more of them to meet it or are
     you still going to get the same distribution?
               I don't know the answer to these questions but I
     have no --
               DR. BONACA:  I agree with Tom, but the other
     thing, adequate protection right now means that you meet the
     regulation, the regulation that we have in the books.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  That is not what it means. 
     The Commissioner makes it very clear.
               If you meet the regulations, there is a
     presumption of adequate protection.  If there is adequate
     protection, that does not necessarily mean you meet all the
     regulations, and it is not necessary and sufficient.  It is
     necessary, not sufficient -- which leaves open a huge hole
     for us to justify, you know, a lot of things.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  No, I do not believe it leaves a
     huge hole to justify other things except by use of the
     backfit rule.  It is not a huge hole. It is a very
     well-defined hole.
               DR. BONACA:  I agree with that.  I agree.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  So all we have to do from now on is
     everything that we want to add to the thing say it meets the
     backfit rule, go through the 51.09 analysis and make sure it
     meets the backfit rule.
               DR. BONACA:  The question I have is if we did not
     use the goals but we used some definition of adequate
     protection, how would we go about risk-informing Part 50?  I
     mean has anybody got any idea how to do that?
               DR. KRESS:  You would have to explicitly spell
     those out.
               DR. BONACA:  Exactly.
               DR. KRESS:  So since we can't, we have to use
     something different, because we can't explicitly spell those
     out.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  But you see --
               DR. BONACA:  We wrote a letter, right?
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  But is it inconceivable
     that as an agency we'll want to have it both ways? 
               We don't want to define adequate protection
     quantitatively and yet we want to risk-inform the
     regulations.
               DR. BONACA:  But the point though that I would
     like to make is that, first of all, we had a regulation in
     place before there was any definition or goals,
     historically.
               Then we began to talk about goals and, you know,
     these goals these members here, they were the AIF, American
     International Forum put them forth in the early '80s, late
     '70s, and now there has been always an intent of filling the
     gap with regulation, with the use of PRA. 
               How have we done that?  By looking at CDF and LERF
     and in cases we found there was a gap in the regulation,
     that there was no adequate protection on some plants, there
     were some changes made in the research of vulnerabilities. 
     There was a process that ended up with the IPEs and so on
     and so forth.
               So I don't think this concept here presented by
     NRC is inconsistent with all these developments.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  It is inconsistent.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  George, let me --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  1.174 -- it refers to
     individual plants and says if you're changing CDF from what
     you have now, which presumably satisfies adequate protection
     criteria, is this and that, we approve or we don't approve.
               This is a very different approach.  This starts
     with the QHOs.
               DR. KRESS:  It ought to be.  It ought to be --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  It doesn't start with the
     existing CDF at this plant.
               DR. KRESS:  George, it ought to be a different
     approach -- 1.174 can be viewed as a formal way to do
     exemptions.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Changes.
               DR. BONACA:  It has to be plant-specific.
               DR. KRESS:  And this is not exemptions.  This is
     rewriting the rules and they should not be -- the two of
     them shouldn't be thought of except in general principles,
     you know, the principles are applicable in both cases but
     they are not the same thing.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  My point is that in 1.174
     precisely because you are talking about changes the issue
     did not arise, because you are not relying fundamentally on
     the QHOs.  You are saying we are allowing this guy to
     operate, therefore there is a presumption of adequate
     protection.  Now he wants to change it a little bit and here
     are some rules.
               Here we are taking a very different approach.
               MR. KING:  No.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  We are not looking at what
     the guy is doing.  We are starting with the QHOs.
               MR. KING:  1.174 started with the QHOs and backed
     out.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  No.
               DR. KRESS:  They did.
               MR. KING:  LERF, 10 to the minus 5th LERF number
     shows up in 1.174 as well as the 10 to the minus 4 CDF as
     cutoffs as to where --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  No, but there you are
     allowing to go higher.  Come on.  
               MR. KING:  But the changes have to be, you know,
     so small that they are almost negligible but there is a
     cut-off in there and it is based upon the safety goals.  It
     is not based upon adequate protection.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  You look at the figures you
     have.  They go to the right and then there is a zig-zag line
     that says, you know, we really don't know where this is, but
     that is exactly the adequate protection, that you are
     approaching now regions where even a small delta is not
     tolerable.
               DR. KRESS:  That is because you are dealing with
     individual plants, not the body of regulations.
               DR. BONACA:  Exactly.  That is the point -- 1.174
     applies to the individual plants.
               DR. KRESS:  If you are going to risk-inform the
     regulations, in my opinion you are going to have to have in
     mind some risk objectives that you are trying to achieve. 
     That is the only way you can risk-inform it.
               Now if I were going to use as my risk objectives
     this factor of 10 above the safety goals that we saw on Bob
     Christie's plants, I would be in real trouble, I think.  I
     think that would be real mistake to try to risk-inform the
     regulations.
               DR. SHACK:  And who would be -- the meaning of the
     safety goal at that point?
               DR. KRESS:  Nobody.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  No, the goal I think was
     stated very well.  It is if you are below the goal, we leave
     you alone.  We don't even raise the issue of backfit.
               DR. KRESS:  That is when you deal with specific
     plants.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Agreed.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  That is exactly what it was
     always supposed to be.
               DR. KRESS:  But that's when you deal with specific
     plants.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  And that was the intent of the
     Commissioners.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I don't think anybody is
     disputing that.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Okay.  Let me explain.  We do not
     need this framework to risk-inform the regulations.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Why not?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Well, because we have another
     framework which we will talk about again tomorrow, which I
     have already explained to you on the hydrogen, where the
     framework is.  You go through the existing regulations.  You
     retain what is effective and efficient in addressing public
     health risk.  You add what is necessary  that comes out of
     your risk assessments and you delete what is not effective
     and efficient.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, then the Staff might
     tell you that we are developing all this to help us decide
     what is necessary.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Well, they can have a framework
     where half the plants in the United States don't meet the
     regulations, which to me is just a debacle of the nth order. 
     It's almost ludicrous when you think about it.
               Do I want to be an in the half of the plants that
     don't meet it and go out there and say, hey, I don't meet
     the regulations but it's all right?
               DR. KRESS:  Well, there's going to be two sets of
     regulations and you'll have to meet one or the other.
               I think that is a problem we have had but I don't
     see any way around that.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Okay.  We are going to have a set
     of regulations where the plants that can meet all the
     quantitative health objectives and treat quantitative health
     objectives and even below the quantitative health objectives
     as adequate protection and meet all those are going to be
     over here in one set of rules and then we are going to have
     another set which can't meet all the quantitative health
     objectives as adequate protection and the subsidiaries, et
     cetera, and they are going to be up at another level?
               DR. KRESS:  Probably.  That is probably what is
     going to happen.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  That is another thing that
     makes me very uncomfortable, Tom.
               DR. KRESS:  I know, but --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  And you know very well -- I
     think all of us know that a lot of licensees will start to
     pick and choose.
               DR. KRESS:  Of course they will.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Then what happens?
               DR. KRESS:  That is the issue of selective
     implementation, that we have got a policy to deal with, and
     we even wrote a letter once that we think you are going to
     end up with a dual set of regulations and don't see any way
     around it.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Well, I see a lot of ways around
     it.
               There's no doubt in my mind I see a lot of ways
     around it.  I can risk-inform the regulations for everyone
     using just exactly the framework that we just explained.
               I don't think it is the most optimum but it
     certainly can be done.
               DR. KRESS:  Well, you would make a new set of
     regulations that would be mandatory for everybody --
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Absolutely.
               DR. KRESS:  -- a different framework.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  The proposed petition for 50.44 is
     a mandatory application for petition for everyone.  It
     doesn't set -- and that is another problem we will talk
     about tomorrow.  It's got nothing to do with Option 3.
               DR. KRESS:  That is certainly another option.  We
     debated among ourselves some about that option.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Let me understand something
     in the context of the framework that was presented.
               Let's say that in one of the entries for
     infrequent initiators one of the facilities happens to be
     higher than the numbers we have here and we say it's a goal,
     it doesn't matter.
               Then Quad Cities happens.  Right or wrong,
     somebody comes up with a sequence that is really violating
     the goals, the numbers that the Staff has shown.
               Where does the Staff start flying people over
     there to find out what is happening and in fact order a
     shutdown or the licensee itself shuts down the plant because
     they feel they have entered the region now where we are
     talking about adequate protection and all this remains with
     this framework obscure.
               DR. KRESS:  I think they make a judgment call,
     just like they do now.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  That's right, so this is
     not helping that way.
               DR. KRESS:  It is not helping their part.  They
     will have to make a judgment call just like they do now.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I think what makes it worse
     is that you are allowing a plant to be higher than some of
     these numbers but we don't know how high they are allowed to
     be before we reach adequate protection.
               DR. KRESS:  Well, you and I know.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I know.
               DR. KRESS:  I think the Staff knows.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I think everybody agrees
     that if you are in the 10 to the minus 3 for the reactor
     core damage frequency, I mean the licensee itself proved
     that they believe that's too high.  They shut down.
               I don't know why we have this great reluctance
     to --
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Are they shutting down because of
     public health risk --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  No.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  -- that they can't survive it, or
     are they shutting down because the investment risk is too
     high to lose $4 billion?
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I think it is really a
     combination, and you can add to that one probably the
     reaction from the NRC and so on, but the truth of the matter
     is that it seems to be consensus that a 10 to the minus 3 or
     higher core damage frequency is something that we have to
     act immediately upon.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I don't think you can
     dispute that.  Now you can argue about the reasons but this
     is the truth.
               DR. KRESS:  So why don't we codify --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Why don't we recognize
     that?
               DR. KRESS:  Why don't we codify that --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  And yet the Commission
     says, the Commission disapproved the proposed change to
     elevate the qualitative statement of the prevention --
     qualitative even -- of severe core damage accidents to a
     qualitative safety goal.  The Commission just flat out
     disapproved it and now we can't do anything about it.
               Anyway --
               MR. CHRISTIE:  I don't think -- you are just
     focusing on the core damage frequency, which again is not
     the reason for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
     existence.
               The reason for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
     existence is the public health effects. The radiation that
     is contained in the fission products in the core have a
     significant impact during accidents, if we have accidents,
     on the public health risk, and it is the role of the Nuclear
     Regulatory Commission.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I wonder, Bob, if there was
     a core damage incident tomorrow and the New York Times and
     Washington Post were after the Commission whether you would
     stand up and say, hey, nobody was killed.  Why are you
     putting them on the hot seat?
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Absolutely.  I would stand up there
     without even blinking.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I don't think the reporters
     would listen to you.
               MR. CHRISTIE:  Again, you are predicating
     everything on the front page of the New York Times and the
     Washington Post and I know that the Staff does it also,
     because I sat in on the meetings and they told me so, and
     that is not an appropriate measure for the regulations of
     the Nuclear Regulatory Commission nor the behavior of the
     Staff.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  What is appropriate it
     seems to me is what the American people say is their role.
               Anyway, I think we are running out of time here. 
     Thank you very much.
               I don't know, now do you want to continue with --
               MR. KING:  It's up to you.  Mary mentioned to me
     that Section 5 has changed quite a bit, so if you have
     comments on the old Section 5 it's probably not worth taking
     time to go through them.
               MS. DROUIN:  I mean we have --
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I have comments on Section
     4 and then I would be very happy to skip 5.
               MS. DROUIN:  I mean we substantially reworked 5. 
     The new version doesn't look anything like the old version.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Will we have another chance
     to look at 5, or the new 5?
               MS. DROUIN:  I mean you have it.
               DR. KRESS:  We have it here.
               MS. DROUIN:  I mean a chance to talk to you about
     it.  Tomorrow or the next day?
               MR. KING:  It won't be tomorrow.  We are not --
     the subject isn't on the agenda for tomorrow but certainly
     we would ultimately like a letter on the framework in
     support of our August paper.  Now the timing of how to get
     that we have got to talk about.
               DR. KRESS:  That's probably, that's something we
     ought to talk about now, I guess.
               MR. MARKLEY:  The next meeting is August 30
     through September 1st.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Maybe we should postpone
     then the discussion until then.  I have a few comments but
     they are --
               DR. SHACK:  Let me just ask what is intended in
     Table 5-1 where you have this regulatory coverage of some
     accidents important to risk.  
               I mean is the implication here that you need a
     regulation addressing each of the accidents important to
     risk, or can you take the argument that if you have achieved
     a sufficiently low level of risk by some other means you
     don't need to explicitly cover them?
               DR. KRESS:  Which Figure 5-1 are you looking at?
               DR. SHACK:  Table 5-1.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Table 5-1.
               MS. DROUIN:  It's been awhile since I have looked
     at this.
               The only thing we were trying to say, and you
     know, this is an early version, I can't tell you what the
     new version looks like, is that we wanted to step back and
     look at Part 50 and look at what are the risk insights
     coming out of your PRAs -- what are your dominant accident
     sequences, what are the contributors, and just kind of match
     them up to the regulations to see at a quick, high level,
     back-of-the envelope approach is there some glaring hole in
     the regulations?    
               Is there some dominant accident class or some
     contributor, some large contributor that is not being
     addressed by a regulation.
               This was just showing how -- you know, we went
     through the accident types that are important to core damage
     and to LERF and tried to map up where these are being
     covered by the regulations, not to read any more into that
     table than that.
               DR. SHACK:  You did seem to be determined to
     preserve the concept of a design basis accident, and that
     would somehow seem to be inconsistent with this notion that
     all these accident classes -- or these would become new
     design basis accidents?
               MS. DROUIN:  Not that these should become new. 
     This is just looking at here are the accidents coming out of
     the PRAs, that PRAs have told us are important.   
               And we actually have regulations that are matching
     up.  And if there is something that is not a match, then we
     would then therefore want to go look at to say this is a
     hole in the regulation.
               DR. SHACK:  Okay, so we want to think about this?
               MS. DROUIN:  Yes, it's just a high level screening
     tool for us.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Have you really thought
     hard about this position that the concept of design basis
     accident should be preserved?
               MS. DROUIN:  Thought hard about it?  I'm not sure
     what you mean by hard.  We've thought about it.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  You just took it for
     granted that this is a good idea?  We are doing a lot of
     things that really go away beyond the design basis
     accidents.
               DR. SEALE:  Like steam generator tubes.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.  This is a beautiful
     paragraph here, right below that table.  Some
     risk-significant accident types and related events do not
     find any mention in the current regulations. 
               So I don't know that the DBAs are something worth
     deserving.
               MS. DROUIN:  It may not be those DBAs, but I do
     think the concept of having accidents against which you want
     to design, personally I think that's a good concept.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  It is, but it could take a
     different form than the current form of design basis
     accidents.
               MS. DROUIN:  That's all we're saying.  We want to
     keep the concept.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               MS. DROUIN:  We aren't saying it's necessarily the
     DBAs that are the books now will still be the same ones and
     in the same form.
               DR. POWERS:  Your affection for the concept is
     because of its design facility that it provides?
               MS. DROUIN:  I'm sorry, I didn't hear you.
               DR. POWERS:  The reason you have an affection for
     this concept is because of the facility it provides to
     design?
               MS. DROUIN:  Yes.
               MR. KING:  That's part of it, and part of it is
     unless you go risk-based, I think you're pretty much forced
     to come into some sort of design basis accident concept.  So
     as long as those design basis accidents really reflect the
     risk considerations, and -- 
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  But there is always a
     residual risk.
               MR. KING:  Sure.  There's a residual risk, even if
     you want risk-based.  
               DR. BONACA:  And under a probabilistic regime, I
     mean, you would have to postulate some event to determine
     the sizing of your pumps or the way you're injecting.  
               DR. POWERS:  Well, what I'm asking -- you might
     well do that, but the question I'm asking is, if it's just
     the design and not this question of risk-based, and just a
     question of design, why does the NRC want to get involved? 
     Why ought not that be up to the designer hypothesizing
     anything you want to do?  
               Now, this other issue that Tom brings up, which is
     that, in essence, we don't want to become risk-based because
     we don't think our risk analysis tools are yet comprehensive
     enough and robust enough that we can rely strictly on risk,
     then gets into this question of there are certain kinds of
     features of plants that we want to proscribe.
               We want to proscribe plants that have an
     end-stable reactivity profile.  Just don't even bring them
     to me, they're forbidden.
               I think I'm putting words in your mouth, but
     that's -- 
               DR. KRESS:  No, that's an accurate statement of
     what I propose.
               DR. POWERS:  Once again, we come to the
     possibility that because we can't set up a completely
     self-consistent regime here, we have to legislate against
     certain kinds of alternatives.
               DR. KRESS:  That makes sense to me.  
               DR. POWERS:  So, we can't get rid of the concept
     of design basis accidents.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes.  I think even in the extreme of a
     risk-based system, your design basis accident becomes the
     whole spectrum of PRA.
               DR. POWERS:  Well, it does, but it might be
     different for each plant.
               DR. KRESS:  It would be different for each plant.
               DR. POWERS:  Yes, or certainly each plant type.
               DR. KRESS:  It certainly would be plant-specific
     design basis accident.
               DR. POWERS:  We discussed that before, because of
     different locations, the risk profile must necessarily be
     different.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes, and because of the different
     reactor concepts.
               DR. POWERS:  All you've succeeded in doing is
     persuading them, boy, I'm glad I'm not doing your job.
               DR. KRESS:  We don't think this is an easy job.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I think the most
     fundamental issue here is the adequate protection versus the
     use of goals.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes.  I think we have a fundamental
     difference of opinion among some of the members on that
     issue.
               DR. POWERS:  I think that's been adequately
     reflected in the e-mail traffic.
               DR. BONACA:  To which we did not contribute
     intently.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Say again?
               DR. BONACA:  For which -- I follow that traffic
     very, very carefully.  I was going to help in a couple of
     times, and I said, well, it's already said.  
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I would say it's reflected
     in today's discussion as well.
               DR. KRESS:  We probably should have added Tom and
     Mary to this, and put our e-mail address on that.  It might
     have been interesting.  
               DR. BONACA:  I would like to say at some point -- 
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  How are we going to solve
     this?
               DR. BONACA:  Wait.  If we -- 
               DR. SHACK:  We're going to out-vote you, George.
               [Discussion off the record.]
               DR. BONACA:  If we decided to go with adequate
     protection, then we would have to quantify it in terms of
     some risk measure.  And I don't see why the one that we
     propose would not be appropriate on an average basis.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  That's what bothers me,
     that because it's the only risk measure that we have, we
     resort to using that without thinking that its intent was
     very different.  
               DR. SHACK:  I still come back to my argument that
     if you have goals, that your regulatory system ought to be
     out to achieve those goals.  
               DR. KRESS:  That's exactly what the Commission
     said they were intended for.  
               MR. KING:   I remind you that this issue is going
     to go to the Commission in our August paper.  I mean, we're
     not going to decide this unilaterally.  We're going to lay
     this out for the Commission that we're using their safety
     goals, subsidiary objectives for this purpose, and, in
     effect what it means is, we're risk-informing the
     regulations to achieve the level of safety that they -- that
     was stated as their expectation in this Agency in the safety
     goal policy.
               DR. KRESS:  I think that's -- 
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  So now someone meets all
     the regulations under Option 3, and then you promise to
     leave them alone and you will never impose additional
     regulations on them because they are safe enough?
               MR. KING:  Yes, unless some new information comes
     up.  
               DR. KRESS:  If you could write perfect
     regulations.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  And the staff should
     incorporate in the reactor safety goal policy statement that
     it is the Commission policy that safety goals are goals and
     not limits.
               Now, what difference would that make?  That some
     plant may violate them and when you issue the rule or
     whatever rule -- 
               DR. KRESS:  That's what it means; that's exactly
     what it means.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I don't understand that.  
               DR. KRESS:  That's why they're goals.  
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  They issue a rule that
     flows from this framework, what does that mean?
               DR. KRESS:  That means some plants will -- 
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Will not follow the rule?
               DR. KRESS:  No.  They will follow the rules.  It
     says that the rules cannot be written so perfectly that
     every plant in how it operates and how it designs and how it
     runs its things, will not meet those numbers.  It will meet
     the rules, but it will not meet those specific numbers.  
               And that's the way the rules are written now, and
     that's the situation we have now.
               MR. SIEBER:  Some plants may choose not to
     risk-inform that rule.
               DR. SHACK:  Even if you assume -- 
               DR. KRESS:  Even if you choose all of them -- 
               DR. SHACK:  -- choose to do it, that's going to be
     a fact of life, that when they do it, because they've done
     it on a generic basis, some will make and some won't.
               DR. KRESS:  More than likely, the ones that choose
     to do it will be the ones that know they can make it easily
     anyway.  
               But that's not something we ought to debate.  
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I don't think you're right
     with your argument that if I have goals, I should strive to
     achieve them, and otherwise, why do I have them?  No.
               The goals were specifically interpreted as meaning
     that if you are below those, there's no reason to even
     consider additional safety measures.
               That doesn't mean that I will establish -- it's
     safe enough; that's what it says.
               DR. KRESS:  I don't think that's what they said.  
               DR. SHACK:  I think there was an expectation that
     they would do that on the average.
               DR. KRESS:  On the average.  I think that's
     explicitly stated in there.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  But it's a safe-enough
     statement.  
               DR. POWERS:  There was an expectation that --
               DR. KRESS:  They made it on the average.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  That's different from the
     expectation.  The protection of the goal is that it's safe
     enough in the sense that I will not ask you to do anything
     else.
               DR. KRESS:  That's an additional interpretation.  
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  This is a -- 
               DR. KRESS:  Related to the backfit rule.
               DR. POWERS:  My perception, based on what I have
     read about the history of things was they were interested in
     the question of, is the body of regulation such that things
     are safe enough now, or is there some tremendous omission
     that we've made out there in this body of regulation?
               And one needs only think about the history prior
     to Appendix R and 50.48.  Here's a tremendous omission.
               I think they were really interested in, is there
     evidence of some tremendous omission?  And we derive that
     evidence by looking at a lot of individuals, and seeing if,
     on the average, things are well away from where our goals
     are.
               DR. KRESS:  That's a good way to look at it.
               DR. POWERS:  But it doesn't obviate our problem. 
     If we want to regulate, if we want to go approve a
     particular installation, what it wants to do, you need some
     number to compare against, and they're just not giving it to
     us.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes.  They're not giving us that
     number at all.  
               DR. POWERS:  And I don't know why.  I mean -- 
               DR. KRESS:  I don't know why they're reluctant to
     do that.
               DR. POWERS:  They kind of have, in that they said
     go ahead and use 1.174, okay, for changes.  And I should
     say, for the formal -- what method of granting exemptions,
     go ahead and use this number, which seems to me a lot more
     tenuous of a thing than saying prove the operation of this
     plant.  
               I seems to me that granting exemptions, I'd be
     more cautious with than just a general running of the plant.
               It's curious.
               DR. KRESS:  It's curious.
               DR. POWERS:  Makes me glad that I don't have their
     job either.  
               DR. KRESS:  We've argued that they ought to do
     that.  
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Are there any other
     important comments?  
               MR. HASKIN:  I just want to make one comment.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               MR. HASKIN:  While I was at Sandia, one of the
     jobs I had was to supervise the group that developed the
     methods to do the uncertainty analysis in 1150.  If you guys
     recall, the uncertainty distributions on core damage
     frequency from 1150, typically from the fifth to the 95th
     percentile is two orders of magnitude.
               If I establish a goal for core damage frequency at
     adequate protection at 10 to the minus three, and I base
     that on a mean, that means that there is a five percent
     chance that my actual core damage frequency could be as high
     as 10 to the minus two.
               One of the things you haven't considered in this
     discussion of safety goals versus adequate protection is
     that if you want to set an objective based on adequate
     protection for things like core damage frequency, you want
     to base that on a mean, or do you want to put some
     confidence level?  
               DR. KRESS:  That's right.  
               DR. POWERS:  It may have been neglected in this
     discussion, but it has been neglected before, and I will
     hasten to point out that the suggestion has been the 95
     percentile for that particular goal.  
               DR. KRESS:  Puts you right back to the safety
     goals again.  That's what I was kind of arguing all along.  
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, this will come after
     we decide what the limit -- what the goal is.  And in 1.174,
     we just -- because, you know, it was too soon for these
     things, so we said there will be increased management
     attention, which means a qualitative treatment.
               But you're right, that this uncertainty has to be
     taken into account.  But that does not eliminate the
     fundamental concern of goal versus adequate protection.
               DR. POWERS:  If you're striving for the safety
     goal, I feel relatively comfortable making comparisons based
     on mean.  
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  So now you're saying that
     on the basis of defense-in-depth, I will use goals for
     adequate protection?
               MR. HASKIN:  No, it's just something that has to
     be considered in the deliberation.
               DR. POWERS:  What do we know about the history of
     the nuclear inspection -- anyone in their goal limit --
     structure?
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  We have this in  -- see,
     the thing about documents that come out of Europe, as far as
     I can tell, is that this concern about uncertainty that we
     have here is not there.
               So they tell you, individual risk, if it's less
     than 10 to the minus six, it's broadly acceptable by
     society, what we would call safe enough.
               If it's 10 to the minus four or higher, it is
     unacceptable, what we would call adequate protection is
     violated.
               In between, it's tolerable, in other words,
     cost/benefit -- 
               DR. POWERS:  I'm aware of the words.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  But the fact that 10 to the
     minus six may have two orders of magnitude uncertainty up
     and down does not appear, at least explicitly, does not
     appear.
               DR. POWERS:  So they must be prescribing methods
     of analysis?
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Not that I have seen.  The
     documents that I have seen do not.
               DR. POWERS:  Well, maybe they're not prescribing a
     particular method, but they're prescribing that the method
     be acceptable to the regulator.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, I'm sure it has to be.
               DR. KRESS:  They can deal with it in that
     prescription.
               DR. POWERS:  It's much more collegial and a less
     confrontational system.  So if regulatory and regulatee
     agree on a method of analysis, yes, you can omit the
     question of uncertainties.
               DR. KRESS:  Because it's implicit in that.
               DR. POWERS:  It's been implicit in the way you've
     developed it, yes.  
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. POWERS:  If you guys would just get along with
     your licensees, instead of being so damn confrontational.
               [Laughter.]
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Any other comments from the
     members on issues that have not been addressed?  
               MR. KING:  Do you want to talk timing of the next
     Committee's action?
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  This is a good idea.  You
     are supposed to send something to the Commission in August?  
               MR. KING:  End of August, we owe a paper to the
     Commission that will have the framework, the policy issue in
     50.54.
               DR. POWERS:  Why don't you come present that
     package to us at our September meeting?
               DR. KRESS:  And our letter would follow.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Is that too late?  That's
     what my question was; when is the Commission expected to do
     something about it, so that September will not be late?
               MR. KING:  I think if we could meet at your
     September meeting, it would probably work out okay.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Can we write the letter at
     the September meeting?
               DR. KRESS:  Yes, I think we could do that. 
     George, that would be a nice letter for you to write.
               DR. SHACK:  I can work on my added comments.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. KRESS:  You and I can get together and work on
     our added comments.
               MR. KING:  Which means you probably want another
     Subcommittee so that we can delve more into the policy
     issues?
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I don't think another
     Subcommittee will help, but I think we can have a three-hour
     -- 
               DR. POWERS:  I think we would have great
     difficulty trying to schedule another Subcommittee meeting,
     but on the other hand, I think this is -- we've examined and
     debated this enough that if you could just appear before us
     and say here are the things that we call your attention to
     that have been changed dramatically from what we've talked
     to you about before -- 
                I mean, just do that in a very terse fashion,
     because, quite frankly, as has been apparent, we've been
     going over this thing literally line-by-line.  
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  The other thing is, you
     know, it depends on what they say in the letter to the --
     the report they send to the Commission.
               If they pose an issue and they say, look, we can
     interpret it this way or that way, tell us what to do, then
     I don't think there is a question of added comments, right?
               DR. KRESS:  Probably.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  If the staff comes back and
     is de facto using certain things in a certain way, then some
     members may disagree, so it depends very much on what you
     guys write in the final.
               MR. KING:  You'd be interested in how we frame the
     issue and what our recommendation is.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes, definitely that.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  If you offer options to the
     Commission, arguing, you know, both sides of the coin, I
     don't see why we would disagree.  
               DR. KRESS:  They may have a preferred option.
               DR. POWERS:  I would presume the Commission would
     like to get our thoughts on which option to take.  
               DR. KRESS:  Or if there is another option.
               DR. POWERS:  This sage and insightful one that Tom
     comes up with or the thing that we come up with.  
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  So we will have then a
     presentation during the September meeting with the
     expectation that we will write a letter at the time.
               MR. KING:  Okay, sounds good.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  Anything else?
               DR. KRESS:  That's a two-hour session.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Members of the public?  
               [No response.]
               DR. POWERS:  I would try to make it short, the
     presentation short.  
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  No, I think we should have
     enough time for discussion.  The presentation itself can be
     short.
               DR. POWERS:  I think I'm very familiar with the
     agenda for September, and I know there's no room to make it
     a lengthy period, and I'm going to talk to you guys.  I
     think September is going to be a four-day meeting.
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  The fourth day is Labor
     Day.
               DR. KRESS:  I don't care; I'm retired.
               DR. POWERS:  Second of all, I don't think that's
     the issue that we're confronting.
               They will have a fait de complis; they will have a
     list of options that are so well explained that there's no
     clarification.  All they need to do is call our attention to
     it.
               DR. KRESS:  All we need is to have the documents
     ahead of time. 
               DR. POWERS:  Dr. Shack will be able to formulate
     his clear and insightful points of view that will
     undoubtedly be endorsed by the rest of the Committee at the
     expense of others.
               [Laughter.]
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  I am not that these
     comments deserve to be in the transcript.  Does anyone have
     anything of substance to say?
               [No response.]
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  Thank you very much, both
     the staff and Mr. Christie.  This was a very informative
     meeting today.  I hope the debate will not be repeated in
     September.
               DR. SHACK:  We tried to head it off with the
     e-mails, George, but -- 
               DR. KRESS:  It didn't work.  
               CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS:  So we are adjourned.  Thank
     you.
               [Whereupon, at 5:07 p.m., the meeting was
     adjourned.]
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