United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

488th Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards - December 5, 2001 - Afternoon Session

                Official Transcript of Proceedings

                  NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Title:                    Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
                               488th Meeting - Afternoon Session


Docket Number:  (not applicable)



Location:                 Rockville, Maryland



Date:                     Wednesday, December 5, 2001







Work Order No.: NRC-132                                Pages 1-62





                   NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
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           NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                     + + + + +
                   488th MEETING
     ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
                      (ACRS)
                 AFTERNOON SESSION
                     + + + + +
                     WEDNESDAY
                 DECEMBER 5, 2001
                     + + + + +
                ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
                     + + + + +
                 The Advisory Committee met at the Nuclear
           Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room
           T2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 4:00 p.m., Dr. George
           E. Apostolakis, Chairman, presiding.
           COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
           GEORGE E. APOSTOLAKIS      Chairman
           MARIO V. BONACA            Vice Chairman
           F. PETER FORD              Member
           THOMAS S. KRESS            Member-at-Large
           DANA A. POWERS             Member
           STEPHEN L. ROSEN           Member
           WILLIAM J. SHACK           Member
           COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
           JOHN D. SIEBER             Member
           GRAHAM B. WALLIS           Member
           
           ACRS STAFF PRESENT:
           MICHAEL T. MARKLEY
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           .                                 I-N-D-E-X
           AGENDA                                          PAGE
           Risk-Informed 10 CFR Part 50 Pilot Program        4
           (Option 2)
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           .                           P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
                                                    (4:01 p.m.)
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  We're back in session. 
           Before we start, I want to say something -- a few
           words about something else.  I think all the members
           know that we have very good relationship with the ACRS
           staff, but today it was made clear to me that some of
           us are loved more than others.  The staff found out
           that it's Dr. Kress' birthday today, so they bought a
           card and they had everybody sign, wishing him happy
           birthday.  So this is for you, Tom.
                       DR. KRESS:  Yes.  You know, it's tough
           when you turn 55.
                       (Laughter.)
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I know.
                       DR. POWERS:  Dr. Kress, I'd like to point
           out that we were going to get you a cake with candles,
           but the fire protection group here said that that was
           too much of a load on the building.
                       MR. ROSEN:  And at 55, what's the
           uncertainty band on that?
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  A factor of two.
                       DR. KRESS:  I certainly appreciate this.
                       DR. SHACK:  We called a little late, but
           we still don't know too many 130-year-olds.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's not normal the
           other way.
                       DR. KRESS:  I certainly appreciate this
           from the staff and thank them very much.  It's a very
           nice card with -- I will take that home and frame it
           and keep it.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
                       DR. KRESS:  Thank you very much.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, back to business. 
           The next topic is Risk-Informed 10 CFR Part 50 Pilot
           Program, Option 2.  We had a Subcommittee meeting
           yesterday when -- yesterday afternoon.  We discussed
           with the staff primarily the language of the rule and
           then the treatment requirements and so on.  We did not
           get into the technical details of the categorization
           process and other issues, but we will have another
           Subcommittee meeting, it was agreed, maybe as early as
           February where we'll go into details in these matters.
                       The staff agreed to present today to us
           obviously a shorter version of their presentation
           yesterday, but we also heard from NEI, Mr. Peitrangelo
           and Mr. Heymer, yesterday, who unfortunately have
           other commitments today and they cannot be with us. 
           But the staff promised to have one viewgraph where
           they would identify some differences of opinion
           without expressing any views since the other side is
           not here.
                       And, Mr. Reed, you have the floor.
                       MR. REED:  Thank you, Dr. Apostolakis.  As
           already mentioned, I'll be trying to go through a much
           briefer version than what was delivered yesterday, for
           the sake of time.
                       And I'll focus on the highlights from
           yesterday's meeting, basically focusing in on the two
           pieces of the draft rule language where I think most
           of the discussion centered -- on the categorization
           area, that's Paragraph C, and also in the RISC-3 area. 
           And then we'll also be discussing some of the early
           comments or major issues, if you will, as requested by
           the Committee.
                       Before we do that, though, real quickly,
           a little bit of background here to get the Committee
           same page.  As you'll recall, SECY-99-256 provided the
           rulemaking plan for Option 2 back in October of '99. 
           It attached an advanced notice for proposed rulemaking
           that was published in March of 2000, which we got
           something between 100 and 200 comments.  And SECY-00-
           194, which published in September of 2000, we provided
           preliminary views on those comments and also some
           additional thoughts on the regulatory approach.
                       South Texas, as the Committee's very
           aware, was a technical effort that went on for I
           believe it was about two years and was just issued in
           early August.  It was the majority of the tech effort,
           if you will, from the staff for about the last year,
           and it was a proof of content for Option 2.  There's
           been numerous stakeholder interactions.
                       We cite three public workshops of note. 
           Most recently there was one in November that I'll
           speak to a little bit here in a second.  We've had two
           Commission briefings in September of 2000 following
           issuance of SECY-00-194, and then also in conjunction
           with the STP exemption approval, we also briefed the
           Commission in July of this year.  Just recently, last
           week, I guess it was -- the 29th, I believe it was, in
           the Federal Register we published the draft rule
           language.  And that, of course, was the major
           discussion yesterday at the Subcommittee.
                       I will mention here a little bit the
           request of the Committee.  In our workshop that we
           held back in November, when we discussed the draft
           rule concepts, we discussed three alternative
           approaches for addressing RISC-3 treatment.  Those
           approaches were, if you will, what I'll call almost a
           pure commercial approach, Alternative 1, which would
           basically have a simple statement in the rule that
           says basically maintain the design basis functions for
           this RISC-3 treatment, basically; Alternative 2, which
           is very much like what you see in the draft rule
           language, which has what I'll call minimum rule
           attributes in the rule, more of a programmatic
           approach but very -- a minimal amount of detail in the
           rule, hopefully; and then Alternative 3, which would
           be a much more detailed rule, which would, in my view,
           very simply put, would be like putting the South Texas
           FSAR in the rule.  So there would be a lot of detail.
                       That was discussed during the workshop. 
           We got good stakeholder feedback, and we drafted the
           rule that you see and what was published last week,
           and it's pretty close to Alternative 2, although the
           staff likes to think it's between Alternative 1 and
           Alternative 2, I think you heard yesterday.  NEI
           believes it's about 1.95.  So there's one little piece
           of disagreement.
                       A little more background to remind the
           Committee of just the general structure and approach
           here for Option 2 and how we're going from the old
           safety-related, non-safety-related world into the
           safety-significant, low safety-significant world. 
           This is the infamous four-box diagram.  It shows the
           RISC-1, RISC-2, RISC-3 and RISC-4 boxes.  This is the
           bins that the expert panel would put the SSEs into.
                       If you're safety-related and you're
           safety-significant, as determined by this Risk-
           informed categorization process, you're in Box 1,
           RISC-1.  If you're non-safety-related, and that
           includes important safety equipment, okay, and you're
           safety-significant, you're in Box 2.  And if you're
           safety-related, low safety-significant, you go to Box
           3.  And, of course, non-safety-related and low safety-
           significant is Box 4.
                       Additionally, I show a little bit of the
           requirements that would be in each box.  Basically,
           Boxes 1 and 2 all requirements continue to apply for
           the safety-significant boxes, okay?  So if they have
           anything on them, and of course Box 1 has a lot of
           special treatment requirements; those continue.  Box
           2, if there are any special treatment requirements,
           those continue, and that will be a function of when
           the plant was licensed and what happened during the
           process, but it can have some special treatments
           requirements there.  Those would continue.
                       DR. WALLIS:  Usually, when you have axes
           like this, the most important things go up on the
           vertical and to the right on the horizontal, and this
           is not the case.  The scale of deterministic increases
           to the left.
                       MR. REED:  Yes.  We didn't --
                       DR. WALLIS:  Why don't you switch them
           around?
                       MR. REED:  I think you might have had that
           comment before, actually, didn't you?
                       DR. WALLIS:  I think I may have, but you
           haven't done anything about it, have you?
                       MR. REED:  No.  I haven't addressed that
           comment.
                       (Laughter.)
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, it wasn't a
           Committee position.
                       MR. REED:  But, in general, that's the way
           it works.  The requirements stay on for Boxes 1 and 2. 
           A lot of effort was focused on Box 3 during the South
           Texas project, and an all out effort's been focused on
           that for Option 2, and it's a major area of discussion
           with all the stakeholders.
                       And what we're trying to do here, just to
           remind the Committee again, Option 2 is really only
           risk informing what are called the special treatment
           requirements, or those assurance requirements that are
           in place throughout Part 50, 54, 52, Part 100, Part
           21.  They're there basically just to try to provide a
           high level of assurance that in fact these SSEs
           perform design basis functions.  We're not changing it
           to unknown requirements, okay, or to design basis
           events or anything like that.  That's Option 3.  Just
           these assurance requirements.
                       So one of the ground rules is for Option
           2 that we have to maintain design basis, and that's
           how we get stuck with this Box 3 and trying to do
           something to provide a sufficient level of regulatory
           assurance that we can say we're maintaining design
           basis functions without in fact imposing all the
           special treatment requirements.  So that's kind of the
           quandary we're in there.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, I think the line,
           "ensure categorization assumptions," does not belong
           there, because that's something you have to do anyway
           for all four boxes.  And it's not really a special
           requirement.  I mean, presumably, everything we do has
           sound assumptions behind it, right?
                       MR. REED:  Yes.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So I suggest that you
           take that out.
                       MR. REED:  Yes.  Could have taken it out. 
           I mean it was a matter of judgment what I put in those
           boxes.  I could have -- yes.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I mean the other stuff
           is different.  Current requirements continue, I mean
           that makes sense.
                       MR. REED:  Yes.  That's right.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So you're telling the
           industry that they don't have to ensure categorization
           assumptions for RISC-3?  You're not saying that,
           right?
                       MR. REED:  What I'm saying is that your
           categorization assumptions have to be valid, okay?
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Of course, but that's
           understood.
                       MR. REED:  And you have to maintain them,
           yes.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's understood. 
           Everything we produce here has good assumptions.
                       DR. SHACK:  No, but I think it means more. 
           It means that the treatment is chosen to assure that
           that's --
                       MR. REED:  Yes.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Use a different verb.
                       DR. SHACK:  It's not as though we're
           making good assumptions or bad assumptions, that
           you're also essentially looking for treatment
           requirements.
                       MR. REED:  Well, it's actually --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, you mean the
           requirements that would make sure that the
           categorization assumptions remain valid.  You need a
           better way to say that.
                       MR. REED:  Yes.  I think "treatment" is a
           bad word, actually, to use, and I think that set off
           an industry.  What we're really saying is if you're
           assuming something in the categorization process, you
           ought to have a basis for that assumption, okay?  And
           take a look at what you're assuming.  If you're
           assuming a widget's going to perform --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So it's closer to what
           I'm --
                       MR. REED:  It's exactly what you're
           saying.  So it's probably an unfortunate term to use
           there.
                       As I mentioned, just to try to hit the
           highlights from the Subcommittee yesterday and not go
           through the entire draft rule language, and I know
           this Committee's very interested in the categorization
           part, so we'll focus on the categorization piece
           first, which is Paragraph C.  I revised these bullets
           since yesterday.  These are now in my language, and I
           do not make any attempt to take the actual draft rule
           language and put it in here.  Now, if you like, I have
           the actual draft rule slides.  If you want to discuss
           it, we could put that up.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  We have that too.
                       MR. REED:  But, basically, what Paragraph
           C is, first of all, it requires the use of an approved
           categorization process.  Appendix T, which in earlier
           versions of this existed, does not exist in the draft
           rule now.  That was a stakeholder comment that if you
           put a very detailed Appendix T in place, we're going
           to get into the same sort of boxes and exemption
           spaces that we have with things like Appendix R. 
           That's a very onerous type of situation to deal with,
           and that can tie up a lot of resources, in fact, when
           you get into that kind of framework.  So we're
           commenting them and basically using an approved
           categorization process, which then requires a
           submittal and a review by the staff.
                       You must have an expert panel or an
           Integrated Decisionmaking Process to determine the
           safety-significance of the function.  In fact, this
           entire thing really revolves around an expert panel
           and giving them the sufficient information to make a
           risk-informed judgment about the safety significance
           of SSCs.  So you must have that expert panel.
                       And that panel must use plant-specific
           PRAs with internal events at full power, at a minimum,
           okay?  And in addition to that, we prefer you use PRA
           as much as possible, but we're only requiring that at
           full power internal events PRA.  And if you're not --
           you don't have everything in a PRA, then you must
           evaluate the SSC function for whatever other tools you
           have available -- safety significance in other modes,
           in external events, shutdown, whatever, fires. 
           Whatever tools you have available, use that
           information and give that to the expert panel.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, I got the
           impression from yesterday's discussions, plus from
           reading the NEI Table 4, there is more just having an
           IDP.  Both the industry and you would expect some
           structure in the deliberations.  Maybe that's
           something you want to put here.
                       MR. REED:  I think that's a good point. 
           I think it's also an observation that we've had to
           date from watching the pilots, that when you get to
           watching these expert panels and especially when they
           get outside the quantitative piece, where you know --
           they're very good at running through the PRA, the RAW,
           the Fussell-Vesely, using the quantitative piece, but
           when they get outside of that and they're in the
           qualitative portion and discussion, I think that came
           up yesterday, it's been an observation we've had, it
           probably needs more structure.  I think NEI
           understands that too.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I can tell you, I mean
           when we reviewed the South Texas application, the fact
           that there was a lot of structure in the expert panel
           deliberations was something that was a positive --
                       MR. REED:  Yes.  I think it makes it a
           more efficient panel.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So you agree with that. 
           Let's see if you agree with the next.  Must use a
           plant-specific PRA with internal events at full power
           and uncertainty analysis.
                       MR. REED:  The key words were "and
           uncertainty analysis."
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's right.
                       MR. REED:  I'll have to look to Glenn or
           Mike or Mark or whoever.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I'm just telling you
           that there's going to be a lot of discussion of this
           when we discuss --
                       MR. REED:  Yes.  I understand.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- categorization
           process.  And there is evidence that if you use point
           estimates which are ill-defined, you may not get the
           categorization that would be the best.  And as I said
           yesterday, one of those papers was written by your
           colleagues here.   And if you use mean values, then
           it's okay.  You get a pretty good categorization.  But
           point values are -- we don't know what they are, and
           the IPEs confirm that.  I mean if you look at the
           IPEs, some of the numbers are way out the mainstream,
           so to speak.  So it seems to me that that would be a
           requirement at the end.
                       And, again, it's not difficult to do
           anymore.  This is not 1980 anymore.  I mean there are
           codes, it's done routinely with our distributions for
           inputs all over the place.  So I think that will be a
           useful thing to put.  Otherwise you're going to pay
           the price or the licensee or the petitioner will pay
           the price later.  When you guys will start asking
           questions -- why did you have this point value here
           and there, what is the basis, and so on.
                       One of the things that most people don't
           seem to appreciate is that an uncertainty analysis is
           easier to defend than point estimates.  It's much
           easier to defend.  So, anyway, that is going to come
           up by at least one member of this --
                       MR. ROSEN:  It also is very important to
           the expert panel to know the bounds of uncertainty on
           what it's using, because if you have the component
           that comes out of the PRA at close to one of the
           thresholds, Fussell-Vesely or RAW, say it's 2.1, well,
           that's just more important than two, and you can't put
           it in the low safety-significant category.  But what
           if it comes out 1.9?  Now, you're tempted to put it in
           the low safety-significance category, but you cannot
           fail to remember in two years you're going to do an
           update of the PRA, based on the actual performance of
           the plant, and it's going to shift the numbers a
           little bit, and you don't want to go there.  You do
           not want to be a plant that has a bunch of components
           that move from category to category based on the
           Bayesian update, because that could wreak havoc, and
           you have to go back then and look at everything you've
           done since the last update.
                       So the expert panel wants to know -- when
           it gets a RAW value, it wants to know the uncertainty
           on that number.  It will want, typically, to place
           things in a higher category.  If the number's very
           well known, that's one thing, but, typically, they're
           going to move -- the expert panel will move things to
           a higher category.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think a lot of it
           depends -- I mean there were at least two papers that
           I'm aware of where people did the categorization, not
           the same, necessarily, as you have, using point
           estimates that they found someplace and then
           distributions and the mean values of distributions. 
           And a general conclusion, although, you know, there
           may be exceptions to that, is that if the point
           estimate you're using is to the right of the mean,
           it's higher than the median, most likely you're going
           to get conservative categorizations.  If it's to the
           left, you will get non-conservatives in the sense that
           an SSC that belongs, say, to Category 3 may end up in
           4.  And I think these are useful insights that will be
           helpful to you.
                       MR. CHEOK:  This is Mike Cheok.
                       DR. FORD:  Can I ask a physical question. 
           Why do you have the --
                       PARTICIPANT:  We've got a guy.
                       DR. FORD:  Oh.
                       MR. CHEOK:  This is Mike Cheok from the
           staff.  I guess we've all come prepared to talk about
           uncertainties in February, in the February
           Subcommittee meeting.  But the one comment I have
           today, though, is that the uncertainties that we are
           talking about are the parameter uncertainties.  I
           believe that in categorization the big uncertainty
           that would affect the results would be the stated
           knowledge or the incompleteness uncertainties.  And I
           think we're trying to address that through the IDPs
           and in a structured IDP process.  I think we can
           handle the date uncertainties in the parameters itself
           but not the epistemic type uncertainties.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Very true.  By the way,
           the date uncertain is not epistemic.  You're right,
           you're right.  But if we do that in the analysis part,
           you know, take care of the parameter uncertainties,
           then the burden on the panel will be less.  And I
           think that's what Mr. Rosen's comment was also about. 
           It will be less.  So the more you do to help the
           panel, the better off you will be.
                       MR. REED:  Sure.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Dr. Ford?
                       DR. FORD:  I have a physical-based
           question:  Why do you have the qualifier at full
           power?
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Because that's the only
           one they have.
                       DR. FORD:  That's the only one.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's the only one they
           have.
                       DR. FORD:  Only one what?
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  PRA.
                       DR. FORD:  Oh.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's recognition of
           reality.
                       DR. POWERS:  Not for want of our trying.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
                       DR. FORD:  The reason why I asked the
           question, not being a PRA expert, is that there are
           other degradation mechanisms that occur not at full
           power.
                       MR. REED:  Yes.  This process, though, is
           going to be assessing the significance at all modes
           and for all events.  It's just that PRA at full power
           is what -- we're going to require you have that.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You know, as the staff
           stated yesterday -- I think they're right -- for the
           modes for which you don't have PRA, then they're
           taking you to a conservative categorization.
                       MR. REED:  Exactly.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  In other words, you're
           paying the price.
                       MR. REED:  Which would tend to make things
           more put up in the higher boxes.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Unless you use point
           estimates.
                       MR. REED:  Right.
                       MR. ROSEN:  In terms of structure, we
           talked about the questions also that the South Texas
           exemption used.
                       MR. REED:  Right.
                       MR. ROSEN:  It provided a lot of
           structure, and we'd encourage you to think about if
           not having that, having something equivalent.
                       MR. REED:  Yes, yes.  I'm sure you have a
           pretty good list of comments that you want to provide. 
           I know those are two are coming for February, and I'm
           sure there's many more.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Sure.
                       MR. KELLY:  This is Glenn Kelly from the
           staff.  Regarding the -- if you're using a non-pure
           technique to analyze things at the Plant, those that
           were for external events where, for example, they used
           the five methodology of a seismic margins method,
           these are things that are going to take you because
           those methods inherently have some conservatisms in
           it, theoretically.  They should be giving you
           conservative results.
                       However, for things like shutdown and mode
           changes, where we do not have particular methods that
           can be relied upon at this point to judge whether or
           not something's important, where it's going to be more
           engineering judgment at this point, you're not
           necessarily going to end up with the same kind of
           assured conservatism that you would for the external
           events.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But even for the
           external events, when I read the NEI document, I had
           a lot of questions, because I'm not sure it's fair to
           say these are conservatives analyses; these are
           screening analyses.  So how one determines the --
                       MR. KELLY:  The Fussell-Vesely it's not
           clear, and that's correct, because it's not clear what
           the Fussell-Vesely is going to tell you.  And with the
           five methodology --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right.
                       MR. KELLY:  -- you can't really do that. 
           What it will do is will potentially tell you whether
           components in an area are important or not, but it
           won't -- that's not the same as giving you a Fussell-
           Vesely --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, the basic problem
           that I see is that you don't have a CDF from those
           models.
                       MR. KELLY:  That's correct.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And these measures
           depend on the CDF.  So these are the -- the sooner we
           meet, I think the better off we'll all be.
                       DR. KRESS:  Yes, George, that brings to
           mind a question that's bothering me for some time.  If
           you look at importance measures, RAW and Fussell-
           Vesely, both of them have the absolute value -- let's
           say with respect to CDF --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
                       DR. KRESS:  -- both of them have the
           absolute value of CDF in them.  That means you're
           treating a plant with a low CDF differently than
           you're treating a plant with a high CDF.  You could be
           treating them differently.  And it seems to me like
           that's not the right thing to do and that there might
           ought to be some sort of a virtual CDF absolute that
           you don't want to get close to, and you define an
           importance measure with respect to a component as to
           how much would contribute to getting up to that
           absolute value that you're willing to accept as a kind
           of importance measure for this kind of classification.
                       MR. ROSEN:  I don't think you're right
           about that, Tom.  The risk achievement worth is a
           ratio.  So it has -- for a plant with a low CDF and a
           plant with a high CDF, you're going to get a ratio. 
           That's what RAW is --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, that's what he's
           objecting to.
                       DR. KRESS:  That's what I'm objecting to.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  He's objecting to it. 
           He says that --
                       DR. KRESS:  That's exactly what I'm
           objecting to.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- you rank them, and
           then you treat the Class 1 the same as in the other
           one.
                       MR. ROSEN:  No.  I'm not making myself
           clear.  Risk achievement worth is --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Both of them are ratios.
                       MR. ROSEN:  Whether or not you're not at
           South Texas, a very low overall CDF, or some much
           earlier plant, they're both ratios --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Exactly.
                       MR. ROSEN:  -- within themselves.  So it
           tends to wash out.
                       DR. KRESS:  No.  That's why I'm objecting
           to it; it doesn't.
                       MR. ROSEN:  Well, that's one I don't
           agree.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think maybe another
           way of stating is the thresholds of 0.005 for Fussell-
           Vesely and two for RAW could be different depending on
           the absolute value of the CDF.
                       DR. KRESS:  Absolutely.
                       MR. ROSEN:  That's the part I don't agree
           with.  We need to work on that.
                       MR. CHEOK:  I think the example here is
           that if the baseline CDF is ten to the minus four, a
           plant with a RAW value of two would get a delta CDF
           increase of ten to the minus four.  Whereas a baseline
           plant CDF of ten to the minus six would only get an
           increase of ten to the minus six.  So the point there
           is --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's the essence of
           the argument.
                       MR. CHEOK:  And the response to that, Dr.
           Kress, is that we do have a requirement in the rule
           language that says that your increase in risk, i.e.,
           CDF and LERF, should be small and conform to that
           specified in Reg Guide 1.174.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right.
                       DR. KRESS:  Which means you have to end up
           with different thresholds for what you use to
           determine significance.
                       MR. CHEOK:  That's correct.  In essence,
           those thresholds could be different for the different
           plants, for different baseline CDFs.
                       DR. KRESS:  Somehow I don't see that
           concept in here.
                       DR. SHACK:  But it's in the NEI document,
           but they sort of admit that when you go through and
           you don't -- you know, if in your first cut you don't
           make it, you have to go back and adjust it.
                       DR. KRESS:  It's in the NEI document,
           which we haven't reviewed.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, but the other side
           --
                       DR. SHACK:  He's right, it is capped in an
           absolute sense by the 1.174 criteria.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But there's another side
           to it.  What if a licensee uses 0.005 and two, and
           everything he finds is fine, the delta CDF is low and
           so on?  But if you change the thresholds and remove
           some of the components from RISC-1 down to RISC-3, you
           still get a delta CDF that's low.  You don't allow
           that because you have fixed the thresholds.  So there
           should be some flexibility there, shouldn't there?
                       DR. SHACK:  Only if you worry about that
           problem.
                       DR. KRESS:  Well, if I'm the licensee, I
           do.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, I mean, gee, if I
           were a licensee --
                       DR. SHACK:  It's the licensee's problem --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, because if you --
                       DR. SHACK:  -- from a regulatory problem.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, the regulator must
           say, "Here are some suggestions from the thresholds,
           but we're open to listening to other comments."  If
           you put them there as an absolute -- but I think this
           comes back --
                       DR. SHACK:  They're not going to be in the
           rule?
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What?
                       DR. SHACK:  They're not going to be in the
           rule.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  They're not going to be
           in the rule.  It's going to be in the guidelines.
                       MR. CHEOK:  As a matter of fact, the top
           event prevention essentially does what you would
           suggest, George, in that you could pick and choose
           what you want to put in RISC-1 and include that in
           your success paths.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I hear that licensees
           using some other methods for importance measures, and
           they're getting many more components going down to
           one.  So you really want to not to ossify the methods. 
           But it comes down to the old argument -- just go and
           find a gypsy, if she tells you what to do, the delta
           CDF is all right.
                       DR. SHACK:  It's acceptable.  It may not
           be optimal.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, because of the
           economy of the country.  And I think the point that
           Tom raised -- you're happy, Tim, right; we're arguing
           among ourselves.
                       (Laughter.)
                       It comes back to -- guys, there's one
           meeting here.
                       DR. POWERS:  If he wants to argue among
           himself, he doesn't want any distractions.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think if you follow
           what Tom is saying with the absolute CDF, then you're
           closer to the ROP.  If you follow the current CDF,
           you're closer to my interpretation of ROP, which will
           come down.  Now, as you're trying to maintain the
           current levels or, as he's saying, as long as you're
           below the regulatory goals, it's okay.  So this point
           will keep coming back, I think.  Now, Tim, back to
           you.
                       MR. REED:  Okay.  Additionally, then the
           rule requires the IDP to consider --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Cindi is smiling over
           there.  Why is that?
                       DR. KRESS:  They probably had this
           discussion among themselves at one time.
                       MR. REED:  As I mentioned, it requires you
           have an IDP, and then the IDP must consider all the
           information I'll just briefly mention -- the PRA
           results, the non-PRA information, defense in depth and
           safety margins.  So this is clearly a risk-informed
           reg guide 1.74, if you will, type approach that we're
           instituting here.  If something's low, if an SSC's
           low, then there has to be a justification for it to be
           low safety significant.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, wasn't that an
           issue that was raised yesterday, I believe, by my
           colleague to the left here, supported by others, that
           all this is focusing too much on CDF and LERF, and
           that some components --
                       MR. REED:  True.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- SSCs are there to
           prevent perhaps a higher consequence -- I mean, yes,
           a higher consequence -- I mean low consequence, high
           frequency and that there may be a way of having those
           --
                       DR. BONACA:  Yes.  I mean the
           classification has the consideration of frequency
           consequence, and here it's just simply CDF.  And
           anything below core damage doesn't seem to be
           considered risky.
                       MR. REED:  At least my interpretation of
           that was -- that's another way of addressing defense
           in depth.  If you look at the NEI document, they have
           that table there, and it's a little bit confusing, but
           it talks about the frequency of the event and then the
           number of redundant diverse systems you have.  For
           very frequent events below consequences, we would want
           to have redundancy and diversity there, in fact, to
           make sure it's low.  But there's other ways of doing
           that.  I think what you're suggesting is another way
           to potentially do that.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, and also the
           argument has been made in the past that the licensees
           will take care of those for other reasons.
                       MR. REED:  If they affect power operation,
           clearly.
                       DR. BONACA:  My main comment yesterday was
           that you're still struggling with justifying --
                       MR. REED:  Yes.
                       DR. BONACA:  -- defending functionality
           for RISC-3 because you still believe, probably because
           of that curve, that they need to be protected, those
           functions.  And you're not convincing me yet that
           you're doing that.  Conversely, if you take RISC-3
           from the box and divide it then based on the risk
           consequence, you could practically divide those
           between those that you preserve and you can maintain
           under Appendix B, and the majority will go under RISC-
           4.
                       MR. REED:  Yes.  I mean there's clearly a
           set of SSCs in Box 3 which have no nexus to safety.
                       DR. BONACA:  Absolutely.
                       MR. REED:  And what have been termed
           ornaments, if you will.  And you were suggesting for
           those we really don't need anything at all.
                       DR. BONACA:  I would like to just insert
           right here the reason why it's important, yesterday we
           discussed what does functionality mean, and we used a
           good example of 89.10, motor-operated valves.  And we
           concluded that for those in RISC-3 now, those MOVs
           would not be stroke tested, right?  They won't be
           anymore under 89.10.
                       MR. KELLY:  No, I believe -- this is Glenn
           Kelly from the staff.  The indication was that there
           would be no requirements under RISC-3 that they
           receive special treatment.
                       DR. BONACA:  Right.
                       MR. KELLY:  But they would be required to
           retain their functionality.
                       DR. BONACA:  And what does that mean?
                       MR. KELLY:  And, certainly, to one extent,
           I expect that inspector might ask a licensee if it
           hadn't stroke tested its valve in five years why in
           the world they think it's functional?
                       DR. BONACA:  Because yesterday, Steve, you
           commented that they would not be anymore under 89.10. 
           So, therefore, they would not be stroke tested.
                       MR. KELLY:  That's correct, they would not
           be under 89.10.
                       MR. ROSEN:  They would not be under 89.10,
           but that just means that they could be -- their
           frequency would be longer.  That doesn't mean they'll
           never be tested.
                       DR. BONACA:  But the reason why --
                       MR. ROSEN:  They might be dynamically
           tested now, and they might be statically tested.
                       DR. BONACA:  Well, one of the reasons why
           it did not work --
                       MR. ROSEN:  It doesn't mean if you put
           something in RISC-3 you're never going to test it.
                       DR. BONACA:  I understand that, but let me
           just say one of the reasons why they did not work
           under design conditions was because the stems were
           underdesigned.  One of the reasons was because if you
           don't stroke stress in that condition, the grease
           hardens with time, and they don't work.
                       MR. ROSEN:  Right.
                       DR. BONACA:  So here we're leaving -- you
           know, here I'm still left, as a member, very uneasy
           about what this functionality means.  We determined
           through 89.10 that in order to demonstrate
           functionality you have to stroke test them under
           design conditions -- accident conditions, okay, in
           addition to improving the stems.  Because now we're
           saying they low safety significance so we put them
           there, and then we'll determine what you have to do. 
           And it seems to me that the very requirements we
           implemented to assure performance are being removed. 
           That's what makes me uneasy.  I mean I just don't know
           at the end of the day what this demonstration of
           functionality will mean.
                       MR. ROSEN:  Well, it starts with the
           answer to the question it does it matter whether it
           works or not?  And the answer is it's very low
           significance.
                       DR. BONACA:  Well, no, you see, because if
           you use the curve I was discussing there, a certain
           percent of those in RISC-3 will be still safety
           significant in my book, as they were in the FSAR.  The
           rest would be not.
                       MR. ROSEN:  They will be in RISC-3, if
           they're safety significant.
                       DR. BONACA:  Because you're using only
           CDF, okay?  And you're assuming that meeting Part 100
           or not exceeding Part 100 is irrelevant.  So you're
           making certain assumptions that the guy on the other
           side may not agree with you; in fact, they probably
           won't.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Anyway, the comment is
           that they should look at these things and possibly add
           something else in addition to CDF and LERF, some
           consideration.  Because even defense in depth, I mean
           it was said earlier that it will take care of these
           things for defense in depth.  Well, defense in depth
           in the abstract doesn't mean anything.  You have to
           have something to defend, right?  And, typically, when
           we talk about defense in depth, we have in mind the
           release or radioactivity over dame of the core.  If
           you say, "No, now I'm interested in something else,"
           then defense in depth will have a different result.
                       MR. KELLY:  This is Glenn Kelly --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I mean the concept is
           the same, but --
                       MR. KELLY:  This is Glenn Kelly from the
           staff.  In the pilots, this issue came up about the
           defense in depth.  And defense in depth, as I
           understand how it's supposed to applied here is
           defense in depth for both the deterministic -- each
           component is supposed to have its functions defined
           for -- its deterministic safety functions as well as
           any functions that are attributes that are given to it
           or taken credit for it under the PRA evaluation.  And
           then you look at to what extent, if you remove the
           treatment for this equipment, whether or not you're
           affecting defense in depth in particular for your
           deterministic evaluation, because, in part, the PRA
           order is already counting in some ways for the defense
           in depth.
                       So they are supposed to be looking at,
           which is one of the reasons why something like standby
           gas treatment system would probably be retained under
           a defense-in-depth argument, because it doesn't affect
           core damage frequency, it doesn't affect LERF.  But it
           is a defense-in-depth thing for your Part 100.  So I
           would expect that that would end up being a RISC-1
           rather than a RISC-3.
                       MR. ROSEN:  That's why the expert panel is
           there.  If you didn't do that, you wouldn't need an
           expert panel for the components that are for model,
           the model components.  You'd just go "click" and you'd
           get the answer, but that's not how you do it.  You get
           the answer and then you subject it to a review by the
           expert panel.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But this is part of what
           we asked for structure of the --
                       MR. REED:  Exactly.
                       DR. SHACK:  But even in that case, when we
           looked at the questions that the panel looked at in
           South Texas, it didn't address Mario's concerns,
           because the questions were all aimed at preventing CDF
           and LERF.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But Mr. Kelly now
           expanded it.
                       MR. ROSEN:  But the questions aren't the
           only -- the questions that are asked are answered for
           the expert panel, but they're not the only questions
           the expert panel asks.  It asks questions about
           shutdown, it asks questions about --
                       DR. SHACK:  I think what Mario is asking
           is do you make them more explicit?  Does it sort of
           somehow get dragged in?  Maybe, but if the criterion
           are RAW and Fussell-Vesely and the questions are the
           questions, then it looks like all the explicit
           criteria are CDF-oriented.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So let's wrap it up by
           saying that the deliberations of the panel, I think,
           we need a lot of guidance there.  We agree that's part
           of it.
                       MR. REED:  Certainly more structure.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  We shouldn't rely on the
           kindness of the panel too much.
                       DR. SHACK:  Even if they're strange.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Even if they're strange. 
           Thank you, Will.  You're the only one who appreciated
           the comment.
                       MR. REED:  Additionally, the draft rule
           requires -- and this is what I refer to as the bottom
           line -- that the potential increase in CDF and LERF
           will be small.  And this is -- I think it's already
           been mentioned to the Committee -- this is sort of, in
           effect, maintaining the current risk profile of the
           plant, this approach here, unlike some more absolute
           value.  So this is currently the way we're going.
                       You'll have to monitor the performance
           condition of SSCs.  It can affect the categorization
           results.  And if you find integrated situation or you
           get -- whatever information you get back, you need to
           take action and maintain the validity of that SSC,
           SSCs categorization, and then to maintain the
           categorization through time.  So it's update the PRA
           and categorization as you either change the
           configuration of the plant or you obtain operational
           data.  So this is make it valid and keep it valid,
           basically.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I don't understand this,
           "must monitor the performance of condition of those
           SSCs that can affect the categorization results." 
           What does that mean?  How would the results be
           affected by the performance?
                       MR. REED:  I think that's an effort -- and
           I might need a little help on this -- but that's an
           effort to note that -- there's thousands and thousands
           of assumptions, as you guys are well aware.  Some are
           very important, some are not important.  What you
           monitor, you want to monitor those that really affect
           the results, the categorization results, and that's
           what you want to focus your energy on and maintain. 
           There are assumptions in there that really don't make
           any difference at all, whether there's RISC-3 or
           whatever.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But if I have a
           component that has been categorized RISC-1 or even
           RISC-3 and I find that its performance is below par,
           how would that change the categorization?  I mean I
           would probably be looking somewhere else why the
           performance is poor.
                       MR. REED:  First of all, you'd make sure
           that you're still in keeping with the assumptions you
           made for its reliability, availability and capability. 
           That would be the first thing you'd do.  And,
           hopefully, the assumptions you're making for that
           component, the data you're collecting, is in keeping
           with that.  If not, then you'd have to alter those
           assumptions.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But would that be
           subsumed then by the last bullet?
                       MR. REED:  Exactly.  Yes, they really do
           overlap.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.  That's why I don't
           need that.
                       MR. REED:  Yes.  A lot of these actually
           do overlap.  I mean I break them out for bullets, but
           --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  As I update my PRA, if
           I have lots of --
                       MR. REED:  These three really all kind of
           go together.
                       MR. ROSEN:  It will affect the shifting
           the categorization of a component.  But you don't want
           to do that.
                       MR. REED:  Yes.  That's actually --
                       MR. ROSEN:  You guard against that in your
           original categorization.
                       MR. REED:  That's actually a very good
           point.
                       MR. ROSEN:  Either way it creates havoc.
                       MR. REED:  Yes.
                       MR. ROSEN:  Operationally -- handling the
           program.
                       MR. REED:  Yes.  That's an excellent
           point.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I would just delete it
           and make it part of the last bullet.
                       MR. ROSEN:  And I know that because some
           of ours shifted, and it's not fun to have to deal with
           that.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Which way?
                       MR. REED:  If they go up, that's the
           problem.
                       MR. ROSEN:  Once they move up, that's a
           real problem.
                       MR. REED:  Yes.  Once you take something
           out of the special treatment requirements and release
           --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But why did they move,
           Steve?  Because of performance or --
                       MR. ROSEN:  I don't remember now.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
                       MR. ROSEN:  There were very few cases, but
           there were a couple that were particularly nasty. 
           They had to be fixed, and we had to go back and look
           at what had we done on these components since we
           categorized them, et cetera, et cetera.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
                       MR. REED:  Okay.  The other area that we
           had, I think, the most discussion on yesterday was the
           RISC-3 treatment, and I've already mentioned the RISC-
           1 and RISC-2 treatment, in passing, that those
           requirements are basically you're maintaining all the
           requirements on those SSCs.  RISC-3, the focus,
           though, is to have sufficient regulatory requirements
           to maintain the design basis functions, basically.
                       So what we're doing in this portion of the
           draft rule is, first, taking off the special treatment
           requirements, and then we're replacing them with the
           requirements you see in Paragraph 50.69(d)(2).  And,
           basically, that says you must have processes to
           control design, procurement, installation, maintenance
           inspection tests and surveillance, corrective action,
           oversight and configuration.  So it's not simply a
           matter of saying, okay, you're going to maintain your
           design basis function; it's also a matter of having
           these processes in place, okay?
                       And if you look at the draft rule, you'll
           see that under each one of these headings, we have at
           least one or, in some cases, two sentences that
           provide a minimal set of attributes for what we're
           thinking that you need to do for each of these
           processes.  But the bottom line is, is that you need
           to apply the pertinent programmatic requirements to
           provide reasonable confidence of the capability of
           RISC-3 SSCs to perform the safety-related functions
           under the design basis conditions.
                       Now, this is -- I think the Committee had
           quite a bit of discussion yesterday -- how did we
           determine this was a sufficient level of regulatory
           confidence and so forth?  And I think this is clearly
           an area where we've had a lot of discussion in South
           Texas.  We've had discussion on Option 2; I think
           we'll continue to have that kind of discussion.  And
           I'll point out it's an area that I think is a major
           issue area here in a couple of slides.
                       MR. ROSEN:  The NEI wanted to discuss
           those, and they characterize this as something in
           between Appendix B and no Appendix B.
                       MR. REED:  Yes, they did.
                       MR. SCARBROUGH:  Right.  This is Tom
           Scarbrough with the staff.  It's sort of -- if you
           look at it, it's sort of on the order of what might be
           imposed for station blackout equipment and ATWS
           equipment.  It's somewhere -- it's not the no controls
           whatsoever so that you can down to what's commercial
           practice kick and count, receipt inspection or tool
           pouch maintenance.
                       It's not all the way down to that level. 
           It's probably somewhere in between.  It's something
           that you might expect for under station blackout
           equipment or ATWS.  But in terms of the actual
           details, we haven't gotten down to that level.  We're
           trying to say that it's not down to the complete low
           level, but it's somewhere in the middle.
                       MR. ROSEN:  Yes.  I think we felt, and I
           think the industry continues to feel, that if you end
           up with a third program, in other words, no program,
           the full program and something in between, then a lot
           of the benefit of this tends to go away.
                       MR. SCARBROUGH:  Right.  Well, that's why
           I think it's important to realize that what we're
           talking about is probably on the order of what's
           already been implemented for the station blackout and
           ATWS equipment.  It's equipment that's a lot of
           commercial grade, but it has some controls over its
           procurement, and that's on the order of what we're
           talking about.  There's a lot more flexibility.
                       I think there was a question that
           yesterday came up in terms of what are some of the
           differences, and we were talking about that today in
           terms of some of the major differences are the
           flexibility.  You have these very high-level
           attributes that we're talking about.  There's a lot
           less prescription in the QA criteria.  You don't have
           the 16 criteria; you have eight processes which are
           very general.  You don't have the very specific
           control of measuring test equipment.  You still will
           deal with that under the general functionality
           requirement, but you don't have the very specific type
           of QA criteria, which you have to have very specific
           procedures and documentation and recordkeeping. 
           There's a lot more flexibility in how you do that.
                       And we talked about procurement yesterday. 
           It's a lot more flexible in terms of getting it from
           vendors.  For certain procedures -- for certain
           activities, such as some types of maintenance where
           it's not technically difficult to do, you can do a lot
           more maintenance without detailed procedures, more
           general procedures, like skill a craft type of
           procedures, that would be allowed.
                       In a specific area, such as motor-operated
           valves, which we were talking about, in this case, the
           way the rule is currently drafted, this draft, 55(a)
           is still applied, and so they still would have ISI and
           IST processes.  And 55(a), in the most recent revision
           of the regulations, applies an overlaying design basis
           capability verification long term for motor-operated
           valves.  So that would be accommodated even for these
           low risks.  But how they would accommodate that is
           through the risk-informed programs that are being
           developed by ASME, the code cases and such.  They
           allow less margin and longer frequencies for testing
           for these low risk ones.  So that's how they sort of
           take care of that.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  Understand.
                       MR. SCARBROUGH:  And so those are some
           areas where that would -- they'd be able to apply this
           flexibility and get a lot of gain.  But they're still
           covered but just less assurance than we have right now
           for Appendix B.
                       MR. REED:  Okay.  Getting on to trying to
           identify some of the areas where there's perhaps some
           differences or concerns between staff and
           stakeholders, and I'm referring to them as early
           comments here.  I just broke them into what I'll call
           areas of concern with the draft rule language and then
           some of the areas of concern with the implementation
           guidance.  And this is, by no means, an exhaustive
           list, but it just gives you some of the more big
           ticket items that at least I heard yesterday and I've
           heard in recent weeks.
                       Certainly, I think you heard that there's
           a view that the language that we have in the draft
           rule in this RISC-3 treatment area that it may be too
           detailed.  In fact, perhaps some of that detail ought
           to be moved to the Quality Assurance Program, as was
           suggested yesterday.  That's one area that we need to
           work on.
                       There was also a suggestion that we should
           probably use what we have available to us in terms of
           regulatory vehicles today.  We've spent a lot of time
           in the last couple years developing design basis 50.2
           guidance.  We should probably use that.  We have a
           Commitment Management Guidance document out there, NEI
           99-04, that the staff's endorsed.  And 50.59's
           recently been revised, and there was a suggestion that
           that ought to be utilized to the maximum extent in the
           framework you heard yesterday.
                       There was also concern that the license
           amendment process that we're suggesting -- right now,
           if you look in the draft rule language, it requires,
           prior to approval, a submittal.  It also requires that
           to be a 50.90 license amendment.  And so there's some
           concerns of is that the appropriate way to go about
           this?  Can we do that without that process?  That's
           perhaps some burdens associated with the license
           amendment.
                       And I think, in general, there were a lot
           of comments that would go to this bullet saying that,
           basically, we just need more dialogue to understand
           what this draft rule language means.  I mean I look at
           some of it, frankly, and sometimes I'm having a hard
           time figuring what it means myself.  So, certainly, if
           we would have the statement of consideration -- if
           this was a proposed rule, we'd have the statement of
           consideration to be explaining that, but we don't have
           that in this format.  We're trying to work with
           stakeholders early.  We don't have that available to
           us, so it's understandable that stakeholders are
           looking at the words and don't know what they mean and
           there's some concerns there, so we just need more
           dialogue.
                       Which leads me to the next piece, which to
           get more comfort in the draft rule, we probably need
           to have a little bit more comfort in how you're
           implementing it.  And that leads to the issues in
           implementation guidance.  Staff has really reviewed
           the categorization part of the implementation -- NEI
           00-04.  We've provided two rounds of comments, and
           we're about to provide a third round.  So we've done
           a pretty good amount of review there on that part of
           it.
                       On the treatment end of it, unfortunately,
           really they didn't have much treatment in the very,
           very early versions, and now, in the most recent
           version, if you look at that, it really allows you to
           pretty much -- it's not really guidance; it's really
           the description of typical processes.  It's not
           aligned to the way the draft rule is today.  I think
           it would have to be written more like guidance and be
           aligned to our draft rule for us to really provide
           constructive comments.  So it remains to be seen how
           we'll address the treatment portion.
                       In the categorization area, like I said,
           we're having another round of comments.  I'd just
           simply point out, there's a lot more than simply the
           long-term containment integrity issue, but that's an
           issue that is a big one, I think.  But there's many
           others that have been identified and also identified
           during our observation of the pilot activities.  And
           we'll roll all those up and get those to NEI in the
           near term.
                       Also, I became very well aware yesterday
           that this Subcommittee has some significant concerns
           on the robustness of the categorization process, and
           so we want to meet with the Committee as soon as we
           can -- February, hopefully; if not, March -- to get a
           list of all those concerns.  And, frankly, I would
           think at that point in time that it would be a good
           idea to have NEI also present and discuss their
           document.  They are in fact the author of a lot of
           that, and they probably would be -- it would be good
           to have them here to defend their document, as a
           suggestion.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, Mike, do we have to
           wait until February?
                       MR. MARKLEY:  It's up to you, whenever you
           and the staff and NEI are ready to sit down and talk.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It has to be in
           Subcommittee.  We should not transmit any comments
                       MR. MARKLEY:  They would be individual
           member comments and have to be captioned that way, but
           we could do that.
                       MR. REED:  I mean I really see the staff
           kind of in the mode of listening to the Committee's
           comments.  And we'd like to get those as soon as we
           can to try to factor those into what we're going to do
           with the categorization guidance.
                       MS. CARPENTER:  This is Cindi Carpenter
           from the staff.  We're available any time that you are
           to discuss that.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But NEI has to be
           available too.
                       MS. CARPENTER:  Right.  Exactly.
                       MR. REED:  Yes.  That's another -- got to
           work them into it too.  We can work with Mike.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I would rather do it
           sooner than later, because the more we wait, the more
           resistance there will be to the comments, because the
           process advances.
                       MR. MARKLEY:  But, George, it would seem
           to me it also would be good if the time when you have
           it, the staff has refined their comments more fully on
           the NEI document as well, so that you're looking at
           something they've got, whether it's a response back to
           them, and you're dealing with the resolution of those,
           as opposed to necessarily just throwing these out to
           get folded in.
                       MR. REED:  We were thinking that way too,
           but I'm not sure how much we'll have refined by early
           February.  Hopefully, we will, but it's most important
           for us to understand these concerns.  So I think that
           I'd rather have that happen, get the concerns as soon
           as possible.  And if we can have our comments refined,
           we can deliver those too at the same time.  Hopefully
           we can get those to NEI first as part of the process.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, maybe we can
           submit -- first of all, during the Subcommittee
           meetings, the comments that members make are
           individual; they're not Committee positions anyway. 
           Maybe send something to them in the form of questions
           from individual members?  Because I really would hate
           to wait until February.
                       MR. KELLY:  This is Glenn Kelly from the
           staff.  And you can correct me, Mike Cheok, if I'm
           wrong, but it's my understanding that we're pretty up
           to date in categorization with NEI.  And we've
           certainly had a lot of discussions with them there. 
           And they reasonably well understand where we are, and
           I think we understand where they are.  We're not
           necessarily in the same place with treatment, so we
           can probably come and discuss categorization right
           away, and we'd have to wait on treatment.  So even if
           you could split those two up --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, yes.
                       MR. KELLY:  -- that's fair.
                       MR. MARKLEY:  George, maybe the best way
           to put this thing together is that if we can refine a
           list of questions or something that would be the
           context of what's discussed at the Subcommittee, I
           think that may be the better way of doing it.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Sure.  I think that's a
           good point.  So I can invite the members to submit
           questions if they wish.
                       MR. MARKLEY:  It really just becomes the
           agenda for the meeting at that point.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.  And, again, things
           that we've covered here, like put more structure to
           the deliberations of the panel, we don't have to put
           those down.  That's part of the transcript now.  But
           there are some detailed technical questions that I
           would really hate to wait until February to give them
           to you.  So Mr. Markley and the Committee will work
           together to come up with the best way to do it.
                       MR. REED:  Okay.  Actually, I've already
           said this, but I'll say it again.  On the treatment
           portion of the NEI guidance, as I mentioned, it's
           really not written in terms of guidance, and obviously
           could not have been aligned to the draft rule since
           the draft rule just recently came out.  So we need to
           work with NEI and figure out the most sufficient way
           to get that tuned up to fit with the draft rule and be
           written as guidance.
                       And I simply point out, and I think the
           Committee's well aware of it, but in the RISC-3 area,
           I think the key to success of Option 2 is
           understanding the details of implementation of RISC-3;
           in fact, hopefully getting agreement on that
           implementation.  That sorts out whether in fact this
           is cost beneficial or not for industry to follow it,
           and it will be the key factor determining success,
           ultimately, of Option 2.
                       MR. ROSEN:  What do you define as success
           of Option 2?
                       MR. REED:  Actually, I define it as
           everybody understanding -- personally, I'd like to
           have both sides completely understand what's going on,
           okay?  We need to have regulatory assurance, okay? 
           That's a given.  We need to maintain design basis. 
           And when we get to the point where we've defined the
           minimum level of requirements for RISC-3 that we have
           to have, okay, as low as we can, and we understand and
           we can transmit to basically deliver the information
           in industry, when we expect the means to implement
           that, then it becomes a function of what does that
           mean in terms of cost and benefit?
                       MR. ROSEN:  Well, that's what I think is
           the definition of success, is that staff is able to
           define a set of requirements that does in fact
           maintain design basis functionality.
                       MR. REED:  A minimum, yes.
                       MR. ROSEN:  And licensees see that as not
           so high a barrier to entry that a fairly large
           percentage of them choose to adopt Option 2.  If you
           set a criteria that preserves design basis
           functionality and everybody agrees but the licensees
           say, "Well, it costs so much, and I wouldn't bother to
           change anything," then I would say that's failure. 
           That's a lot of work for nothing.  There's no change.
                       MR. REED:  Yes.  I mean I have to start
           with the prerequisite that I maintain design basis
           functions, and there's a minimal set of requirements
           to do that.  I hope that it works out.  That's cost
           beneficial.  If it's not cost beneficial, then
           obviously it's not -- it doesn't behoove anybody to
           follow this approach.  This is a voluntary initiative,
           and staff shouldn't be taking its resources to put
           together a voluntary initiative that nobody will
           follow.  So we're both interested, both industry and
           the staff, of what the costs and benefits are.  And
           the sooner we can get there, I think the better off we
           are.
                       And then, quickly, just one slide, George,
           on where we're going from here.  We're continuing our
           efforts to review the NEI implementation guidance, and
           in that regard, developing guidance for review of the
           submittal, which would look at the categorization
           process and the PRA quality issues.  We're continuing
           to observe pilots.  We've observed two pilot plants to
           date, two pilot expert panels and two more are coming.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.  Tim, I had a
           question on that.  Is the purpose of the pilots to
           observe the IDPs or to put the whole process under
           scrutiny?  Because the reports that you got back from
           your colleagues, which I must admit I read very
           quickly, but the reports that you got back from the
           two pilots were primarily dealing with the
           deliberations of the panel.  Will there be any effort
           to see if this is how they did the categorization,
           they're calculating Fussell-Vesely correctly?  In
           other words, the whole works, not just what questions
           the panel asks.
                       MR. REED:  Well, clearly, the expert
           panel, in my mind, is the culmination of the process. 
           They have all the information delivered to them.  For
           example, the pilot I was involved with, observing Quad
           Cities, Quad Cities, basically, the BWR Owners Group
           gave them about a 300-plus page document that did the
           categorization, okay?  And we got an opportunity to
           take a look at that.  And then they additionally
           provided data sheets and what have you to help the
           panel do its job.
                       So, in a sense, you get to -- when you
           observe the IDP, you get to see the RAW information in
           addition to watching the panel perform.  And so it's
           a good opportunity to interface with the pilots in an
           efficient manner with minimal interruption and still
           get an awful lot of feedback.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But are you going to
           question what's in the 350-page input to the panel?
                       MR. KELLY:  I can speak about the two that
           we already had.  Generally, we didn't really get the
           information early enough ourselves to be able to do
           any kind of independent test.  What we did do is, as
           Tim mentioned, is to observe the third part of the
           categorization process.  We did not look at how they
           came up with defining the functions for each
           component.  We did not look at how they did the
           Fussell-Vesely or RAW calculations for each component. 
           Those, given that you have a PRA, are relatively
           simple calculations to set up.  We were more concerned
           about that they had things such as had defined all the
           important functions for the components, had considered
           potential problems associated with failure of the
           components.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The statements in the
           NEI report, though, regarding common cause failures I
           must say I don't --
                       MR. KELLY:  You have some issues.  That's
           one of our issues.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I'd like to see a
           natural implementation of this and say, "This is what
           we did."  For RAW it says -- I believe it says that
           you don't need a common cause failure.
                       MR. KELLY:  Well, this is one of the --
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It exists for a year,
           and I'm trying to understand what that means.
                       MR. KELLY:  Well, one of the problems
           associated with common cause failure is that I don't
           think in either one of the pilots that they understood
           what they were doing regarding common cause failure.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Other than that, did you
           like what they did?
                       MR. KELLY:  Well, I mean this is one of
           our comments.  We recognized that they didn't really
           understand that.  And there were a number of things
           that they didn't understand, but this is a learning
           process for them also.  As we had mentioned at the
           Subcommittee, generally they had about six or seven
           experts about various parts of the plant, one of which
           was generally a PRA expert, and he was generally the
           only person that had any clue about really what RAW
           and Fussell-Vesely or any of the PRA stuff meant.  And
           that was a real limitation in how the IDPs were run. 
           Hopefully, in the future, that part will be -- they'll
           be better educated in where the risks are, as defined
           by the PRAs and things like that.  We did identify
           that in our comments that came out of the pilots.  I
           think Mike has a comment.
                       MR. MARKLEY:  I guess, for the record, I
           guess it's not that fair to say that they did not
           understand common cause failures.  I guess the
           understanding was different from what the staff would
           understand it to be.  They, basically, did not account
           for the common cause failures in the calculations of
           importance measures.  The staff position was that we
           have to account for it somehow, either through the
           random failure probability, such as the beta factors. 
           We are still in the middle of discussions with NEI on
           that.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I expect that.  I didn't
           name it that, by the way.
                       (Laughter.)
                       Don't look at me that way.  Are you done,
           Tim?
                       MR. REED:  Just about.  Additionally,
           we'll continue issuing revisions of the draft rule
           language onto the web as they become available.  Of
           course, we're going to meet with ACRS, as I point out
           here, in the February/March time frame, whatever we
           work out with Mike Markley.  We have to start the
           regulatory analysis and of course develop the proposed
           rule package, which we've started on now.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Good.
                       MR. REED:  So those are the tasks that we
           have to perform.  Thanks.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Any comments, questions
           from the members?  Well, thank you very much.  And I
           must say I'm really happy to see that you're so
           willing to ask questions yourselves and learn from
           that what the Committee has to offer.  That's very
           good.  That's why I don't want to wait until February
           when perhaps you will start being more defensive.
                       (Laughter.)
                       So this is early in the process, and I'm
           really very happy to see that you have the right
           attitude.  So thank you very much, appreciate it.  You
           responded to the Subcommittee's request very well,
           even though you only had a day.  So we'll meet again. 
           And we'll discuss with Mr. Markley what the
           appropriate way would be to --
                       MR. ROSEN:  Get comments in.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- give you comments or
           maybe have another Subcommittee soon or somehow
           communicate with you.
                       DR. POWERS:  If you're looking for input
           on that, I really grow nervous when members start
           offering comments outside of the normal processes of
           these meetings.
                       MR. REED:  Maybe we'll have to have a
           meeting and round them up at that point.
                       DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Sure.  That's part of
           the consideration of whether we send comments.  Okay. 
           Thank you very much.  Now we have to work on our
           reports.  I think we start at 5:30.
                       (Whereupon, at 5:09 p.m., the ACRS
           Advisory Committee Meeting was concluded.)
           
           
	 
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