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ACRS/ACNW Joint Subcommittee - May 4, 2000

                       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                     NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
     
                                  ***
                MEETING:  ACRS/ACNW JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE
     
     
     
                              U.S. NRC
                              Two White Flint North, Room T2-B3
                              11545 Rockville Pike
                              Rockville, MD
     
                              Thursday, May 4, 2000
     
               The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:30
     a.m.
     MEMBERS PRESENT:
               JOHN GARRICK, ACRS Chairman             
               THOMAS KRESS, ACRS Co-Chairman
               GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS, ACRS, Member
               GEORGE HORNBERGER, ACRS, Member.                            C O N T E N T S
     PAGE                                                    ITEM
     Introduction                                              3 
     Overview:  Risk-Informing NMSS Activities                 4 
     Status of SECY-99-100 Efforts:  Training,
               Workshop, Criteria, Safety Goals               33 
     A Process for Risk-Informed Regulation of 
     Activities                                              109 
     PRA for Dry Cask Storage                                119 
     Nuclear Byproduct Materials Risk Review                 201 
     Matrix Summary of Risk Assessment Results
       for Byproducts Materials Activities                   201 
     Proposed Rule for Domestic Licensing of Special
       Nuclear Material                                      236 
     .                         P R O C E E D I N G S
                                                      [8:30 a.m.]
               DR. GARRICK:  Good morning.  Our meeting will now
     come to order.  This is a meeting of the joint subcommittee
     of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and the
     Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste.  I'm John Garrick, co-
     chairman of the joint subcommittee.  On my right is Tom
     Kress, also co-chairman of the committee.  Joint
     subcommittee members in attendance are George Apostolakis of
     the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and George
     Hornberger of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste.
               The purpose of this meeting is for the joint
     subcommittee to discuss the development of risk-informed
     regulation in the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
     Safeguards, including risk-informing fuel cycle programs,
     integrated safety assessments, byproduct material risk
     analysis, dry cask storage risk analysis, the results of a
     public workshop on the use of risk information in regulating
     the use of nuclear materials and related matters.  Sounds
     like a busy day.
               The subcommittee will gather information; analyze
     relevant issues and facts; and formulate some positions and
     actions as appropriate for deliberation by the full
     committees.  Richard Major is the designated Federal
     official for the initial portion of this meeting.  The rules
     for participation in today's meeting have been announced as
     part of the notice of this previously published in the
     Federal Register, part of the notice previously published in
     the Federal Register.  A transcript of the meeting is being
     kept, and it's requested that speakers identify themselves,
     speak with clarity and volume so that they can be heard.
               We've received no written comments from members of
     the public, but we have received one request from Robert
     Bernero for time to make an oral statement, and right now,
     it's hopeful that we can fit that in right after our second
     presentation and perhaps just before or just after the
     break.
               Our first speaker will be Marty Virgilio, deputy
     director of the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and
     Safeguards, and unless there are some comments or questions
     from the members, I think we'll proceed, Marty, and let you
     take the floor.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Thank you; good morning.  I am
     Marty Virgilio, for the record, deputy director of our
     Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, and I'd
     like to start with a thank you to the committee members for
     taking the time to meet with us today.  I look forward to a
     productive exchange of ideas.
               With me today, I have John Flack, who will be
     speaking to you next.  You may know John from his
     responsibilities in the Office of Research, but John has
     been working with us for the last several months heading up
     this risk group that we have formed in NMSS.  Also today,
     you'll have a chance to meet some of the members of the risk
     group.  You may have met some of them before in the other
     responsibilities:  Stacy Rosenberg will be with us today. 
     Stacy has been a risk expert in the office of NRR, and I
     believe that at one point in time, that she may have briefed
     you on a risk assessment that she was responsible for on
     Kiwi Dam, where we were looking at the safety requirements
     necessary to ensure protection for the Oconee Nuclear Power
     Station.  Stacy was responsible for that effort.
               We also have Dennis Damon with us today.  Dennis
     is going to be talking us a little bit later about fuel
     cycle facility safety and the ISAs that are being performed
     or being required there as a part of our new Part 70.  Jim
     Smith is here with us today.  Jim is also a member of the
     group.  He's our medical and industrial link, and Christiana
     Lew, which I know you've met and had interactions with
     Christiana over the high-level waste program.
               We also have Alan Rubin with us today.  Alan is
     from the Office of Research.  He will talk to us today about
     the PRA that Research is doing to help us in understanding
     some of the issues surrounding high level waste storage, and
     Betsy Ulrich will be coming down from region 1.  Betsy is
     not here yet but will be making a presentation to you later
     this morning or early this afternoon on a material risk
     study that we had done.
               What we have in store for you all today is an
     exchange on the overview of our program and the status of
     our current activities, and then, we'll have the individual
     presentations on the cask storage, on Part 70, the fuel
     cycle facility requirements and the ISAs and also on the by-
     product materials risk review study.  If I can have the
     first slide, please.  Next slide, please.
               Just by way of background, and I know you're all
     familiar with this, but I thought it just again for the
     record, and maybe the audience, going through the
     chronology; we started, I think, in earnest looking at risk-
     informing the waste and material activities in 1997 with a
     commission paper where we laid out some ideas as to
     direction and received some feedback from the Commission on
     our approach.  And in March of 1999, we put forward a
     Commission paper, SECY 99-100, that provided a lot more
     detail on our proposed approach, areas where we were
     considering risk-informing our programs and activities.
               The Commission responded to that SECY paper in
     June of 1999 with an SRM and provided more direction to us,
     additional ideas and thoughts about which directions that we
     ought to be proceeding in, and in July of 1999, we
     established a task force to move this effort forward.  On
     the next page, if I could have the next slide, please, just
     going back to SECY 99-100, we had a number of
     recommendations in that, the first being that we proceed to
     implement a five-step process, and I've got another slide in
     a few seconds I'll show you on that five-step process and
     that we continue to implement our approaches for addressing
     risk management issues, our ongoing activities and that the
     Commission approve the formation of a joint subcommittee
     that would help us with constructive criticism and peer
     review of our ongoing activities and ideas for directions in
     the future.
               On the next slide, you can see the SRM, and
     basically, the Commission accepted the proposal that we laid
     out, those three ideas I put on the last slide, and in
     addition provided some additional guidance to us.  They
     asked us to develop materials safety goals; they asked us to
     make sure that we were using an enhanced participatory
     process to develop the goals and include within the goals
     the avoidance of property damage.  They asked us to consider
     critical groups and whether critical groups could be defined
     like we have done in the high-level waste forum for other
     activities in assessing risk and managing risk.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What is the logic behind
     avoiding property damage here and not including land
     contamination for reactors?
               DR. VIRGILIO:  None that I -- you know, and I --
     it's a good question as to where we -- 
               DR. KRESS:  I would guess, George, that they're
     focusing on the Yucca Mountain type issue or -- you'd
     probably only get property damage as a real consequence in
     the accidents.  That would be my guess.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Tom, as we go through and look at
     some of the material activities that we have and some of the
     issues that we're dealing with today, we're not only dealing
     with radiological contamination, but if you think about
     issues that we're dealing with like Atlas, Moab, we're also
     dealing now with more environmental issues in the waste and
     material arena than on the reactor issue, and I think this
     was on the Commission's mind -- 
               DR. KRESS:  Yes, I think --
               DR. VIRGILIO:  -- at the time that they were
     generating this SRM.  It was not only the repository, but I
     think it was some of these other issues.
               DR. KRESS:  Right; it's environmental
     contamination in general.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  The SDNP sites that we're involved
     in; there are so many different issues that we're involved
     in today that includes the environment and property
     considerations that I think it was only logical that they
     went that way.  But then again, you say, well, why aren't we
     going in that direction for reactors, which I think, you
     know, is a little outside my scope but might be something to
     consider as we move forward in that front.
               DR. KRESS:  I think we ought to do it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, but, I mean, the staff has
     come back and said that they will not include it, right?
               DR. KRESS:  They only include it in regulatory
     analysis.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, but not part of the
     quantitative -- 
               DR. KRESS:  They don't have quantitative safety
     goals.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. KRESS:  There are some people I've heard say
     that it's subsumed within the two goals that they have to
     some extent.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. KRESS:  But I don't believe that.
               DR. GARRICK:  Okay.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Okay; and last, they asked us to
     ensure that we include the agreement state component in our
     thought processes; today, we have 31 agreement states, and
     there are four more eager to join the program and so -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  On the previous slide, again, I
     have another question.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Sure.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What's a critical group?
               DR. VIRGILIO:  In the context of Yucca Mountain is
     the best way that I can describe it -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  -- by example is that we are
     looking at the effects of the plume that could be predicted
     to leave the repository; on a group -- a hypothetical group,
     a farming community living within the vicinity of the
     repository, and we're looking at the effects on that group. 
     We're looking at how much will they receive in terms of dose
     as a result of hypothetical accidents that could occur at
     Yucca Mountain.  You could think about critical groups in
     terms of transportation, another example that we haven't
     gone down.  This is my example, but you could think about
     transporting a cask down the road and possibly having a
     critical group or a target for assessing risk to the public
     as a family in a car driving alongside that cask or, you
     know, or somebody -- or the folks that work at the truck
     stop, where the truck might stop on its route.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  So it's hypothetical groups of
     members of the public and how they might be exposed to
     radiation as a result of accidents, upsets or normal
     activities associated with the program.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, why don't we use the term
     in reactors?
               DR. KRESS:  Critical groups?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes; I mean, we use the idea.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes, we use the idea.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But not -- is part of this joint
     subcommittee trying -- part of the purpose of existing here
     is to harmonize the terminology, perhaps?  I mean, what's so
     different here?  I mean, you have to try a little harder, I
     think, to define the critical group.  There was a
     controversy in that Academy report regarding what the group
     is because of the huge time scales.  But it would be
     helpful, I think, to start using the same terms.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  What term is used in reactors?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Nothing; we just say individual
     risk, societal risk.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  But you have to use an N
     individual.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  So it's an individual and not a
     group.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's not a group at this time.
               DR. KRESS:  It's a group averaged into -- 
               DR. HORNBARGER:  Okay; so, it's the same idea,
     then.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, the way it's calculated --
               DR. HORNBARGER:  It's the individual; it's the
     sort of average individual in a critical group.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Exactly.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Exactly; but it's supposed to
     be, you know, the community surrounding the reactor, I
     suppose.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You don't have to make any
     hypothesis, because you know who they are.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes; it's the ones living around 
     the -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  Right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So either there is no -- 
               DR. HORNBARGER:  Well, you still have to make an
     hypothesis, because the community can grow -- 
               DR. KRESS:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's right.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  -- over the lifetime of the
     reactor.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's right so -- 
               DR. KRESS:  That's supposed to be part of the
     analysis, protecting that.  But you don't have to worry
     about 10,000 years either.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  It's a better guess.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Next slide, please.  I think we've
     covered that one.
               Just to go back to SECY 99-100 for a moment, the
     Commission endorsed the staff's approach to a five-step
     process.  Those steps really boil down to identifying the
     candidate applications, where we would want to move forward
     and risk-inform our programs; decide how we would then
     modify our regulatory approaches; change the approaches; and
     then implement the program, and in parallel with that, we
     would be developing or refining the risk tools that we have
     available to us through the reactor program and through our
     own program activities.
               If we go to the next slide, after our last
     interaction, and sometime in the November time frame, you
     wrote a letter to Chairman Meserve and recommended that we
     do a number of things.  We saw that the two key things
     within your recommendations being that you asked us to
     develop a set of principles and a safety goal approach for
     each of the NMSS-regulated activities, and you asked us to
     identify analytical methods to be applied to implement these
     approaches on an application-specific basis.
               If you go to the next slide, Pat, we wrote you
     back in January, and we told you that we would develop
     screening criteria, and here we were being or trying to be
     as responsive as we could to your recommendation on a set of
     principles, so this is the way we were approaching it, by
     developing screening criteria for determining what we would
     move forward with and risk-inform in specific applications. 
     We also said that we would examine experience with risk
     assessment methods, measures and metrics currently being
     applied.  Here again, we were being responsive to your
     recommendation that we look at our analytical methods.
               In addition to responding to your recommendations,
     we told you that we were going to move forward using the
     enhanced participatory process; scheduling meetings and
     workshops with interested parties and that we would begin to
     develop our training program.
               If you go to the next slide, please, what I want
     to do is give you a little bit of status on where we are on
     what we told you we were going to do.  What we did is we
     developed and published in the Federal Register some draft
     screening criteria for identifying those areas where we
     should apply risk-informed approaches.  We solicited public
     participation in the development of the screening criteria
     and safety goals in a workshop we had just a couple weeks
     ago.
               We are currently in the process of examining our
     methods, measures and metrics that we would apply in NMSS to
     confirm that we are on the appropriate approaches, and
     today, we'll share with you some of the specific
     applications and some of the methods that we're using and
     hopefully get some feedback from you on whether we're on
     track with regard to those programs.  And lastly, I think
     we've made significant progress in developing our training
     program.
               On the next slide, I just highlight some current
     activities we have ongoing a little bit outside of the scope
     of what we've been corresponding with you on.  We've made
     some organizational changes.  We've brought the risk group
     that we had formulated and residing in one of our technical
     divisions up to the front office, so now, the risk group
     reports directly to Bill Kane and I, and we've established a
     steering group, and I think you'll recognize some of the
     members of the steering group.  They include, within NMSS,
     Don Kuhl and John Grieves and Mike Weber.  And then, from
     outside NMSS, Gary Hollohan, Tom King from research; Bruce
     Malik from Region II and Joe Gray from OGC.
               In addition to supporting Tom, we also have Joe
     Murphy, who has been in and out of this process, but I think
     we've got a very strong steering group now to help ensure
     that we stay on track.  And today, we'll talk a little bit
     about some of the activities that we have ongoing, including
     the ISAs for the fuel cycles; the byproduct material risk
     analysis; the PRA for dry cask storage, and I understand
     that the full committee got a recent briefing on
     transportation and where we're going on our risk studies
     there.  So we didn't put it on the agenda today, but we
     could come back to you again in the very near future and
     give you an update on where we're going on our
     transportation risk studies.
               On the next slide, just highlighting that we're
     increasing our interactions with the stakeholders.  We had a
     Commission meeting in March on the risk-informed regulatory
     implementation plan.  A subset of that is where are we going
     in the waste and materials arenas, and we had the public
     workshop in April that I mentioned earlier.  And John Flack
     is going to go into a lot more detail about what we heard
     from the stakeholders at the public workshop and some of our
     analysis of those thoughts.
               John will also talk about the three-tiered
     approach to training that we have, and just so you
     understand just the background, we thought about it in terms
     of tiers and the first tier being the managers, making sure
     they had a fundamental understanding of what we were doing
     and then the second tier being all the staff, all the
     technical staff that we have in the waste and material
     arenas, including the staff working in the regional offices
     and making sure they had a basic understanding of what we
     were doing in these programs and then the third tier being
     more advanced training for the people who would actually be
     employing these risk assessment methods and using risk
     management techniques as appropriate that come out of the
     analysis.
               So it's a three-tiered approach, and again, John
     Flack will explain that in a lot more detail.
               Just to highlight and introduce what John will
     talk about on the next slide is the April workshop.  We had
     participants from other Government agencies.  We had other
     representatives from all of the regulated industries; public
     groups and other interested parties participating, and
     transcripts are now available.  We're having copies of the
     transcript made so you can see that, and I think it was a
     very good workshop.  Everybody was well-engaged, and we got
     a lot of good feedback, and John is going to share with you
     specifically some of the ideas in detail.
               The focus of the workshop was basically two-fold. 
     The first part of it was looking at the screening criteria,
     and we introduced that screening criteria and took comments
     on it; looked at examples.  We actually asked the --
     challenged the group that said not only give us comments on
     the screening criteria but other examples of various --
     where we should move forward independent of the screening
     criteria and also pilot applications, and we'll talk a
     little bit more in detail about that.
               And we solicited input on development of the
     safety goals.  We had this laid out for a day and a half,
     and quite truthfully, I thought we were going to spend most
     of the time talking about the screening criteria, but when I
     go back and look at the transcript, we spent most of the
     time talking about the safety goals, which was very
     productive.  I think it was a really good meeting and a lot
     of good ideas on how to proceed with a process for
     developing safety goals.
               DR. KRESS:  When you talk about safety goals in
     this arena, are you talking about some sort of risk
     acceptance criteria for individual facilities?
               DR. VIRGILIO:  At this point, what we're doing is
     trying to decide how best to attack this, and we had thought
     about maybe going down seven paths consistent with some of
     your guidance.  We have seven programs within the NMSS waste
     and material program, and I think we're refining our
     thoughts on that.  There may be a better approach and maybe
     bringing that down to five and individually maybe working
     forward in some way to define safety goals in those five
     specific areas, and John will get into a lot more detail
     about this but not necessarily on a facility level but
     starting maybe on one area, on medical, on another area,
     maybe on the facilities, on the industrial facilities and
     try to define goals in each of those areas and then seeing
     if we could step back and say is there an overarching goal,
     you know, that would cover the five or the seven areas but
     working from the bottom up, working in areas and building to
     see if we can get some overarching safety goals.
               DR. KRESS:  On a more general level, when you say
     goals, is that something to be strived for or something that
     has to be met?
               DR. VIRGILIO:  No, we're thinking in terms of a
     hierarchy of overarching goals that would then be supported
     by regulations that would have to be met.
               DR. KRESS:  Okay.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  And we're also trying to make sure
     we have a clear idea in our minds of how these overarching
     goals fit within the context of the Commission's strategic
     goals.  We've got a -- I don't know if you've had a chance
     to see the latest strategic goals and performance goals that
     the Commission is now finalizing, but there has to be a
     hierarchy, I think, between these goals, the Commission's
     safety goals and performance goals and then the regulatory
     requirements.
               DR. KRESS:  That disturbs me a little, because I
     don't see the connection, frankly.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  And we have to make that
     connection.  We have to do that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But if you find goals, and then,
     you have regulatory criteria based on those goals that must
     be met, aren't you implying that the goals are in fact
     defining adequate protection?
               DR. VIRGILIO:  I would rather stay with the
     regulations defining the adequate protection and the goals
     being an overarching framework.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So the regulations, then, will
     not be derived from the goals.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  The regulations have to be derived
     from the goals and consistent with the goals.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes; consistent, I understand.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  And any new regulations -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You have to be careful here.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You know, the distinction
     between goals and adequate protection.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  We have to be abundantly clear in
     defining that, and right now, I think we've got, you know,
     and we've got goals; we've got strategic goals; and we've
     got regulations.  And as we move forward in the waste and
     material arena, it's critical to us that we understand the
     linkages and relationship between those three components of
     our framework.
               DR. KRESS:  Normally, the goals put forth in the
     strategic plan are sort of a measure of how well NRC does
     its job of overseeing.  Now, we're talking about a
     regulation that deals -- regulations that deal with the
     actual design and implementation thing.  It seems to me like
     those are two separate things and not necessarily -- they
     don't necessarily have to be related to each other at all.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  I would say that the goals, you
     know, are the outcomes that you're trying to achieve:  no
     deaths; you know, no destruction of property, you know, no
     loss of property.  I mean, those are the goals you're trying
     to achieve, and the way you achieve -- 
               DR. KRESS:  When is that applied?  Over the next
     year?  The next 5 years or -- 
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Well, the strategic goals are meant
     to be enduring.  If you think about the Commission's
     strategic goals, they're meant to be long-lasting, enduring
     goals.
               DR. KRESS:  No deaths forever.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Right.
               DR. KRESS:  Well -- 
               DR. VIRGILIO:  No deaths.
               The performance goals that they have in that same
     book are meant to be 5-year goals.  They're meant to be --
     let's see how we're going to do for the next 5 years in
     meeting those overarching, enduring requirements.  And then,
     I see the regulations as being the mechanisms, you know, the
     requirements that we're going to impose on the regulated
     communities for meeting, you know, to help ensure that we
     achieve those outcomes.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes; well, that's what bothers me,
     because your regulations are sort of one-time things.  These
     goals are going to be re-established year after year after
     year.  Are you going to change the regulations to meet the
     new goals, or are you going to set up your regulations based
     on another set of criteria and then worry about the goals
     when you talk about inspection, operations and other things? 
     You see, that's the connection that bothers me.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's not clear to me at all what
     the role of the goals ought to be in the regulation, because
     the regulations, really, are dealing with adequate
     protection.
               DR. KRESS:  That's the other thing that bothers
     me, absolutely, George.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I mean, if you go to reactors,
     and it takes even at 10-4, which is a subsidiary goal for
     core damage frequency -- 
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- I don't think you will find
     any regulation that is derived from that.
               DR. KRESS:  Except the backfit rule.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, then, there's one.
               DR. KRESS:  But, you know, that's a special.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And we have plants right now
     that have CDF above the goal, and they're allowed to
     operate.  So I think that there is a real issue here, the
     distinction between goals and adequate protection, and there
     has been reluctance to define adequate protection
     quantitatively, not only from you, or I don't even know
     whether you are objecting to it, but in the reactor arena,
     we were told that they would rather stay away from it,
     because adequate protection is not just a number.  It's the
     result of a whole process, where the numbers are only part
     of the process.
               But I think there is a real issue there:  how do
     you interpret these defined criteria and quantities.
               DR. GARRICK:  But this is an old issue, George.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  I'm looking at a SECY 89-102 written
     in 1990, and it's pretty clear on its distinction between
     adequate protection and goals.  It says the Commission
     believes that adequate protection is a case-by-case 
     finding -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  -- based on evaluating a plant and
     site combination and considering the body of our
     regulations.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right.
               DR. GARRICK:  Safety goals are to be used in a
     more generic sense and not to make specific licensing
     decisions.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes; but that was in 1989.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, we want to use the goals on
     a plant-specific basis.
               DR. KRESS:  To risk-inform the -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Which would upset this, I mean,
     it would change that.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes; I think that would upset that
     concept.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But the question is how do you
     use it?  If you adjust the goal rather than the definition
     of adequate protection; I mean, they're two different
     things.
               So you're going to have the same problem here, I
     think.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  And this was discussed; you can see
     in the transcript a number of the stakeholders raised this
     issue of the relationship between the goals and the
     regulations, and I think, yes, we have a challenge.
               On the next slide, John will go into a lot more
     detail, but I just wanted to sort of ground you at a fairly
     high level as to what were some of the recommendations we
     got from the participants at the workshop, and basically,
     they had a number of comments with respect to the screening
     criteria.  There was, I think, a very strong consensus to
     pursue safety goals and to do it as a series, not to try to
     start with one single goal but to work down parallel paths
     looking at the groups of activities that we do and see if we
     could establish goals for individual groups first.
               If you go to the next slide, the participants also
     recommended that we summarize the results -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Excuse me again.  Let me
     understand the criteria; I'm sorry.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Okay.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The criteria will be used how?
               DR. VIRGILIO:  The criteria that we put out at the
     workshop -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Actually, we put a Federal Register
     out first and then discussed at the workshop would be used
     to identify new areas where we would move forward to risk-
     inform.  That was the purpose of the criteria.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, oh, oh, oh, oh.  That's
     different.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Why would you go about risk-
     informing a new activity or an existing activity?  And so,
     we laid out a number of criteria that one would have to meet
     in order to decide.  And we took this from your
     recommendations on principles.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  For how do you go about approaching
     risk-informing your program?  You suggested that we define
     some principles.  And so we, instead of calling it
     principles, we called it this criteria and screening
     criteria.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So the criteria are not to be
     used to identify unacceptable risks.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  No, sir; it was strictly to say
     that this was an area where it was ripe for a risk-informed
     approach, and so, we would look at it using this screening
     criteria.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Another dream crushed by
     reality.  I thought you were going to define that, which
     would have been a definition, a semi-definition of adequate
     protection.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Not yet.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Not yet; right.
               DR. KRESS:  They do have what they call
     quantitative acceptance criteria in this document here,
     which is a good step in the right direction.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Other participant recommendations
     are just to summarize the results and inform the Commission
     and hold more workshops.  There was a desire on a number of
     the stakeholders to get out and talk -- and we're talking
     about regional areas, not necessarily NRC regional areas but
     to get some more local input on the development of the
     goals, local values, local desires.
               There was a desire that we continue to work in a -
     - with the group that we had or similar groups to develop
     the safety goals through a consensus process, and there was
     also, I think, a general agreement that we can develop
     safety goals in parallel with continuing to risk-inform our
     processes, not that we have to have the goals first.
               That pretty much summarizes what I wanted to tell
     you.  If you have any additional questions on my
     presentation, I'd be happy to take them now.  John Flack is
     going to provide a lot more detail on the training program,
     the workshop recommendations, and John will actually talk as
     well about some of our next steps:  where do we go from
     here?  And any questions for me before I turn it over to
     John?
               DR. KRESS:  Yes; on your concept of having several
     groups of activities, each of which would have its own
     safety goal, do you have some overriding principle that
     would integrate those and make them all consistent?  And
     what I have in mind there is some sort of cost-benefit. 
     Here's this activity.  It has some assessed benefit to
     society.  Therefore, we're willing to accept some cost of
     having an accident due to that as a result, and maybe that
     cost versus benefit could be the same number for each of the
     activities, and since you would have different benefits, you
     would have different costs, which would lead to different
     acceptance criteria.
               Do you have some sort of overriding principle like
     that that you're trying to use?
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Not yet, but I think, you know, we
     want to go to some overarching principle that would if not
     provide consistency provide harmony or at least a logical
     approach to looking at each of the five or seven areas that
     we proceed down.  I think we have to do that, but we haven't
     thought through to the point of on what basis would you
     establish that overarching view?
               DR. KRESS:  Well, I think you have to have
     something, because you can't -- I mean, it's -- 
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Yes.
               DR. KRESS:  -- it's going to be incoherent if you
     just pick each one out of the air.  There needs to be
     something to tie them together.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  And we also -- and I know the
     Commission has given us some guidance in this area, but we
     also want to look across at the reactor population, too, and
     make sure that there is some logic to what we're doing vis-
     a-vis what they're doing in terms of safety goals as well.
               DR. KRESS:  Well, they don't have this overriding
     principle there either, unfortunately.  It's something we
     called for, but it doesn't exist.  I mean, if you looked at
     the prompt fatality and the latent fatality and the non-
     existent land contamination and other societal risks,
     there's no overriding integrating factor for those.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  While we believe at this point
     starting from the bottom up, working in these areas would be
     helpful, we all, I think, agree that that's what we need: 
     an overarching principle that would tie this together or a
     framework that would tie this together so that logically,
     you could look across the entire scope of our activities and
     say -- 
               DR. KRESS:  But each one of them has a -- 
               DR. VIRGILIO:  It fits.  It fits within a
     framework.
               DR. GARRICK:  Tom, you don't think the qualitative
     statements that preamble the safety goals are in the
     category that you're talking about?
               DR. KRESS:  In a sense, when you say small
     increase over -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. KRESS:  -- existing risk, that is a type of --
               DR. GARRICK:  Right.
               DR. KRESS:  -- of thing, but those two are
     inconsistent, because what happens is only one of the goals,
     almost 90 percent of the time, controls because they're on
     an inconsistent basis.  They're not tied together in a
     sense.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  Right .
               DR. KRESS:  For example, why should the safety of
     nuclear power be tied to automobile accident deaths?  I
     mean, that doesn't make any sense at all to me, and that's
     basically what it is:  it's tied to the automobile accident
     deaths.  But why?  There's no reason for that.  So there's
     no real -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  These are policy issues, Tom. 
     Why should there be a reason?
               DR. KRESS:  Because you have to have these
     acceptance criteria before you can risk-inform, and you've
     got to start somewhere.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. KRESS:  And if you just pick values out of the
     air, you're going to end up with an incoherence in the
     system.  You know, it may not be a bad incoherence, because
     you could look at each group separately but -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But that will be a societal
     incoherence.
               DR. KRESS:  It's a societal issue.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But not the Nuclear Regulatory
     Commission incoherence.
               DR. KRESS:  Oh, yes, but society is not going to
     come knocking on your door and say here's what we want.  The
     Nuclear Regulatory Commission has to develop these itself
     somehow.  Nobody is going to come and hand them to you?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, but the one-tenth of 1
     percent is clearly a policy issue.
               DR. KRESS:  Sure.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And it can be a logical one.
               DR. KRESS:  These are all policy issues.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. KRESS:  But what I'm saying, there's a need
     for a coherent basis for such policy issues.
               DR. GARRICK:  But the one-tenth of 1 percent could
     be viewed as an interpretation of what is meant by the
     qualitative overarching.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, that's what I'm saying.
               DR. GARRICK:  The goal that -- yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I mean, Tom, you asked what is
     the reason behind it?  Well, there is no reason.  There is
     no logic.  I mean, this is it.  All we want is these risks
     from these technologies to be lower.
               DR. KRESS:  But there could be some logic is what
     I'm saying.  That's my problem.  And the logic could be
     we're willing to accept so many deaths, which means so much
     money and multiplied by money per death for automobiles just
     because it has certain benefits to society.  You can
     quantify that benefit to some extent.
               We ought to be able to say what's the benefit of
     nuclear power to society?  And we ought to be able to accept
     the same costs, that is, the same number of deaths at the
     same frequency.  And that's an overriding principle that
     just doesn't seem to be evident anywhere in these
     regulations.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, but then, you would run
     into other problems.
               DR. KRESS:  Of course you've got the problems, but
     you -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The threat element of risk; the
     catastrophic potential.
               DR. KRESS:  Of course, you've got to -- we've got
     to think about those things and factor them into your
     decision in some way.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  Your argument is basically one of
     risk harmonization in the jargon?
               DR. KRESS:  Yes; that would -- it could be called
     that, yes.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  I mean, we would prefer to see
     NRC regulations risk-informed the same way that EPA
     regulations or Department of Transportation regulations, and
     they'd all be based on how many, so many thousands of
     dollars per statistical death.
               DR. KRESS:  Something like that, yes.  You know,
     you need some overriding principle that -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's difficult to defend, yes.
               DR. KRESS:  Anyway, it's just a thought.
               DR. VIRGILIO:  John?
               DR. FLACK:  Okay.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No high-tech for you, huh?
               [Laughter.]
               DR. FLACK:  Good morning; I am John Flack, the
     risk task force leader.  The risk group in NMSS is a group
     that acts as a focal point of all risk-informing activities
     that are going on in the office, and so, I have headed that
     group up now for the past 3 months, and today, as Marty had
     mentioned, I plan to cover two areas.  One is the training
     that is being developed for the office to bring them up to
     speed in using risk concepts, and the second is to provide
     you with an overview of the feedback from the public
     workshop in the two areas; the screening criteria that was
     sent out for distribution as part of the Federal Register
     notice and the entertainment of potential safety goals for
     nuclear materials and disposal of nuclear waste.
               So moving on to the first topic, which is
     training, as was mentioned earlier by Marty, we plan to use
     a three-tier approach to train the office on risk, risk
     concepts.  The first year is a management and supervisory
     level of training program that was really a roll-up from
     tier two, which is being developed as a pilot, and we expect
     to exercise that pilot this fiscal year, and I'll go into
     the outline of what we're following on that pilot program. 
     And then, there's tier three, which is really targeting
     those that are specialists in risk, who use risk on a day-
     to-day activity, and some of these courses would be given
     in-house, and some would be taken through other agencies,
     and we're developing a list of those courses.
               There's two things that need to be considered
     while we're developing the training program, and one is the
     fact that we also, and NMSS also has regional staff that we
     need to bring in for training to make sure that it's
     properly implemented risk concepts, and secondly, we need to
     think about the agreement states, and one of the issues that
     you'll see that came out of the workshop is that if we're
     moving in a risk-informed direction, how do we train those
     that are out there in the agreement states as well with
     their limited amount of resources?  So these are two things
     we need to consider during development of the program.
               Now, with respect to laying out the program for
     training, I kind of followed the Farman approach.  Richard
     Farman used a concept when he taught students about physics;
     he said first, you tell them why they need to know it, and
     then, you tell them what they need to know, and then, you
     let them determine for themselves how to do it.  Well, we do
     all three here, though.  The approach that was laid out was
     we would go through first explaining why we need to use risk
     up front; why it's important to use it and why the
     Commission has considered it to be important and then go
     into the methodologies:  what are the methods that we would
     use to carry out this concept of using risk?  And then,
     finally, how it's applied through application, specific
     applications as examples.
               So that's the kind of thinking that when we laid
     out the training program.
               And as you can see, in the why of why we are using
     risk, it's interesting to note that the first topic of
     discussion in the introduction of that area is adequate
     protection and safety goals and why they are different in
     that regards based on an historical perspective as well as
     where we're trying to blend the two today; it was
     interesting to think about in that context; but basically,
     from where we have been, safety goals, trying to be
     something we aspire to which involves performance as well as
     defense-in-depth that has already been instituted at the
     sites to adequate protection as generally defined in the
     strategic plan as meeting the bulk of the regulations.
               So just getting that out as the differences in
     concepts to the students and how we are trying to blend the
     to understand one with regards together is something that
     really should be discussed up front.
               DR. KRESS:  When do you define adequate protection
     as meeting the bulk of the regulations?  And then, you're --
     you set out on an activity where you're making a wholesale
     modification of the regulations?  How useful is that
     definition to you in doing that activity?
               DR. FLACK:  Well, I think -- yes, I think you're
     touching upon a point of public confidence.  I mean, when we
     have established adequate protection, it's something that we
     believe that we have done with our regulations and that
     plants do adequately protect the public.  I mean, that's the
     position that you're coming from up front, and the
     regulations are trying to establish what that is.  I mean,
     they do establish what that is.
               But there's also goals that you want to aspire to,
     and I think this is where you stand back, and you look at
     the broad set of the regulations and how they're being
     implemented and what they're achieving and then what are we
     trying to achieve, well, in steps to safety goal?  Well, the
     safety goal is a way of articulating what we're trying to
     achieve.  It's something that you try to aspire to.  And I
     think in that context, one can, you know, sort of understand
     what role each of these play.
               Now, ultimately, it would be the -- ultimately,
     they should come together.  When we have all the answers, I
     think it will come together.  But as this continues to
     evolve, and we get closer and closer as we evolve, I think
     we're coming closer and closer together.  But I don't know
     if we have all the answers yet.  I mean, we always have to
     question that, you know.  And so, I think that goals
     shouldn't be met; they should be something that we're saying
     here's what I'm trying to aspire to.  I mean, in some cases,
     you might meet them, and that's fine, but it's not something
     that should be in the sense of a requirement, you know, that
     you have to meet these goals.
               So again, why?  Why do we need risk?  We have the
     PRA policy statement that goes through a number of reasons
     why we think it's important, the Commission thinks it's
     important to use risk concepts, and those would be
     explained, of course, as part of that up front discussion
     and class.  And then, we talk about the strategic plan and
     what's the relationship between the strategic plan and the
     risk-informed regulation implementation plan, which you'll
     soon hear about; this is the one that the staff has been
     working on and presented to the Commission I guess it was
     about a month ago.
               Now, and I visualize the strategic plan again as
     those strategic goals on top, and then, we have performance
     goals which we expect to meet, and then, between the two,
     you need some implementation plan.  How do you go from your
     strategic goals to how you're measuring or what's causing
     you to measure what you're measuring?  And that, to me, I
     envision that as the piece, the dovetailing of the risk-
     informed regulation implementation plan.
               So with that fitting together like that, that
     would explain why we're -- and risk-informing the plan
     itself would explain how the policy itself is being
     implemented, the Commission's PRA policy statement.
               So I see those two as dovetailing, anyway, in that
     sense of the word, but we're still working on developing the
     risk-informed regulation implementation plan and laying that
     out and how that will -- then, we will get down to the
     regulatory activities and how those are being risk-informed.
               So I see that as an introduction to the students
     as to why we're using risk.  And then, we move on to the
     principles of risk-informed integrated decision making,
     which is Reg Guide 1.174, where there's a lot of information
     there that is generic, which is the way we do business using
     risk, and that carries over certainly to the other fields. 
     And then, as we move through this cost, we begin at a higher
     level moving down now to its actual applications to
     materials and waste disposal, and right now, the document
     that really outlines that is SECY 99-100, which you're
     familiar with and how we're implementing that process.
               And then, of course, the connection with respect
     to nuclear materials and waste of how we use risk and
     rulemaking, licensing and inspection and assessment as being
     those three key regulatory areas by which we operate and
     drawing that connection between -- to risk and the
     regulations.  So again -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  John, I hope that the emphasis on
     this, on the training is not so much on the why being
     answered in the context of because we have rules and
     regulations and what have you but rather what's behind the
     reason we have the rules and regulations.  I don't think the
     American public is all that impressed with the why being
     answered, being given in the context because it's required
     by the regulations.  I'm just suggesting -- and I hope the
     emphasis is on the merits of a risk-informed approach.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  The merits of a risk perspective,
     because this is not very impressive to me just to see this
     list, because, you know, I don't -- I'm a member of the
     public; I don't trust the Government.  I want something more
     basic than safety goals and PRA policy statement and
     strategic plans and regulations and what have you.  I want
     somebody that really understands what we're going to benefit
     from in taking a risk view here and that understands what
     risk is.  So I hope the emphasis is on that.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; I would say -- well, I guess
     there's a couple of things.  I understand the emphasis that
     you're making as certainly important to make.  The objective
     -- this gets back to the objectives of the course, and what
     I'm laying out is more of an outline with the objective in
     mind that we want to bring the staff up to speed in risk,
     and we want the staff to understand why risk is important to
     use it, why it's important to know, and how does it fit in? 
     So the emphasis was more on the staff itself rather than the
     public domain.  So there is a part that I'll get to in the
     end about risk communication, and that is how do you
     communicate to the public.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  But that comes at the very end of the
     list, and this is only meant to be the establishment of an
     outline.  I mean, there is a lot of meat that needs to be
     put on the bones.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  But it's just the way we're thinking
     through the process of training the staff in the Office of
     NMSS -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  -- to appreciate the views on it.
               DR. GARRICK:  But my point is that the real reason
     we're doing risk assessment is, A, we want to know what the
     risk is in a realistic fashion; that it's something more
     valuable to us than a bounding analysis.  That's the real
     merit of a risk assessment.  And number two, we want to know
     what's contributing to the risk.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes, absolutely.
               DR. GARRICK:  And so that we can do something
     about it.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  So that we can manage it.  And when
     I see a list like that, I don't see -- 
               DR. FLACK:  Well, I get into the other pieces.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  This is still at a very high level.
               DR. GARRICK:  Right; I understand.
               DR. FLACK:  And now, we get into the next piece. 
     Let me move ahead to the methodologies and then what comes
     out of those methodologies and then how do we use those
     findings.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  So this is still establishing the up
     front why risk is -- why we're using risk, and certainly,
     the outputs and the outcomes of using risk is something
     that's important.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  You know, that adds to what our
     knowledge base is, and really, that's the main thrust.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But why we're using risk; I
     think part of what John said answers that question in the
     motivation behind it so it belongs here really, doesn't it? 
     That you really want to avoid -- to get away from
     conservative bounding analysis, a more realistic view of
     what's going on.  Maybe that should be the very first
     bullet, even above the safety goals.
               DR. FLACK:  Well, yes, I mean, you discussed that
     in the context of goals and adequate protection and -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You can even bring it up there,
     yes.
               DR. FLACK:  I mean, that's really -- you know --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, so you were planning to do
     that -- 
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  That would be part of what we mean by
     adequate protection versus -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I see.
               DR. FLACK:  -- a safety goal.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, yes, if you do a job of
     marrying this list and its language to the background, like
     you said, you said when you were talking about safety goals
     versus adequate protection that there's language in the
     rules and regulations of a background of the type that we're
     talking about here.  But just wanted to make the point that
     that's quite important, that background information.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; and I think when you flesh out
     why, you know, you have a PRA policy statement to begin with
     and the reasons that led you there -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Right.
               DR. FLACK:  -- were some of the reasons that
     you're describing now.  So, I mean, there needs to be a lot
     more, again, meat on the bones here, but just as a
     structure, you're quite right.  I mean, these things have to
     be brought up.  I think that one of the shortcomings that I
     see is that we tend to jump into teaching students the tools
     and the methods, and you say okay, now, go forth and use
     them, but there's not enough up front discussion of why do
     you use risk?  What is risk, you know, doing for you, and I
     think these are the kinds of, you know, things that need to
     be discussed; right.
               Okay; which gets me to the second part, and that's
     the what, and that is, you know, as part of that -- part of
     the course; it's to go through also the methodologies and
     what are the -- what they are, the concepts, the methods. 
     And through that discussion, of course, of what risk is and
     then the general methodology that's used in finding out what
     that risk is and then the key modeling areas, and these
     configuration or with reactors, of course, it's as built, as
     operated plant or operating condition and what we mean by
     success and how that's modeled.  Of course, human
     reliability is an important part of that methodology and
     common cost failure, accident progression and consequence
     analysis and external events.  So these are all the key
     modeling areas that one would discuss in a course like this
     to get ideas to students on how or what is, you know, this
     is the what, what modeling areas there are out there that
     need to be done.
               And then, following that, of course, then, we get
     over to the data, statistical analysis and treatment of
     data, and there will be some of that as part of the course;
     basic treatment of uncertainties, and this, of course, is
     trying some limitations of the methods.  So this would be in
     that context of getting out the methods, explaining to the
     students what methods are out there and how they're going to
     be applied will then follow.
               DR. KRESS:  Go ahead, George.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The uncertainty treatment in the
     statistical analysis, the biggest uncertainties, at least in
     reactors, are usually associated with models themselves, not
     the data failure rate kind of thing.  Is that part of what
     you're going to discuss here, even though there are no
     methods really for handling those, but the model
     uncertainties really drive the whole thing.  And I think a
     lot of staff's regulations come from that.
               DR. FLACK:  Well that clearly, I mean, this is --
     the assumptions that go into even the model need to be
     articulated well.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right.
               DR. FLACK:  How you deal with that, it's helps to
     understand that in the context of the limitations of the
     process, that one is dealing with what we believe to cover
     the -- what the model is expected to cover based on the
     assumptions that go into the model, and certainly, that
     comes out; that would need to be discussed in the context of
     uncertainties.
               So once that groundwork is established, then, it
     becomes more the data uncertainties that we're talking
     about, but both uncertainties play an important role.  You
     know, I tend to agree with you.  I think that's one of the
     reasons why, you know, we're more in a risk-informed 
     arena -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  Because of that, you know.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's right.
               DR. FLACK:  And it's really to open your eyes to
     look for these things and not to say you got them all, I
     think, is -- you know -- is the answer to that but -- okay;
     so, moving off from the methods, we get to the applications. 
     And here's where I relied on my team members to actually
     provide us with a lot of input to this, so we've met with
     the training instructors, and we have identified some
     specific applications, and now, we're into how do you use
     these methods?
               And those are, you know, the four that we have
     established is fuel fabrication, one for fuel fabrication,
     one for transportation, one for nuclear materials and by-
     products, which you'll hear something about today, and
     radiological waste disposal.  So each of these, essentially,
     has their own methodology.  So we've developed sample
     applications of that and turned those over to the
     contractors, and now, the team members, each team member has
     a domain that they'll be interacting with the instructors on
     so at least the students who take this course see the
     practical applications of these methods as we're using them
     today in the NRC.
               Each of the examples that have been developed for
     those particular areas, of course, need to address certain
     elements, and of course, one is the differences in
     methodology; each has its own methodology, as mentioned; the
     key assumptions, which gets back to the modeling question;
     data analysis; the results and findings; what comes out of
     that analysis; and then, how do you use those findings or
     insights in decision making?  So trying to get out already
     what's going on more globally within the office is really
     the intent of that, of those applications.
               Okay; that's sort of the how.
               DR. MARKLEY:  John, just one question.  In your
     developing an appreciation for the staff for the use of risk
     information and the analysis methods, are you going to be
     developing something comparable to the senior reactor
     analyst, where you have people in the various areas that
     will be more or less responsible for doing some of the
     analysis associated with it along those lines to support
     those activities in the field and stuff?
               DR. FLACK:  Well, we haven't gotten -- we really
     haven't gone that far yet.  We're thinking about -- if we're
     talking about significant determination processes and
     specific findings and how they're assessed, I believe that's
     an area that we still need to pursue.  So we don't have, per
     se, like SRA types within NMSS.  We have a group, though,
     and certainly, as things get more interesting and get
     brought in, what is the risk perspective of this, then, the
     group would take it more or less on, and then, the expertise
     within the group would deal with the issue.  But there is
     not an assignment or a specific individual assigned like a
     similar -- 
               DR. MARKLEY:  But the group is a group of risk
     analysts, per se, or are they people with experience in
     those technical areas?
               DR. FLACK:  Both.
               DR. MARKLEY:  Both?
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  John, there is one thing that always
     bothers me about training syllabi that I see in the risk
     field, and they don't somehow match up very well with the
     real world in terms of activities.  I look at your examples
     on your previous slides of methodology and application, key
     assumptions, data analysis, results and findings, insights
     and use and decision making.  The most important activity in
     a risk assessment is what I would call the building the
     logic models, answering the question what can go wrong?
               It's probably 70 percent of the risk assessment,
     and yet, there is a kind of this idea conveyed out here that
     a risk assessment is primarily analysis of data.  That may
     be 5 percent of a risk assessment.  The thing that's really
     the tough, hard-nosed stuff in doing a comprehensive risk
     assessment is not clearly identified in that kind of a list. 
     Now, it could be buried in the notion of methodology and
     application, but where the man-hours are really spent, and I
     speak to you from having directed over 40 of nuclear power
     plant PRAs, is in developing the logic models, the event
     sequence diagrams and the fault trees that answers the
     question what can go wrong? 
               And that's where the real value of the risk
     assessment comes from; you know, people say that you can't
     do a risk assessment if you can't do data, if you don't have
     data, and of course, that's complete nonsense.
               DR. FLACK:  Right.
               DR. GARRICK:  Because that's not where the energy
     is consumed.  The energy is consumed in understanding how
     the plant works.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes, right.
               DR. GARRICK:  And you understand how the plant
     works when you start answering the question what can go
     wrong, and the way you answer that question is through a
     structured set of scenarios.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  And somehow, that just doesn't come
     through.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; no, I -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  And that's where the whole
     brilliance of a good risk assessment is.
               DR. FLACK:  Right, exactly, right, right.
               DR. GARRICK:  If you don't have people who
     understand how the plant works but might be the world's
     expert on data analysis; might be the world's expert on
     methodology and so forth, you're going to get a lousy PRA.
               DR. FLACK:  I couldn't agree with you more. 
     There's always limitations in a course like this.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes; I know, but I just couldn't
     resist it because -- 
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; I -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Because there is -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I count this as something else.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If you have people who know the
     plants very well, and they don't understand data analysis
     and methodology -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, I know, I know.  I know,
     George, but that's there; that's there.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You know, just for the record.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. GARRICK:  That's represented.  But the real
     hard work of a PRA does not seem to be represented.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  That's my point.
               DR. FLACK:  It's hard to get that appreciation
     from someone just quickly going through one of these
     examples, and certainly, these examples that are presented
     take an enormous amount of time.  I mean, there's a lot of
     resources that went into these, and in a couple of pages,
     you present that to them.
               DR. GARRICK:  I understand; I understand.
               DR. FLACK:  So it's just the fact that the people,
     to really appreciate it, need to do it.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  And when they do it, they'll
     understand it, but it's to get them there.  The whole idea
     is to get them there.
               DR. GARRICK:  John, my main point is that a PRA is
     principally an engineering analysis problem.  It's
     principally an engineering and operations analysis.  And
     that is something that has to be emphasized in the training.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; I agree.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Maybe under examples to include,
     there ought to be a bullet that actually addresses that. 
     You know, I don't know how to put that -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, the closest thing I know --
     right; the closest thing I know, George, is something like
     logic modeling.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  It's something that really gets --
     gets it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Structuring the scenarios?
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes; structuring the scenarios.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think that would be a good
     addition.
               DR. GARRICK:  Structuring the scenarios.
               DR. FLACK:  We're just writing it as methodology.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  Structuring and scenarios.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, structuring the scenarios.
               DR. FLACK:  Structuring of scenarios.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Do you want to call them failure
     scenarios or -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Well I -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Because it's not really -- we
     call them accident reactors.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; I understand.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's the word that applies to
     NMSS, the scenarios.
               DR. GARRICK:  Scenario is okay.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Scenarios.
               DR. GARRICK:  Because that -- 
               DR. FLACK:  They will certainly cover that as part
     of the -- you know, like, for example, the event reanalysis,
     but again, the appreciation of actually doing it in the real
     world is -- you just can't get that across in the classroom. 
     You have to summarize it, you know.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  But certainly, we'll reemphasize that
     as another bullet.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Good point.
               DR. FLACK:  Okay; so, then, that leaves us with
     the last two areas of the training program, which would be
     the application of the risk insights to regulatory decision
     making, but it's not just generating things and not being
     used.  And here, also using the tool once it has been
     developed to gain insights by performing sensitivity studies
     and bounding analysis, and that gives you more information
     about -- about whatever you're modeling the area; the impact
     of uncertainties through those sensitivity studies, and some
     of this last one, performance measures, is something that
     you would gain by doing an analysis and understanding what
     are the important measures, important performance measures
     to capture and then use, for example, to demonstrate that,
     in fact, you are achieving what the model is predicting,
     something that you could actually measure in the course of
     time.
               DR. KRESS:  Somewhere in these six areas, you have
     a concept of how defense-in-depth fits in with a risk-
     informed or risk application processes?
               DR. FLACK:  Well, other than how it would be
     discussed in the context of 1.174 up front, you know, what
     we -- you know, how it becomes one of the elements,
     principles of good regulation, I wasn't going to go venture
     into what we mean by that in the context, you know, of the
     applications at risk.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You know, John, when you talk
     about uncertainties and their impact on decision making,
     maybe that's a good place to -- 
               DR. KRESS:  That would seem to me like the right
     place to put it, yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Especially model uncertainties,
     because if you think about the, you know, motivation for
     defense-in-depth, compensatory measures is really the
     uncertainty you have.  Now, again, you don't need to give
     them a whole treatise on it, but you have an item here
     insights and use in decision making, for example.  That's
     where a discussion of defense-in-depth versus the rational
     approach to designing compensatory measures would belong.  I
     mean, just as a thought.  I mean, you don't have to decide
     now, but it's certainly an important issue.
               DR. FLACK:  Oh, it is, but the question is can it
     be confusing within that context?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It is already confusing.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. FLACK:  Well, this is true, but it should be
     something that's borne out.  It's -- there's almost you're
     working like between two worlds, one of being -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Exactly.
               DR. FLACK:  -- deterministic and one of being
     probabilistic, and then, you're trying to bring the two
     together to have it make sense within the principles of
     1.174, and the question is how does one articulate that in
     the context of a training course?  A lot depends on the
     instructor, and it's not going to be me, which is
     unfortunate.  Otherwise, maybe I could discuss this with --
     you know, the problems and the issues that come out of how
     we deal with these as things we're trying to blend the two.
               But I guess in concept, what we're trying to
     achieve -- establishing defense-in-depth mechanisms to
     account for uncertainties, which is why you wouldn't want to
     remove the containment, for example -- certainly is an
     appropriate thing to talk about in the context of the
     course.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The -- well, again, I mean,
     1.174 is a pioneering document, but the way defense-in-depth
     is presented there is a third principle; the connection
     between defense-in-depth and risk assessment is not very
     clear.
               DR. FLACK:  Right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And it's okay; I mean, that was
     the first time we wrote something like that.  But I think a
     discussion of defense-in-depth in the context of the
     uncertainties that will come out of all of these analyses
     would be a more reasonable thing to do and explain at least
     the connection -- 
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- that -- 
               DR. FLACK:  And there is a structure to it, you
     know, I think.  You know, as you become -- of course, as you
     go down further and further in the likelihood of events, you
     would have less and less defense-in-depth because of the low
     probability of the event, where events that you would expect
     that would occur, you would expect a lot of defense-in-
     depth, and that would still bring you down to this low
     probability.  So, I mean, they kind of trade off against one
     another.  As a reactor tripped, there's a lot of defense-in-
     depth to bring the plant to a safe shutdown.  Of course, in
     the extreme, there is no defense-in-depth for a meteorite,
     for example; I mean, it just happens; that's it.
               So, I mean, in between, you have the whole
     spectrum of -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes; we are not saying that
     these issues are crystal-clear to everyone, but at least the
     discussion of defense-in-depth -- 
               DR. FLACK:  Sure.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- of the context of the
     uncertainties and their impacts on decision making, and that
     will naturally bring you back to the model uncertainty
     issue, because that's a major driver.  I don't think there
     is any defense-in-depth measure that was placed there
     because the distribution of lambda was too broad, the
     failure rate.  I mean, it's really the model itself that you
     worry about.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; good point; okay.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And that's where, in fact, I
     would agree with John.  I mean, that's where the
     availability of methodologists has actually done a
     disservice to the community; because there is so much
     statistical literature on how to handle failure rates, we
     can pay a lot of attention to that, when, in fact, from the
     PRA perspective, they are not the major drivers.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Uncertainties in failure rates
     are not the major drivers, right?
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; well, you tend to go to the area
     where it's the easiest to -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  At the moment you assume it's
     exponential, you have already made a big assumption.
               DR. FLACK:  That's -- okay; good, and the last one
     is, of course, risk communication.  We were discussing how
     it is important to communicate the results, both internally
     and externally, and there is work obviously still going on
     in that arena right now, and we don't have all of the
     answers to it but to at least emphasize the need to do this
     as part of this course.
               Okay; so, those were the six areas of the pilot
     program.  Then, if there are no further questions, I'll move
     on to the workshop.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Let me -- risk communication; I
     know it's a fashionable term.  Shouldn't it really be
     replaced by building trust or something?  That's really what
     you want.  You want the public to trust you, not just to
     communicate -- the risk communication is part of it.  And
     I'll give you an example.  In talking to people or laymen,
     they have no idea how you guys develop regulations and the
     extensive reviews and the public comment period and so on. 
     And it seems to me that their confidence in the agency goes
     up after they realize how much scrutiny every document you
     produce goes through, and that's not part of risk
     communication.  That's building trust.
               So I was wondering whether we can start talking
     about trust, of which risk communication is a very important
     part but not just risk communication.  I mean, you have
     processes in place that really the general public are not
     aware -- they are not aware of.  And yet, they enhance --
     they should enhance the confidence they have in you.  They
     don't know that this committee exists and that, you know,
     everything is aired in public, and we are free to say
     whatever we like, and the public is free to come and
     participate. 
               DR. FLACK:  Yes, right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I mean, that's important.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; yes, well, this really gets into
     external communication in general; I mean, how we
     communicate to the public.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes; so, in fact, the thing you
     have in parentheses there, public confidence -- 
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- it seems to me that should be
     the heading.
               DR. FLACK:  Instead of risk communication.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And risk communication is under
     it.
               DR. FLACK:  Well, okay, but we also have internal
     communication.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes; that's true.
               DR. FLACK:  Which is important too.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Internally, you don't have to --
     they know what the processes are; I mean, all you have to do
     is communicate risk.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  You hope they already know.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  All the evidence to the
     contrary, you know; 70 percent of you guys don't think risk-
     informed regulation will go anywhere.  That's still true.
               DR. KRESS:  Who took that poll?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Was it the IG or someone?
               DR. KRESS:  IG?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Do you remember?
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; well, in light of that I was
     thinking of how the information gets -- that's being used
     again; the risk group is a support group, and it's generally
     supporting a technical area.  Well, how do you package the
     results from your risk studies so that the technical area
     can use that, capitalize on it?  Some of the things that
     John had been mentioning has to somehow get across to the
     people that are going to use this to make the decisions. 
     That generally will not be the risk analyst that makes the
     decision.  It will be someone in the technical area.
               So that bullet was intended to somehow get -- to
     get the output from this analysis in a form that is usable
     and will be used by somebody making those technical
     decisions.
               DR. GARRICK:  Also, it's a risk course, so I can
     understand why you would put communication or risk
     communication as a headline, even though I agree with what
     George is saying, that what we're really talking about here
     is how to build public confidence.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes, clearly.
               DR. GARRICK:  How to build trust.
               DR. FLACK:  That second bullet is getting to the
     public that we're using risk.  We're doing regulation in a
     smart way, and one of the things we're using is risk to do
     it and getting that point across to the public.  I mean --
     well, as we'll get into the workshop, you'll hear some of
     these public groups think risk is just the opposite; that
     it's a means for relaxing the regulation.  And so, there's
     always this other element that's there that -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And if you talk to the industry,
     it's the other way.
               DR. FLACK:  That's right; so it's -- there's
     always sort of a problem with that, too.
               DR. GARRICK:  Let's talk about that workshop.
               DR. FLACK:  Okay; moving on to the workshop, the
     workshop was held last week, April 25 and 26.  There were
     approximately 50 people who showed up at the workshop. 
     There were about 26 participants around the large table. 
     The objectives of the workshop were to both inform and
     obtain stakeholders' input on two things.  One was the
     criteria, which Marty had mentioned this morning, earlier
     this morning on how to decide whether a certain regulatory
     activity should be risk-informed, and the other was on the
     nuclear safety goals. 
               As part of the Federal Register notice that went
     out, we provided the five-step implementation process out of
     SECY 99-100.  We also listed the criteria, proposed
     criteria, and then, we listed a number of questions that we
     thought as food for thought that they would have behind
     their minds as they participated in the workshop.  And I
     kind of structured the feedback along those questions we had
     asked.
               This view graph just provides an overview of the
     organizations that were represented, which gives a pretty
     broad spectrum of participants.  Again, there was
     approximately 20 to 25 that sat around the table that
     participated in the discussion.  The next view graph shows
     the framework that was outlined in SECY 99-100; the five-
     step process.  The first was to identify candidate
     regulatory applications that are amenable to expanded use of
     risk assessment information, and we primarily focused on
     that one.  The others kind of flow from that:  decide how to
     modify regulation -- the regulatory activity, and we'll
     discuss a little about case studies that are being proposed
     on how do we do that, use that to decide how regulation
     might be modified.
               And then, once we ran a pilot, we would then think
     about changing the regulation and then implementing that new
     regulation and then what it would take as far as tools to
     make that happen.  But I don't see these five steps as
     naturally occurring one after the other.  There's a lot of
     feedback from, you know, what you do depends also on what
     tools you have and that sort of thing, so kind of -- there's
     a lot of feedback between the various steps, but we
     primarily, as part of the workshop, focused on number one.
               The next view graph paraphrases the screening
     criteria, and those -- that was three, three items on that. 
     So if we were proposing a risk-informed activity, a new
     activity that would change the way we do business; the first
     one would say the new regulations should be at least -- it
     would have to at least address one of these:  maintaining or
     improving safety; improving the effectiveness or the
     efficiency of the NRC process; and/or reduce unnecessary
     burden.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, the moment you say reduce
     unnecessary burden, shouldn't you add a fourth item, add
     regulations where appropriate?
               DR. FLACK:  Add regulations -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, I mean, the risk analysis
     may indicate that there are areas where you need more.
               DR. FLACK:  Oh, well, I -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Because this, you know,
     regarding communication with the public, I mean, we're
     overdoing it with the reduction of, you know, unnecessary
     burden, and, I mean, that's not the purpose why we're doing
     all this.
               DR. FLACK:  Right.  I see the first bullet and the
     third bullet working together, you might say.  When you
     bring them together like that, you kind of say we're doing
     smart regulations.  If it results in a decrease; that's
     fine.  If it results in an increase, that's fine.  We're
     just doing it the smartest way we know how to do it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But what you just said is great,
     but it doesn't come across.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes, it -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, if you decide to put a
     bullet reduce unnecessary burden, it seems to me you have to
     have something also that says that you may add something if
     you find there is a hole someplace or just delete it.
               DR. FLACK:  But the question is if we add that as
     a bullet, if we say, well, it meets that bullet, that bullet
     is linked to one of the other bullets.  It's not by itself a
     bullet.  Like you would say I would add a regulation, but it
     would need to either reduce burden or improve safety or
     something like that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Something like that, yes.
               DR. FLACK:  Right; I mean it's -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I would make it one bullet;
     you're right.
               DR. FLACK:  So we would have to sort of implicitly
     be that and one of the others.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The reason why I'm saying this
     is I don't really think it affects the substance of things,
     but the last three or four years, we've been talking a lot
     about reducing unnecessary burden, and the agency has been
     criticized that the reason why we're doing all this is to
     reduce burden, and that's not true.  That's not true.
               DR. GARRICK:  It's a by-product of the process.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's a by-product, and for 20
     years, we've been using PRAs to add regulations.
               DR. FLACK:  Well, that's -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And, of course, people
     conveniently forget that.
               DR. FLACK:  That's right, and I think it's only
     saying, well, at this point, I'm going to go back and look.
     We haven't taken anything; we've kept adding and adding, and
     maybe there's things that got superseded and something that
     could be -- and so, it's really a -- well, we went through
     this phase, then, to -- let's look at it from a different
     perspective.  What is out there that we can reduce; since
     we've been adding and adding and adding over the years, is
     there anything now that's not just worthwhile going and
     implementing?
               And now, I think we're coming back to the point as
     though we're doing it as a group thing.  When we look at
     something, we look to see if there's -- safety can be
     improved or we can reduce, and I think they come together
     now at this point.  We're not looking at one or the other;
     we're looking at both simultaneously.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  In fact, that strikes me that
     your first bullet there is essential.  It's not one or more
     of the following; the first always has to be satisfied.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right, and the second, too.
               DR. MARKLEY:  George, I think as long as you're
     relying on licensees to identify the initiatives, you're
     going to end up with burden reductions and not increased
     regulations or enhancements.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But, Mike, I'm not questioning
     the actual practice.  I know that we're trying to do the
     right thing, and we are most of the time.  I'm just
     addressing what's written there.
               DR. MARKLEY:  Right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And because of the recent
     criticism, I mean, I have no -- there's no question in my
     mind that we are not doing this just to reduce burden, but
     we have been criticized that we are overdoing it with the
     reduction, and we keep talking about it all the time, so
     either delete it or add something to the effect that if
     necessarily, you know, we will add something.  We will add
     unnecessary burden.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. HORNBARGER:  No, no, you make it completely
     parallel, and the fourth one is add necessary burden.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right, right, right; that's
     exactly it.
               DR. FLACK:  Add necessary burden.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  And I think the point is well taken,
     as you'll see in some of these comments back from the
     workshop -- well, one of the public citizen groups felt that
     the last two of these criteria should not be part of it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's right.
               DR. FLACK:  They only believe that the first one
     should be part of it.  And that was their position. 
     Obviously, that wasn't shared by everyone in the room, but
     that's where they were coming from.  But we'll take that --
     you know, we'll think about that, what you said, and see if
     we can change -- see what we can do to clarify the meaning
     of that first -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
               DR. FLACK:  -- first criterion.
               The other two, of course, are that there needs to
     be data and analytical methods available or able to be
     developed if you want to make that change work, and then, of
     course, it's the implementation, whether it can be realized
     at a reasonable cost.  Again, this looks almost like the
     why, what, how, whether you start with the why are you doing
     it and then what, what it is that you plan to do and then
     how are you going to do it; it sort of flows in the same
     kind of logic.
               So that was the criteria that was proposed, and
     there is a comment period that's still open, and we're still
     waiting to hear from others on that as well.  I don't know
     if we'll get -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, again, in the context of
     the criteria, though, I don't know what it means maintaining
     or improving safety.  The criteria are -- will tell you
     whether you should risk-inform a particular activity, right? 
     That's what Virgilio told us earlier.  The screening
     criteria; what's the purpose of the screening criteria?  To
     decide -- 
               DR. FLACK:  To see if -- yes, to see if there is
     an area of the regulation that could be risk-informed and
     then why would you -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  How can maintaining safety be
     part of the criteria?  I don't see that, and, you know, I
     just don't see that.
               DR. FLACK:  It could be part -- well, okay.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I mean, that's a consideration
     when you decide to do something, and you're asking yourself
     now, what should I do?  Well, then, you say of course,
     whatever I do, I have to maintain safety.  But it is -- or
     improve it, but it's not part of the screening criteria, I
     don't think.
               DR. FLACK:  Well, it almost says that if, you
     know, it goes hand-in-glove with the last bullet, which says
     that if you have a proposal that you wish to reduce burden
     that you would at least maintain safety while doing that or
     improving safety, but that would be a win-win situation.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right; but this is a
     consideration after you decide that there is unnecessary
     burden.
               DR. FLACK:  That's right; you would first decide
     that -- yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's after that.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; you would first observe that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Your first decision, the
     maintenance of safety really is irrelevant.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; it's almost like an overarching
     kind of principle that -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes; we always want to maintain
     safety.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes, right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  There's no question about it.
               DR. KRESS:  A criterion might be does this
     particular regulation have a high risk or a high impact on
     safety.  That could be a criterion.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  This regulation; no, you're
     looking at activities, right?
               DR. FLACK:  Activity.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And you're asking yourself
     should I risk-inform this part of -- the regulation of this
     activity.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes; then, you're going to -- you're
     going to risk-inform all the activities.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. KRESS:  The question is which parts of the
     regulations?  And you look at the individual regulations and
     say does this have a high impact on safety, a high impact on
     the safety of this particular area?  That could be a
     criterion.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Why would that be a criterion
     for risk-informing it?
               DR. KRESS:  Well, if you have to -- if it was low-
     impact, there's not much reason to risk-inform it, maybe.
               Yes?
               DR. ROSENBERG:  Hi; I'm Stacy Rosenberg.  I'm in
     the risk task force.  The first criterion is to resolve a
     question with respect to maintaining or improving safety, so
     that's what we're looking at is if there is a question -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh.
               DR. ROSENBERG:  -- with respect to maintaining or
     improving safety, we would want to use a risk-informed
     approach to try to answer the question.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Then it should be restated here
     to make that clear.
               DR. ROSENBERG:  That's just paraphrased from 
     the -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  In other words, there is an
     issue that has come up -- 
               DR. ROSENBERG:  Exactly.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- that creates a question -- 
               DR. ROSENBERG:  Right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- whether safety is maintained,
     and then, that can be -- and the thought is that by risk-
     informing the process, you will be able to place that issue
     in perspective and maybe resolve it.
               DR. ROSENBERG:  Right, right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, okay, yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  But isn't this just parroting the
     background information to the PRA policy statement?  These
     words have appeared many, many, many times and in this
     order, too:  maintain safety; make the NRC more efficient;
     and reduce licensing burden if it can be justified.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But, John -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- they are used there after you
     decide to risk-inform the regulations.  The Commission is
     telling you do these things; risk-inform the regulations,
     and in the process, make sure you are maintaining safety and
     so on.  But here, they're deciding whether to risk-inform. 
     And that's why I raised the question, but after the
     clarification, I think if you change the words, then, it's
     okay.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; that should have been the
     question up front.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, that is the question.
               DR. FLACK:  That's on the table that you were
     going to address.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Makes sense.
               DR. FLACK:  And then, you would just bring the
     fourth as a question.  Of course, it's also being exercised
     in the other arena as well as part of the policy statement.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The other thing is the data.  I
     don't know if you like that, John.  I mean, if we don't have
     data, we don't do risk assessment.
               DR. KRESS:  Similar to your question, George, the
     second one there:  improve the effectiveness of -- you know,
     that's a weird criterion in a sense that almost anytime you
     risk-inform the regulations, it's probably going to improve
     efficiency.  The criterion ought to be maybe does this area
     have a high impact on the -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. KRESS:  -- effectiveness or efficiency or
     something like that.  And it seems like improve is not the
     right criterion.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, I think the words were
     borrowed from -- 
               DR. KRESS:  Yes, I think the -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- documents that John Garrick
     mentioned without really adapting them to the fact that you
     are talking about screening criteria here, whether to risk-
     inform or not.  And the context they have been used in the
     past is after you decide to risk-inform, make sure these
     things are right.
               But number two, I mean, why would that be a
     consideration in the screening criteria if the principle is
     -- and that's why we have fault trees; that's why we have
     all of these things.  If you don't have data, you go deeper
     and deeper until you get some evidence that will be used,
     and the availability of data was an issue in 1970 when
     people were telling other people that the reactor safety
     study would never be completed, because you don't have the
     data.  And then, it was completed.  So I don't know that
     number two means anything.  That's why we do risk
     assessments, right?
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes; I don't have too much problem
     with it when it's in the context of analytical methods, when
     it's data and analytical methods.  You know, the analytical
     methods are what allow us to turn up the microscope on the
     system such that we can see it down to a level of where some
     evidence, some data exists.  So it doesn't have the same
     impact as it would be if -- as a statement that you often
     hear, namely, you can't do a risk assessment because you
     don't have the data.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's right; that's right.  We
     need data.
               DR. FLACK:  In the context of whether or not data
     becomes important as part of your decision, if you need to
     collect additional data.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  They're always important.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Data are always important.
               DR. FLACK:  Okay.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The existence of data should not
     be a driver.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes, that's true.
               DR. GARRICK:  Information, yes, perhaps.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But data at what level?
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  See, it can be misinterpreted. 
     It may be at a much lower level.
               DR. GARRICK:  Evidence is another word that would
     work.
               DR. FLACK:  Evidence?
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes; evidence and analytical methods
     exist.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I would say just analytical
     methods to make it clear.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Because it's too subtle
     otherwise.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  Okay; any other questions or comments
     on the screening criteria?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If I were picky, I would ask you
     what is reasonable cost, but I am not.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. FLACK:  Moving right on -- 
               [Laughter.]
               DR. FLACK:  Okay; so, the next -- these are the
     comments, actually, that we received on the screening
     criteria.  First one is not a surprise; any new requirements
     should be established using a risk-informed approach.  I
     think there was general consensus on that around the table. 
     Other comments:  a risk-informed approach should be pursued
     if it would lead to improvements in the effectiveness or
     efficiency of either the NRC or stakeholders process.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's a good comment.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; so they felt that that should be
     added.
               Maintaining or improving safety should be the
     primary focus, and this gets back to the comments we just
     discussed about the public citizen groups supporting only
     the first of those three bullets; all other issues were
     secondary.  And that the costs of the public and society
     need to be considered in deciding to risk-inform a program,
     and it was very sensitive that the public should be
     considered in any burden reduction assessment, so it was a
     sense of communication.  They wanted to be on board,
     particularly these public citizen groups, to any kind of
     reduction that would be forthcoming from the activities that
     we're proposing.
               So, those are four comments.  Some other comments;
     as Marty had mentioned, a lot of the comments were picked up
     as part of safety goal discussions and not so much the
     criteria, but there were these other three comments which we
     thought were important enough to put forth to you:  that the
     area suggested for examination include -- and this is for
     risk-informing -- include broad scope licensees, unsealed
     sources, sealed sources, engagers in transportation.  Those
     were the areas that were identified as being ripe or to be
     looked at for risk-informing activities, regulatory
     activities.
               Also implementation and associated training
     requirements needs consideration; again, that was brought up
     as if we're going down a risk-informed path that we need to
     be thinking of training to agreement states and that the
     inspection process should always be thought about while
     we're doing this, and it should fit hand in glove with the
     implementation.  So as you go down in parallel, think about
     how you're going to do this in implementation space.
               DR. GARRICK:  John, we have a break scheduled in
     the middle of your presentation somehow.  Could you advise
     us on what would be the -- 
               DR. FLACK:  This would be the greatest time to
     take it since we're going into safety goals next so -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Okay; then, I think if it's
     agreeable to the committee, we'll take our break right now.
               [Recess.]
               DR. GARRICK:  All right; I want to make an
     announcement because we're trying to accommodate one of the
     committee members here in being present during one of our
     discussions.  You will note on the agenda that item seven is
     a discussion of joint subcommittee protocols, and one of our
     committee members has to leave prior to that scheduled time. 
     So what we would like to do is move that topic up to the
     lunch period, and we'll have it right here in this room. 
     We'll break long enough to get a sandwich or something, but
     we will try to, while having our lunch, have that discussion
     as much as we can to take full advantage of the full
     subcommittee.
               So unless there's any problem with that, that's
     the procedure we'll follow, and if there needs to be follow-
     on discussion, we'll have that at the designated time as
     item seven on the agenda.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But we expect to finish a little
     earlier, then.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes; it appears that we might be
     able to finish a little earlier.
               Okay; go ahead, John.
               DR. FLACK:  Okay; so, now, we'll move on to the
     second -- what was discussed at the second half of the
     workshop, safety goals, and Gary Hollohan was the one that
     presented this nice, interesting phrase from one of the
     philosophers:  there's one thing stronger than all of the
     armies in the world, and that is an idea whose time has
     come, and for that being safety goals for material and
     waste.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, Victor Hugo also wrote Les
     Miserables.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  We are not implying anything by
     that.
               DR. FLACK:  Okay.
               What do we mean by safety goals?  To establish a
     nuclear safety goal that broadly defines an acceptable level
     of risk to the public and in this case also the worker,
     which is somewhat different or an extension, you might say,
     of the scope of reactors.
               Okay; first question that had been posed as part
     of the Federal Register notice was what people should think
     about their perceptions of what material safety goals are
     and what they would achieve and whether or not it would be
     supported by various individuals, and I believe in general,
     the first bullet held true, that it was -- that most, if not
     all the people, at the table believed that it would be a
     worthwhile endeavor.  So it is getting support out there to
     move in this direction.
               It was generally -- there was a general consensus
     that the goal should be qualitative in nature at the highest
     level, and then, there was some discussion on how it would
     be implemented, whether it should be quantitative or
     qualitative, and I think that would have to be a, you know,
     exercise or understood in the context of an application, but
     there was pretty much agreement that the goal itself should
     be qualitative.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Why is that now? 
               DR. FLACK:  Why is it?  Why would one think of it
     as being qualitative?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  At which point would the
     Commission say these are the quantitative goals?
               DR. FLACK:  Well, I think at least my opinion
     would be that it would be more on how you implement it; that
     the goal itself is more philosophical in nature, and I think
     you'd find that Gary Hollohan feels very strongly in that
     direction as well, that the goal being a philosophical goal
     by its very nature would be qualitative.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, the quantitative health
     objectives were quantitative.
               DR. FLACK:  Well, only when you got down to the
     0.1 percent; you mean for the reactors.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; then you were into
     implementation; what do we mean by this, no more risk to the
     population and then came with well, what do you mean by
     that, or limited risk to population; well, then, it comes
     down to, well, how do you implement it?  Well, then, the
     next step would be something quantitative.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But it was part of the safety
     goals statement.
               DR. FLACK:  You mean at the highest level, at the
     highest level?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, I think so.
               DR. FLACK:  It's not quantitative; it's
     qualitative, yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It starts out with a qualitative
     statement.
               DR. FLACK:  Statement, yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And then, it says for reactors,
     it should be one-tenth of 1 percent of all -- 
               DR. FLACK:  Right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- other risks, which is part of
     the -- 
               DR. FLACK:  Well, okay, I see what you're saying. 
     You say you take it as a package deal.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes; I take it as a package.  I
     mean, that's a statement of the Commission.
               DR. FLACK:  At what time do you make that
     quantitative link?  Is it still at that level?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I remember Gary was objecting to
     putting core damage frequency and surrogate goals like that
     in the -- 
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- top level statement, but
     there has to be some quantitative statement even at the, you
     know, in the Commission's statement on safety goals. 
     Otherwise, the staff will have no guidance how to do it.  I
     mean, you can't put that in a regulatory guide.
               DR. FLACK:  No, I agree.  I think that when it
     comes down to the practicality of it all -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  -- it has to be something
     quantitative, and it's that the numbers represent something. 
     It's not that, you know, you need to achieve it as a
     requirement, but it tells you this is what I think it should
     be, and you can't argue with that.  I mean, once you write
     down 0.1 percent, everybody understands what that means.  It
     takes away words like being reasonable and so on.  This is
     it.  So I personally feel strongly about that myself.
               However, and I don't know if everybody agrees with
     that.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, maybe you've already mentioned
     this, but it seems that the distinguishing words here is
     qualitative safety goals versus quantitative objectives. 
     That's what I'm reading from the rules and regulations.  The
     qualitative safety goals is this general statement about it
     doesn't want -- nuclear power shouldn't add any significant
     risk.  The quantitative objectives is when you get into the
     0.1 percent.
               DR. FLACK:  So there is at this -- that 
     separation -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  -- of the two at that point.
               DR. GARRICK:  So they make the distinction -- 
               DR. FLACK:  Yes, okay.
               DR. GARRICK:  -- by separating goals from
     objectives.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; okay; if that's the one way of
     looking at it then.  So that's the break at that point.  So
     you have the goals, and then, you have objectives.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, but, you see, the third
     bullet should help define the objective of the regulation. 
     Is that what you mean?
               DR. FLACK:  This was in the context of the goals
     themselves would help us do the, that that would be the
     mechanism.
               DR. GARRICK:  I suspect that that was -- oh, I
     see; this is work -- 
               DR. FLACK:  These are other comments --
               DR. GARRICK:  Right, right.
               DR. FLACK:  -- that were made at the workshop, and
     I think that that was made in the context they're worth
     pursuing because it would help define the objectives of the
     regulations.
               DR. GARRICK:  All right.
               DR. FLACK:  But then, if you say if I'm going to
     sit down and develop safety goals, then, how would I develop
     them?  Then, you would start with some overall philosophical
     statement and from there go to your objectives.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, maybe the approach here is one
     step at a time.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  Maybe we ought to resolve the issue
     of a qualitative goal and go from there and -- it may not be
     a bad idea to adopt that as a path of progression, and if it
     can be tightened or bettered or improved on, obviously,
     you'd want to consider alternatives for doing that, it
     seems.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; I was thinking the committee
     could be very helpful in letting us understand that part.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. KRESS:  Well, one of the admirable qualities
     of the PRA and a risk assessment is it's quantitative.  And
     if you're going to make full use of that attribute, you need
     to have quantitative risk goals, and I don't know how bound
     you are to workshop feedback.  I mean, these are things you
     take into consideration.
               DR. FLACK:  That's right.
               DR. KRESS:  But I certainly would say somewhere
     along the line, you need to have quantitative goals that are
     -- that are expressed in risk terms related to PRA or risk
     type activities.  Just almost seems like you can't function
     in a risk-informed world without it.
               DR. FLACK:  Very well.
               DR. KRESS:  Even 1.174 has quantitative things in
     it that they use.
               DR. FLACK:  That's true; I think most methods that
     you would look at -- I'm thinking about them -- ISA, PA, you
     know, barrier, hazards barriers, target analysis; that sort
     of thing, all involve some sort of quantification.  You're
     ending up with a quantified numerical result at the end. 
     And then, the question is how do you link that numerical
     result to some higher level goal that you're trying to
     achieve, and, you know, if we're thinking about risk of the
     public out there, which is basically where it comes down: 
     how much risk -- the fact that we're using nuclear materials
     means that we're going to expose the public to some risk.  I
     mean, they just can't avoid that.
               So the question is then how much is acceptable
     risk, and that's where you begin to get into what percent
     are we talking about to the public and then the worker, for
     that matter, because we're dealing with both of these more
     in this arena, and structuring it that way so then, the
     natural tendency would be, of course, once you come down to
     a percentage, then, you're there; essentially, this is what
     we think.  And then, you can use different methods on seeing
     where you lie relative to that goal and what you could do if
     necessary to meet the goal but not as a requirement but
     things that you could do to improve the regulatory process
     in doing that.
               DR. GARRICK:  Tom, what about another thought
     process here?  Suppose we took this in a kind of a phased
     approach and said, well, the first thing we maybe ought to
     be doing is doing some risk assessments, some quantitative
     risk assessments and seeing what kind of results we get,
     what constitutes a rational form to put the results in, et
     cetera, et cetera, and give some experience in developing
     this measure before we necessarily freeze on how we want to
     calibrate it?
               In other words, you can always calculate the risk
     without a goal.  You don't need a goal to calculate the
     risk.  But you learn a great deal in the process of doing
     risk assessments about what you can do and what you can't do
     about what the contributors are, about what the
     uncertainties are, and it's possible that that kind of
     information could be extremely beneficial in the calibration
     process.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes; I support that very strongly, and
     I'll tell you why I view a goal or an acceptance criteria as
     a completely separate entity than what you're talking about.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. KRESS:  If you do what you said first, it
     tells you what's possible.
               DR. GARRICK:  Right.
               DR. KRESS:  And that odds somehow enter into your
     decision on what a goal or acceptance criteria you might
     have.  It tells you, you know, if your risk assessment of
     some sort of activity gives you a number, and you set an
     acceptance criteria that's impossible to achieve -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Right.
               DR. KRESS:  -- well, you haven't done very much.
               DR. GARRICK:  That's right.
               DR. KRESS:  And I think it helps guide doing it
     both ways.
               DR. GARRICK:  Right.
               DR. KRESS:  But I think you set -- I mean, the
     basis behind acceptance criteria stand alone, in my mind,
     and can be developed as a separate activity, but you've just
     got to be careful you don't put a value and shoot yourself
     in the foot, and your activity helps keep you from doing
     that.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  Okay; some of the other comments that
     safety goals would help communicate what it is we're trying
     to achieve, certainly, articulates that to the public.  Then
     came a lot of discussion about whether it should be
     application specific versus, you know, global that captures
     all of the different areas, and we could talk about that a
     little bit more when we get to the case studies, but many
     thought that it would probably be more than one goal that we
     were talking about.
               That the development, of course, would be a long
     and involved process, and people recognize that.  It wasn't
     something that needed to be done because -- at the moment,
     in a short period of time, to do something.  But it's
     something that I guess people felt they were more patient,
     they were more patient with and that it was an evolutionary
     kind of goals that would be developed in that.  It would be
     a long process.  And that was satisfying, I think. 
               The relationship between safety goals and
     strategic goals; we talked about some of that before.  It
     really needs to be articulated what we mean by strategic
     goals, what do we mean by safety goals, performance goals
     and how they all relate to one another was a comment that
     was made.  And so, these were all in the perception of what
     we would use or envision safety goals to achieve and the
     benefits from doing that.
               The next question focused on the developmental
     process of the goals themselves and that we should try to
     understand the goals underpinning our current regulations as
     part of that developmental process; to use case studies; to
     develop safety goals and then, while doing the studies,
     actually capitalize on their insights.  So that leads us to
     development of risk-informed approaches in parallel with the
     safety goals, which is something that Marty had mentioned
     this morning, so we're not really waiting for the safety
     goals to be developed; there's a lot to be gained just from
     working through the process and seeing how risk plays out
     within that context.
               There was some sensitivity to the desire for
     consistency with and among agreement states and that there
     may be different values across the different states, so it
     may not be that easy just to have them all agree on what we
     mean by a goal, but this was one of the issues that kept
     coming up at the workshop.
               DR. GARRICK:  Were the agreement state
     representatives vocal on the issue of safety goals and
     probabilistic approaches?  They have been in the past; I
     just -- 
               DR. FLACK:  Vocal in the sense of -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Vocal in the sense that most of them
     were not favorably disposed toward doing PA probabilistic
     performance assessment, for example.  
               DR. FLACK:  Oh, well, I guess we never got down to
     the level of where, you know, to discussions of the tools
     and the methodologies -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Okay.
               DR. FLACK:  -- in order to implement it.  It was
     more at the philosophical level, whether we need goals or
     not, so maybe that may become an issue.  I know that
     resources, there's always a problem, and it came also up in
     a context of well, if we go ahead with this, what about
     training?  How do we make it work.
               DR. GARRICK:  Okay
               DR. FLACK:  So, yes, I think that's the next level
     down; that's something that we're going to need to be
     concerned about.
               And that gets to the next one, which is ensure
     regional and local involvement, and that is, again, trying
     to lead to goals that are consistent across the different
     regions and localities; to certainly hold workshops, public
     meetings in the diverse regions and involve stakeholders
     early in the process, so these are things, again, that they
     want to know what's coming; they want to be involved in.  So
     there was a lot of support in that regards.
               Okay; what factors -- next view graph is what
     factors need to be considered during the development of the
     safety goals for materials and waste?  And there's some
     really sticky ones here, I think, the first one being
     national versus local values again, the diversity across the
     nation with respect to that.  And then, came the question of
     ecological risk, and that was discussed this morning in the
     context of reactors:  where are we going here that's
     different than reactors with regards to that risk
     contribution?
               And then, we're looking at operational versus
     accident risk, so you're looking at these two things
     together, where with reactors, it's primarily accident risk
     that we're dealing with.
               And then, you have worker and public risk.  So, we
     look at the worker and what the worker is exposed to with
     respect to his job and the risks that he would normally be
     exposed to as part of that versus the public, who is outside
     that area and what would they normally be exposed to, and
     then, the goals would certainly be tailored differently
     between the two, it would seem.
               Harmonization among and with other agencies; that
     was something that came up this morning about the other
     different agencies and having different, possibly different
     objectives.  And then, there's a question of legislative
     requirements and what legal ramifications there are in
     developing such goals, and we'll probably hear a little bit
     from Bob on the next one:  risk to future generations is
     sort of associated with waste disposal, so I'll let -- Bob
     Bernero is here, and he will certainly want to discuss that
     a little bit further.
               Also, the risk associated with theft, sabotage and
     diversion of nuclear materials.  Now, we have a different
     type of risk, the risk of diversion of materials that's
     possibly to be considered in the scope of a type of safety
     goal.
               And then, you have the risk associated with
     chemical toxic releases to the environment as part of the
     activities that go on at these facilities, for example.  And
     then, there's always the hidden considerations that may be
     embedded in the regulations that we have to be sensitive to
     when we look at the regulations and say this is what led to
     X.  There were some considerations that were obvious, but
     then, there may be others that were hidden in those
     decisions that got us there, so it's not going to be a
     simple process.  There are quite a number of factors that
     are going to be involved in considering safety goals for
     this area.
               On the next slide, we ask the questions about the
     analogy between the reactor safety goals and the development
     of material safety goals, material and waste disposal and
     safety goals, and clearly, at one level, there is an
     analogy, and that is the radiological risk to the public,
     although the criteria might be different:  what risk are you
     exposing the public to?
               So, I guess that's as far as it goes as being
     analogous.  The rest are the worker risk, the ecological
     risk, the risk for diversion of materials; these would all
     be different.  These are somewhat different areas that are
     not presently being captured by the reactor safety goals at
     least in the implementation for reactor safety.
               And then, five:  the question of whether these
     safety goals should be overarching, or there should be
     safety goals in each of the areas, and this led to
     discussion, and it seemed that there was a general consensus
     that one goal wouldn't capture everything; that there would
     be a need for separate goals and that we should use these
     case studies, which I'll get into in a moment, the different
     areas to explore safety goals in these different areas.
               But, you know, at the end, there should be
     something that brings them all together, and so, although we
     may go down different paths, once we're there, we may find
     that there is a next level up that we can kind of pull these
     goals together at some higher level; it certainly can be
     entertained, but it may not be so easy to start from that
     point.
               DR. KRESS:  The reactor safety goals are -- takes
     precedence to the mean values, which implies to me some sort
     of statement about the uncertainties.  When you choose a 0.1
     percent value and say this in the assessed version of this,
     you want it to be the mean value at this thing, what you're
     implying is that given the level of uncertainty in that
     assessment, this is an acceptable value to you given that
     this is a confidence level that you're willing to accept. 
     Are you going to have some thoughts about confidence levels
     or uncertainty in terms of these goals?  Are you going to
     say -- are you going to stick with this mean value concept? 
     How are you going to factor that sort of thinking into that?
               DR. FLACK:  And the question applies, you know,
     it's hard to answer a question like that without an
     application.  I would say, of course, the mean value is the
     preferred value just from the mathematical beauty of it, and
     it captures the thoughts on your uncertainties and so on,
     and when you deviate from that, you're using, you know, a
     certain degree of judgment as to what, okay, if we're going
     to go to something else, why are we going to something else?
               DR. KRESS:  Well, I personally don't view the mean
     value as any unique position on the distribution.  It is a
     unique position because it's the mean, but it doesn't have
     any special meaning to me other than that.
               DR. FLACK:  The mean's the mean.
               DR. KRESS:  Yes, it's the mean.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; I recognize that.
               DR. KRESS:  But, you know, median is just -- 
               DR. FLACK:  That's another concept.
               DR. KRESS:  And any 95th percentile or anything
     is, you know, just as unique.
               DR. FLACK:  Well, whatever measure is chosen, it
     needs to represent something, and it's in its representation
     that it becomes important, and it's not so much that we want
     to try to achieve this value by comparing the mathematical
     models and the results of those models to it so much on a
     numerical basis, but it's something that comes out of how we
     try to articulate our view on safety.  What are we doing? 
     What does it represent as a value?  And it leads you back
     again to the percentage.  When we talk about a certain
     percentage of risk to the public, and then, the question is
     well, how do you demonstrate that what you're measuring is
     the risk and that it is indeed a certain percentage of what
     the public is exposed to?
               Well, you're comparing again two values.  It's not
     just a value; it's a comparison of values.  And so, when
     you're comparing values, one has to be more or less
     consistent with that comparison, and comparing means is one
     way to do it.  There may be other ways of doing it, but it's
     a good question that really needs to be fleshed out as, you
     know, part of the studies, I think, that needed to be done,
     and the models that are developed and how we represent risk
     out there that the people in the public or the worker might
     be normally exposed to, so it's coming to grips with that
     within that context.
               So any other questions on factors to be
     considered?
               [No response.]
               DR. FLACK:  Oh, I'm moving ahead already on this
     one.  Safety goals -- oh, okay; five and six, I think we
     discussed.
               How resource intensive -- we mentioned that
     earlier, that it's too soon to tell exactly how resource-
     intensive this project is going to be, but it certainly will
     be long-term and involved.  And one comment is, well, try to
     do the easiest task first.  Go after the low-lying fruit, so
     you can be somewhat efficient and effective in the way that
     you would attack the problem and also that as part of the
     resources that NRC needs to again consider -- I must have
     mentioned this three or four times already, the training
     needs for the agreement states.  So it will not be a simple
     task.
               Number seven, what will ultimately change if we
     have goals from what we're doing now was a question we had
     posed out there, and there were comments.  Most people
     believe that by putting goals out that we would likely get
     safety improvements and relaxations where requirements do
     not contribute to safety, so by knowing how safe is safe
     enough is a two-edged sword there, but people believed, and
     I think most people believe that it would make us look at
     things differently and things would change one way or the
     other.
               It would certainly help consistency regarding the
     regulatory process because people then understand what the
     goals, the objectives of the registered, what we are trying
     to achieve as a regulatory agency.  There is potential for
     savings, since you will focus resources on those areas that
     will most help you reach the goal, and it certainly would
     enhance communication by allowing the agency to express
     their expectation of what is safe enough.  So those were the
     comments that were generated on the seven.
               And that pretty much covers the spectrum of
     comments that were mentioned at the workshop with respect to
     those questions we had asked.  
               So if there's no other questions on those, I'll
     just mention the case studies that were suggested, and these
     are the different areas in which we were entertaining
     further work to define -- for testing the screening criteria
     and the value added in risk-informing a focused area and in
     developing specific safety goals, so again, this would be an
     in parallel kind of activity.  One area is, of course, waste
     disposal, high-level, low-level and decommissioning.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Is that high level waste
     disposal area risk-informed already?
               DR. FLACK:  Is it already risk-informed?  Well, we
     could ask Chris that question if Chris wants to entertain
     it.  I would think so.  I would there there's a great deal
     of risk already embedded in that regulation.  It would just
     be a matter of going the next step up with it and saying,
     well, you know, what fraction of the risk to the public are
     we talking about and whether that's getting us there.  I
     don't know about specifically whether we could define it as
     a goal.  I mean, there are certain requirements in the
     regulation that are being established, and presumably, if
     you meet those regulatory requirements, you would meet some
     goal.
               But I don't know; Chris, can you shed any light on
     that?
               MS. LU:  This is Chris Lu.  I'm also a member of
     the risk task group.  The final part 63 now is in front of
     the Commission for consideration, so I can talk from the
     proposed rule that we put on the street.  We do require, for
     post-closure period, we do require a performance assessment
     to be conducted, and in the proposed rule, we are looking at
     the mean peak dose over 10,000 years as the compliance
     point.
               In terms of the safety goals, during the workshop
     that we had last week, a couple of the participants pointed
     out that since we do have a risk-informed performance based
     rule, we can imply what is the safety goal from that using
     the regulatory criteria and requirements.
               DR. GARRICK:  So the answer to George's question
     is yes.
               DR. FLACK:  It may very well be.
               DR. GARRICK:  It seems.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  This is the most risk-informed
     activity in the NMSS, isn't it?
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes, yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  At this point, and the EPA
     criteria are also or used to be.
               DR. GARRICK:  I'm very top-down oriented, and as I
     look at that list, I kind of come out that as far as safety
     goals are concerned and risk assessment is concerned that 90
     percent of the problem is number one.  That's the bad news. 
     The good news is that we're well advanced in number one over
     all the others in terms of the use of risk based methods.
               You know, if you think about it, large process
     facilities cast some packages and associated transportation;
     there's no reason why we can't basically use the reactor
     risk assessment technology to deal with those kinds of
     problems.  I also think that on medical uses and fuel
     sources, the NMSS with the studies they've done recently are
     in pretty good shape in terms of understanding what the
     risks are and have done a very good job, in my opinion, of
     pointing out the relative contribution of operational risk
     and accident risk and concluded the thing that a lot of us
     in this business have been saying for a long time, that the
     real risk is operational risk.  It's not accident risk.
               So that kind of brings us back to as far as safety
     goals are concerned and what is the real threat to the
     public and the concern, and the achilles heel of the
     industry is still number one.  The rest is kind of no, never
     mind almost, and I sure hope that our resource allocation
     and our problem resolution emphasis reflects on our state of
     knowledge about that.  One of the questions this committee
     asked very early on is that NMSS should tell us, on the
     basis of their expertise, what they think the real risks
     are.
               Well, I think they've done a pretty good job of
     that with respect to sealed and unsealed sources and medical
     uses of isotopes and with respect to the by-product problem. 
     Beyond that, except for the repositories, the problem can be
     handled in a very -- in a fashion very similar to the
     reactors in the sense that it can be based largely on
     reactor risk assessment technology.  So -- and when you come
     to the repository, then, the question of differences there
     become critically important.  It's not an accident issue on
     repositories.  It's a long-term performance issue.  And I'm
     not sure we've gotten that message out to the public.
               I could almost argue there's not a safety issue,
     and the reason there's not a safety issue is that we have
     time to interdict and to intervene.  We don't -- we are not
     caught by surprise by a big accident.  It's a long-time
     deteriorating, degrading process, so the driver as far as
     public risk is concerned on repositories is the denial of a
     resource, not public safety.  Now, we may eventually come
     around to that, and we're not there yet, but there is no
     public safety issue, because as soon as we detect that
     there's something in the water, we do something about that. 
     As soon as we detect that there's something in the food, we
     do something about it, and we have years and years of time
     to do that.
               So the real issue there is denial of a resource,
     and it's probably the reason why EPA is so adamant about the
     groundwater standard and protecting it now that they have a
     standard.  If they didn't have a standard, maybe there would
     be a much more rational process developed here.  But I think
     that -- I'm hopeful that when we get around the safety
     goals, these very activity-dependent issues are getting into
     account and the differences, and I see the problem centering
     principally around, still, number one, because I think for
     the most part, we can piggyback what we know already except
     for maybe the establishment of some sort of safety goal to
     use as a rule.
               So I'm hopeful that the thought processes here are
     taking into account such things as in risk assessment, the
     whole goal is to be realistic, and if you're realistic, the
     issue is not public safety on waste disposal.  It's resource
     denial.  And because you've got an opportunity to intervene,
     to interdict, you don't even call it emergency response,
     because it's not an emergency.  It's something that happens
     very, very slowly, and you can detect it very, very, very
     early, and the opportunities are tremendous for corrective
     action.
               So I don't know if any of that kind of dialogue
     came out in this workshop, but I sometimes think we confuse
     the public because we present these issues sort of as if
     they're similar, and I'm talking about waste disposal versus
     reactor safety, and the differences are extreme.
               DR. FLACK:  Well, no -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  And they give us a great opportunity
     to recast the problem and deal with it in a much different
     way.
               DR. FLACK:  No, I think that's the reason why we
     have these five areas.  That's not clearly that it would be
     similar to one of the others.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  It definitely needs to be looked at in
     its own right, and I think that was one of the areas where
     it was identified as a specific area.  But I think what the
     message is is that maybe it's more in the vein of public
     communication already what we have.  We don't need anything
     new.  We need to communicate what we have better and that
     it's really through the implementation, maybe, of some
     performance measures that we will know when things have
     deteriorated, and we can take those actions, and that's a
     defense-in-depth mechanism, actually.
               DR. GARRICK:  That's an action that's no different
     from today.  We don't -- we don't plant crops in
     contaminated fields today.  We measure; we know what we're
     doing.  We don't use a water supply that's polluted or
     contaminated, and I don't think we're thinking that way. 
     And that's what we're talking about here, and that's all we
     have to do to keep it from being a safety issue.  So I'm
     just throwing out this kind of notion that it's not a safety
     issue.  It's an environmental impact issue, and that's all
     it is for number one.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  And yet, number one is 90 percent
     plus of the reason why there is an ACNW or why there is
     anxiety in the nuclear industry about the waste and that we
     can't solve the waste problem.
               DR. FLACK:  Well, yes, that may be true.
               Number two is not so far behind, though; I mean,
     there is a lot of concern in that area as far as
     transportation and so on.
               DR. GARRICK:  It shouldn't be, though.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  It shouldn't be, because we know how
     to analyze transportation, and we've done a tremendous
     amount of field work in transportation.  We've just done a
     lousy job of making that field work available.  We have run
     trains into walls; we've run trucks into trains, and we've
     damaged casks from every angle and perspective we possibly
     can.  And the public does not know that.  They have not seen
     that information, and they have not seen it organized and
     compiled and structured in a way that communicates what we
     do know about it.
               I think transportation is one of the biggest bogey
     mans that exist in this whole arena and that we as
     technologists, as agencies, have failed miserably in
     conveying what is known about transportation risks, and
     we're spending billions of dollars as a result of it, not
     only in the nuclear field but in other fields as well.  So
     we, regulatory agencies and technologists have failed
     miserably in communicating to the public the transportation
     issue.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes; I think there's an activity now
     to plain English issuance of that work that had been done on
     those transportation studies and the work that, I guess,
     continues to go on in demonstrating that the risk is small.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. FLACK:  But I -- you know, I think what your
     concern is being appreciated by the staff and moving that
     direction, but, you know, maybe they should have been there
     earlier, but the plain English is supposed -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  No, what I'm trying to do is cut
     through some of the things here, and, you know, I sometimes
     think we treat these things as if they're equal when, in
     fact, the differences are extreme and that if we fixed one
     of these up there, you know, 95 percent of the problems
     would go away.
               DR. KRESS:  I agree, and I think when you develop
     some sort of risk acceptance criteria or safety goal, and
     for the waste disposal area, I think it has to be an
     acceptable frequency of a release exceeding a certain amount
     of activity at a particular time.  I think you have to have
     all three of those things:  an acceptable frequency, a given
     amount of activity and at a given time.  You have to
     discount 10,000 years from now to present cost some way if
     you have a cost criterion involved in it.
               So it does -- I think you're exactly right, that
     it impacts on how you -- what you say is an acceptable risk
     and what you define as your risk is the risk of exceeding a
     certain frequency of release at a given time.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  Just for the record, I want to
     disagree with one thing that John said, and that is that
     although I agree with much of what he said about the
     differences, I think that one would have to be careful
     saying that it under no circumstances would be a public
     safety issue, and one of the comments he made was for
     example, we don't drink polluted water today.  This is
     patently untrue if you look on a worldwide basis.  One
     recent example that has made the news is the use of a very -
     - a water supply in Bangladesh by a very large number of
     people, and we know full well that it's contaminated with
     arsenic.
               DR. GARRICK:  And my point there George -- 
               DR. HORNBARGER:  But there's no alternative.
               DR. GARRICK:  My point there, and I've been to
     Bangladesh, and I know that.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  But my point there, though, is we
     have a choice.  We have a choice to not drink that water.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  Yes; the people in Bangladesh
     don't have much of a choice.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well -- 
               DR. HORNBARGER:  That's my point. 
               DR. GARRICK:  We certainly would have a choice to
     not consume radiation contaminated water.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  Well, I mean, it's easy to say
     that the people in Bangladesh don't have to consume that
     water.  The point is they don't have an alternative.  And
     your point is that people in Los Angeles, for example, can
     drink bottled water.  That's fair enough.  So it has to do
     with what you envision the wealth of the society being at
     the time, and that's very hard for us to say with certainty
     that thousands of years from now, people in Nevada would be
     able to drink bottled water.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, I know it's an extreme view,
     but it's a view I make to make a point, and the point is
     that the opportunity exists to prevent it from being a
     problem, whereas maybe if you had the right kind of reactor
     accident, you wouldn't have that kind of opportunity. 
     That's really the only point.
               DR. FLACK:  Okay; so, these, again, are the five
     areas that had come out as areas to be pursued possibly
     using case studies to better understand the regulatory
     process and to develop safety goals as part of that process.
               No other questions, I'll move ahead to the last
     slide I have, follow on activities.
               So we're still digesting all that has come out of
     the workshop, and we still have an open comment period, so
     we're not at the stage where we have a fully-developed plan,
     but that's where we're headed.  As far as follow-on
     activities, we're going to inform the stakeholders and
     solicit comments by issuing a workshop summary with the
     transcripts and making those transcripts available to
     everyone.  I believe we will be getting a copy for the
     committee as well.
               Draft a plan; that would be something that we're
     planning on doing within this fiscal year.  We'll develop a
     plan, draft a plan and then, of course, interact with the
     group, the NMSS steering group and so other stakeholders as
     part of the development of that plan and then to inform the
     Commission and the ACRS, ACNW of the plan and then what the
     next steps will be.  So, we're hoping to have that developed
     as part of this fiscal year.
               So, I would say we're in a stage now where we're
     about to be off and running.  So, with that -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, that's great.  We may have
     time to hear from Mr. Bernero after all.
               DR. FLACK:  Yes, great.
               DR. GARRICK:  But let me, before I do that, make
     sure that the committee is -- doesn't have any pressing
     questions for John.
               [No response.]
               DR. GARRICK:  No; thanks a lot.
               DR. FLACK:  Okay; thank you.
               DR. GARRICK:  It was very helpful.
               DR. FLACK:  I appreciate it.
               DR. GARRICK:  Bob?
               DR. BERNERO:  I promise to be brief; nearly
     impossible.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. BERNERO:  There is a two-page handout that I
     brought a bunch of copies of, and I hope you all have it. 
     The handout, titled a process for risk-informed regulation
     of activities, is intended to amplify the recommendations I
     made at the workshop just discussed on April 25 and 26th,
     and just before I remark on what the handout says, I would
     ask you to recall that 20 years ago, when the reactor safety
     goals were being developed, there was an explicit statement
     in plain language of what the safety objective was, and it
     varied in expression, but it was essentially that the risk
     to those people who lived closest to a reactor would be
     negligible compared to the average risk of accidental death
     or cancer death, and that led to the hierarchy of one-tenth
     of one percent and, you know, what database you're going to
     use, and there's not that much sensitivity, because the
     Commission could have argued for 10 percent, for 1 percent,
     and it chose the very conservative value one-tenth of one
     percent, and I can attest from my own participation in it
     that it chose one-tenth of one percent because available
     risk assessments said yes, that can be met, that strict
     standard.  It was holding the nose to the grindstone,
     really.
               The fundamental point that I try to make with this
     handout is that one needs to start with a plain language
     qualitative statement of the safety goals or objectives, and
     a word of warning:  in the NMSS arena, one has to do this
     unique to the practice, a term often used in material
     regulation as a practice.  That could be radiography; it
     could be bracha therapy; it could be low level waste
     disposal, but it's a practice that involved the disposition
     of radioactive material.
               I suggest in the handout a way to approach the
     statement of objectives for waste disposal, and one of the
     alternatives -- and I've used it before -- no person in
     future should suffer radiation exposure from these wastes
     that we would not find acceptable today.  Now, that's an
     exposure statement.  It could also be couched as a -- or
     couched in risk terms or supplemented by a risk statement,
     and more on that in a moment.
               I suggest that in each arena, there needs to be a
     plain language qualitative statement of objective.  Then,
     one can develop measures of protection, still staying fairly
     close to qualitative language, not yet going into
     quantification, and I suggest, using the example of waste
     disposal, the three measures of protection.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Before you go to that, Bob, you
     have another example in your plain language paragraph: 
     releases from this isolated waste should do no harm to
     anyone.  Doesn't that imply that there will be releases?
               DR. BERNERO:  Oh, yes, definitely.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And we know that that's a fact?
               DR. BERNERO:  Oh, yes, yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  We're not trying to prevent
     those?
               DR. BERNERO:  Yes; there's virtually no guarantee
     of total containment for the what?  Maybe 20 half lives of
     all the isotopes.  You know, we're quibbling about isotopes
     like iodine-129 with semi-infinite half-lives, you know, so
     20 half-lives of iodine-129 is, I don't know, 300 million
     years or something like that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I still think that your second
     example is better, though.
               DR. BERNERO:  Oh, I'm not laying claim to any of
     these, and I point out they don't have the risk terminology. 
     But the three measures of protection that I think are
     expressing the idea I'm trying to develop; the first one is
     the likely, the expected or the predicted release results in
     exposures that are clearly acceptable.  In other words, if
     you decommission a reactor and leave a pile of rubble that
     has detectable or measurable concentrations of
     radioactivity, you are looking for your best estimate, your
     most likely outcome to be clearly acceptable:  no harm.  You
     wouldn't do it otherwise.
               But then, you can go to a second, a risk
     statement, taking careful account of uncertainties in
     modeling, in data, in scenario development that taking those
     uncertainties into account, the estimates to the persons in
     the vicinity will be within the level of public exposure
     risk that we find acceptable today.  Now, there's a little
     trick here:  when you speak of the future exposure, you're
     forced to consider a predicted exposure or the risk of
     exposure, whereas what we find acceptable today is a
     measured as well as a predicted exposure, and that's an
     important difference.
               And then, lastly, the third measure of protection
     I would suggest is that go beyond the risk analysis; probe
     further for weaknesses, whether it's with an importance
     analysis or some other measure, because in waste disposal or
     in other material practices, there are factors that do not
     lend themselves to robust risk assessment.  Radiography, for
     instance, I think you'll hear more about it later; it's so
     crucial to recognize that the individual radiographer is at
     the heart of the problem, and modeling the radiographer and
     his or her behavior is very difficult.
               So the handout goes on into quantitative measures,
     and the first thing I try to point out on the second page;
     you've heard from me before on a ladder of exposures, going
     from the high exposure down or from a low exposure up, and I
     list only four rungs on the ladder here, from 1 millirem to
     1,000 millirem, and the point I'm trying to make is we
     glibly speak in risk assessment -- this is performance
     assessment for waste disposal -- of calculating a mean
     value, taking due account of the uncertainties in data,
     scenarios, models and so forth.  But no one ever speaks of
     the uncertainty in the threshold of acceptability.  There is
     no doubt in my mind people speak of 25 millirem or 15
     millirem or 4 millirem as a threshold of acceptability as if
     to say below that number, I'm happy; I sleep well at night. 
     If it goes above that number, I'm unacceptable; the
     situation is unacceptable.
               That's wrong, and all you have to do is climb the
     ladder one way or the other, and you see that.  The standard
     is uncertain because of the habitual choice of very low,
     conservative numbers that make us talk about what I consider
     indistinguishable things like 25 millirem versus 15 millirem
     versus 4 millirem.  To me, it's 10 millirem.  There is no
     distinction over this order of magnitude.  One should only
     speak in orders of magnitude.
               And so, if you do performance assessment as risk-
     informing, going back to the first three things, the first
     three measures of protection, I would see that as a set of
     findings of acceptability, not excluding the other
     deterministic findings like human intrusion being dealt
     with, things that don't lend themselves to risk assessment. 
     But for the risk information of decisions, the findings can
     be something on the order of measure number one is the best
     estimate; measure number two is the mean value of a good
     performance assessment; and measure number three is the
     suspicious probing for weakness in the analysis, recognizing
     that there is a healthy difference -- I shouldn't say
     healthy -- a substantial difference between what we're
     stating as the standard of acceptability and what we might
     recognize as a standard of tolerability.
               DR. GARRICK:  Is what you mean by number three the
     whole curve?
               DR. BERNERO:  No, it's more than that; it's
     probing the process itself for, you know, I've always
     thought things that can bypass the event tree, that can
     render the systematic analysis weak.  You should be treating
     in the, like, adequacy of site characterization; that's an
     uncertainty that should be treated in a good -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  So it's, in the language of George
     and Tom here, it's the unquantified uncertainty.
               DR. BERNERO:  Yes; yes, the things that you really
     don't feel comfortable handling, and what I'm probing for
     here is some systematic method to probe for weakness and to
     look for the edge of the cliff, because the one thing you
     don't want to do is have an unquantified uncertainty that
     lurks and may likely give you catastrophic results.  I have
     to disagree with you, John, on what you were saying earlier
     about waste disposal about if it leaks, we'll detect it, and
     we can interdict it.
               DR. GARRICK:  I said that option exists.
               DR. BERNERO:  Yes, yes, that option exists, and I
     would argument that in the plan language statement of no one
     in future will suffer exposure or risk or whatever the
     Commission or the regulator would choose to say that there
     has to be a statement of willingness to depend on
     stewardship or monitoring or even budgeting in the future. 
     Right now, I spend a lot of my time looking at the
     Department of Energy's remedial action alternatives, and
     frankly, they're driven by the availability of funds and
     other factors that make it highly desirable that one could
     have passive protection.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes; well, we could debate this for
     a long time, and this is not the place to do that, but the
     point I was making is that it basically is no different than
     the challenge that the human race has of dealing with any
     environment.  There's nothing peculiar about that
     environment.
               DR. BERNERO:  Yes, and you're right in that, John,
     and it's just that in nuclear waste technology, as against
     contaminated waste technology or anything, there has been
     this espousal of an objective to do it passively without
     human intervention for whatever period of time and simply
     assessing at some interval -- 10,000 years or 500 years or
     whatever -- how successful has that been, or how successful
     would we predict that to have been.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  Bob, just a comment.  You used
     the 25, 15 and 4 millirems, and we all know that those
     numbers have some associations, and I would just point out
     that the 4 millirem, if it's interpreted as radionuclide
     specific, may, in fact, be one or two orders of magnitude
     lower than 15 to 25.
               DR. BERNERO:  Yes, yes, if you use ICRP-2 and all
     of that, yes.
               The point I would make on waste disposal, my
     understanding -- I didn't participate or listen, but in the
     Maine Yankee decommissioning, I understand that there has
     been heated debate about whether 25 millirem is sufficiently
     protected vis-a-vis 15 millirem, and that, to me, is
     terminal bottom line disease.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, hasn't the state already put
     their limit on it of 10?
               DR. BERNERO:  Oh, yes, most of the states do at
     10.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. BERNERO:  Yes; South Carolina, New York State,
     and I wasn't, you know, ruling out any.  But the -- I think
     to quarrel about the level of protection provided by 10
     versus 15 betrays that the argument is in the wrong forum,
     you know; the point has been missed.  That's not risk-
     informed.
               DR. KRESS:  Bob, I'm interested in your comment
     about comparing measured risk versus predicted risk as being
     comparing apples and oranges to some extent, and with
     regard, with respect to the high level waste repository, I
     would expect an acceptable risk 1,000 years from now ought
     to be much different than an acceptable risk tomorrow or, I
     mean, 10 years from now.  How do you deal with that in
     acceptance criteria?  How do you factor that kind of time
     consideration into a risk acceptance criteria?
               DR. BERNERO:  It's factored in by the underlying
     assumption that there will be no change in the vulnerability
     of the human body to radiation exposure and also no
     significant change in the ability of medical science to cure
     cancer; that radiation induction of cancer and the relative
     fatality from cancer will not change.  There has been
     substantial change in -- just in my career, I recognize, but
     the fundamental assumption is today's standards will be
     appropriate standards to judge the future.
               Now, as far as oversight is concerned for
     hazardous waste or for radioactives in hazardous waste at
     circla sites, the institutional mechanism is fix it to the
     appropriate standards, and for circla, come back every 5
     years and look at it; for RCRA, come back every 30 years and
     look at it, and we'll talk about it then.  That's a vastly
     different thing.  The only place in radioactive waste that
     we encounter something like that is in the rather bizarre
     case of uranium mill tailings.  If you ever get a chance to
     go look at it, uranium mill tailings are monitored annually
     after site closure with NRC oversight, and people go out
     there with shovels and tree planting to fix them.
               DR. GARRICK:  Bob, it's our fault -- I realize it
     -- but your two minutes are up.
               [Laughter.]
               DR. BERNERO:  Thank you.
               [Pause.]
               DR. RUBIN:  Good morning.  My name is Alan Rubin,
     and Bob is always a hard act to follow, but I'll do my best. 
     I'm a section leader in the probabilistic risk analysis
     branch of the Office of Research, and I've had the pleasure
     and the opportunity to have a number of interactions with
     the ACRS before, but this is my first time to have some
     interactions with ACNW and the joint subcommittee.
               The subject I'll be presenting will be one of the
     applications of PRA for analyzing the risk from dry casks,
     and let me first mention that this is an effort that
     involves a number of participants both in the Office of
     Research and in the spent fuel project office of NMSS.
               DR. KRESS:  Is this on site at reactor plants
     you're talking about?
               DR. RUBIN:  This is on-site storage, dry cask
     storage.
               DR. KRESS:  On-site storage.
               DR. RUBIN:  Dry cask storage, yes; I'll get into
     the scope and the nature of the program as well, Tom.
               The participants, the many participants from the
     Office of Research are myself, Ed Roderick and Chris Rider,
     also in the probabilistic risk analysis branch; Ed Hackett
     in the materials and engineering branch and Charles Tinkler
     in the safety margins and systems analysis branch, and they
     are with us today.
               The time frame that we're in now in developing the
     plan, it's a very good opportunity for us to get feedback
     from this joint subcommittee on our approach to the plan,
     which I will be presenting today, so we welcome this
     opportunity to get your comments.
               For an outline of what I'll be going over, I'll
     first present the objective of the project itself.  I'll go
     over the scope as we see it as well as the major planned
     tasks that are included in the program plan, which will
     include discussion of potential accident initiators; how we
     plan to screen those initiators; looking at various
     initiating event frequencies and sequence frequencies and
     consequence and risk quantification, and I will also discuss
     the present schedule and status of our plan right now and
     overall program.
               We heard presentations earlier this morning at a
     fairly high level, sometimes philosophical level on safety
     goals, and this time, we're going to get into a specific
     application of PRA, and the objective of this risk analysis
     is to do a pilot PRA for a specific spent fuel dry cask
     storage system at a reactor site, and this is a first of a
     kind, and it's got challenges being a first of a kind, which
     we have encountered; we need to overcome some of these
     challenges in carrying out the program.
               In terms of NMSS, what we expect to provide and
     NMSS hopes to get out of this program is to get information
     in several areas, to see whether there's a need to do
     additional site-specific PRAs; to see whether there's a need
     to develop any additional data or methods for doing PRAs for
     dry cask storage and to see whether some additional analysis
     would be required.  And in the longer term, NMSS would like
     to be able to use this information to provide input to the
     safety goal assessment; to risk-informing 10 CFR Part 72 as
     well as for the inspection programs for dry casks.
               [Pause.]
               DR. RUBIN:  The participation in the program
     involves all three divisions in research, and it's a team
     effort:  division of risk analysis and applications has the
     lead for the systematic analysis and integration of the PRA
     as well as coming up with frequency and probabilistic
     assessments; division of engineering technology will
     participate in coming up with analyses and engineering
     assessments of the materials of the multipurpose canister
     and the cask as well as the overpack structure, and I'll
     give a figure later on, a diagram to tell you a little bit
     more about the cask itself and develop some thermal
     analysis.
               Division of systems analysis and regulatory
     effectiveness will provide assessments of the radiological
     release and dose assessment to the public in the event of an
     accident.  It's very important that we coordinate this
     program very closely with the spent fuel project office in
     NMSS, and we've done so up to this point, and we expect to
     continue to do so.  This is in terms of both developing the
     program plan itself as well as carrying out the plan.
               We also anticipate that we may need some
     information from licensees to provide dry cask design or
     operational data, in effect, perhaps some analysis that
     supports some of their information, their safety evaluation
     report.  We expect that we will also need some contractor
     support in the area of human reliability analysis for -- to
     address the handling and transport aspects of transporting
     the fuel and the cask itself and perhaps other additional
     contractor support as well.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So you can do everything else;
     start your thermal analysis, everything except human
     reliability analysis?
               DR. RUBIN:  Well, we know that we may need some
     analysis as well.  It's going to depend on what's available
     from the contractors, from the -- not from the contractor;
     from the analysis already done for design basis accidents
     analyses by the vendor, by the licensee, and see whether we
     can extrapolate that or whether we need to do some
     additional analyses, and we're wrestling through right now
     to see whether we can do that in-house or we'll need
     contractor support.
               DR. GARRICK:  Did you say that some of the same
     team members are involved as were on the spent fuel pool?
               DR. RUBIN:  Yes; that is correct; same names, same
     guilty parties.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               DR. RUBIN:  That's the team.  Let me go over
     what's entailed in the scope of the project, and in the
     recommendation from NMSS, we select the whole tech high
     storm 100s dry cask for analysis for this pilot PRA, and
     that's based in the potential usage of this dark cask as
     well as availability of data that's been submitted in the
     licensee's application.  It's the different modes of the
     analysis, the analysis itself will include handling of the
     fuel and the dry cask; onsite transport, transport of the
     cask to its storage pad as well as the long-term storage
     onsite.  It does not go beyond that; it does not include
     transportation PRA, which has been done separately, separate
     risk assessment for that.
               We will need to select a site, and most likely, it
     will be a generic site such as we've done for the AP600
     reactor design, which should encompass as large as possible
     that number of site characteristics in the country.  We
     don't include all of them, but a large percentage of the
     various characteristics of the site. 
               The types of events that we will consider include
     normal and accident conditions such as -- including design
     basis and beyond design basis accidents; site-related
     phenomena such as earthquakes, flooding, high winds as well
     as man-made incidents that can occur during a handling of
     the cask like cask drops or other handling accidents.
               We also will look at the condition of the fuel in
     the canister itself in the cask; whether there are some
     preexisting fuel failures; the condition of the clad, which
     will factor into the assessment in terms of consequences and
     risk from radiological release from the fuel and from the
     cask.  
               And a real important point that's part of the plan
     is to say how are we going to assess the results?  You know,
     what is the criteria?  We talked about that this morning and
     developed -- and NMSS developing safety goals, whether it be
     the probability of release of radioactive material to the
     environment or radiation-induced latent cancer fatalities to
     the public, and we expect to work very closely in NMSS to
     provide input to specify these measures of success related
     to the safety goals that you've heard discussed this
     morning.
               That's a broad picture of what the scope of the
     program, the PRA, will entail.  For some background; I think
     this sketch will be useful just to see what we're talking
     about.
               DR. GARRICK:  I may have missed something, Al.
               DR. RUBIN:  Okay.
               DR. GARRICK:  Are you calculating radiation-
     induced latent cancer fatalities?
               DR. RUBIN:  If the release aspects include that,
     we may be calculating that.
               DR. GARRICK:  Okay.
               DR. RUBIN:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  All right.
               DR. RUBIN:  Depending on the release, and we may
     get into the meteorology and -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  I see.
               DR. RUBIN:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  So it depends on your source term.
               DR. RUBIN:  That's right.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes; okay.
               DR. RUBIN:  Yes.
               First, the fuel itself is put into this
     multipurpose canister.  The fuel assemblies are inserted in
     that canister.  It holds up to 25 BWR assemblies -- 24 PWR
     assemblies or 64 -- 68 BWR assemblies.  The canister is
     drained of water and pressurized and filled with helium. 
     The purposes are to prevent corrosion of the steel on the
     multipurpose canister itself as well as to enhance heat
     transfer to the canister.  When the canister is inserted,
     the overpack itself -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Why is the called multipurpose?
               DR. RUBIN:  It's just the name given.  It's
     multipurpose because it can be used for storage as well as
     transport.
               The overpack is a large part of the structure. 
     That's approximately a 19-foot high structure, 11-foot
     outside diameter.  It's got an annulus of steel both inside
     and outside that diameters, and it's filled with about 2.5
     feet thick concrete, and the overall weight of this
     structure when filled is about 180 tons.
               In order to promote cooling in the long-term
     during storage, there are inlet and outlet events, four of
     them around the periphery of the multipurpose -- of the
     overpack itself.  So it's all natural circulation vented
     system; no fans, no pumps, no active systems.  It seems like
     a relatively straightforward PRA kind of analysis compared
     to a reactor.  But it's -- even though it seems
     straightforward, this is the first time that it's being
     done.
               And the first step in the program plan is to
     identify the potential accident initiators, and that was
     brought up this morning as an important point.  We want to
     be sure we have as complete as possible set.  We've had
     preliminary discussions with the spent fuel project office
     staff to identify issues that they have thought about, and
     we'll be adding some other issues, potential challenges to
     the functions of the cask leading to a potential release. 
     And I'll get into some of these initiators in my next slide.
               We'll assess the initiators that have been
     identified in other related studies or PRAs and see if
     they're applicable to the dark cask, and we'll include those
     as appropriate.  And it comes down to pretty much
     categorizing the many initiators into their effect on the
     mechanical impact of the cask; the thermal impact and impact
     on criticality and perhaps some others, and for each of
     those accident type initiators, we'll address the various
     system modes, the handling, the onsite transport of the cask
     and storage for the 20-year license of the cask itself.
               To go through these preliminary initiating events
     that we have looked at, I first want to make it very clear
     that many of these events are included in design basis for
     the dry cask, but we need to look for PRA purposes beyond
     design basis types of events, and that's why we're including
     the kinds of events that you see here.  First of all, in the
     categorization of mechanical impacts, we'll be looking at
     handling accidents where the cask could be dropped either
     before or after sealing of the canister, and I should have
     mentioned -- let me go back for a moment -- the canister
     itself. 
               The canister is sealed, and there is an overpack
     seal for the whole dry cask system itself.  So we will be
     looking at potential weld failures of the seal on the
     multipurpose canisters as an example of a failure or release
     path.  As an example for the drop of a cask, the current
     design basis is the cask is designed for a drop height of 11
     inches, right about a foot.  So are there some ways or some
     scenarios where, you know, that height by human error or
     something else could be exceeded?  And those are the kinds
     of things we'll be looking at in the human reliability
     analysis area.
               In transferring the cask, that the cask
     potentially could tip from sudden movements or stop during
     onsite transport; in the storage of the cask, the long-term
     storage, could the cask be hit by a tornado-generated
     missile large enough to impact the cask, knocking it over or
     impact by a truck or an aircraft accident?  Could the cask
     tip over from a seismic event?  That's not mentioned on the
     slide, but it is included in our list of events that we're
     looking at.
               [Pause.]
               DR. HORNBARGER:  So your tornado scenario is the
     cask tipping over rather than being penetrated?
               DR. RUBIN:  Yes, yes; I imagine it would be hard
     to penetrate a steel barrier with two and a half foot thick
     concrete.
               So these external events that we're looking at, by
     the way, are very similar and parallel to that of a reactor
     analysis in an internal, individual plant examination of
     external events program, the IPEEE program.
               DR. HORNBARGER:  Of course, there are reports in
     tornadoes of a piece of straw being driven through concrete
     walls.
               DR. RUBIN:  And it would have to -- we have not
     considered the straw impact on a concrete wall.  We are
     looking for some feedback during this discussion today.
               Thermal air accidents is another area; obviously,
     as I pointed out, the cask has a venting for heat removal. 
     Could there be some scenarios where the high heat load
     assemblies are inadvertently loaded into the cask, having
     higher heat loads that would be anticipated?  In
     transferring the cask onsite, looking at a fire from ignited
     fuel from the transport truck.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I don't understand that.  Can
     you explain that scenario a little bit better?
               DR. RUBIN:  Which one?  The transfer?
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The transfer, yes.
               DR. RUBIN:  The cask is transferred by vehicle to
     the storage pad, and if that vehicle has an accident, and
     it's got a certain amount of fuel in it, what kind of
     thermal loads from the truck -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, the fuel.
               DR. RUBIN:  The truck, the fuel.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh.
               DR. RUBIN:  The gasoline -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
               DR. RUBIN:  -- in the truck, okay?
               All right; and long-term storage, vent blockage,
     perhaps, from flooding, long-term flooding, for example, how
     long that could occur and what temperature conditions would
     then result in the fuel in the assemblies, and what impact
     would that have on the integrity of the fuel in the
     canister?  Look at high ambient temperatures associated with
     a fire; looking at perhaps a fire associated with a crash of
     an aircraft.
               And then, finally, we're including criticality
     events, where, from handling -- the possibility of highly-
     enriched fuel being loaded in a cask or water ingression
     from a flood with a failure of the overpack and a failure of
     the multipurpose canister; flooding and causing criticality,
     perhaps.
               There's a fairly long list, and there are some
     more details that I'm not going into today, but a real
     important part is that we expect in our next step to do a
     screening.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Your event trees will be fairly
     simple.
               DR. RUBIN:  Oh, yes, oh, yes, and that's where
     we're looking at four types of entries, many types -- you
     know, there could be many possible ways that you could
     impact the thermal loading by blocking the vents, anywhere
     from flooding to a bird's nest that's not found for awhile,
     but they basically are all in the same event trees; that's
     right.  We're boiling down a lot of these different types of
     sequences into a short, limited number of event trees.
               And a real important part in the first phase of
     this program is the preliminary screening, the consequence
     analysis.  The purpose of this is to eliminate any
     inconsequential either initiating events from further
     consideration based on the sequence frequencies or the
     release magnitude, and the release magnitude would be based
     on the extent of cask failure, and the purpose of this
     screening study also is to see whether we would need more
     information for some additional, more detailed analysis. 
     And I'll get into this screening study a little more in the
     next slide.
               DR. GARRICK:  Do you have a sense for which
     scenario is going to be your bounding scenario?
               DR. RUBIN:  I mean, my gut feel is that, you know,
     you have a passive cask sitting there that we really need to
     focus on handling the human aspects of the transport.  We
     don't have a bounding scenario right now, but I think that
     scenario where there has not been much done on the human
     reliability of the cask handling, and we intend to look at
     that pretty closely.
               DR. GARRICK:  Thank you.
               DR. RUBIN:  As far as the steps going for the
     screening and preliminary consequence analysis, we are
     identifying and -- the information available to come up with
     the initiating events and the event trees and fault trees. 
     We'll assess the sequence frequency and the consequences on
     a limited basis for screening purposes, and we would
     eliminate any significant sequences from further
     consideration.  There are basically several ways to deal
     with this.  
               MR. RUBIN:  There is basically several ways to
     deal with this, that a given initiating event, the cask
     doesn't fail or the canister doesn't fail, and a third
     screening approach would be, even if there were some kind of
     mechanical failure, would the release have an adverse impact
     on the public?
               Clearly, there's data, there's methods going into
     here.
               We'll have some uncertainty and sensitivity
     analysis that we'd expect would be part of this screening
     study, and as we go along through this, particularly since
     this is a first of a kind, we expect to have interactions
     and peer review and comments as we go along, and it could be
     that, once we're finished with the screening study, we may
     have eliminated a lot of scenarios.
               DR. KRESS:  All of them?
               MR. RUBIN:  I can't tell you now.  Stay tuned.  If
     I know that --
               DR. KRESS:  You're starting out with some sort of
     a measure of what release would be acceptable to you?
               MR. RUBIN:  That's something that, as I mentioned
     earlier, we're going to need to determine with NMSS what
     measure of release.  Do we use the same kind of measure
     that's used for reactors?  Given that there is nothing
     better, we may try that, but I think that's yet to be
     determined.
               If there are some sequences or events that don't
     screen, we would -- the next step would be a more detailed
     frequency quantification for those sequences, fairly
     straightforward looking, first to see what kind of data are
     available, benefits of cost of getting that data, refining
     the event trees and fault trees and computing sequence
     frequencies and sensitivity studies as necessary.
               The purposes for this more detailed analysis would
     be to look at the radiological consequences, the
     calculations for those important sequences that don't
     screen, determine the releases from the cask, the off-site
     consequences, as well as the risk calculations.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You will develop frequency
     consequence curves?
               MR. RUBIN:  Yes.  Come up with overall risk, yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What's DCS, by the way?
               MR. RUBIN:  Dry cask system.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
               DR. KRESS:  You're going to do this on a cask
     basis or you're going to look at the whole --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The size of casks.
               DR. KRESS:  -- storage?
               MR. RUBIN:  We're looking at a site where there
     may be on the orders of tens, fifty, at probably maximum 100
     casks at a site.
               DR. KRESS:  They're all going to undergo the
     accident at the same time.
               MR. RUBIN:  Well, not necessarily, no.  We're
     treating it individually, but if there is some -- a sequence
     that would be a common mode failure, like a seismic event
     tipping over casks, then it would impact more than one --
     potentially could impact more than one cask.
               DR. GARRICK:  But if your screening indicates that
     there is only one scenario that really can result in any
     kind of a consequence problem, does that mean that's what
     you'll analyze, or will you still analyze all the scenarios?
               MR. RUBIN:  No, if we can screen them out, we will
     not continue, no.  Our attempt is to get some results as
     early as we can, you know, with some reasonable information,
     and not do more than is necessary.
               MR. HORN:  What happens if they all screen out?
               MR. RUBIN:  I'd say, then, the next phase doesn't
     -- we stop right there.  We wouldn't have a need for more
     detailed analysis.
               But let me go on.  You're leading into my next
     slide, which is potential additional analyses or assessments
     which may be a followon to this first pilot PRA, looking at
     various fuel conditions such as high burn-up fuel, the
     number of casks at a site, there's a proposal for a private
     spent fuel storage facility in Utah, and looking at various
     cask -- different designs.  That's something that could
     follow on to this.
               We're looking at one specific design for this, the
     Holtec High Storm.  Other designs have different features,
     and we want to be able -- maybe want to be able to see how
     that could impact our screening analyses, for example.
               The final slide is our schedule and the status.
               Where we stand right now -- we've developed a
     draft program plan in Research that we've discussed with
     NMSS, and we're in the process of getting ready to send that
     formally to NMSS.
               The project scope, identifying the site
     characteristics, the design, initiating events, we intend to
     have done in the August timeframe, and we would hope that,
     depending on the available resources and data, to have a
     draft report available in about a year from now on the
     screening assessment, and that depends on the availability
     of data and what kind of information we need as we go along,
     and then any followon, additional sequence calculations
     would need to be determined following the conclusion of the
     screening part of this project.
               That hopefully will give you an overview of what
     our plans are and where we're going.
               DR. GARRICK:  Are you finding anything unique here
     with respect to methodology requirements?  In other words,
     are at a loss for methods for any part of the analysis?
               MR. RUBIN:  I think what we're focusing on -- we
     want to have a complete set of the sequences.  I'd say no, I
     don't think we've met that through the problem, the area,
     but we want to include the sequences and the data.  If
     there's not data, what are we going to do?
               DR. GARRICK:  Yeah.
               MR. RUBIN:  Are we going to do some analyses? 
     We're going to base our assumption on some extrapolation of
     analyses that have already been done for design basis-type
     events?  That's what I see as probably the most resource-
     intensive, as well as the human reliability aspects.
               DR. KRESS:  I think you'll be faced with some of
     the same issues pointed out with the spent fuel pool study,
     what's the source term, how you deal with the fire-driven
     event, and what are the things you don't know about and the
     effects of hydrided clad.
               I think the issues are the same for the cask, plus
     a few more, and that's what do you know about long-term
     deterioration of the cask that may cause internal corrosion
     events like -- driven by moisture and maybe hydrogen that
     gets produced in the process.
               MR. RUBIN:  I should mention at this time, in
     response to that, there are some ongoing related activities
     that Research has in support of NMSS and dry cask.
               Now, the results of those programs -- probably
     most of them will not be available in time for the screening
     study, but for example, the -- looking at -- I think it's
     the Surry cask, fuel in the Surry cask, looking at the
     condition of that fuel, they took an initial, the fuel
     cladding looks fairly good, but they haven't done analyses
     in the fuel cell yet.
               DR. KRESS:  The problem with the screen that I see
     is how do you determine the initiating frequency of a fire
     that's a self-igniting fire?
               MR. RUBIN:  A self-igniting fire is okay.
               DR. KRESS:  You know, I see how you can get more
     of a fuel spill from a truck.  You could probably come up
     with the frequency of that, but a self-ignited fire that may
     be driven by the -- by a change in the heat transfer
     properties of the system so that it overheats to some
     emission temperature that's driven by the hydrided state of
     the fuel -- you know, how do you get a frequency?
               MR. RUBIN:  Well, you have an inert atmosphere. 
     You have helium.  It's a helium-filled canister.
               So, you would have to have a sequence where the
     helium has escaped, you haven't detected it for a long time,
     and there are inspections that go on on storage to look for
     those kinds of things, to look to see if the vents are
     blocked or not.
               DR. KRESS:  It may be driven by the fact that you
     have that helium.
               MR. RUBIN:  Oh, yes.  Oh, yeah.
               DR. KRESS:  Could very well be.
               MR. HORN:  Just for my education, you mentioned
     that the cask drop was 11 inches, but the multi-purpose
     canister is tested at a higher elevation, is it not?
               MR. RUBIN:  Oh, yes, it is.  That's about three or
     four feet.  The transfer cask --
               MR. HORN:  Yeah.
               MR. RUBIN:  Its drop rate is about, I think, 40-
     some-odd inches.  When I said the 11 inches, that was for
     the whole over-pack.
               MR. HORN:  There's also a design basis fire test?
               MR. RUBIN:  Yes, there is, and it's the amount of
     fuel that's in the truck, and the question is if there's
     more than that -- those kinds of things are in the design
     basis, which we already -- you know, that information has
     been provided, at least the results of those analyses have
     been provided to the agency.
               DR. GARRICK:  As long as it's not located next to
     the fuel tanks for the diesel generators, huh?
               MR. RUBIN:  A lot of what-if's.
               DR. GARRICK:  All right.
               Any other questions?
               [No response.]
               DR. GARRICK:  We'll enjoy hearing a progress
     report as you start.
               MR. RUBIN:  Okay.  We intend to keep the joint
     subcommittee informed.
               DR. GARRICK:  Okay.
               DR. KRESS:  Given the status and progress of Yucca
     Mountain, I think this is an important study, because we're
     probably going to have a lot of dry cask storage on-site.
               MR. RUBIN:  And if we need to go into the -- you
     know, the more detailed sequence analysis, that's going to
     take an extended -- probably an extended period of time.
               DR. GARRICK:  Thank you.  Thank you very much.
               MR. RUBIN:  You're welcome.
               DR. GARRICK:  It's a remarkable event, but we're
     on schedule.
               DR. KRESS:  You run a lot tighter meeting than
     George does.
               DR. GARRICK:  George has a lot more patience than
     I have.
               Okay.
               Why don't we adjourn for lunch, then, unless --
     and we're going to reconvene here and discuss protocol as
     soon as we grab a sandwich and bring it back here, 12:15.
               [Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the meeting was
     recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day.]
     .                   A F T E R N O O N  S E S S I O N
                                                      [1:00 p.m.]
               DR. GARRICK:  The meeting will come to order, and
     this afternoon we're going to talk about risk-informing fuel
     cycle programs, etcetera, etcetera, and Mr. Sherr is going
     to take the lead on it, I gather.
               MR. SHERR:  I'm going to give a quick overview on
     the background of the fuel cycle programs for risk-informing
     the regulations, and Dennis Damon, who is now with the NMSS
     work group but until recently has been in FCSS and been an
     integral part of the work that we've been doing in this
     area, will be providing more detailed information.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, what is the definition --
     in the documents I have, there was a very long paragraph
     where one can find the definition of byproduct material, but
     the definition itself was not given.
               DR. GARRICK:  It's in the Atomic Energy Act.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I have to go back to that.  It
     gave me all the paragraphs, but special nuclear materials
     are uranium and plutonium?
               MR. SHERR:  Enriched uranium.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Enriched uranium and plutonium.
               MR. SHERR:  Right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
               MR. SHERR:  And other materials as the Commission
     may determine, which they haven't determined any so far,
     since 1954.
               The major activity that's going on in terms of
     risk-informing activities in the fuel cycle area -- and I
     guess maybe it's worthwhile to just step back a second, when
     we say fuel cycle area, what we mean.
               The regulations and their development would apply
     to essentially the existing fuel cycle fuel fabrication
     facilities.  They will also apply to the plutonium mixed
     oxide facility that's currently planned, and we expect to be
     receiving a license application before too long.  So, those
     are the facilities that are immediately expected to be
     subject to this regulation.
               This rulemaking has been going on for quite a long
     time.  It was initiated at the Commission's request in 1993,
     and we are nearing the final stages.  The final rule package
     is due to the Commission within the next couple of weeks,
     May 15th.
               In fact, when I leave here, I'm going to go back
     and try to get the package out of the office.
               In parallel with this effort is an effort that's
     directed to revising the oversight program, similar to what
     has been done in NRR for the reactor area, and this program
     is also directed to make a more risk-informed perspective in
     terms of the inspection program.
               First slide.
               There's two events that occurred that affect the -
     - significantly the current rulemaking.
               One was in 1986, the Sequoyah Fuels accident, and
     that didn't directly affect this rulemaking other than the
     fact that it raised the issue in terms of is NRC responsible
     for chemical safety as well as radiological safety, and
     there was a lot of discussion about this, congressional
     hearings, and the result of all that was a memorandum of
     understanding between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
     OSHA which limited NRC's responsibilities in terms of
     responsibility for chemical consequences and protecting
     against them but, at the same time, identified certain
     responsibilities.
               This rulemaking addresses those responsibilities,
     and later on, when Dennis is talking about the performance
     requirements of the rule, you'll see how it does that.
               DR. GARRICK:  It should be pointed out, of course,
     that this UF-6 release fatality was not a radiation
     fatality.
               MR. SHERR:  No, that's right, and that was the
     controversy at the time, which agency should have done
     something about this type thing, and there was a lot of
     different views on that and a lot of pointing different
     directions.
               In 1991, there was a near criticality incident at
     one of the fuel fabrication facilities, and following that,
     there was a significant review that was conducted, and a lot
     of problems were identified with the way safety programs
     were being implemented at facilities.
               It wasn't that they were inadequate, but one
     didn't have the confidence that they were always going to be
     maintained.
               Basically, the fuel cycle licensing approach was
     done on a renewal-to-renewal basis, and whatever changes
     happened to the safety program between renewals was outside
     the oversight of NRC, and how well there was control in
     between time varied depending on the specific circumstances,
     and the particular situation at the facility where they had
     the near criticality incident, there was a case where
     controls were changed, and so, there was a clear need for
     better configuration management.
               As I said, in 1993, the Commission -- after a few
     other things were done, the Commission said it's time to
     pursue a rulemaking at essentially -- they didn't use these
     terms in those days but essentially with a focus on the
     conduct of an integrated safety analysis which had as part
     of that -- as I say, they didn't use this terminology, but
     risk-informed, performance-based rule.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, at that time, I guess, the
     terminology was different, too, because today we would not
     say increased confidence in margin of safety, we would
     simply want some risk acceptance criteria, wouldn't we, Tom? 
     That's really what it means.  If you are quantifying risk,
     you want some risk goals.
               MR. SHERR:  Yeah.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.
               MR. SHERR:  Yeah.  And that's exactly what the
     rule does, and that will be a significant part of the
     presentation as you -- if you've looked ahead in any of the
     view-graphs, we'll be discussing those risk goals.
               But the integrated safety analysis is essentially
     a systematic review of the hazards and a means for
     identifying controls.
               I brought with me the definition.  I'm not sure
     it's in any of the material that you have, and it's defined
     in the proposed rule as a systematic analysis to identify
     facility and external hazards and their potential for
     initiating accident sequences, the potential accident
     sequences, their likelihood and consequences, and the items
     relied on for safety.
               So, basically, it's a systematic safety analysis
     where it simultaneously considers the radiological nuclear
     criticality, fire, and chemical safety hazards.
               DR. GARRICK:  What is that you're defining?
               MR. SHERR:  Integrated safety analysis.  That's a
     inherent part of the whole rule and the focus.
               From the -- just to give a little -- I'm not sure
     how familiar you are with the fuel cycle industry as
     compared to the reactor part of the industry, but it's
     worthwhile to note two significant differences between the
     fuel cycle and the reactor area.
               One is that the fuel cycle facilities have diverse
     processes.  The equipment varies from facility to facility. 
     It's not where, if you've gone to one reactor of one type,
     it's pretty much the same as the next one in terms of
     general equivalence-type thing.
               The other thing is that it's a less contained
     environment.
               There are a lot more administrative actions and,
     accordingly, administrative controls that are involved as
     compared to engineering controls, and these things affect
     both the database that might be available in terms of
     equipment reliability, as well as the ability to quantify
     the effectiveness of controls, the administrative controls.
               Next slide, please.
               In terms of the major elements of the rule, as we
     mentioned, the focal point of the rule is the requirement
     for licensees to conduct an integrated safety analysis,
     which we referred to as ISA.
               As I mentioned, the integrated safety analysis
     essentially identifies the accident sequences of concern,
     and for each one of those accident sequences, identifies the
     items relied on for safety that will either prevent that
     accident from happening or to sufficiently mitigate its
     consequences so it is reduced in terms of the level of
     concern.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, how is the ISA different
     from a PRA?
               MR. SHERR:  Well, I think, in overall concept,
     it's the same, and in fact, PRA -- a PRA is one example of a
     methodology that could be used, and using event trees is
     certainly what we would expect for complex processes, and I
     think the biggest difference -- and this will be an issue
     that Dennis will be talking about later -- has to do with
     the degree of quantification that we expect from the
     process.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  In order to avoid the
     proliferation of terms, why can't we just call it, then, a
     PRA and then define different types of scope where in some
     instances perhaps you don't want to go into detailed
     quantification and in others you do?
               I mean we already have level one, two, and three
     for reactors which are PRAs of different scope.  One stops
     at the core damage event, the other proceeds to containment,
     and the third one is, you know, the full PRA with risk
     estimates.
               MR. SHERR:  Yeah.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think it would be important to
     harmonize terminology, don't you think?
               MR. SHERR:  Well, this terminology has been used
     in the fuel cycle area now for quite a number of years.  A
     number of licensees already have license conditions to be
     conducting ISAs.
               They're not geared to any particular performance
     standards that the rule would establish, but that's an open
     question, I guess.
               DR. GARRICK:  What you're really saying is that
     the ISA can be -- can embrace either a deterministic
     approach or a probabilistic approach.  Is that right?
               MR. SHERR:  Well, it can use quantifiable ways of
     assessing likelihood or less quantifiable ways of assessing
     likelihood, and as I was saying, Dennis is going to be
     addressing that particular aspect, and I think that's the
     major difficulty in dealing with the fuel cycle facilities,
     is that it's much more difficult to do a quantified safety
     analysis.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But then if you don't do that,
     how can you demonstrate that you have increased confidence
     in the margin of safety?  What metric would you use for the
     margin of safety, or will it be qualitative and say, gee, I
     have an extra barrier, so I have increased confidence?  Is
     that really what it is?
               MR. SHERR:  Dennis?
               We're skipping into the more detailed part of the
     presentation.
               MR. DAMON:  Well, my own impression about the
     increased margin of confidence and safety is not really the
     assessment of risk.
               It is the fact that the knowledge both of the
     plant staff and of the NRC staff as to what actually you
     have in the way of a safety design was not very complete,
     not well documented, not analyzed systematically.
               Consequently, if you ask somebody the question,
     what is the risk of this facility, they say, well, I think
     it's okay, but I'm not very confident.
               It's the second order of uncertainty.  The word
     "uncertainty" has been mentioned many times here.  It's the
     uncertainty level that was high.
               DR. GARRICK:  It sounds like what you're
     attempting to do here is to provide more flexibility in the
     rule than you think would be provided if you used the words
     "PRA."
               MR. SHERR:  That's true.
               MR. DAMON:  Right.  Because the rule, as you will
     see, is mandating things.  It's not like PRA has been used
     elsewhere as a form of information for guidance.  It's a
     requirement that they do certain things.
               DR. GARRICK:  Clearly, a PRA would be an
     acceptable ISA.
               MR. DAMON:  Yes.
               MR. SHERR:  Clearly.
               DR. GARRICK:  I'm with George.  I don't quite
     understand why we went in that direction, but I'm not sure
     wed can do much about that at this point, and I am
     sympathetic a little bit, because this evolved with time,
     before probabilistic analyses was really a part of the
     process.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That reminds of the individual
     plant examination situation, where, when the generic letter
     was published in 1988, they deliberately avoided the word
     "PRA," because some people were arguing that you could do
     this, you could identify the vulnerabilities using other
     ways, other methodologies.
               Now, six, seven years later, we got all the IPEs,
     and there wasn't a single one that did not use PRA.  So, the
     reality of it was that, really, the generic letter asked for
     a PRA, at least a level one PRA.
               Is that correct, Tom?
               DR. KRESS:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Your impression, too?
               So, why perpetuate these things?
               There is some fear, I guess, when it comes to PRA,
     that people will have to produce an 11-volume document with
     all the details in reactors.
               I mean if you don't have a system that has the
     highly redundant and diverse systems of a nuclear power
     plant, your PRA will be much simpler, but it will be a PRA.
               I mean the reason why those event trees go around
     the room is that, in reactors, you have all these, you know,
     redundancies and opportunities for operators to intervene
     and do things and so on.
               If you didn't have those, then maybe one page
     would be enough.
               But it's a matter of scope.
               You know, I appreciate the fact that, you know,
     these words have been used already in the regulations, but
     at some point we have to start creating some harmony.
               DR. GARRICK:  What I guess you're telling us is
     that integrated safety analysis is more of a process than a
     prescriptive analytical activity.
               You don't -- we'd get real concerned if it was so
     prescriptive that it was something very different from a PRA
     or precluded a PRA being an acceptable form or an acceptable
     interpretation of an integrated safety analysis, but it
     sounds like you've accommodated that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  In some instances, the way I
     understand it, the ISA would allow you not to calculate the
     consequences, just scenarios, and in other instances, it
     would not even ask you to produce probabilities, but in
     other words, you take the complete triplet, and instead of
     subtracting things, for some reason, which remains to be
     determined --
               DR. GARRICK:  That's why they call it safety and
     not risk.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.  But the idea is there. 
     It's the same thing, really.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yeah.
               MR. DAMON:  Part of the reason why there's a
     difference in terminology is historical, the methodology of
     all -- not from NRC groups but from the chemical industry.
               DR. GARRICK:  Right.  We understand that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But even when they borrowed our
     PRA, they called it QRA.
               MR. HORN:  Maybe we could introduce that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.
               MR. SHERR:  The ISA guidance document that has
     been developed weighs heavily on the chemical industry
     guidance document for hazards analysis, which, as you say,
     includes a broad spectrum of specific approaches.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But again, you know, let's not
     be in awe of that.  The truth of the matter is we're ahead
     of them when it comes to safety issues.  I mean that's the
     truth.  We are actually quantifying risk.
               So, the fact that the chemical industry is doing
     that doesn't mean anything to me.
               DR. GARRICK:  I think we ought to hear out their
     story, and I have some of the same anxieties, but I believe
     history has put us where we are, and to try to undo it would
     be quite difficult.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I appreciate your position.  I'm
     just saying that maybe it's time we started thinking --
               DR. GARRICK:  I'd feel much better if, everywhere
     I see ISA, I can put PRA.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, as long as we understand
     that the scope may be different depending on the situation.
               DR. GARRICK:  Because it's not risk-informed if we
     don't deal with the triplet, as George says.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's right.
               DR. GARRICK:  Okay.
               MR. SHERR:  So, the ISA identifies the basic
     controls that are either going to prevent or mitigate --
     prevent the accidents or mitigate their consequences, and in
     addition, the rule requires the facilities to maintain
     management measures that ensure that the items relied on for
     safety are, in fact -- will be, in fact, available and
     reliable, and essentially, the bottom line of the rule says
     that the results of your ISAs has to demonstrate that the
     performance to the requirements of the rule be satisfied.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, let's see now what that
     means.  Are you going to talk about it later?
               MR. SHERR:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
               MR. SHERR:  Very shortly.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's too prescriptive.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, one of the things I notice in
     the material that we were supplied, which was the rule,
     etcetera, it says that -- and maybe we don't need to go
     through all of this -- there are four major steps in
     performing an ISA, and to deal with one of the questions
     that George raised, step number three says determine the
     consequences of each accident that has been identified for
     an accident with consequences at a high or intermediate
     level, as defined in the regulation, the likelihood of such
     an accident must be shown to be commensurate with the
     consequences as required in 10 CFR 70.61.
               So, you've got it all mixed in here, which even
     makes more for the case of why ISA, why not just PRA, but
     anyway, I think we understand where you're going.
               MR. SHERR:  Well, I think the important thing is -
     - I mean without regard to what we've called the terminology
     -- is that the performance requirements are in terms of
     risk.  They're saying the risk needs to be limited, and as
     Dennis will be going into more detail, we've identified two
     categories, high consequence and intermediate consequence
     events, and essentially the requirements for high
     consequence events -- they have to be highly unlikely, and
     intermediate consequence is unlikely, and those terms are
     not defined in the regulation, they're discussed in the SRP,
     and again, that's part of the detail.
               DR. KRESS:  What do you do with the consequence
     events that are in between those two?
               MR. SHERR:  That are below those?
               DR. KRESS:  Fifty rems.
               MR. SHERR:  They're mutually exclusive.
               DR. KRESS:  Oh, I see.
               MR. SHERR:  But it's just a question of what's
     below those levels, and that's treated as part of Part 20
     requirements.
               Part 20 still comes into play.  This is only
     dealing with the accident.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What's the limit for workers at
     reactors?  Is it 100 rem?  It's 25, isn't it?  Five rem. 
     So, why is this 100?
               Let's go back to the --
               MR. SHERR:  Actually, Dennis skipped ahead here.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.  Dennis doesn't know us
     very well.
               Okay.
               So, for workers, it's 100 rem or more.  I don't
     understand that.  Must be highly unlikely.
               MR. DAMON:  These are accident risks.  I mean the
     5 rem is an occupational dose.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, so, this is accident.
               MR. DAMON:  These are accidents.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, you are requiring, then,
     accidents that lead to this dose to be highly unlikely. 
     Okay.
               DR. KRESS:  Now, suppose I have an accident that's
     projected to cause 1,000 rems.  Is my definition of highly
     unlikely the same as for 100 rems?
               MR. SHERR:  Theoretically, yes.
               DR. KRESS:  That seems a little strange to me.
               DR. GARRICK:  It's highly, highly unlikely.
               DR. KRESS:  I would want some gradation in that.
               MR. DAMON:  That's a good question which I don't
     think could be answered outside of a court of law.
               What I did in the Standard Review Plan when it
     came to that exact point is I said, because that upper
     category is open-ended on the upper sign, that whatever
     guideline -- the guidelines that were developed in the
     Standard Review Plan as to how to judge whether something is
     highly unlikely or not were addressed to the typical type of
     accident that would occur in that group, but it made a
     warning statement that if your accident is substantially
     above or below this typical case, then the likelihood has to
     be scaled accordingly.
               DR. KRESS:  So, you did deal with that as
     qualitative.
               MR. DAMON:  Yes.
               So, I'm claiming, as a member of the staff, that I
     can interpret that in a flexible way.
               Now, whether that would stand up, you know, I
     don't know.
               DR. KRESS:  That looks like a bit of a problem to
     me.
               MR. DAMON:  It was considered early on as to
     whether to put additional categories, but then you get into
     the thing and you'd end up having some kind of complementary
     cumulative distribution in the rule or something.
               DR. KRESS:  Well, I'm not so sure that's a bad
     idea.  You know, that might be a good way to cover the whole
     spectrum.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, what's the third category? 
     Is there a category -- we have highly unlikely, unlikely,
     and expected?
               MR. DAMON:  What Ted was saying is, if you look at
     the criteria for unlikely, you could be below that.  You
     could have an accident that produced effects below that, and
     that accident is not addressed by the requirement that's
     stated here, it's just left, and that's actually a risk-
     informed aspect of this.
               There was a deliberate decision that accidents at
     that level weren't worth the effort to impose a requirement
     to analyze.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What is the dose limit for
     routine activities?  Is that five?  For workers.  Okay.
               MR. DAMON:  So, there is a window there.     
               MR. MARKLEY:  George, this is that special planned
     exposure category that I was telling you about this morning,
     25 rem or better.
               MR. SHERR:  The last overview point was just the
     fact that, when this rule goes into effect, the completion
     of the integrated safety analyses and implementation of the
     controls at the facilities to satisfy the performance
     requirements will need to be implemented within four years
     of the rule is published, which we're hoping will be late
     this summer.
               And with that, I'm going to let Dennis then go
     into the more detailed parts of the performance
     requirements.
               MR. DAMON:  My name is Dennis Damon.  As Ted
     mentioned, I, up until recently, worked for him in this area
     and other areas, and now I'm in the NMSS risk group,
     addressing risk-informed regulation.
               DR. GARRICK:  We've heard of that.
               MR. DAMON:  Again, the purpose of this -- doing an
     ISA is not the same as a risk assessment.  It is a
     regulatory mechanism, as opposed to an attempt to assess
     what the risk is.
               It's an attempt to induce the licensees to do
     systematic safety analysis, identify what they're relying on
     for safety, and make a determination that it's adequate, and
     it's based on the OSHA process hazard analysis concept
     that's been implemented in their domain and for which they
     have about 100,000 licensees which they require do this type
     of analysis, and it's mostly qualitative.
               Occasionally, people will do what is a PRA, and
     these -- so, the attempt to bring a risk structure into this
     ISA is to specifically ask that consequences and likelihood
     be addressed separately and in the manner that it's
     described here, and that is to ask that all the accidents
     identified in the ISA -- that the consequences be calculated
     and determine whether they are -- in which one of these
     categories they are, below unlikely, unlikely or -- these
     are also referred to as intermediate consequence and high
     consequence.
               So, the accidents that are identified are going to
     be determined to be in one of these categories by
     quantitative calculation, but then, likelihood -- we do not
     expect the current licensees to, in general, quantify
     likelihood when they take the next step, which is to
     determine whether it's highly unlikely or not.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You do not expect them to
     quantify it.
               MR. DAMON:  We do not.
               One of the reasons the word "PRA" wasn't used -- I
     mean it's used in the Standard Review Plan.  There's a
     statement in there that it is one acceptable way of doing
     things, of meeting the rule, but the licensees vigorously
     resisted.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Do you think that people will
     have a common understanding of what a highly unlikely
     sequence is?
               MR. DAMON:  No, and that's why, in the Standard
     Review Plan, I attempted to provide some guidance to our
     staff reviewers and, indirectly, to the industry as to what
     we believe.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I don't remember that.  Can you
     give me some idea of where that guidance is?
               MR. DAMON:  The Standard Review Plan is -- it's
     not here.
               Along with the rule, there's a Standard Review
     Plan for reviewing the license application or an ISA summary
     when it comes in, and in there, there's a chapter on ISA. 
     Chapter three is on ISA.
               In that chapter, it will have -- it has acceptance
     criteria for likelihood.
               In other words, there will be a likelihood
     evaluation done by the licensees as a required element of
     the ISA.
               So, they will submit what they think highly
     unlikely means, and in the Standard Review Plan chapter, it
     says what we think it means.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, is there a place where it
     says clearly highly unlikely is this?
               MR. DAMON:  If you look --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.
               MR. DAMON:  -- in the slides --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, yeah, you are quantitative,
     on 3.0-28.  Highly unlikely, a frequency of less than 10 to
     the minus 5 per accident per year.  So, with tears in your
     eyes, you're back to PRA.
               MR. DAMON:  Yes.  Yes, that's right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And then unlikely is a frequency
     of less than 10 to the minus 2 but more frequent than 10 to
     the minus 5 and not unlikely -- I guess that's likely -- is
     more frequent than 10 to the minus 2.  So, you are becoming
     quantitative.
               MR. DAMON:  Yes, right.  There's quantitative
     guidance in there, and in fact, in the section -- the more
     recent version of the Standard Review Plan is slightly
     different than what's there, because it was recognized that
     the number of accident sequences that are identified in
     these ISAs is under the control of the analyst, he can
     partition his trees more finely or more coarsely, and so, to
     preclude playing games with what's the frequency per
     accident sequence, which is the way the rule is stated --
     the rule is explicitly stated, it's each event must be
     highly unlikely, and so, to preclude that game-playing, the
     guidance says that you divide by the total number of
     accidents in the entire industry to figure out what's an
     acceptable number.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Divide by the total number of
     accidents?
               MR. DAMON:  You can imagine all the different ways
     you could do this, and I thought of them, and there's no
     easy solution to the situation of proposing a risk goal
     unless you do it cumulatively, and then you have to be
     quantitative.
               DR. GARRICK:  It seems that we are kind of playing
     games here.
               It seems, by the time you do a good job of
     answering the questions that you're asking in the rule, you
     have built the basis for a risk curve.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's correct.
               DR. GARRICK:  You have your CCDF.  All you need to
     do now is decide what the uncertainties are.
               But it's kind of strange that we're in this
     situation where we have to dance around PRA so much because
     of the stigma associated with it, or for some other reason,
     and call it other things.
               There's no way you're going to be able to
     convincingly analyze a chemical plant and answer these
     questions without essentially having the critical points on
     a CCDF, is there?
               MR. DAMON:  Well, I tend to agree that, in many
     cases, you will look at a case that's being analyzed and you
     won't be able to decide, you know, whether it's highly
     unlikely or unlikely without doing something quantitative,
     but --
               DR. GARRICK:  I also get very nervous when we
     start talking about separating consequences from likelihood.
               Most times when we do that, we get in trouble,
     because we get consequences out there which people pick up
     as if they're not unlikely, and the one advantage of a risk
     form for the results is that you can't do that.  The risk is
     -- combines the two and forces consideration of them in
     combination.
               But anyway, we're a bit late in our commentary on
     this.
               But it does have some underlying problems that
     indicate that there's still a long ways to go in the whole
     arena of risk communications before we can make the
     transition that is a clear algorithm for becoming risk-
     informed.
               MR. DAMON:  They do, in fact, use PRA on fuel
     cycle facilities in Europe.
               DR. GARRICK:  I know.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Where?
               DR. GARRICK:  In Europe.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, even here.  I was reviewing
     some PRAs that were done for DOE 10 or 15 years.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yeah, DOE did a PRA on the ICPP, the
     chemical reprocessing plant.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It was a PRA.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes, it was a bona fide PRA.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  John, you said we are late. 
     What stage is this at now?
               You're sending it up when?
               MR. SHERR:  We've gone through the proposed rule
     process, and the rule is due to the Commission May 15th. 
     The final rulemaking package is due to the Commission May
     15th.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You've been through the public
     comment period and everything?
               MR. SHERR:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Wow.  Why are we involved so
     late?  We don't exist before.  Did the ACNW have a chance to
     review it?
               DR. GARRICK:  No.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No?
               MR. HORN:  I suppose we all had a chance to review
     it if it was out for public comment, but we didn't do it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, that's something for us to
     discuss.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes, I think so.
               Carry on.
               MR. DAMON:  This is one point that should be made. 
     The jurisdiction of the NRC is restricted to certain things. 
     Not all chemical accidents are within our jurisdiction to
     address in this rule, so it's only certain things.
               The ISA -- the rule defines this term, "item
     relied on for safety," and it's important to recognize why
     the different terminology was chosen.  It's because most of
     the things relied on for safety in these plants are
     procedural.  They're what we call administrative controls. 
     There is hardware involved, but it's usually hardware
     operated by somebody.
               DR. GARRICK:  But Dennis, is the NRC worried about
     anything other than radiation risk?
               MR. DAMON:  Yes, chemical death or health effects
     due to chemicals.
               DR. GARRICK:  I know they are, but I mean really. 
     The foundation of the regulations --
               MR. DAMON:  In these plants, yes.  Like Ted was
     saying, the only person that's been killed in an NRC plant
     regulated in the fuels materials area was a chemical death.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.
               MR. DAMON:  And so, we are concerned about it for
     that reason.
               There are many different things that could go
     wrong and kill somebody in the plant.   
               MR. MARKLEY:  Even the radioactive materials are
     more chemically toxic than they are radioactively in a lot
     of cases.
               MR. DAMON:  So, it is a real concern.  We've hired
     chemical engineers and chemists and we're seriously
     concerned about chemical safety in these plants for the
     things within our jurisdiction.
               Of course, the other radiological hazard is having
     a criticality event, which is -- you know, in light of
     Tokai-Mura, that's a real thing, too.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Do these ISAs exist now?  Have
     they done them?
               MR. DAMON:  Yes.  There six, seven fuel cycle
     facilities.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  They have done these ISAs?
               MR. DAMON:  What happened was the staff attempted
     to get -- when it was determined that they wanted the
     licensees to do them the staff tried to get the licensees to
     do it without a rule, and some agreed to do them and some
     point blank refused.  So, some have done them.
               Only one of them has really done it to near
     completion, and that's BWXT, which is a naval fuel
     fabricator.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And that will be submitted to
     you or has been submitted?
               MR. DAMON:  It has been submitted, but it's been
     disguised.
               It was submitted as what's called a Chapter 15 of
     their license application, which is a description of their
     plan, but it actually is a summary of their ISA.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I wonder whether a way around
     the problem we're facing here is to recommend to the
     Commission to issue a -- can they issue generic letters in
     this area and ask for identification of vulnerabilities and
     let the industry then discover by itself that they really
     need a PRA?    
               MR. MARKLEY:  That's what they did with 88-20,
     George.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  For reactors.    
               MR. MARKLEY:  Yeah.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, what I'm saying is would it
     make sense to recommend something like this here, because
     unless you do it, you will never be convinced that you need
     a PRA.
               So, you will ask them to identify vulnerabilities
     and let them do it any way they like, and eventually they
     will all do a mini-PRA.
               Then we will not try to derail this.
               DR. GARRICK:  Just as a matter of curiosity, do we
     have a sense of the scope of the six or seven ISAs?  Are
     these --
               MR. DAMON:  Yes.  I mean I'm familiar with how
     much they've done.
               DR. GARRICK:  Are these 10 man-year studies or one
     man-year studies or what are they?
               MR. DAMON:  I would say that the BWXT one is
     easily up in the 10 man-year category, and most of the rest
     of them will be approaching that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Is it because they are doing it
     for the first time?
               MR. DAMON:  I think it's a couple reasons.
               One of them is the number of processes for which
     you have to do analysis.
               Instead of a single machine, you know, reactor
     that's basically a fairly simple machine, they have -- like
     a typical plant might have 100 different processes, and each
     one of them is a unique piece of machinery that has its own
     design and own safety design.
               So, just the sheer number of things they have to
     analyze is one factor.
               The other one is that they -- you have to do it
     with a team -- a chemical expert, a criticality expert, a
     PRA-type expert.
               By the time you're done, you've got four or five
     people sitting there working on this simultaneously.  So, it
     tends to be expensive.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I wonder whether this
     subcommittee should actually spend a day on these things.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, what I was thinking, George,
     before we go too far on this, it might be very constructive
     for us to get a presentation on one or two of these ISAs --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's what I mean.
               DR. GARRICK:  -- a specific presentation of an ISA
     and to get a more in-depth sense of just the nature of the
     analysis and the depth of the analysis.  That's something we
     may want to talk about.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.
               MR. DAMON:  I thought about that before I came
     here.  I thought about bringing slides that showed some of
     the -- extracted from some the existing ones, but they're
     all -- they're classified as proprietary information, so
     we'd have to address that somehow.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yeah.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Won't be the first time.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yeah.  Right.
               MR. DAMON:  Yeah, I agree.
               DR. GARRICK:  What about the naval facility?
               MR. DAMON:  It's quite easy to find stuff that's
     not classified.  It's just they'd have to pick ones that
     didn't have anything that they didn't want their competitors
     to know about, maybe.
               DR. GARRICK:  Right.  Well, I happen to know that
     a few pieces of the Sequoyah Fuels facility was analyzed on
     a probabilistic basis.  So, there's pieces and parts of
     probabilistic fuel cycle analysis around.
               MR. DAMON:  Right.  For example, the NFS facility
     in Irwin, Tennessee, a few years ago -- they wanted a
     license amendment to have a process for down-blending
     highly-enriched uranium down to reactor levels of
     enrichment, and that's a hazardous operation, because
     normally the way you assure safety is to make the geometry
     of the piping and vessels small enough so that the high-
     enriched won't go critical.
               Well, they wanted to do it in a way where
     eventually they're going to get to a geometry that would be
     critical if they were high-enriched.
               So, it was such a touchy thing -- they did a
     quantitative PRA of that process design, but see, a lot of
     these processes, the safety design is so incredibly simple
     that even calling it an analysis is hard to do.
               For example, like at BWXT, they fabricate metal
     reactor cores for submarines, and the fabrication processes
     are working with a big machine shop, they work with big
     pieces of metal, and the typical way they assure criticality
     safety is simply to have a rack that holds only so many
     piece parts at a certain spacing, and that's what they work
     out of.
               They take the piece out of the rack, they work
     with it, they put it back in the rack, and the rack is -- it
     would probably take, you know, 10 times that much or six
     times as much as in the rack to be capable of being critical
     if you took it out of the rack and assembled it into a form.
               So, it's just a sheer safety margin and the way
     they work with things that they control criticality.  As
     long as people that are working there follow the rules, they
     are very, very far from criticality, and so, you can see
     it's a lot of human reliability, is what it is.
               DR. GARRICK:  I think one of the things that would
     make a lot of us feel a lot better -- and I've read this to
     some extent but not in great detail, because it's awfully
     thick -- I'm talking about the rule -- is that if there was
     more made of the fact that a PRA is an acceptable and
     established approach for carrying out the integrated safety
     analyses, the fact that that was totally, from what I read,
     excluded, I think, is a missed opportunity.
               MR. DAMON:  Well, it certainly -- in the Standard
     Review Plan, it's quite clear that it's not only an
     acceptable way, it's -- in the area of identifying
     accidents, there are statements made that, for a complex
     process, fault trees should be used.
               I mean our experience in reviewing the parts of
     ISAs that have been submitted is that some of the licensees
     attempt to analyze a system that clearly calls for fault
     tree by a more simplistic technique that is too vague and
     does not really explain what accidents can occur in the
     process, and so, we have made it -- tried to make it clear
     in the guidance that that's what's called for, and in fact,
     NUREG 1513, which is the ISA guidance document -- it has a
     flow chart in for selecting methodologies that would drive
     one to choose a fault tree for an appropriate complex
     process.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Do we have this NUREG?
               MR. SHERR:  It's part of the proposed rule
     package.
               DR. GARRICK:  The guidance document.
               MR. DAMON:  ISA guidance.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The NUREG is here?
               MR. SORENSON:  It's in that package I sent you.
               MR. DAMON:  So, there's two guidance documents. 
     Actually, there's three, which I was going to get to.
               There's the ISA guidance document, which primarily
     addresses the overall architecture of an ISA and how you --
     and all the different methods for identifying accidents,
     like fault trees, event trees, what-if analysis, different
     things.
               Then there's the Standard Review Plan, with an ISA
     chapter.  That has acceptance criteria in it and suggested
     format for presenting results.
               The other one is NUREG 6410, which is the accident
     analysis handbook, which is consequence evaluation methods
     for fuel cycle facilities, both chemical and radiological.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  There is something that is not
     clear to me.
               You mentioned that there is certain guidance in
     the Standard Review Plan, so at least, you know, the
     licensees will know where the stuff is coming from.
               Isn't that the job of a regulatory guide?  The
     Standard Review Plan is for internal use.  Is there a
     regulatory guide here?   
               MR. MARKLEY:  The Standard Review Plan is publicly
     available, George.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It is publicly available.  
               MR. MARKLEY:  The NUREG is available for the
     licensees' use.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  How come there is no regulatory
     guide?
               MR. SHERR:  Historically, we have had a standard
     format and content guide as a companion document to the
     Standard Review Plan, and the decision was made at some
     point that, in many respects, those two documents are
     redundant and that the standard format and content guide
     doesn't provide as much detailed information.
               So, basically, the Standard Review Plan is also --
     serves also as a standard format and content guide.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Does NMSS issue regulatory
     guides?
               MR. SHERR:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But in this case, the Standard
     Review Plan really plays that role.
               MR. SHERR:  Yes.
               MR. DAMON:  Yes.  That was an explicit decision. 
     I remember when they made it.  They said, you know, we're
     going to make the -- in fact, it's just a general policy not
     to try to do this type of guidance with regulatory guides
     but to either do it -- it's either in the Standard Review
     Plan or it's a NUREG, one of those two.
               MR. SHERR:  The Standard Review Plan has been in
     development for about as long as the rule has been in
     development, since '93, and it was published as part of the
     proposed rule, and in fact, we received more comments on the
     Standard Review Plan than we received on the rule itself.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If it's been in development
     since 1993, how come it hasn't been reviewed internally by
     the ACNW?  This is a rule.    
               MR. MARKLEY:  I can't tell you how many iterations
     it's gone through, George, and certainly I wasn't party to
     the ACNW deliberations.  I don't know what has happened and
     what hasn't and when the opportunities were and weren't. 
     You might ask some other players where that occurred.
               DR. GARRICK:  Are you aware of anything, Rich?
               MR. MAJOR:  I'm not aware of anything.  The ACNW
     has not focused on fuel cycle facilities, especially fuel
     fabrication plants.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I see.
               DR. GARRICK:  Our charter has changed.  Our
     charter certainly includes such facilities, and so, we're
     not maybe keeping up with due process here.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
               DR. GARRICK:  But I am struck by the fact that,
     when I look at SECY 99-147 and I look at the background
     paragraph that talks about a near criticality incident,
     etcetera, etcetera, has prompted the NRC to evaluate its
     safety regulations for licensees that possess and process
     large quantities of special nuclear material and so on and
     so forth.
               The staff concluded that, to increase confidence
     in the margin of safety at a facility possessing this type
     and amount of material, a licensee should perform an
     integrated safety analysis, and then it goes on to say what
     an ISA is, and no reference really to risk assessment in the
     traditional sense.
               So, this obviously has a chemical heritage to it,
     and is quite separate from picking up on the NRC legacy of
     advancing towards a risk-informed regulatory practice that
     has been largely influenced by, to be sure, reactor
     applications and more recently, performance assessment
     applications of nuclear waste.
               So, this middle ground here of large fuel cycle
     facilities, fuel facilities and processing facilities and
     UF-6 conversion facilities has kind of been in a vacuum as
     far as getting lots of attention from either the ACRS on the
     one hand or the ACNW on the other hand, and given that it's
     rooted in the chemical field and that the chemical industry
     has been driving it for the most part, it's gone a different
     direction, and I don't think it's anymore complicated than
     that.
               But I think this has been very constructive.  I
     think this has helped us focus a little bit on an area that
     maybe, you know, the advisory committees have --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, you are responding to an SRM
     dated December 1, '98.  Is that really what this is?
               MR. SHERR:  No, I think it was July 8, '99.  The
     package you have is the proposed rule package.  An SRM was
     issued as a result of that on, I think, July 8th.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Of last year.  But the whole
     history started a long time ago.
               MR. SHERR:  It started in '91.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, an extra two years wouldn't
     hurt, would it?
               Okay.
               DR. GARRICK:  All right.
               Let's go ahead, if we haven't completely
     disrupted.
               MR. DAMON:  I'll go through this very fast, and
     then just stop me when you want to talk about something.
               This is what an ISA does.  It uses systematic
     methods to identify hazards, namely just where in the plant
     are there things that are hazardous, because that's --
     again, remembering the roots of this, the problem was they
     weren't addressing chemical safety at all at these plants. 
     They did not have any kind of documented chemical safety
     analysis, controls, the NRC was not regulating it, and so,
     we're trying to get a documented safety analysis on the
     record here, first identify where are the hazardous
     chemicals and the radiological materials, then do what we'd
     be more familiar with, fault trees or whatever, identify
     actual specific accident sequences, and identify the
     consequences and the likelihood of those accident sequences,
     and specifically, here's another item that we're interested
     in, identifying items relied on for safety.
               This may sound sort of strange to say a statement
     like this, but if you go to a facility -- even if you look
     at the old-style documentation that are nuclear criticality
     safety analyses, which they've done for years, and you ask
     yourself what things in this process are they relying on for
     safety, very often, when I've gone and looked at them, they
     are not documented.
               They are relying on certain characteristics of the
     process which is not in the documentation, and without that
     characteristic -- in other words, you take the GE event.  It
     was a solvent extraction process, and the output from the
     process went to a holding tank that was safe geometry, it
     would be sub-critical under any conditions, and the tank was
     relatively small, and what had happened is they increased
     the throughput in the plant such that the operator was
     having to empty that tank about every hour or so because it
     was too small and would get filled up from the process.
               Well, there's a big difference in the safety of
     that -- and so, what they didn't understand was the safety
     of that process depends on the demand rate, if the guy is
     under a higher and higher demand rate until finally they had
     a process upset which caused him to -- there was a control
     valve malfunction in the process, and during the process
     when that control valve was malfunctioning, he was still
     transferring -- he had to transfer every hour the contents
     of this tank, and so, the process design -- they didn't
     realize it depended on the demand rate, and they needed to
     lower the demand rate by increasing the tank capacity, and
     that's what they did.  After the fact, since '91, they've
     built a lot of very, very, very large safe geometry tanks.
               So, now they don't have to transfer every hour. 
     They can sit there and wait for days until they do a
     transfer and make sure it's done right.
               So, they don't understand what they're relying on
     for safety, and it's the major thing that I think ISA will
     accomplish here.
               They will put it down in writing and they will
     send us that list of what they're relying on for safety. 
     We've never had that before.
               We have never had here in this agency a list of
     what they're relying on for safety in their plants.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Which is really similar to what
     the Commission did when the power industry was resisting
     PRA.  They asked them to find the vulnerabilities.  Isn't
     that another way of putting it?  And then the industry
     realized that the only way to do it was to use PRA.  I mean
     it was a hugely successful program from that point of view. 
     It spread the technology, really.
               I mean the individual IPEs -- some of them are
     really not very good, but you know, the learning process was
     tremendous, and that's maybe what we need here.
               MR. DAMON:  Again, it's a -- like you say, it's a
     process of them learning what they don't know by doing it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Exactly.  That's very useful
     background, yes.
               There is an interesting view-graph a little later
     that says likelihood -- is that before or after where you
     are -- likelihood, evaluation, acceptance criteria.  I don't
     know where we are now.
               MR. DAMON:  There's three different things that --
     when the staff receives an ISA summary to review, what we're
     going to be looking for in there is the completeness of
     identifying all the accidents, the correctness of the
     consequence evaluations, and the adequacy of the method they
     use and the criteria they use for judging that things are
     highly unlikely or unlikely.
               That guidance is in the Standard Review Plan
     chapter.
               The completeness is address by the -- for one
     thing, the methodologies.
               Do they use these methodologies that we've told
     them to use in selecting it with a flow chart in NUREG 1513
     and have they applied it each time to each process in a
     correct manner, and of course, then, we'll have the staff
     review the results and see if they think that they've picked
     up on all the accidents.
               NUREG 1513, like I say, is primarily focused on
     identifying hazards and accidents.  It's got methodologies. 
     It's based on the AICHE red book on complying with the OSHA
     rule and has a flow-chart for selecting the correct process,
     and it has a long list and includes actually quantitative
     PRA as one method in there.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, but you know, I've seen
     the what-if stuff.  I mean it was presented to me as if it
     was a big deal.
               I think it depends very, very much on the hazards
     you are talking about.  In some instances, you know that the
     hazards are not very large.  Maybe a quick what-if analysis
     is good enough.  It's qualitative.  You ask people,
     knowledgeable people, what can happen here and there.
               But in light of what this agency has done to
     promote risk assessments and so on, this is really a trivial
     Mickey Mouse kind of thing.
               So, I am not sure that it should be one of the
     acceptable methods, and the recommendations that come out of
     it really are, again -- I mean if you're talking about a gas
     station or something like that and you want to avoid
     accidents, maybe it makes sense, but not for a facility that
     has nuclear materials in it, and the hazards -- you know, I
     mean they have been glorified by the chemical industry, and
     for us, it's a starting point of a PRA.
               I mean no PRA analyst will start doing PRAs
     without doing some form of hazard first, you know, what if
     this fails, what's going to happen, let me understand the
     system, structuring the scenarios that we talked about
     earlier.
               MR. DAMON:  Well, I think that the flow-chart in
     NUREG 1513 -- that's what it's intended to address.  It's
     intended to prevent them from doing that, and I'm not sure
     it's going to be successful.
               We're going to have to arm-twist them into it. 
     We're going to have force them.  The staff is going to have
     to tell them you cannot do what-if on a complex process, you
     know.
               That's only appropriate for -- in fact, my own
     view is it's really just a front-end, it's a screening,
     brainstorming thing you do on the front-end, and then you go
     ahead and you do your fault trees and event trees.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's right.  But this industry
     is dominated by chemical engineers, isn't it?
               MR. DAMON:  Yeah, I would say mechanical and
     chemical.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah.
               MR. DAMON:  There are criticality engineers who do
     the criticality safety, but they're primarily, you know,
     reactor physics calculators.
               They're not -- the discipline that is missing in
     these plants, in my own opinion, is reliability engineers. 
     They do not have reliability engineering as a discipline in
     any of these plants.  They don't know the subject.
               So, like I say, if you look at the rule, the
     bottom line is consequences have to be understood
     quantitatively.  So, they do have to do calculations for
     that.
               There's a guidance document on it, this NUREG that
     was generated a few years ago.  It's a summary of the
     current state of the art in methodologies for calculating
     consequences, both chemical and radiological.
               Really, when you look at what the consequence
     levels are, the intermediate high defined in the rule, you
     only need a gross estimate in order to figure out where
     you're at, and then, to know whether you're highly unlikely
     or unlikely is the appropriate category.
               One of the things about this is -- about these
     methods is a lot -- I would say most of the accident
     sequences will be nuclear criticalities for which
     consequence evaluation really doesn't need to be done.
               It's clearly going to be a high consequence event
     by definition in the sense that you can't preclude the fact
     that someone might be standing there and might get killed. 
     Therefore, the process has to be protected at the level of
     highly unlikely.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, let me understand what this
     means.
               The applicant defines -- you mean the applicant
     will assess the frequency, qualitatively perhaps, of
     sequences and declare them as unlikely or highly unlikely. 
     The applicant will not define what is unlikely the way you
     do in the SRP.  That's your job.
               MR. DAMON:  Right.  Well, the way we refer to it
     is he can establish a method which has criteria in it for
     what constitutes highly unlikely in his view, and the staff
     will then have acceptance criteria in the Standard Review
     Plan as to whether we accept that criteria.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You mentioned in the SRP that
     highly unlikely means 10 to the minus 5 or less.
               Now, what if an applicant comes and argues that 10
     to the minus 4 is still highly unlikely?  Is that what this
     means, defines?
               MR. DAMON:  Yes, it does.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  This is kind of unusual, isn't
     it?  I mean this should be the job of regulator, what is
     acceptable.
               MR. DAMON:  Yes.  That's what I say.  The Standard
     Review Plan says what we regard as acceptable.
               So, there's no point to them coming to us and
     telling us 10 to the minus 4.  We've already said --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, the applicant really doesn't
     define it.
               DR. GARRICK:  Likelihood has no relevance except
     when associated with a particular consequence.    
               MR. MARKLEY:  George, I don't think it's
     appropriately defining; it's categorizing.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But that's my concern.  Does the
     word "define" mean categorize or actually define what's
     acceptable, what's unlikely, high unlikely, because if it's
     the second, I think it's the job of the NRC to do that, not
     of the applicant.
               In other words, the applicant should be assessing. 
     In other words, they should be saying yes/no.     
               MR. MARKLEY:  I don't know that I agree with that,
     George, because I mean I still think the licensee has the
     obligation to determine it and the NRC the obligation to
     confirm or determine whether they would agree or not.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But the applicant will never
     tell you what's acceptable.
               MR. DAMON:  Let me clarify why you get in this
     dilemma.
               If we were doing it quantitatively, there would be
     no -- if we were going to insist that things be done
     quantitatively, there would be no question about, it would
     be very simple.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
               MR. DAMON:  But since what we anticipate is that
     they won't do it quantitatively, what they'll do is do it
     qualitatively, if you try and define a scheme by which
     they're going to categorize controls by their qualities,
     they're going to have to explain to us what this scheme is
     by which they're going to evaluate something and say, yes,
     this is highly unlikely because it has this characteristic,
     this characteristic, this characteristic, therefore it's
     highly unlikely.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But that's an assessment, that's
     a categorization.
               MR. DAMON:  Yeah, it's a categorization, right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That is okay.
               MR. DAMON:  And we're going to ask them to do this
     categorization and then tell us which ones of these do you
     consider to be highly unlikely.  It's a misleading term. 
     The natural interpretation is it should be a number.  So,
     they're going to develop some kind of method.
               I've divided the potential methods into three. 
     They could do it quantitatively.  He could do a PRA, and
     they could, therefore, define a likelihood by a frequency
     per year or some analogous quantitative measure.  The other
     extreme is purely qualitative by the characteristics of
     whatever the process design is.
               The one in between is the BWXT method, the method
     they used, which one way of describing it is to say it's an
     order of magnitude, a quantitative, or you could say it's a
     qualitative method that assigns index values to likelihood.
               DR. GARRICK:  They do a lot of this in the marine
     field, as well, particularly in the offshore.  They use
     exactly the same language, and they have relied heavily on
     what they call indexing methods, and the UK rules that have
     come out with respect to safety case requirements for
     offshore platforms have adopted a kind of a similar set of
     descriptors and terms, and all of that does have its roots
     in the chemical industry.
               MR. DAMON:  As I said, this index method is the
     method that BWXT used, and it's what we would like the
     others to use.  It remains to be seen if they will do it.
               One of the problems has been, as I said, BWXT's
     submittal is proprietary.  They, in fact, wouldn't even
     submit their methods document.
               So, I don't even know the scheme that they used,
     all I have is the results, and so, when they -- of course,
     that will change when the rule goes into effect, I can
     demand the methods document, but they were very tight-fisted
     about this, and fortunately, it seems to be getting away
     from that.
               They seem to be working through NEI, working
     together more, or maybe they're going to iron this out and
     they will come to use BWXT's method.
               Like I said, a quantitative method is not
     required, but it's permitted, and that's the way it's stated
     in the Standard Review Plan.
               This index method is the one that's actually been
     used.
               DR. GARRICK:  It would be much better there if you
     said that it's encouraged, because saying permitted makes it
     come across as a inferior method to the other methods.
               MR. SHERR:  It is sort of encouraged in the sense
     of what the Standard Review Plan identifies as an example is
     this semi-quantitative approach, and so, in that way, that's
     the only thing that we've identified so far.
               The industry has been saying they would like us to
     develop another example that's purely qualitative, and we've
     been struggling with that.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, what they're going to discover
     is the same thing that the NRC discovered when they started
     out with their IPE program thinking that -- and justifying
     it principally on the basis that it was less cost, and they
     have ended up with models that are at greater cost than the
     kind of full-scope PRAs that were being advocated in the
     late '70s and early '80s.
               They'll just make the same discovery eventually,
     that the best way to do this is, in fact, to build a
     quantitative model and to be creative about how they build
     that model in order to achieve the cost control that they
     want and that all of this other stuff will hopefully go by
     the wayside, because it's just a way of dancing around and
     avoiding hitting it on all fronts.
               NASA has gone through the same thing.  They have
     resisted probabilistic methods from 1959, from the time that
     GE presented a calculation that found its way in Congress
     that the probability of getting a man to the moon and back
     was something like 5 percent, and they got embarrassed by
     it, and the then-administrator said we will never use
     probabilistic methods again.
               Well, they're using probabilistic methods, and
     they're using them increasingly extensively, and eventually
     they'll come around.
               There is now a risk model for the shuttle, and so,
     unfortunately, it seems to be the way that it has to go,
     that everybody has to satisfy themselves that they have
     another way, and I think that, until you answer the risk
     question, you know, you've not answered the margin question.
               MR. DAMON:  I agree, and my own view -- this
     resistance to PRA is not the staff.  It's not the NRC staff. 
     It is the licensees.  They insist, oh, you couldn't possibly
     do this stuff, and they just don't understand.
               Like I say, part of the problem is they don't have
     people that have ever done this, so they don't understand
     how they could do it.
               You know, if they had on their staff people who
     had done it, they would understand, yes, you could do it.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yeah.  So, it will come, and maybe
     this is just as well, that it has to come in this fashion.
               The marine industry is going through the same
     thing.  When they finally got pushed to the wall and they
     did the Prince William Sound study, which was pretty close
     to being a full-scope probabilistic risk assessment, and
     they've learned a tremendous amount from that study, much
     more than all the rest of the studies they've done, put
     together, about risk.
               So, you know, it seems to be a pattern that is
     unavoidable, and we're going through it now in the chemical
     field.
               MR. DAMON:  I agree.  What I see when I see the
     analyses, unless the system is extremely simple, what will
     happen when they use these non-quantitative methods is they
     will simply get the system model wrong.  In other words,
     they're not -- because they're not used to formulating what
     I would call a quantitative reliability model, they don't
     understand the equation, and if you don't write the equation
     down, you don't know what you're relying on for safety in
     the system.
               So, they get everything wrong.  They don't succeed
     in identifying -- for one thing, when a redundant system --
     they don't properly understand the virtue of limiting the
     down time by surveillance method or having fail-safe
     equipment or self-announcing failure.
               You know, the idea that when -- if you have two --
     a redundant system and you get the first failure, you've got
     to be aware that that system is in a vulnerable state so
     that you can render it safe.
               You've got to limit the down-time of that initial
     failure.
               They don't understand that, so they don't do
     anything about it in some cases, and in some cases they do,
     they've figured it out by just sort of experience, that, you
     know, you need to have something to recognize when the
     machine breaks, but they don't understand the concept, they
     don't understand the math behind it.
               DR. GARRICK:  How are we doing?  According to the
     agenda, we're due for a break in about 10 minutes.  Are we
     within 10 minutes?
               MR. DAMON:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  Okay.  Good.
               MR. DAMON:  The trouble with qualitative --
               DR. GARRICK:  We say this like it's your fault.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, he has been so slow.
               DR. GARRICK:  And we apologize for our
     interruptions, but we're learning a lot.
               MR. DAMON:  The idea here is how is the staff
     going to judge when the applicants send in their version of
     a likelihood evaluation whether this thing all makes sense?
               My own view is, if you have any doubts, you're
     going to do your own quantitative analysis of whatever the
     situation is, but one way of looking at things is to
     categorize things by the various qualities that you rely on
     to achieve a high reliability, high availability type of
     system, and this is a list of the different factors that
     need to be evaluated, and if the applicant hasn't considered
     these things, they don't know how to put the whole thing
     together, then they're going to get the wrong -- an
     inadequate answer.
               For example, the thing I was mentioning about
     limiting down-time is what I'm calling here an availability
     measure.
               That's certainly something they need to address. 
     They need to tell you in the analysis what surveillance
     they're doing on the equipment to detect that it's in a
     failed state -- functional test, monitoring, operator
     observation, or what, and of course, independence is related
     to, you know, things like common cause and diversity, and
     there's guidance in the Standard Review Plan telling the
     reviewer to look and see, have they looked support system
     failures, you know, power supply to the system and stuff
     like that.
               If they haven't done that, then they probably
     haven't got a system that is going to meet the standard for
     highly unlikely.
               The reason the number 10 to the minus 5 and that
     quantitative stuff was put in there is we asked somebody --
     we asked one of the applicants, one of the licensees, what
     would they consider to be a highly unlikely for a single
     accident to occur, and they said, well, less than once in
     the life of a plant, and at that point, I realized they
     didn't understand the concept that we're talking about each
     accident here, that there's thousands of accidents, and that
     if it was once in the life of a plant times 1,000, they
     would be having them every month, you know, and they don't
     understand things in that way.
               So, that's why that kind of guidance is in there,
     if they come in with a definition like that, but what we
     expect is these qualitative things.
               These graded management measures are all the
     things like QA, maintenance, configuration management.  We
     expect them to specify what they're going to do to these
     items relied on for safety that's going to make them
     reliable and available and to commit to them in writing and
     submit that list of items relied on for safety that
     specifies all these qualities that they're going to
     maintain, and admittedly, this doesn't look very elegant
     compared to doing a risk assessment, but compared to where
     they were, you know, in 1991, this is a big step forward to
     just get them to list all the items relied on for safety and
     send it to us.
               This is the thing that they're accustomed to, and
     one of the reasons that they practice this concept of
     qualitative evaluation is it goes back to the fact that the
     only kind of safety analysis they did was criticality safety
     analysis, and in that field, the people that write the
     standards on that, many years ago, came up with the idea of
     a thing they call double-contingency, and there's the
     double-contingency statement.  It's just redundancy.
               They're just saying don't rely on any single
     control, and they learned this the hard way.  Back in the
     '50s and '60s they had a criticality accident about every
     two years until finally somebody says, you know, maybe we
     should upgrade the safety of these things, and they came up
     with this.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Single failure criteria, right?
               MR. DAMON:  Single failure criterion.
               So, this is what they have been working to for the
     last 30 years, and they haven't had a criticality in a NRC-
     regulated facility in the entire history of the agency and
     they haven't had a criticality in DOE since the mid-'70s, I
     believe.
               That was a shielded criticality.
               No one has died in a criticality since the '60s.
               So, there was a sudden improvement when they
     adopted this concept.
               So, what we're trying to do is get them to take
     one more step here, do a little --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Do you think it would be a good
     idea to ask everyone to try to identify plant
     vulnerabilities?
               MR. DENNIS:  That is part of what is specified. 
     In fact, it's in the rule.  They are required -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  They will have to do it.
               MR. DENNIS:  They are required to identify
     vulnerabilities and to correct them.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  How much time do they have to do
     that?
               MR. SHERR:  Four years.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Four years.  And they will
     submit the ISA to you for review?
               MR. SHERR:  ISA summary, right.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Summary.  It's IPE all over
     again, guys, It's really all over again.  It's IPE. 
     Somebody must love it very much.  
               MR. DENNIS:  Because of the number of processes
     involved, these analyses actually are quite voluminous.  It
     takes about two bookshelves to three bookshelves full of
     stuff or more to cover one of these plants.  It's quite
     bulky.  So the ISA summary, we might get down to half a
     bookshelf.  
               DR. GARRICK:  While you were out, I was pointing
     out the IPE started out as a simple solution that was
     increased in scope with such things as external events and
     later with large early releases, et cetera, et cetera, and
     until you clearly see that, yes, you could have done a very
     competent PRA, full-scope PRA for what's been spent.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  We understand all this.
               DR. GARRICK:  It's a little unfair for a George
     Apostolakis and John Garrick to be ganging up on you on this
     discipline.  We clearly have our prejudices with respect to
     the use of PRA.  
               Is that it?
               MR. DENNIS:  That's it.
               DR. GARRICK:  That's very good.  Well, we are
     interested in this and see how it evolves, because it does
     have a very familiar ring to it in the IPE world.  So I'm
     sure there's lots of lessons to be learned there.  But I
     would sure be a lot happier if the rule was not so sensitive
     against the use of PRA as a preferred option for complying
     with independent or integrated safety analysis.
               Very good.  Any other -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You say that you do have one of
     the ISAs, the BXT?
               MR. DENNIS:  BWXT used to be B&W, Babcock &
     Wilcox, only they changed their name and they put an X in
     it, for some reason.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's like LAX.  Do you think we
     can have a subcommittee meeting, a joint subcommittee
     meeting reasonably soon, where we can discuss the ISA and
     the details?  Because what you gave us today is really a
     presentation that one would make before -- they will be
     invited, too.
               DR. GARRICK:  But I think if we heard a
     presentation of an ISA of a specific facility, then we'd
     develop a much greater sense of what it's all about and also
     may be able to make some constructive ties with what is
     required to upgrade it to a PRA.
               STAFF:  If this is a question directed at the
     staff, the answer is yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.  
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Would the industry be willing to
     come?
               STAFF:  That I don't know.  We would certainly
     work with them to see if we could get them to participate.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If you asked them today, they
     will come.
               DR. GARRICK:  Thank you very much.  We're going to
     take a 15-minute break.
               [Recess.]
               DR. GARRICK:  We'll come to order.  We are now
     going to hear about why they sent us this big book on
     byproduct material risk analysis, and three volumes, and I
     think you ought to tell us about it.
               Would you introduce yourself and tell us what you
     do, et cetera, first?
               MS. ULRICH:  Sure.  My name is Betsy Ulrich.  I'm
     a Senior Health Physicist in Region I.  I do both licensing
     and inspection of materials activities.  A few years ago, I
     was asked to take part on the -- let's see, what was it
     called at the time -- nuclear materials byproduct risk
     review group, which we shortened to RRG and you may see that
     in the handout occasionally. 
               That's what I'm here to talk about today, the risk
     assessment that was done of byproduct material activities.
               There's three things that I would like everyone to
     remember about this study.  This particular slide is not in
     your handout, but everything that's on this slide is.  
               The first is that in this NUREG and in our report,
     you will see numbers, and the use of numbers implies or may
     imply that there is great accuracy.
               In fact, the numbers that resulted in the risk
     assessment for radiological risk have uncertainties that are
     on the order -- orders of magnitude.  So because we have
     numbers doesn't mean great, great certainty in this case.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Let me understand that.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes, sir.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The way I read the book is that
     there is variability on several orders of magnitude if I
     look at the numbers for one activity from facility to
     facility or maybe across activities.  But if I specify one
     activity, is the uncertainty orders of magnitude?
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes, it is.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And why is that?
               MS. ULLRICH:  Because even among the systems, as
     we define them, there is great variability, and I will talk
     about that in the presentation.  So if you want to hold
     that, I think we'll get to it.
               The second point that I want to make is one that
     has confused many of the people that I've presented some of
     this information to in the materials community, and that is
     our risk values have units of millirem per year.  It's
     because when we defined risk, we said this is the
     consequence in terms of dose, millirem per year, multiplied
     by a probability of some event happening.
               The resulting units are millirem per year.  People
     look at the tables, don't read the word risk, they see the
     millirem per year, and they said you don't get doses like
     these in materials activities.  And so it's something that I
     have to stress to a number of people.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So it's the expected dose.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.  And the third is that we did
     not make any judgment in the study as to what is acceptable
     risk.  That is something that probably needs to be done, but
     it was not done here.  We simply assessed what we believed
     the risk values to be.
               These are the topics that I will move through,
     some more quickly than others, and certainly spend whatever
     time you want in the different areas.  Who we are, what the
     scope of the risk assessment included, what categories of
     radiological risk we assessed quantitatively, how we did the
     risk assessment or how the contractor did the risk
     assessment, since they did the real guts of that work, and
     where our uncertainties are, how we used the consequence
     information, and what evaluations the risk review group did
     of the NUREG CR information, and what we conclude the
     results are.
               The risk review group had two goals, to identify
     and document a technical basis for a risk-informed approach
     for regulating byproduct materials.  That included all Part
     30 activities.  So those are activities covered by the
     regulations in 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, and 39.  And to
     develop a graded approach for regulating them using this
     risk information.
               We had five persons on the group; two health
     physicists, one from the NRC, that was myself, one from the
     State of Colorado.  We also had persons with experience in
     risk assessment, engineering and human factors.  So that was
     the core group, and our job was to figure out how to cope
     with this project, to find a contract to assist us with it,
     oversee what they did, work with them, and try to make some
     conclusions out of this as to how we can use this
     information for materials.  
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, the risk assessment person
     was from the reactor arena?  
               MS. ULLRICH:  John Randall, actually.  So yes.  
     As I said before, Parts 30 through 36 and 39, again, I have
     given this presentation to some other people, so I find
     myself riding my little hobby horse about you multiply dose
     times the probability and you get units of dose, but it's a
     risk value in this study.
               We defined what we considered discreet systems for
     materials activities based on similar uses, quantities and
     forms.  This is the obligatory slide that's difficult to
     read.  This pretty much covers the range of materials
     activities.  We did have pointed out to us in the comment
     period that we missed a couple of items, like nuclear
     laundries, decontamination services, but I think overall,
     we've got a good scope there.  
               Why some of the uncertainties are still high, even
     with a system like fixed gauges, there's a wide range of
     gauges, there's a wide range of activities used in the
     gauges, how they're used, where they're used.  So there's
     uncertainty when you come up with one number for that
     category.
               One correction to this, and that is system four. 
     It should be nuclear medicine, generator only, and this is
     because there are some hospitals that use generators,
     molytech generators, and more and more now do not.  So if
     you wanted to assess the risk for a group that uses a
     generator, you would add systems four and five.
               So the four is generator only and then five is all
     the nuclear medicine involved with administering those
     dosages to patients.
               Scope of the risk assessment.  For the
     radiological risk, we looked at what is the risk to workers,
     what is the risk to the public, what is the risk under
     normal conditions and off-normal conditions.  There's
     actually another set of categories, which is risk to
     individuals and an industry-wide risk.
               It did not include doses to patients.  That's real
     important for people in the medical community to understand. 
     It's also important for the people in NRC to understand,
     because a lot of our regulations involve misadministration
     to patients.  That was considered out of bounds, out of the
     scope of this project.  So that's not included.
               We didn't look at transportation, covered under
     Part 71 or DOT, and we didn't look at developing future
     technologies.  
               The real nice thing, and this will come up again
     later, is that along with the NUREG CR, the contractor
     developed the database that could be used for revising
     systems or adding new systems, as we have more information
     about new technologies.  
               DR. GARRICK:  Having done this study now, I
     suspect you'd be able to reduce these 40 systems down to a
     much smaller number.
               MS. ULLRICH:  I don't think so.
               DR. GARRICK:  You don't think so?  
               MS. ULLRICH:  It was real difficult even coping
     with the variations within these systems.  It was an
     extraordinary amount -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, if you were to do it by risk,
     if you were to categorize it by risk, would you be able to
     sort a smaller grouping?
               MS. ULLRICH:  I certainly think that you could
     sort out systems that you wanted to look at in more detail
     and more rigorously.  I think you could select out the
     systems with higher risks that you might want to find more
     information about and make it a more certain assessment.
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, if you wanted to dig deeper
     into those that were most important.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.  
               DR. GARRICK:  John, you seemed to have a reaction
     to the question.
               MR. RANDALL:  Yes.  I was just thinking.  I didn't
     stay with the group long enough to get to that point, to get
     a chance to think about sorting the risk numbers.
               The group functioned for a while as a group and
     then suddenly we weren't a group anymore.  It was just
     interesting.
               MS. ULLRICH:  There was some attrition, yes.  
               DR. GARRICK:  I found the document to be very
     useful, and the partial answer to the question that this
     joint subcommittee asked early on is that you should tell us
     what you think is important from a risk perspective, and
     let's start from that point.  
               You've kind of done that now for the byproduct
     side of the problem.
               MS. ULLRICH:  I think so.  These two bullets are
     really probably the meat of what we had assistance from the
     contractor to do, getting a quantitative and qualitative
     assessment of the radiological risk.  We also attempted to
     get a qualitative evaluation of some of the other risks and
     all of that information is summarized on the matrix handout
     that some of you may have picked up. 
               So you will see the bottom list of some of the
     other issues we looked at, regulatory burden, risk of
     contamination, the cost of decontaminating, non-rad health
     risk.  Those we simply didn't have the time or other
     resources to pursue that in any kind of quantitative way. 
     So those were qualitative and based on mainly literature
     research, if I recall correctly.
               The matrix summarizes all of the numbers and in
     all of the risk categories.  These are the eight risk,
     radiological risk categories that we looked at.  The first
     four are all the individual risk categories.  The second
     four are industry-wide risk.
               It's not truly a collective dose.  It's looking at
     the population of the industry only, not the persons that
     would be affected by that industry, and I'm not really sure
     what to do with those numbers or how best to use that
     information.  It's simply clear that if you look at
     industries that are large, such as portable gauges, having
     many thousands of them out in use, they rise higher level of
     risk, if you're comparing industry-wide risk, than they do
     in individual risk.
               Industries that are very small, the use of pool
     irradiators, mega curie pool irradiators, you can probably
     count on a couple of hands and maybe a foot how many we have
     of those in the United States, very small industry.  So as
     an industry risk, they don't come near the top.
               So I'm not really sure how we should use that
     information, but we do have it at this point.  The other
     thing is there's probably larger uncertainties with the
     industry risk, because now we're guessing how big the
     industries are, and that's also a difficult thing to do.
               The method that we ended up choosing for the
     radiological risk assessment was probably best described as
     a modified target, hazard -- hazard barrier target analysis,
     where the hazard is the radioactive source.  There are some
     barriers that may be administrative, may be physical, which
     protect the source from reaching a target, who is either a
     worker or a member of the public.
               The other thing to remember with this study is
     that a member of the public could be a collocated worker,
     somebody who is not assigned to work with radioactive
     material, but may be at the next laboratory bench or may be
     the flag person on the construction site near where somebody
     is using a portable gauge.
               So that would constitute, in this study, a member
     of the public, not a worker.
               DR. GARRICK:  That almost lines up with level one,
     two and three.  In the old reactor days, we used to talk
     about the plant model, the containment model and the site
     model.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Okay.
               DR. GARRICK:  It's the same kind of breakdown.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.  Well, what did we have to do? 
     Well, we had to adequately describe the systems,
     characterize the systems in a way that made some sense, that
     it would include the main range of radionuclides, the range
     of activities that were used in each system, and then look
     at what are the barriers, what kind of shielding is there,
     what kind of confinement is there, what kind of restrictions
     to access are there, what's required by regulation, what's a
     good practice. 
               That took a while to develop, again, because the
     industries, even within the systems, vary and people use
     radioisotopes for different things or in slightly different
     ways.  So it's not terribly consistent from user to user and
     it's less consistent as you go from sealed to unsealed.
               The unsealed users are all over the board with how
     they handle stuff.
     Developed scenarios or sequences of what kinds of things
     happen when people handle radionuclides and what can happen. 
     Can they pick it up?  Can they drop it?  If they drop it,
     does it break?  If they drop it, does it spill?  All those
     sorts of things went into the sequence development.  
               Then those sequences, in an effort to simplify it
     or characterize as event trees, but only in terms of success
     or failure of shielding or confinement or access.  The
     contractor did not attempt to do that for all the individual
     events that would comprise shielding or comprise
     confinement.
               DR. GARRICK:  Betsy, in connection with the
     development of the scenarios, one of the things I was trying
     to figure out as I read the document is whether the
     database, such as the NMED or whatever it is, drove the
     structuring of the scenarios or whether the physical system
     and an engineering analysis thereof drove the development of
     the scenarios.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Where there is a system that would
     be considered engineered, like a pool irradiator or
     radiography unit, that certainly drove it.  I think work
     habits drove it, the process people go through in using,
     looking at it from how do they get the material, how do they
     receive it, when they handle it, what are they using it for,
     how do they store it.
               NMED did not drive that at all.
               DR. GARRICK:  Okay.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Okay.  NMED was actually a very
     limited resource for us, in many ways.
               DR. GARRICK:  I know that and that's why if you
     were going to tell me that it was an NMED, then you were in
     for some real questioning.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Okay.  Now we start getting into
     some of the interesting stuff.  Determining the frequency of
     sequences, that is where NMED did come in.  Where we had
     incidents that were required to either be reported and we
     had NMED information, some of that was used to develop
     probabilities for the frequency of those events happening.
               One of the errors in here is that we don't have a
     good handle on denominators.  NMED would give you the number
     of numerators, the number of reported events that happened,
     but we don't always have good denominators for these
     numbers, either.
               Nuclear materials events database.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  NRC?
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.  
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The equivalent of LERs?
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes, sort of, but a little
     different.  It's a little more compact than the LERs.  
               MS. ULLRICH:  It also gathers information from the
     agreement states, as well, for the materials activities. 
     Once a frequency was determined, we could also calculate the
     doses and then calculate the risk value by multiplying
     those.
               All that information is on computer disk.  It's
     the byproduct material system risk database.  It's got a
     file and a user's guide and that is available to NMSS.  They
     have a couple copies of that, and that contains all the
     information that is the basis for the dose calculations and
     the risk calculations. 
               It wasn't a trivial effort.  I don't know how
     these numbers compare to a PRA or to a reactor risk
     assessment, but to me these numbers were mind-boggling. 
     Fifty-six different nuclides, 518 tasks, 4,000 normal and
     off-normal sequences and over 27,000 individual
     calculations, and none of that is in the NUREG.
               DR. GARRICK:  That's a small fraction of one PRA.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.  To me, that's a big deal.  It
     was a lot of effort, and I wasn't the one who had to do it. 
     So kudos to the people who did it.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, you're going to talk about
     the uncertainties at some point.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  In the assessment process, when
     you calculate the consequences, you say somewhere here that
     you were uncertain about the -- I made a note on it.  The
     risk results are based on an average consequence for the
     conditions evaluated.  There can be significant variability
     of risk results around the average due to the variations
     from one user to another, and from one day to another.
               Would you care to explain?
               MS. ULLRICH:  Sure.  Let's take a hospital
     situation, since many people are familiar with that, and a
     hospital situation is actually more consistent than many of
     our other material systems that handle unsealed material.
               But on any given day, they may have six patients,
     they may have 16 patients.  If they have 16 patients,
     they're going to be handling more activity than they would
     on a six-patient day.  They may have iodine therapy just one
     day a week or one day a month.  Iodine therapies drove the
     dose consequences in these risk analogies.
               So if you have a hospital that doesn't use iodines
     at all, their risk is going to be much lower than the
     hospitals that are frequent iodine users.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So there is an uncertainty,
     then.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Regarding the number of
     activities.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Taking place within a period of
     time.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And the reason why we're
     interested in that is because if you have N activities, then
     there is maybe a high probability of human error or
     something like that, because people have to do many more
     things.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  This is not the typical
     uncertainty that you find in PRAs.
               MS. ULLRICH:  No.  
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  This is different.  This is, in
     the parlance of some of us, aliatory.  The uncertainty
     regarding the frequency of the initiator, for example,
     that's different.  That's epistemic.
               So I'm really wondering how you've coupled those
     things in your event trees.  Do we have the event trees and
     I didn't look at them?
               MS. ULLRICH:  No.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Is it possible to get an example
     of a calculation that will walk me through this kind of
     thing?  Because I'm really curious to see how you combine
     the two.  It's something that is not done normally.
               MS. ULLRICH:  I've got two victims in the back
     that I can pick on for a response to that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.  Who are they?  Mr.
     Youngblood.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.
               MR. YOUNGBLOOD:  The right choice is actually Mr.
     Schmidt.
               DR. GARRICK:  You have to say who you are.
               MR. SCHMIDT:  Bob Schmidt, with Scientech.  I was
     pretty much the lead on the risk analysis.  We did not do
     any uncertainty analysis.  Everything was calculated
     basically as a point estimate of numbers to get the
     frequency and to get the consequences.  There was no
     uncertainty analysis.  All of the statements about
     uncertainty are judgments as to what the variability might
     be, what the uncertainty, but there's all kinds of
     variation, trying to avoid getting into trouble with the
     right terms.
               When you analyze the system, the source strengths
     can be very large within a system.  One user can use it one
     way, one frequency.  Another one can stand further.  You
     have to determine how far away from it he stands, how often
     does he drop it, does it open up, what are the airborne
     release fractions.  
               There are so many parameters, that we did not do
     an uncertainty analysis.  It was just a point estimate, a
     best estimate that we could make based on the available
     information.
               Some of the data, if you look at the normal risk,
     that's pretty good, because we have data on normal risk. 
     The radiographers get a risk or an exposure per year which
     is recorded and which is reported to NRC.
               On the other hand, some people don't, it's not
     reported.  Accident risks are obviously -- where we knew
     there was an accident, we would -- and we got a consequence
     for that accident, we'd kind of go look at what was reported
     in NMED; are they reasonable or not, yes, but we didn't do
     any uncertainty analysis.
     DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, when you say you didn't do an
     uncertainty analysis, I guess you mean you didn't do an
     uncertainty analysis in the PRA tradition, where, again, you
     consider the uncertainty in the frequencies of the
     initiators, the unavailabilities of systems, and so on, the
     epistemic part.
               But since here you have aliatory and it makes a
     difference in the model, I wonder how you would do it.  I
     mean, you could still do it in a point estimate basis, but
     you still have to consider cases like do they have one
     patient or six.  Is that in the event trees, the number of
     patients and the consequences?
               MR. SCHMIDT:  There was an assumption about we
     gather data and try to determine the frequency of use in a -
     - generally, it was kind of a maximum facility.  It was a
     facility that used -- did this activity, from talking, in a
     limited sense, to a few licensees and we had restrictions
     there, how many times would they do it in kind of a maximum
     case in a day, how many times a year, what was the source
     strength, and that's the way it was combined.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Increase in probability of human
     error because of the simultaneous or concurrent activities
     was not included.
               MR. SCHMIDT:  No.  We didn't get into that.  If we
     had data on how many drops, the issue about there's no
     denominator and getting a probability of a spill, that would
     kind of enter in and be taken out, because how many spills
     did you have in a year, we knew, but how many activities in
     a year, we didn't know, but we put it into the numerator and
     in the denominator.
               The numbers for the industry, though, are better,
     because we had all the -- if the reporting is accurate, how
     many occurrences occurred through the whole industry, how
     many people are out there using them, that's an uncertainty.
               DR. GARRICK:  But it does sound like, A, you
     considered the use of the facility, the frequency, the
     frequency of the use, and, B, you considered the nature of
     incidents per use.
               MR. SCHMIDT:  Yes.
               DR. GARRICK:  And that frequency was probably
     influenced by the use frequency, was it not?  That is to
     say, if it was extensively used, you might make an
     adjustment for there being more incidents per use than if
     it's used infrequently.  Did you make any of those kind of
     adjustments?
               MR. SCHMIDT:  I can't recall any case where we
     made a judgment that a facility that did a lot of this work
     had a greater or a lower frequency of occurrences than one
     who did just a few.  We did not get that sophisticated.  We
     had enough trouble getting one number, much less a -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  But that would be one place where
     you would come close to an initiating event analog, is if
     you considered those kinds of things.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It still would be very
     illuminating to see a detailed analysis for two or three
     cases, different cases, if we can get that.
               MS. ULLRICH:  We have the system 24 walk-through,
     which is probably about as close as that would get, Bob.  
               DR. GARRICK:  Okay.  Go ahead.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Okay.  
               DR. GARRICK:  I found this study very interesting,
     by the way.  It was very informative and illuminated one of
     the issues that is very important in the materials field,
     and that is the contribution to risk of operations versus
     accidents, and sort of rather dramatically indicates the
     great differences here between this problem and, say a
     reactor problem and the presentations of that, even though
     it was very qualitative and non-uncertainty, was very
     helpful in a risk communications sense.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Okay.  That's good.  Since we've
     talked so much about uncertainties, I don't think we need to
     spend too much time on this, but I would say there's
     uncertainties, or perhaps variabilities or variations is the
     better term here, in what we know about the systems.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  This is a very important point,
     because there are two kinds here that appear to be very
     important.  One is this randomness in the number of uses or
     other things and then this other one is of the state of
     knowledge type, where you really don't know the numbers.
               In a PRA, when we say uncertainty analysis, we
     mean the second.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Because everything else is
     frequencies, exponential distributions, straightforward.  So
     I would really be curious to see how you guys handle this or
     in the future perhaps how you will handle it.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Variabilities in the information we
     had about the systems, variabilities in the dose
     calculation.  Probably external dose calculation is of
     better certainty than internal dose, but is still the choice
     of how far away is the person, how long do they spend there,
     that sort of information.
               We use the alloys from Part 20, which is ICRP-30
     based.  We've had people argue with me about that shouldn't
     be the best way to do it.  As far as internal dose goes, one
     of the conversations I had with Charlie Minehold was how
     good are internal dose models, and he said, well, for
     tritium, you're probably good for a factor of two or three;
     for everything else, it's up in the air.
               So there are uncertainties in the dose modeling. 
     Just because we can crank numbers in a computer doesn't make
     them particularly good numbers all the time.
               The third category is uncertainties in the
     frequency or probability, likelihood, whatever you want to
     call that term, and that's what you were talking about
     before; how often do things happen, how well do we know
     that.  So those were the -- 
               DR. GARRICK:  You talk a lot about uncertainty,
     but you don't do anything about it.
               MS. ULLRICH:  It was really -- I'm certain that I
     didn't know enough about it.  There was nothing we could do
     rigorously for this.
               DR. GARRICK:  I understand.
               MS. ULLRICH:  There's too many unknowns and given
     the time we had.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  We should move on.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Well, then I'll do that.  One of the
     things that I do want to emphasize is that we have the dose
     calculations first, the consequence, and that information,
     looking at where do you get the big doses, was what -- was
     the information that was used to say what things do we have
     to regulate and make sure are in place, what barriers have
     to be there with very high assurance, with high assurance or
     with moderate assurance.
               So when the NUREG document talks about where our
     regulatory options should be, what areas should we regulate,
     it's based on what things gave you big dose.  And that, I
     think, is important for people to understand if they're
     going to use this document.
               The risk numbers alone don't tell you everything. 
     Where the doses are tells you what barriers need to be in
     place.
               Not a big surprise for the sealed sources, one of
     the barriers that has to be there with very high assurance
     is the integrity of the source encapsulation.  That's
     something that's a function of the manufacturer, not the
     person who uses the source.  It's got to be manufactured
     right to begin with and then they can begin to abuse it and
     run them over with steamrollers and the other interesting
     things that happen with some of our sources.
               For most of the unsealed materials, the major
     barriers were prevention of loss or abandonment, and that's
     a big one for the sealed sources, as well, as anybody who
     has been in any of the steel industry meetings will hear
     about, and preventing accidents to the material, and both of
     those involve a lot of administrative barriers, as well as
     physical barriers.
               The risk review group did also do a survey of
     inspector and licensing personnel.  We had hoped originally
     to get some information that would help us with the -- the
     contractor with the risk assessments.  It didn't get done
     quite in time.  They ended up not being able to use any of
     that information, but then I used it as a sort of test, is
     the opinions of inspectors and license reviewers about the
     safety of these different systems and how frequently they
     have accidents and what kind of doses they get, in line with
     what the NUREG calculations showed.
               On the whole, it was pretty good.  There were some
     glaring differences, but.  These were the kinds of
     evaluations that were done with the material and all of this
     is reflected in some of the tables you have, selected tables
     at the end of the handout.
               Let me deal with that first issue, and that is
     looking at the issue of do you look at two significant
     figures, do you look at one significant figure, or if the
     uncertainties are really on orders of magnitudes, do you
     look at these numbers in powers of ten.
               I ended up choosing to use the one significant
     figure column, because it was the most comfortable one to
     use for me.  The powers of ten made the range of categories
     so broad that I really didn't feel like I got a handle on
     it.  So in all my other evaluations, I used the column of
     one significant figure.  
               This is the risk to individual workers under
     normal conditions.  This is the one which you see the
     highest risk.  
               The nice thing here is that you can compare this
     to real doses that people get in a typical year, because you
     would pretty much expect them to use material properly all
     the time and get those kinds of doses.
               We don't typically see doses of 3,900 or 2,000 rem
     in a year.  Even for the radiographers, it's not terribly
     normal to be that high anymore.
               DR. GARRICK:  Thirty millirem, right?
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.  I'm sorry.  What's a factor of
     a thousand between friends, right?  No.  It's a millirem.  I
     also ranked the systems just to see how they came out and
     that has its interesting aspects, as well.
               Here, the numbers are simply the ranking from one
     to 47, because as you see, we ended up breaking some of
     these systems into smaller portions.  You had asked earlier
     if we could consolidate it down more and what we found is we
     were breaking it into smaller pieces.
               It jumps out right away that we got a lot of low
     numbers here for radiography at field sites.  That's overall
     a risky activity, but for some of the other systems, you can
     see it really jumps around, depending on what risk you're
     looking at.
               So I didn't see any point in coming down to a
     single number of risks for a system because it hides where
     you might want to make some regulatory changes.
               DR. GARRICK:  I think that's excellent.  I think
     that was a very wise decision.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Let's see.  One of the other
     evaluations we did was to look at how the risk of the
     systems stacked up against the way we inspect them. 
     Materials is a little different from reactors in that we
     have categories, priority of inspections.  Priority one gets
     inspected once a year, priority three every three years,
     priority five every five years, and they're unannounced
     inspections.
               I'm not sure I really see a pattern in there.  On
     the other hand, it's also clear that we have looked at the
     consequences in a lot of the systems in determining who
     needs a lot of attention.  Radiographers, pharmacies, these
     people get looked at every year.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Would it make sense now to
     inspect teletherapy every three years and nuclear pharmacy
     once a year, when you have 50 millirem versus 800?
               MS. ULLRICH:  Well, that's something that needs to
     be looked at.  It plays into how good of a dose number. 
     This is only in order by risk to the individual workers. 
     It's not looking at any of the other risk categories here in
     this comparison.
               So there may be other things driving it and one of
     the other things that I have to say is that the nuclear
     medicine people are just up in arms about how high that
     number is.  It can't possibly be that high and we got to go
     back and look at that again, and, in fact, that may be what
     we need to do.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Just like the reactor people.
               MS. ULLRICH:  Yes.  It's interesting to look at. 
     This is something that we need to check and it may be a
     place to use some of this information.
               The numbers in parentheses are for broad-scope
     programs, which may have multiple of these activities. 
     Under a broad-scope program, they would get inspected every
     year. 
               
               What are the overall results?  I don't believe
     that the risk value alone is sufficient to regulate.  There
     are some byproduct material systems, like the pool
     irradiators, that can produce lethal doses of people get
     past the barriers, and so you have to make sure that you've
     got regulations in place for those kinds of things.
               There may be other things that have to be
     considered, as well.  But I think the risk value does have
     its place.
               One of the good things, we did not identify, in
     the consequences, in those doses, anything unexpected,
     anything that we didn't have regulations in place to handle
     already.
               Lots of general trends, and I think you've already
     talked about some of these, that the risk is to the worker,
     the public risks are much lower, the accident risks are much
     lower.  So I don't think we need to go over that in a lot of
     detail.
               To address that issue of comparing the risk value
     to the inspection priority, I probably graphed that three or
     four different ways just for the worker risk and really
     didn't see a particular pattern.  But I'm not sure that it's
     the fault of either system right now.  The inspection
     priorities are based on program types, rather than systems.
               The systems are different from the program types
     that we use in NMSS.  It may indicate, where there's big
     differences, that some additional study needs to be made to
     see why what we think -- why we need to inspect frequently
     is either not justified by the risk value or may need to be
     changed.
               And the most important thing, and this comes up
     with the strontium-90-I applicator, which came into the
     bottom of the risk list in every category, just about, the
     risk assessment, as we said earlier, didn't include risk to
     patients.  The strontium-90 applicators really don't have
     much harm to workers or people, but there have been some
     whopping doses to patients when they were misused or, in one
     case, there was a series of misadministrations because they
     had the calibration incorrect and the decay curve incorrect
     for the use of that device, and that's something for the
     Part 35 people to think about, I guess.
               Systems with low risk values we can probably look
     at to consider for reduction in regulatory burden.  I think
     these other points are discussed already.  
               I think it's real important and I'm kind of glad
     to hear some of the favorable comments on this report,
     because the materials community is picking it apart, for the
     ones who do see it.
               It's a first attempt to do this.  As far as we
     could tell, we couldn't find anything of this scope before. 
     There is certainly some risk assessment done of some
     individual material systems.  I think there's a PRA for the
     gamma knife that was done.
               But this scope is a new thing.  I think it's got a
     good solid basis.  It could be extended, if we want to
     extend it.  It could be used for new systems, if we need to
     use it for new systems.  It's a consistent way of comparing
     the different activities.  
               So I was really pleased with the NUREG and the
     risk database that we received.
               Where do we go from here?  I think some of the
     information from the NUREG, the risk database, the risk
     review report, the matrix summary can be used in developing
     the safety goals for the NMSS activities.  It may be some
     resource information to help decide what pilot activities
     would be selected, what systems, what kind of byproduct
     material activities do we want to look at for more rigorous
     risk assessments.
               It can be reference information to risk-inform
     changes we might need to make in regulations, current
     guidance, new rule-making.  I believe we've already got a
     commitment for the licensing and inspection guidance
     document, the NUREG-1556 series.  Those start under revision
     this year and those teams should be using this information
     as a reference to make those revisions.
               And I already talked about how I think that risk
     database is a useful tool. 
               So that's what I have for you today.  Are there
     any other questions at this point?  
               DR. GARRICK:  I'm sure there are.  What do you see
     as the next move?
               MS. ULLRICH:  Well, we're always working on
     something and the NUREG-1556, I know those revisions are
     starting, so I would certainly like to see this involved
     with them, and I would personally hope that this information
     is able to be used by the folks working on the SECY-99-100
     activities.
               DR. GARRICK:  Have you been tracking at all the
     changes that have been made on the reactor side in NRC
     oversight and the way the maintenance rule and the IPE work
     has influenced the overhaul of NRC oversight for reactor
     inspection?
               MS. ULLRICH:  I would say that I've seen some of
     the trickle-down effect from that.  
               DR. GARRICK:  Well, I see a similar opportunity
     here.  You've touched on it, with trying to matrix the
     results with the inspection frequency and duration, I guess. 
     But I would think this would be an important starting point
     for really examining the efficiency and effectiveness of
     inspection.  Meanwhile, this analysis would also come under
     some increased examination and criticism and that would be
     constructive, as well.
               So I hope that there is some consideration given
     to that.
               Hornberger?  George?  We can just encourage you to
     keep up the good work.  There is no question that in the
     details, you can find problems with the analysis, but from a
     top-down perspective, it's a giant step forward in
     understanding what is going on in the byproduct arena.  If
     we could do something similarly for the other major
     categories of the materials side, and there is movement in
     that direction, then I think we would begin to see a risk
     perspective of the entire materials side of the business.
               The performance assessments are certainly doing
     that as far as the repository issue is concerned.  The dry
     storage is doing some of that as far as fuel storage is
     concerned.  Then, of course, we heard about fuel fabrication
     facilities and fuel cycle facilities.
               So it does appear that there is movement and I
     guess the only anxiety that some of us have is we would like
     to see more commonality, if you wish, of the methods,
     because there does seem to be -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And terminology.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes, and terminology.  There does
     seem to be a determination on the part of each of these four
     or five groups to at least have a certain amount of tools
     that are unique to that particular section, and I'm not sure
     that's necessary.  But the progress that's been made is
     still very encouraging.
               Any questions from staff?  Comments?  Thanks,
     Betsy.  That was very helpful.  
               Well, what I think we ought to do now is spend a
     little time asking what we ought to do with what we've heard
     today.  I suppose that to be orderly about it, we ought to
     just go to the top of the agenda and work our way through.  
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I propose we don't write a
     letter on the opening remarks.  
               DR. GARRICK:  I'm glad to hear that.  All right. 
     The first presentation from Virgilio was an overview, risk-
     informing NMSS activities.  That kind of had a lot of pieces
     and parts that maybe we discuss individually.  
               But what are some of the thoughts of the committee
     about what we heard this morning?  The committee is only
     three-fourths here.  
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think a general message that
     things are happening in various activities and that's good,
     but there is a need for, as you just said, for coordination,
     perhaps, common terminology, methods and so on.  I think
     that's a general conclusion that deserves to be documented
     somewhere.
               There's certainly a lot of work that's going on. 
     The only one -- if we decide to write a letter that gives an
     overview of everything we heard, I would limit it to a short
     letter.
               Now, the special nuclear materials, I think,
     deserves a separate meeting with all details on the ISA and
     so on.  Maybe we can just put that in this letter.  And I
     would propose that this become an ACNW letter with enhanced
     membership, as we agreed earlier.  That would take forever.
               The special nuclear materials is of concern to me
     because they are sending the rule up next week and clearly
     we don't have time to have another meeting and everything.
               So I was wondering whether there was a mechanism
     alerting the Commission to the fact that maybe more detailed
     comments would be forthcoming.
               DR. GARRICK:  One of the things we've already
     observed, it was kind of interesting, that's come out of
     these joint committee meetings, is that the energies of the
     advisory committees have been, for the most part, consumed
     in two areas, reactors and high level waste repositories.
               And in the meantime, there's a lot of other
     activities going on and it doesn't seem that they have had
     the same kind of review and advice on the risk-informed
     movement that these two extremes --
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And I would put that also in the
     general comments.
               DR. GARRICK:  Right, right.  So that may make some
     suggestions about the planning and the activities of the
     committees.
               Have you got anything to say about that, John?
               MR. RANDALL:  Yes.  One of the things we discussed
     at the last ACNW meeting was the division of work in certain
     areas, like decommissioning.
               DR. GARRICK:  Right.
               MR. RANDALL:  And there are some other areas, like
     Part 70, 71, 72, which were originally included in an MOU. 
     There is a draft MOU between the ACNW and the EDO, the ACRS
     and the EDO, and it lays out areas of coverage for
     particular committees.
               But there is some overlap and there's some overlap
     in Part 70 and we need to handle those, I think, on a case-
     by-case basis.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's a different issue.  What
     we're saying here is that there were some activities that
     were not reviewed by -- 
               MR. RANDALL:  I know.
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.  
               MR. RANDALL:  There's some history to that, and I
     don't want to go into all that right now.  
               DR. GARRICK:  Yes.  Maybe it was by design, but
     anyway.  We have some real -- 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  We're looking for more work.
               DR. GARRICK:  -- catching up to do.
               MR. RANDALL:  There are some activities which are
     picking up some areas in NMSS and fuel fabrication
     facilities, there's talk about handling an application for a
     Mox facility at the same time.  NRR will be handling the
     licensing and utilization of that material.  So there will
     be a division of responsibilities, which are already
     outlined in this MOU, to look at some of these things.  Of
     course, they're unbudgeted, so that's a problem I have to
     deal with.
               Now, the sub-issue you raised if you feel -- if
     you have concerns about the staff going forward with this
     Part 70 rulemaking activity, I think it's something that we
     need to let the staff know either through the EDO or through
     the Commission.  Usually, these things will go up to the EDO
     and then at some point get to the Commission, and the
     Commission may not act very quickly on this package.  
               But we certainly can let the Commission know that
     the committee is interested in providing some comments.  But
     I think the staff would probably like to get a heads-up on
     those types of comments in case they want to make any
     changes in the document, they have an opportunity to do
     that.
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think we should have another
     meeting just on the special nuclear materials.
               MR. RANDALL:  Marty, do you have a schedule for
     the Commission?  Is it on a tracking system?
               MR. VIRGILIO:  Yes.  The paper is going up to the
     Commission, as Ted said, within the next week or so.  It's
     due up to the EDO, I believe, on Monday and then the EDO
     gets a couple of days review and then it's due up to the
     Commission.
               The Commission meeting I think has been scheduled
     for the week of June 20, somewhere right around there.  It's
     up to them how long it takes to decide on moving forward.
               One thing that we might want to consider is can
     you separate the concerns, the rule and the standard review
     plan, and the two categories.  One way to proceed, and I
     think the rule is written at a fairly high level and you
     might find that that's an acceptable approach, I believe it
     is, listening to the concerns that were raised today, and
     allow us to continue to work together on the standard review
     plan through working through examples.
               That's an approach that I think would be a good
     approach.  If it works for you, you would have to look at
     the rule and make sure you see the rule the way I do, in
     light of the issues that we've discussed today.
               DR. GARRICK:  That's a good point. 
               DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  In any case, I don't think this
     committee -- do we need the reporter?
               MR. VIRGILIO:  I don't think so, no.
               DR. GARRICK:  No.  
               [Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the meeting was
     concluded.]
	 
	 	 
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, February 12, 2014