United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

461st Meeting - April 8, 1999

                       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                     NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
               ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
                                  ***
            461ST ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
                                (ACRS)
                                  ***
                        USNRC
                        11545 Rockville Pike, Room T-2B3
                        Rockville, Maryland
                        Thursday, April 8, 1999
               The subcommittee met pursuant to notice, at 8:30 a.m.
     MEMBERS PRESENT:
         DANA POWERS, Chairman, ACRS
         GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS, Member, ACRS
         JOHN BARTON, Member, ACRS
         MARIO FONTANA, Member, ACRS
         THOMAS KRESS, Member, ACRS
         DON MILLER, Member, ACRS
         ROBERT SEALE, Member, ACRS
         WILLIAM SHACK, Member, ACRS
         GRAHAM WALLIS, Member, ACRS
         MARIO V. BONACA, Member, ACRS
         ROBERT E. UHRIG, Member, ACRS.                         P R O C E E D I N G S
                                                      [8:30 a.m.]
         DR. POWERS:  The meeting will now come to order.  This is
     the second day of the 461st meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor
     Safeguards.  During today's meeting the Committee will consider the
     following:  the insights gained from the risk-informed pilot
     applications, proposed final revision to 10 CFR 50.65, paragraph (a) of
     the maintenance rule and the associated draft Regulatory Guide, proposed
     approach for revising the Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement,
     proposed ACRS reports.
         The meeting is being conducted in accordance with the
     provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.  Dr. Richard P. Savio
     is the designated federal official for the initial portion of the
     meeting.
         We have received no written statements or requests for time
     to make oral statements from members of the public regarding today's
     session.
         A transcript of portions of the meeting is being kept, and
     it is requested that speakers use one of the microphones, identify
     themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so they can be
     readily heard.
         Now, the members are reminded that today during the lunch
     hour, we will get a briefing on the ethics that govern our actions as
     special government employees, and the procedure you should follow is to
     grab some lunch and come back to this meeting room.  Again, I encourage
     you to think about your personal situation and any questions that you
     might have to pose to the speaker.  I do believe he has some prepared
     remarks, but I think he would be most happy to address particular
     situations in an extemporaneous fashion.
         We are going to begin today's meeting with a much
     anticipated presentation on the insights gained from risk-informed pilot
     applications.  Dr. Shack, I believe that you are acting as the Cognizant
     Member on this extensive program?
         DR. SHACK:  Yes, I am.  We are going to hear today, I guess,
     from Rich Barrett on lessons learned from the risk-informed pilots.  We
     got about a two inch stack of SERs on pilots covering a wide range of
     activities, and I thought they were rather interesting reading myself. 
     It was an attempt to see just how 1.174 would work in practice.  Got to
     look at how people handled the incompleteness in PRAs and the fact that
     the PRAs frequently didn't cover all the components of interest, and I
     found it interesting to see how those problems were addressed.  I guess
     Rich is going to start this off.
         Was that correct yesterday, you have now moved to the PSA
     Branch?
         MR. BARRETT:  Well, it has always been the PSA Branch, it is
     the Probabilistic Safety Assessment Branch, although we sometimes call
     it the Risk Branch or the PRA Branch.  We have a little bit of an
     identity crisis in that respect, but it is all the same thing.
         DR. POWERS:  I guess one of the things that always interests
     me about pilot applications is they are essentially experiments.  And
     when I think about experiments, I think about experimental error. 
     Looking at a particular plant in a particular period of time, and I am
     wondering how you translate the data you gather from these experiments
     and extrapolate them forward in time, recognizing that there can be
     experimental error.  So to the extent you can touch upon those ideas, I
     would appreciate knowing.
         MR. BARRETT:  Yeah, I think we will touch upon those ideas,
     because part of the effort, as Mark will point out, is to try to
     understand how you go about making the transition from a pilot or
     topical/pilot to the copycat type of applications that you would get
     from other licensees.
         If I could just take a few moments here, we requested this
     briefing some months ago because -- I guess for a couple of reasons. 
     One is that we know that we have come before you on a number of
     occasions to give you individual briefings on a wide range of issues. 
     You know, you have seen individual slices of the salami, we thought it
     would be useful for you to see the big picture and get an idea of how it
     all kind of hangs together, and where our successes have been, where our
     -- I won't say failures, but where we think we still need -- have to
     work to do and we have not yet achieved success.  So that is really the
     one reason.
         The other reason is that I think we have stood or sat before
     you on a number of occasions and talked about some of these issues in a
     very abstract and conceptual way, and it is difficult sometimes to
     understand, when you are just sitting, talking about abstractions and
     words that end with a-t-i-o-n, how it really will be implemented in the
     real world.  And so today Mark Rubin, who is one of the two Section
     Chiefs in the SPSB Branch, and has been very heavily involved in it, in
     the lead for much of the work that we have done in terms of bringing
     this, a lot of these concepts into reality, is going to give you an
     overview of what we think we have accomplished and what we think we have
     learned.  Mark.
         MR. RUBIN:  Good morning.  As Rich said, I am Mark Rubin,
     one of the Section Chiefs in -- is it the PRA or PSA Branch?
         MR. BARRETT:  Oh, come on Mark.  PSA.
         MR. RUBIN:  PSA, okay.  We also have a number of the
     technical reviewers who are involved in the individual pilot risk-
     informed review, so if there are any questions directed specifically at
     some of the technical evaluations, we have a number of the people here
     who might be available to provide more information.
         As Rich said, we are here to talk about lessons learned a
     little bit, where we have come and where we are going, some of our
     successes, some of the challenges that are still remaining and things
     that are still going to need some additional attention and refinement. 
     But we want to leave the clear message that we think we have
     successfully completed the first phase of risk-informed regulation, and
     that was a phase after all the methodology development that went on for
     the last 20 years, but this is the phase, the beginning of the
     implementation, significant implementation of risk-informed regulation. 
     We think we have completed the first phase, is the end of the beginning
     -- hopefully, not the beginning of the end -- and we are ready to move
     on to a lot of additional applications and areas for risk-informed
     techniques for licensing safety evaluation reviews and licensee actions.
         The first phase that is essentially complete is that the
     staff -- as shown up on the viewgraph that I will put up right now -- is
     that we have completed the evaluation of the first industry proposals,
     which really evolved into the pilots.  A number of the areas that we
     jumped into, in fact, the majority of them, at the beginning, were
     originally industry proposals, industry suggestions, GQA, ISI, IST and
     they evolved into the pilot activities and the staff evaluation process.
         The guidance documents, Reg. Guides, SRPs that ACRS was
     heavily involved in the development of have been complete, finalized,
     except for ISI, which is issued as a draft for trial use to get us a
     little more experience, since we hadn't finished the industry topical,
     the EPRI or WOG reviews at that time.  But it is out for use and any
     tweaks that we need to do to it as we finalize the industry topicals
     will be incorporated in a final final to be issued in the future.
         And, of course, an area of great interest to the industry,
     as well as to us, is that we completed the body of first pilot
     applications in a number of areas, and we think we completed them
     successfully, though with some challenges and a few issues still
     remaining that we will get into.
         Well, since we finished the first phase, what is the second
     phase?  Where are we going now?  We are really going into, in a sense, a
     production mode.  More and more risk-informed applications are coming
     in.  This is not to say that every licensee request is risk-informed or
     relies on risk in either a significant or even a tertiary manner, but we
     are seeing an ever-increasing number in a wider variety of areas, and we
     are completing reviews in a number of areas.
         We also -- and ACRS again was significantly involved in the
     development of the risk-informed Part 50 revision options paper that
     went up to the Commission at the very end of last year and the staff is
     currently awaiting Commission guidance through an SRM on which
     combination of the options to go forward on.
         And there also is a much more broadly based risk-informed
     standard tech spec program that is currently being embarked on which
     would look at a much wider variety of tech spec AOTs and look a more
     risk-informed basis for more extensive changes, rather than just the
     piecemeal treatment that was given in the original tech spec pilots, SIT
     tanks, LPCI, things of that nature.
         Well, where do we review the successes?  There was a lot of
     startup cost to get the guidance documents out, and there was some
     concern from industry that it took too long, cost too much, delayed the
     pilots.  There was a benefit for getting the guidance documents out and
     I think we have reached the point where we are really getting the
     payback now from the documents.  The pilots that we did, I think have
     validated the approaches used in the Reg. Guides, SRPs.  The follow-on
     reviews that risk-informed are following the Reg. Guides and SRPs.
         A key issue is the guidance and the process for blending
     probabilistic with deterministic methods in doing staff safety
     evaluations.  Early on, as you are well aware, there was some concern
     that this was going to be a risk-based approach, that we were going to
     look at bottom line risk numbers.  It was going to be above or below,
     yes or no, go or no-go.
         Clearly, the staff identified in the guidance documents that
     that was not the approach being used, that it was going to be an
     integrated approach and that was delineated in the guidance documents
     and, in fact, reading the Safety Evaluation Reports, looking at the way
     the staff has done the reviews, the RAIs that go out, the interactions
     with the licensees, clearly, this is not a risk-based approach, it is an
     integrated approach.  It includes a lot of engineering, deterministic
     considerations as part of the safety determination.  The qualitative
     risk insights is part of the determination, as well, of course,
     quantitative findings is part of the decision process.
         We think it has been successful, and I think it has proven
     that it is possible and very feasible to have an integrated,
     deterministic PRA engineering approach to decision making.
         One of the key focuses of the risk-informed approach,
     specifically in the guidance documents, is the use of risk
     categorization.  It was called originally risk ranking, but as Dr.
     Scheron indicated, on a briefing a year-and-a-half or two years ago,
     small differences in ranking aren't meaningful.  Categorization, broad
     robust categories is the guidance that is useful in making decisions on
     the areas that are more fruitful, more robust for risk-informed changes,
     relaxations and some requirements that may impose unnecessary burden,
     GQA heavily used, risk categorization process, it was also used in IST. 
     It is useful even in areas where you can quantify to some degree the
     impact of the proposed change, such as IST, looking at increased
     surveillance intervals, as well as areas such as GQA where we really
     don't have models for the impact of a QA program on equipment
     reliability.
         So the categorization process and the experiences with it, I
     think has proven to be a success.  It was an early focus of the staff
     and it was an area that industry also focused on early, and I think it
     has been quite successful.
         The end result of our activities is that unnecessary burden
     is being reduced in a number of areas.  It is varying, depending on the
     application.  There are some difficulties with -- difficulties may not
     be the correct word, but some residual issues that reduce the amount of
     burden reduction to somewhat less than the licensees had originally
     desired in some areas.  We are working on some of those issues and I
     will be getting to them in just a few viewgraphs further down the road.
         Clearly burden reduction can be very significant on the
     current risk-informed processes in areas such as ISI. GQA offers some
     potential with some difficulties I will get into in a moment.  IST is
     allowing changes to surveillance intervals, as the committee is well
     aware of.  There are issues on how much follow-up and feedback and root
     cause analysis that should be performed on low, very low importance
     equipment -- that is something the Staff is still considering and I'll
     also get into that briefly a little later too.
         A further area of success, at least in our view, is improved
     efficiency and effectiveness of our safety review process.  The guidance
     documents for all the time and the money it took to develop them now
     provide the foundation for us to go forward in a structured way -- Staff
     guidance, industry guidance.  It makes all future applications, now that
     we have paid the start-up cost, much more efficient, much more focused.
         DR. POWERS:  What are the measures that you used for
     efficiency and effectiveness, especially effectiveness?
         MR. RUBIN:  I'll have to admit to a qualitative assessment
     at this point.
         DR. POWERS:  Okay.  How do you do a qualitative assessment?
         MR. RUBIN:  The measures --
         DR. POWERS:  You look around and say what you are doing is
     good?  The guys that did it the old way said that they were doing is
     good.
         MR. RUBIN:  Well, compared to the efforts that went into the
     pilot reviews and the effort that are going into follow-on reviews, much
     less Staff resources, more focused reviews, more complete submittals,
     less need for follow-up RAIs, less need for interactions, redirection,
     corrections in the technical approach taken by licensees.
         The ISI reviews through the pilot program were very lengthy. 
     There was a effort at the completion of it to develop a standardized
     format to attempt to negate the need for a lot of additional requests
     for information back and forth between the licensee and the Staff.  That
     has been worked on with EPRI.  I believe it is almost finalized and the
     new follow-on ISI submittals are going to be using it.
         The difference is a few months of review versus what was a
     year, a year and a half review, as we were feeling our way through the
     first-of-a-kind technical review.
         Providing the technical guidance on what should be the key
     elements of a submittal.  Hopefully we'll broaden out into other areas
     and we will get much more focused submittals that will require much less
     back and forth between us and the licensees.
         MR. BARRETT:  Mark, if I could add a word.
         MR. RUBIN:  Sure.
         MR. BARRETT:  I think a lot of what Mark said relates to the
     efficiency of our reviews and I would add to that that we actually have
     been gathering some statistics on how our reviews relate to the reviews
     that are being done in purely deterministic ways and they are becoming
     much more -- more and more comparable in that respect.
         The question of effectiveness may be a different question,
     and that is how good of a safety result are you getting, how good of a
     result are you getting when you compare it to the criteria that we have
     been using in NRR to evaluate everything we do, maintaining safety,
     reducing regulatory burden, public confidence.
         I think that the biggest issue there is that when you do a
     risk-based review you have a quantitative or at least semi-quantitative
     way of evaluating where you were and where you got to, and that to me
     the biggest effectiveness gain from all of this work.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Could the same decisions that you reached
     using risk information have been reached using traditional methods?
         MR. RUBIN:  Could they have been reached?  Possible.  Would
     they have been reached I think is another question --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well --
         MR. RUBIN:  -- but -- excuse me --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Go ahead, go ahead.
         MR. RUBIN:  The traditional methods had a lot of tradition
     behind them, a lot of history, regulatory feeling of confidence.  The
     risk perspective folded into the process allowed an alternate way of
     providing confidence in areas that were nontraditional approaches or
     stretching out beyond, as Gary Holahan used to say, we are now looking a
     little out of the box, going beyond the areas where we traditionally
     have accepted proposed changes.
         A good example would be the hydrogen instrumentation
     monitoring time.  That was one of the phase zero NEI pilots that had
     been in maybe three times previously and rejected three times.  Would it
     have been allowed by traditional methods?  Maybe.  But it wasn't -- and
     when we folded it into the risk-informed arena, the sort of
     comprehensive look that was taken in the environment of trying to probe
     the severe accident strengths and weaknesses part of the decision
     process was enough to sway the decision and reversed it.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  For example, what would be the equivalent
     in the deterministic framework?  What would be the equivalent of ranking
     SSCs using importance measures?  Would it be based on judgment or the
     issue would not come up at all -- we'd just go with declared safety-
     related categories and nonsafety related and then take it from there.
         MR. RUBIN:  Certainly the first approach would be just what
     you said.  It's safety-related or it's not.  But clearly over the years
     it's been looked at more finely than that and it is judgment.  The
     safety importance of equipment of course has been judged.  System
     engineering assessment would let you decide if a component, certain
     component, was actually in a success path required for system functional
     performance to meet the goals.  Small bypass pathways, drain valves,
     mini-flow loops that if they fail to open didn't defeat the required
     flows -- clearly you can make deterministic judgments in cases like that
     and perhaps provide longer AOTs or some enforcement discretion, but the
     structure is missing to some degree that the risk perspective provides,
     but clearly some of that has been done in the past but I think we are
     able to do it better now.
         One of the early concerns was, oh, risk-informed regulation
     we are going to give away the store.  Risk is going to go way up. 
     Safety is going to go way down.  Well, that hasn't happened, to the best
     of our knowledge.  Most of the applications have been either risk-
     neutral, risk-beneficial to the best of our ability to assess with
     perhaps some very small increases in some cases.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But again are these increases in the
     quantitative part of the risk?  I mean were there any unquantified
     benefits?
         MR. RUBIN:  Oh, yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay, so I think you should be a little
     careful when you say that, to make sure that you include those.  Maybe
     the overall change in risk was not a positive one.
         MR. RUBIN:  You mean the overall changes in risk --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You calculate risk, okay, and maybe you
     have a delta CDF, a delta LERF or one or the other --
         MR. RUBIN:  Yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- which is positive, small.  You say
     okay, in this case we accepted an insignificant increase in plant risk
     but does that include perhaps the benefits that have not been quantified
     yet?
         DR. SHACK:  In the Texas Utilities case, they actually
     computed increases in risk and then made the argument that because of
     the unquantified benefits --
         MR. RUBIN:  Yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And that is part of the Regulatory Guide
     as I remember, 1.174.  We said there that we have to include the
     unquantified benefits as well.
         MR. RUBIN:  Right.  You will see that in the Staff safety
     evaluations.  When I said that we had a risk-neutral risk benefit
     application with possibly some increase, some of the individual
     applications showed both potentials -- a very small worst case upside
     but a likely expectation of risk neutral or risk benefit, and so your
     statement is very true.
         There may be other applications.  Power uprate for example,
     the only change is higher power, even though they weren't submitted as
     risk-informed, Reg Guide 1.174 submittals, a very limited perspective,
     risk perspective, was taken and in fact you have higher inventory, less
     operator response time.  Those were looked at.  They were very small
     impacts but it would be slightly up because there's no compensating
     elements --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I understand that.
         DR. FONTANA:  In the baseline value, do you compare the
     effect of the action against -- is that the plant like it was or the
     plant like it would have been had you used deterministic methods or
     implementing a certain change?
         MR. RUBIN:  It's the plant like it was before the requested
     change.
         DR. FONTANA:  Okay.
         MR. RUBIN:  As built, as operated when the papers supposedly
     came in the door requesting the license amendment.
         DR. FONTANA:  Okay.
         DR. SHACK:  One of the things I did note was that in many
     ways this seems to increase Staff discretion in making these judgments. 
     If you have a deterministic rule you either make it or you don't.  Here
     none of these PRAs are in a sense ipso facto adequate to compute the
     risk that you are interested in typically, and the Staff is making lots
     of judgments that they can, you know,  accept the fact that the baseline
     PRA is incomplete, there is no low power shutdown analysis but you argue
     the ORAM -- a number of things, so, you know, is this becoming much more
     an eye of the beholder kind of evaluation?
         MR. RUBIN:  Well, I wouldn't say that all the deterministic
     evaluations are without the application of judgment over the last 30, 35
     years.  Is more judgment being used now?  I don't know if more judgment
     is being used -- perhaps different judgmental tools that are both
     quantitative and qualitative are being applied and I don't mean to give
     a gobbledegook type of answer.
         It's not you can get any answer you want.  I mean I firmly
     believe that.  People have argued that.  Critics have argued that and I
     don't believe that is the case at all.
         You're able to analyze impacts for some of the applications
     quantitatively.  In some cases not able to model the potential benefits
     that Dr. Apostolakis mentioned, such as IST improved testing methods
     that would increase the probability of detection of a fault that might
     not have been captured by an earlier testing method.  So it can't
     quantify that, but you're able to look at in some cases the upside risk
     given some -- I don't want to say, conservative, but given some bounding
     or some, you know, a little bit pessimistically derived assumptions and
     see how bad could it be at worst with reasonable, you know, reasonable
     pessimism, but not totally ridiculous approaches.  And then look at
     areas of uncertainty, the things you're not modeling, be it shutdown, be
     it improved methods in some cases, and then attempt to decide if the
     decision is a robust decision.  That's what we have to determine.
         We don't have to determine a quantitative result with any
     exact certitude, but is the decision a prudent one given what we know. 
     Yes, judgment is going into that, but that's judgment based on a lot of
     quantitative, qualitative risk-assessment information and a lot of
     quantitative and qualitative engineering deterministic assessment folded
     together.
         So I don't view it as that different from what has been done
     the last 35 years.  It's just that there are some new tools coming into
     play aiding the judgmental process.  And judgment is just part of it, a
     small part of it.  There is a lot of analytical basis behind the
     decisions.
         One of the key benefits that we've seen, you know,
     maintenance of plant safety, improved safety, low risk, is that we're
     seeing industry much more focused to a large degree on severe-accident
     issues.  There's increased risk-awareness.  The maintenance rule
     certainly was a driving force on that.  But we're seeing more and more
     consideration of risk in proposals from the licensees, support for
     responses to potential violations, enforcement actions.
         So clearly industry is also becoming much more applications
     oriented, also moving out of their first phase, which I would call
     probably the IPEs, into real decision-making, operational safety
     management of their plants.
         DR. POWERS:  You mentioned operational safety, which is a
     bit different than severe accidents, high-risk endeavors.  It really
     speaks to a variety of regulations that exist that probably govern or
     worker dose than anything else, at least as an immediate consequence. 
     And we have at our plants residents who are geared much to this
     operational safety, conduct of ops we would call it in another context. 
     Do they have a similar feeling of increased focus by the licensees on
     safety?
         MR. RUBIN:  I probably shouldn't speak for the residents. 
     You know that they are being trained in the techniques.  They are
     getting additional guidance in the current inspection manual on applying
     risk-informed techniques, and there's of course a much more focused new
     assessment inspection process that will be much more finely honed
     towards risk.  As far as what they believe, I can't speak for.
         DR. POWERS:  You try to collect that data?  I mean, does
     anybody ask them?
         MR. RUBIN:  I honestly don't know, but we have -- our points
     of contact are the SRAs, and I don't see an SRA here today.  In fact
     ours we had to loan out to Region IV.  We could certainly inquire.  I
     don't know what form there might be, but we do have interface meetings,
     and there's a lot of interaction.
         DR. POWERS:  I mean, isn't that an important data point to
     derive from these experiments?
         MR. RUBIN:  If they believe the plants are more --
         DR. POWERS:  What their overall experience with the process
     is.
         MR. RUBIN:  Well, I think that's being incorporated in the
     assessment and inspection process.  They're key players in the task
     force.
         Briefly to identify a few other what we construe as success
     elements of the process.  Clearly from the licensee's standpoint these
     techniques are providing improved operational flexibility, more online
     maintenance --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Has anybody used 1.174 to argue that they
     should be allowed to do online maintenance?  Has anybody done these risk
     assessments?
         MR. RUBIN:  Well, online -- they don't need to use 1.174 to
     do online maintenance unless they have a tech-spec prohibition, which
     some plants may have in a few cases, perhaps diesels.  If they meet the
     AOTs that they do the maintenance rule, A3, assessment of configuration
     risks, soon to be the A4 if the Commission accepts the proposed rule
     change, they can go forward and make those -- do that online
     maintenance.  It doesn't require --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So why do you say then there is increased
     ability to do it?  Why is that relevant to our discussion?  I don't
     understand.  You just said that there is no reason to use 1.174 to be
     allowed to go to online maintenance, so where did the conclusions that
     there is increased ability to do it come from?  I mean, have you seen
     any studies, even though they didn't have to use 1.174, has anybody done
     a risk assessment with and without online maintenance so we can compare?
         MR. RUBIN:  The ability to do online maintenance doesn't
     require permission in most cases.  What online maintenance you do and
     the ability to fit it into the allowable AOT in a number of cases did
     require 1.174 applications.  For example, the diesel teardowns.  They
     couldn't be done in the original AOT intervals.  The ISI inspections are
     being done -- normally you wouldn't do those on line, so that's probably
     not a good example.  But mostly it's an issue of extending intervals
     beyond the current allowed specification, such as IST going from
     quarterly or 30 days to 18 months, perhaps six years in the case of some
     check valves.
         You're stretching out maintenance requirements.  It can be
     done on line because of the maintenance rule flexibility if the A3
     assessment is done, so the tech spec changes enable the increased online
     maintenance to be done.  In a sense it is a bit of a side issue, but
     there is a lot of commonality.
         DR. BONACA:  So the bullet refers only to the cases where
     you supported changes in tech specs to allow longer times?
         MR. RUBIN:  Well, those are the cases where they can do
     things that they couldn't do before, but I'm not -- I guess I meant --
         MR. BARTON:  They weren't submitted through 1.174, they were
     submitted in a deterministic approach and they got a bunch of RAIs that
     were risk-informed RAIs, and then they made utilities put in a
     configuration management risk program to be able to do that.  But they
     didn't submit license amendments in accordance with 1.174.  That's the
     way the staff has been handling these increased outage times.
         MR. RUBIN:  We meant this statement more broadly than just
     1.174.  It's meant in the context of the increasing risk-informed
     approaches.  And the maintenance rule certainly is a key part of that. 
     Without the maintenance rule type of assessment, online maintenance
     could very well be imprudent, and even if it perhaps was allowed, it
     really wasn't implemented by many licensees, and the increasing use of
     it is what really has required the maintenance rule, A3, soon to be A4
     determinations.  So sort of the totality of the maintenance rule
     activities plus the risk-informed approaches in pilots I think is what
     gives you this ability for increased online maintenance, not just 1.174.
         MR. BARRETT:  Mark, if I could just say a word.  I want to
     make sure we don't leave the wrong impression.  There are a number of
     plant-specific submittals that have been brought in under 1.174 that
     have requested these allowed outage increases.  Specifically to make
     online maintenance possible there have been a number of owners' group-
     sponsored topical reports for a variety of systems from a number of the
     owners groups that basically are trying to do the same things.  And
     referencing 1.174 is the basis.
         The other point I'd like to make is that our experience is
     that even though we might give an allowed outage time of 14 days to make
     sure that there's enough time to do a diesel online maintenance, the
     licensees are not taking the entire 14 days.  There's a lot of
     experience that they're actually completing these things in a much more
     expedited fashion.
         MR. RUBIN:  Well, having the extended AOTs will prevent
     unnecessary plant shutdowns in some cases.  It's directly tied to the
     issue that you've just mentioned, increased flexibility in performing
     tests on pumps and valves.  I also mentioned that previously.  IST
     program, extending the intervals.  ISI changes.  Certainly from an
     operational safety standpoint directing to the issue that Dr. Powers
     raised on plant worker exposure a big reduction in worker exposure, cost
     of doing the inspections, and better inspections because they're focused
     on more safety-risk-important locations.
         And also the ability to modify QA controls commensurate with
     safety, which the rule allows, but there hadn't been really guidance on
     how to do it and what it meant to do it.  So overall, a lot more
     flexibility.  Some limitations.
         That we still have to work on, especially in the GQA area.
         Also, an issue that is of great interest to the industry is
     the potential reduction for the need for submittals to the NRC for prior
     review and approval in all cases.  Both the IST, GQA programs reviewed
     risk-informed processes for changing program elements, not an absolutely
     final list of equipment that was treated according to various
     requirements within the program.  Therefore, once the process has been
     appropriately reviewed, approved, appropriate feedback mechanisms are in
     place through the licensee, the need for Staff approval in some cases
     will be negated.
         Also, the proposed change to 50.59 will make it possible --
     the minimal change -- and future changes to make the entire 50.59
     process more risk-informed concerning severe accident issues -- if that
     is one of the areas endorsed by the Commission SRM -- would also allow
     more licensee flexibility, ability to go forward without Staff review
     and approval in areas where there is no safety risk significant impact
     from them doing so.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I must say I don't understand very well
     the first statement there.  I thought the Staff approval, the need for
     Staff approval was a different regulation -- 50.59.  How can this
     approach reduce the need for that?  Isn't that what happened in South
     Texas, that you approved the GQA program they had but then when they
     implemented it and they wanted to remove some components from the high
     risk category then they hit on 50.59, which did not allow them to do
     that without approval from the Staff.
         MR. RUBIN:  Not from high risk category.  From the other --
     EQ -- code requirements --
         MR. BARTON:  I think it was the code requirements.
         MR. RUBIN:  Yes.  Your statement is very true.  Those
     limitations are impacting the ability of South Texas to make the
     changes.  If we can overcome that, and there are some processes in place
     to do that, making changes to the specific elements in the QA program
     would be within the purview of the licensees if they met the basic
     process.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But right now this is not true, is it?
         MR. RUBIN:  It is true as long as they don't run up against
     other regulatory limitations.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Ah.
         MR. RUBIN:  And they won't in some cases.
         DR. MILLER:  But they did in South Texas?
         MR. RUBIN:  For a number of components.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Can you give me an example, Mark?  I want
     to understand this better.  Does an example come easily to mind?
         MR. RUBIN:  You mean what they can change?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, without staff approval.
         MR. RUBIN:  They can change ISI locations.  Steve, correct
     me if I am wrong, they -- Mr. Dinsmore?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I see.
         MS. DINSMORE:  This is Steve Dinsmore from the Staff.
         What this means is again if they go through and they do the
     process and they select the welds to inspect, later on if they have new
     information they can change the welds to adjust for the new information
     that they have without coming in beforehand and saying we would like to
     do this, can you re-review our process and reapprove?
         With the QA stuff, if they move stuff from high to low, they
     can adjust the QA controls depending on where it is and again they don't
     have to come in and say we have moved this thing from high to low, can
     you tell us that's okay?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But they were not allowed to change the
     welds before?  What is the --
         MS. DINSMORE:  We had a list of welds.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, you had a list.
         MS. DINSMORE:  And the QA stuff they couldn't change at all.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So now South Texas is allowed or
     whoever -- I'm using that because I know they have to approve their
     program -- they can move a component from the risk-significant category
     to the, say, targeted QA category without prior approval?
         MS. DINSMORE:  That's right.  Then they adjust the controls
     which they are using.
         MR. RUBIN:  But the process to do that is very well defined,
     plus the feedback loop, so if there is degradation they didn't expect,
     they can reassess the importance of the equipment.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So what was the problem then, John?  Some
     codes?
         MR. BARTON:  I guess they got hung up in -- they had
     commitments to the IST program -- Section 11 --
         MR. BARRETT:  This question is still in play and we haven't
     gotten to the bottom of this yet, but basically we gave them approval to
     take a graded approach to quality assurance, which can be a big
     operational impact from their perspective, but what they found was that
     when they went to implement it, say in procuring something, they still
     had, even though something was found to be in a low risk significance
     category -- perhaps it was a drain valve on an important system or some
     local indicator on an important system, something that would not really
     be important to the functioning of that system -- but it was still
     labelled as a safety-related component, and as such it was still subject
     to a lot of qualification requirements, so even though it had a low QA,
     it could be graded down in QA, it still had to be procured in a way that
     would not really result in any particular savings in money and in cost.
         So the question is is there a mechanism for taking something
     like that, a very low significance component in an important system, and
     reclassifying it from safety-related to nonsafety-related, and that is
     where the question, the 50.59 question came up.  Would they have to
     submit 23,000 license amendments to have these things changed? -- and I
     can tell you that question is still in play.  It may very well be that
     they do not have to do that, that we can find an efficient process --
     and there should be an efficient process for reclassifying equipment
     that was probably overly conservatively classified in the first place,
     but the jury is still out on that.
         MR. BARTON:  Then by enabling them to do that, they would be
     able to get out of some of the other code requirements like the ASME
     IST.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The categorization of components as risk-
     significant and the middle category and significant does not affect
     their classification as safety-related or nonsafety-related, is that the
     message?
         MR. BARRETT:  Not necessarily, no.  That is one of the
     issues to be addressed in the Part 50 rulemaking.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But you say when they want to buy
     something that has been declared safety-related even though it may
     belong to the targeted QA category, it still is safety-related right
     now?
         MR. BARRETT:  That's right, so it still has to meet
     environmental qualifications.  It still has to be seismically
     qualified -- not seismically capable.  You certainly want it to be
     seismically capable but it has to be seismically qualified.  It has to
     be environmentally qualified.  It has to have all of those pedigrees on
     it even though we found that it is not risk significant.  That is an
     issue to be resolved and we are making progress on it.
         DR. MILLER:  Can you describe in more detail about the
     progress you are making?  I don't understand.  It seems like a fairly
     straightforward thing.
         MR. BARRETT:  Let's see.  I guess this is a long story.  We
     have requested that, as Mark will tell you, we have requested that the
     Commission give us authorization to go forward and change Part 50 as it
     relates to these questions.
         We have requested the Commission authorize us to give wide-
     ranging exemptions to a few plants so we can get some experience on how
     this might work, and one of those plants that has come in quite early is
     South Texas.
         In discussing their proposals for exemptions to things like
     the IST and ISI requirements and other requirements, we have begun to
     examine whether these exemptions are really required in order to do what
     they want to do, and we are now examining the possibility that South
     Texas could request a regulatory finding from us that there is another
     approach that can be made.  That finding, of course, is going to require
     NRR, the General Counsel and others to bring the best information we
     have to bear, but there may in fact be a more efficient way of meeting
     the regulations and allowing them to do what they want to do -- that
     would for instance allow them to make some of these changes without
     specifically requesting a license amendment for hundreds or thousands of
     pieces of equipment that have no risk significance at all.
         MR. RUBIN:  The licensee, South Texas, has suggested that
     they can recategorize a number of safety-related components still
     meeting the regulatory requirements, the definitions that they have to
     meet, the tests that they have to meet for it not to be safety-related,
     but they are proposing that an additional test would be a risk-
     importance test before they declassify.
         There are some early discussions that have taken place and
     we are talking to them some more.  We will also be talking to our Office
     of General Counsel on what flexibility there is to do that, but
     declassification has occurred in the past if it is not necessary that
     they retain the safety classification.
         As you just discussed, there was more impact in South Texas
     on GQA implication than people had expected.  The ultimate solution,
     hopefully, is to revise the regulatory requirements so they can
     accommodate regulatory treatment based on appropriate elements of risk
     and safety importance.  But, hopefully, in advance of that, we can go
     forward with exemptions or this reclassification process, and we are
     working now with South Texas to achieve that.
         DR. MILLER:  You said that it was not expected.  I thought
     when we looked at the GQA, there was discussion about if you had a
     safety-related component and it were indeed non-safety significant, that
     that would require some reclassification.  I think that was discussed a
     year-and-a-half ago.
         MR. RUBIN:  What I recall from a year-and-a-half or two
     years ago --
         DR. MILLER:  Or to the GQA Reg. Guide.
         MR. RUBIN:  Yeah.  There clearly was a recognition on the
     part of the industry and the utility that there would be limitations
     that they bumped up against under the regulatory requirements.  I think
     what happened is they under-estimated the extent of the bumps, so they
     expected to be limited to some degree.  It turned out they were limited
     significantly from what they wanted to change the QA requirements on. 
     But I don't believe they were originally planning reclassification. 
     That might have been held out as something to consider in the future.
         If they had folded that into the original submittal, it
     could have been considered, but it was not part of it.
         DR. MILLER:  Isn't that going to be a generic problem with
     the GQA --
         MR. RUBIN:  Definitely, yes.
         DR. MILLER:  This is not a once in a lifetime issue.
         MR. RUBIN:  No, and that is why we are trying to deal with
     it not only on a one-to-one case in South Texas, but that it be an
     important focus of the Part 50 change process, to accommodate these
     types of issues.
         DR. FONTANA:  Would you backup a viewgraph, please?
         MR. RUBIN:  If I can find it, I can do it.  Let's see.
         DR. FONTANA:  Well, anyway, the one that says NOED.
         MR. RUBIN:  Two.
         DR. FONTANA:  Well, I just want to know what NOED is.
         MR. RUBIN:  Notice of Enforcement Discretion.
         DR. FONTANA:  Thank you.
         MR. RUBIN:  Sure.  Stepping back one or two meters, where
     are we?  What have we learned, what have we accomplished?  We have
     improved the staff review processes.  Through this risk-informed
     activity with the Reg. Guides, SRPs and the experience we gained in the
     pilots, we have developed a process to expedite review of risk-informed
     submittals, each one is not one of a kind, with more application of the
     judgmental issues that were questioned earlier, but more formalized,
     guided sentence criteria, both for the submittal process for the
     licensees and the staff review.  The issue of scope and depth of review
     has been dealt with at the office level, with office letter 830, to
     provide guidance to the staff that the scope of the review should be
     commensurate with the potential safety significance of the issue.  RAIs
     should be focused on the technical issues that are related to safety. 
     The potential impact of the request should guide how much safety review
     is conducted.
         The interactions with industry on PRA quality are a key one. 
     Certainly, PRA quality has been an important concept, an important issue
     hanging over this entire process.  Resolution, of course, is needed. 
     Industry took a leadership position early on with the BWR PRA
     certification process.  The staff was also involved through the Office
     of Research with the national consensus standard process.  Those two
     processes are going on somewhat in parallel right now, and there is an
     effort to attempt to draw them together and help identify what role each
     will play in use and staff assessment and review of PRAs in our safety
     review process.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Was the issue of quality important enough
     in some cases to become an issue, so you had to go back and forth, you
     know, arguing about certain assumptions perhaps, or calculations, or was
     it minor?
         MR. RUBIN:  For the most part, it was minor, but the depth
     of the quality review varied considerably, from sending a team of five
     or six experts down to a site for a week, which was done on Comanche
     Peak, to reviewing a national lab performed review of one of the PRAs
     and then following up issues or weaknesses that were identified there,
     to very focused reviews on such things as EDG AOT requests where the SBO
     modeling was looked at in some detail, but the whole content of the PRA
     didn't need to be looked at because it wasn't as pervasive through the
     plant as something like GQA would have been.  So there was a large
     variety.  But we generally did not get into arguments on small quality
     issues because, from the applications that were underway, those
     questions, or those answers didn't become key to making the decision.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, perhaps, also, the submittals you
     received were a little biased towards better quality, because, you know,
     they are first of a kind, so the licensees made sure that their PRAs
     were very good.
         MR. RUBIN:  Yes, it is self-selection to some degree since
     the stronger PRA licensees were the ones who were involved in the pilot
     activities.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Exactly.
         MR. RUBIN:  And that is something we are very aware of and
     want to make sure that sufficient quality continues as there is much
     wider applications.  A very good point.
         DR. BONACA:  Although, I mean in some of these SERs, there
     was significant criticism that your staff made regarding the limitations
     of the PRA and yet a lot of arguments were made to explain why those
     shortcomings would not affect the conclusions of the SER.  You know,
     that surprised me, too, that somebody would go in with certain
     applications and then you would have to do that kind of -- a lot of
     jumping around to justify why you could still support the application,
     although, you know, there were shortcomings in the methodology.  Isn't
     that true?
         MR. RUBIN:  Well, there are a couple of issues here.  First
     of all, these were our first of a kind reviews, too.  Just as the
     licensees put a lot of effort in ensuring the quality, we put a lot of
     effort into reviewing quality issues to gain knowledge in the process
     and experience, and to ensure that these pilots were fully completed
     adequately.  But looking at weaknesses in a PRA, I think is an important
     part of the review process in a number of cases because there is not
     necessarily a requirement that the perfect PRA is the minimum
     requirement for a risk-informed decision.  They will be of varying
     qualities and varying completnesses in scope.
         Does that mean a moderately complete PRA?  Perhaps it is a
     Level I study, perhaps it doesn't have shutdown treatment in it, as most
     don't at this point.  Does that mean we can't use it to make some
     decisions?  Well, no, we don't believe so, but you still have to probe
     what the obvious weaknesses are to test the robustness of your decision
     process.  And I think that concept is described fairly completely in
     Reg. Guide 1.174.
         DR. MILLER:  So, Mark, even though we would expect these to
     be the higher quality PRAs, we did still see a substantial variation in
     the quality of the ones in the pilots?
         MR. RUBIN:  Certainly, we saw a variation.  I think all of
     them were pretty good.  I think it would be more scope issues at this
     stage.  But there are clearly OPRAs out there that the quality issue has
     become much more relevant.
         DR. MILLER:  So when we get farther in, we get this more on
     a routine basis.  There is going to be PRAs out there whose quality are
     not nearly as good as the ones we have seen here in the pilots.
         MR. RUBIN:  I would certainly expect that, but I think that
     is the reason for the industry certification process and our activities
     in the standards process.  Hopefully, these will drive --
         DR. MILLER:  That is going to take a while to catch up to
     quality.  I mean if the standard -- let's say the standard is issued
     another year, how long is it going to take for the industry to catch up
     on quality on their PRAs?
         MR. RUBIN:  That's a very valid point vis-a-vis the
     standard.  For industry certification, though, most, if not all, of the
     BWRs have been done, and the other vendor groups are jumping on board. 
     Now, the industry certification and the standard are not one and the
     same right now, but a strong peer review is certainly an important
     element to help achieve quality and will be a good focal point for the
     staff's evaluation.  In the case --
         DR. MILLER:  Isn't the certification process partly focused
     on just the limited scope of the PRAs?
         MR. RUBIN:  I think it is pretty broad.  I think they look
     at quite a bit.  They rate the various elements for --
         DR. MILLER:  It seemed like there was different gradations
     in that certification process.
         MR. RUBIN:  Yeah, sure.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, you have reviewed many so-called
     deterministic requests over the years, right?
         MR. RUBIN:  The staff or me personally?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, --
         MR. RUBIN:  Yeah, sure, of course.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Did the quality vary there?
         MR. RUBIN:  Yeah, absolutely.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  All right.
         DR. POWERS:  But we hold PRA to a much higher standard,
     George.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I noticed that.
         DR. MILLER:  Mark, I had a question.  Earlier, you made a
     comment on the graded depth of, I guess, reviews.
         MR. RUBIN:  Yes.
         DR. MILLER:  Historically, that has always been done.  Do
     you think this is providing a lot more guidance in those, is that what
     you are saying there?
         MR. RUBIN:  I think, historically, it is a good concept, but
     perhaps, historically, it has not always been achieved.  And now the
     guidance at the office level is clear, that resources should be focused
     commensurate on the safety importance.  And an insignificant impact
     request should certainly receive less resources than a request that
     potentially has significant.
         I mean it is obvious, but in the past there have been, you
     know, review activities that perhaps have been excessive, and we are
     trying to make sure that they are properly focused on safety and the
     guidances come from Mr. Collins, the Office Director, through an office
     letter to ensure that that is the way business is carried out.  That
     RAIs that are issued are appropriate and necessary.  You know what you
     are going to do with the answer because you send them.  You don't need
     the answer, why are you asking the question?
         DR. UHRIG:  One quick question.  The RILP abbreviation, what
     is that?
         MR. RUBIN:  Risk Informed Licensing Panel.  Did I skip that? 
     My apologies.
         DR. UHRIG:  Okay.
         MR. RUBIN:  Part of the process to improve the Staff
     effectiveness is to have an early, fairly senior management level body
     to bring issue to for resolution, for guidance, and a number of Division
     Directors are on this panel and issues such as South Texas, issues such
     as configuration risk management, how that should be treated in the tech
     specs or an administrative procedure, issues that are raised by industry
     get early senior management attention to help keep the Staff focused on
     the success path.
         Where are we going now?  The future is here, so to speak. 
     We are working to process risk-informed licensing actions.  We have a
     number of them in-house in a number of areas.  The new IST proposals
     came in, some new ISI proposals are coming in-house.  We are continuing
     to work with industry groups on topical reports such as the EPRI ISI
     report still under review and a number of code cases, at least three
     related to ISI.  I am sure there are others -- an IST code case under
     Staff involvement.
         We are continuing to incorporate the insights from lessons
     learned into the guidance documents, though we have not yet had an
     update cycle.  I think the first one towards the end of this year we'll
     be considering comments from industry as we get more experience
     conducting the individual reviews.
         There have been some suggestions perhaps in the IST area
     that the requirements for monitoring and feedback of low important
     equipment is somewhat excessive, and the Staff is considering that, and
     that may be reflected in the future change to review guidance.
         We are standing by on our marching orders on Part 50, risk-
     informed process, and we expect to be receiving SRM very shortly, and we
     are working rather intensely with South Texas to try to get some sort of
     interim relief or resolution to the impediments on the GQA process.
         There is also the significant interaction with the risk-
     informed tech spec activity that I mentioned at the very beginning of my
     briefing.  The Owners Group tech spec committees are working with the
     Staff to flesh out a much more broadly based program.  We expect a lot
     of stakeholder interactions in many areas -- the SECY 98-300
     specifically mentions that we plan to proceed with pretty extensive
     interactions, meetings in that area but they are ongoing in numerous
     areas with frequent meetings with Owners Groups, with NEI, to keep
     pushing these issues.
         When problems are fleshed up, then both the RILP, the
     licensing panel, and the PRA steering committee, which is chaired by Mr.
     Thadani and crewed by the office directors, is also certainly in the
     loop, very much so, in providing policy guidance on how to proceed, so
     there is involvement at the very highest levels of agency management, a
     lot of interaction with the public, and quick routes to mid to senior
     level office management to provide guidance in resolution of problems.
         DR. UHRIG:  Has this gotten rid of the backlog of tech specs
     that keep accumulating?
         MR. RUBIN:  I should probably ask our risk-informed
     licensing manager, who I don't think is here today.  I think the backlog
     is decreasing but I am sure it is not zero.
         MR. BARRETT:  I think there are two answers to that
     question.
         The overall backlog of licensing actions, I don't think that
     the risk-informed program is central to reducing that backlog.  There is
     a major effort in place to try to reduce that backlog and to reduce the
     Staff's performance, the overall Staff performance, on timeliness of
     review.  I think we are having a lot of success as an office in doing
     that, but I would not attribute very much of that to this particular
     program.
         Now the subset of tasks, of licensing actions, that fall
     into this category, which are of the order of 10 to 15 percent
     perhaps -- I don't have good statistics -- but it is of that order, we
     have very good performance on turning these around.  Once we get them,
     we turn them around.  We took some statistics for one quarter, for the
     first quarter of this fiscal year, and I think the average time,
     residence time, was eight months, between from when it arrived to when
     we completed the review and the average Staff effort for routine
     licensing actions was about 30 hours of review, so these are good
     statistics for this particular subset of actions.
         MR. RUBIN:  In conclusion, I would just like to repeat,
     reiterate that we have stepped out beyond the start of this process.  We
     have the guidance in place.  It's being used successfully by the Staff
     and by industry with some areas of difficulty that we are giving a fair
     amount of attention and industry is giving attention to, and I think we
     see some success potential there.
         We are seeing an increasing stream of risk-informed
     licensing actions, but that is not 100 percent.  Everything in it isn't
     risk-informed, just a small percentage, but it is definitely increasing
     in risk awareness of the industry in dealing with regulatory safety
     issues, very obviously increasing, and clearly we want to send the
     message that we are receptive and flexible in expanding the use of risk-
     informed techniques to a wider variety of our safety decision-making
     processes.
         We have certainly seen that in the assessment inspection
     process, changes to the enforcement process, and we welcome new
     initiatives by industry in other areas that are amenable to these
     techniques, making better decisions.
         That concludes my remarks.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  One of the areas that caused some
     apprehension when the Guide was published was the detailed discussion on
     uncertainties and model uncertainty and completeness uncertainty and all
     that.
         Did you have any issues related to these in the actual
     submittals you reviewed or it was more or less routine, because people
     read these things and say, my god, you know, what they want.
         MR. RUBIN:  I don't think it has in an operational sense
     turned out to be a problem.  I could in the future, depending on a
     particular application that would be more sensitive -- the decision
     would be more sensitive to the fundamental uncertainty issues.
         Here the areas of uncertainty don't seem to be driving the
     decisions.  The programs include so much in addition to the risk
     elements into the integrated process that we haven't been constrained by
     those issues.
         DR. FONTANA:  Do you see any potential revisions to Reg
     Guide 1.174 as a consequence of the experience that you have had here?
         MR. RUBIN:  We have a cycle due and our colleagues in the
     Office of Research are the leaders in that revision cycle, even though
     certainly NRR is heavily involved.
         I think we have a cycle towards the end of the summer.  I am
     seeing a nod from the back -- no, not the end of the summer.  I am off
     on my date.
         Right now we haven't identified specific changes to it.  We
     are considering potentially some in the IST area but we think it is too
     early, but for 174 I am not aware of anything that we feel needs to be
     changed at this time.
         Mark Cunningham from Research.
         MR. CUNNINGHAM:  Yes.  The cycle now is about the end of the
     calendar year basically.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And there were no problems related to
     maintaining the philosophy of defense-in-depth and safety margins?
         MR. RUBIN:  I think that has been one of the big successes
     of the process.  No, no problems.  I think it's been achieved.  It was
     certainly in the top of everyone's thoughts as the reviews were going
     forward.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Was defense-in-depth affected by any of
     these actions?
         MR. RUBIN:  I don't believe so.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So maybe that is why there was no problem.
         MR. RUBIN:  Good point.
         DR. SEALE:  Mark, you have undoubtedly learned a lot of
     specifics to replace some of the unease that may have existed going in
     as to what constituted an adequate PRA treatment of the kind of detailed
     issues that were involved in this kind of risk assessment.
         We talked earlier about what constituted an adequate PRA and
     all.  I think we all recognized that none of these submittals were done
     doing a bare bones IPE submittal.  Rather, there was a lot of addition
     and so on.
         You have now gone through and done a combing of those
     efforts and you had an opportunity to make a value judgment on how
     successful these modifications have been in addressing the issues
     germane to this kind of treatment.  What kind of feedback mechanism do
     you have to let future applicants know what turns you on and what turns
     you off when you get a PRA submittal in support of one of these things?
         MR. RUBIN:  Well, there is the traditional approach where
     the next submitter reads the RAIs and the staff safety evaluation. 
     Nothing new there.  It's always been done.  If we put out --
         DR. SEALE:  You can see when you smile and when you frown.
         MR. RUBIN:  Yes.  You can tell that.  But there are some
     other things going on.  This standardized format process is sending a
     clear message, this is what we want to see when a submittal comes in,
     and we expect it to be very successful in ISI and hopefully in other
     areas.  The interactions with industry that we plan to continue,
     everywhere from maintenance rule to the meetings on the ISI submittal
     guidance approach that I just mentioned.
         There's a lot of talking going on, but between the standard
     format and seeing what the staff findings are in the SE, I think we do a
     fairly good job of it, but, you know, we're always available to talk and
     give thoughts.
         One of the key elements is out of the new staff review
     process 803 it encourages early interaction back and forth verbally,
     face-to-face meetings, don't just send in a submittal and expect to get
     RAIs in 14 months.  If there are issues that pop up from a quick staff
     look, the guidance from the Office of Management is quick feedback to
     the licensee in the areas that don't look too good, and perhaps it's our
     misunderstanding of the issue, perhaps there's an incompleteness on the
     submittal.  So we're going to try to do a lot more face to face and
     provide much earlier feedback than in the past to help it along.
         DR. SHACK:  We're running a little bit behind schedule, so
     unless there's another burning question, I'd like to give Mr. Biff
     Bradley from NEI a chance to give his perspective on pilots.
         MR. RUBIN:  Thank you.
         DR. SEALE:  Thank you, Mark.
         MR. BRADLEY:  Good morning.  I'm Biff Bradley of NEI.  I
     appreciate the opportunity to discuss some of the lessons learned from
     the risk-informed pilot applications, and I have a few slides on some of
     the specifics from the industry perspective.
         But before I do that, I wanted to say that I think the
     biggest lesson we've learned is that change is possible.  Last year was
     a real banner year for actually achieving change, and I have to say
     prior to last year I think there was a lot of skepticism in the industry
     that we'd ever reach fruition with a lot of these approaches and
     actually achieve real change in the field.  And we have seen that
     happen.
         There is -- I can tell you from working at NEI -- there's a
     considerable amount of momentum and much more interest at the executive
     level and at all levels in the industry in proceeding with risk-informed
     applications and regulatory improvements.  We have formed a new
     executive working group to oversee and provide strategy direction in
     this area, and we had to turn away applicants.  We had so many
     interested utilities that in order to limit it to a workable-size group,
     and we still have about 22 or 23 people on there.  So that's a positive
     indication that there's real interest out there.
         I wanted to give you a little bit of information about some
     specifics -- get my maintenance-rule slides out of the way here.
         MR. BARTON:  And maybe we can resolve your concerns on those
     while you're at it.
         [Laughter.]
         MR. BRADLEY:  That would be nice.
         MR. BARTON:  It would shorten the staff briefing.
         MR. BRADLEY:  I wanted to talk about some of the areas we
     perceive as most successful, and in all these cases where we've had
     success, some of the credit for that success should go to the NRC staff
     for being proactive and helping us to develop processes to make these
     changes work, and one of those is ISI.  And, as you know, this effort's
     been under way for a number of years, and there is a significant burden
     reduction associated primarily with the reactor coolant system, ISI,
     scope.  By focusing the weld-inspection scope based on known degradation
     mechanisms and risk insights are you able to achieve a narrower scope of
     inspection without any risk decrement.  And, as you know, this can be
     done on a full-plant basis or on a partial basis.  That is just the
     Class 1, the RCS, ISI.
         DR. POWERS:  When you say that you reduce the scope and you
     go -- get no risk decrement?
         MR. BRADLEY:  That's correct.
         DR. POWERS:  It seems remarkable to me.  I mean, I would
     think that there must be some risk decrement.
         MR. BRADLEY:  There are a number of reasons for that.  The
     previous scope was not focused.  It was essentially somewhat random. 
     This is a targeted focused scope based on a lot of industry experience
     about --
         DR. POWERS:  So you might even say there's --
         MR. BRADLEY:  It's a risk improvement for some plants.
         DR. POWERS:  Risk improvement.
         MR. BRADLEY:  There's also improvements in testing methods,
     in the NDE methods that are picked up as part of this that also result
     from a lot of experience.
         DR. POWERS:  Well, it's probably true in the full scope
     implementation because there in fact you add --
         MR. BRADLEY:  Right.
         DR. POWERS:  I mean, you actually may add some -- you've
     reduced many, but you add others that are significant.
         MR. BRADLEY:  It's true even in a Class 1 partial scope. 
     These are either risk-neutral or a risk improvement in the ones we've
     achieved so far.
         Just to give you some ballpark numbers on actual burden
     reductions, as you can see, the -- and there is a lot of plant
     variation, plant-to-plant variation on this because of differences in
     design, the amount of radiation exposure involved, how old the plant is,
     accessibility, et cetera.
         But for a typical plant we're looking on the order of a
     quarter of a million dollars per year or per cycle, which essentially
     will pay for the implementation costs in one cycle.  And more
     importantly there is a significant occupational radiation exposure
     reduction typically on the order of 25 person-rem per year or per cycle. 
     These should probably be per cycle --
         DR. SHACK:  Per cycle.
         MR. BRADLEY:  Per plant.  And that is a not insignificant
     proportion of the whole occupational exposure burden that we face.
         DR. SHACK:  Just out of curiosity, at our Materials and
     Metallurgy Subcommittee meeting an NEI staff person estimated the cost
     of a ten-year update to the ISI at a million bucks, and you're going to
     do the whole risk-informed ISI implementation for 250K?
         MR. BRADLEY:  Yes, well, this is just a fraction of the
     whole program.  I can't speak to that other number.
         DR. POWERS:  When you quote 250K burden reduction, does that
     include some evaluation of the worth of 25 person rem avoided exposure?
         MR. BRADLEY:  No.  You can attribute a certain cost
     reduction to the exposure reduction, but this is not included, so
     there's actually a greater benefit there.
         Another thing that the industry and staff have I'd like to
     say successfully worked together on, and we talked -- Mark talked about
     this previously -- is a process to expedite the review and approval of
     these changes for follow-on plants after the pilots, and luckily for us,
     10 CFR 50.55(a)(a)(3) is a unique regulation in that it provides right
     there in the existing regulation for the use of alternatives that can be
     approved by the Director of NRR, and because of that you don't need
     rulemaking in order to come up with a -- or use a different approach.
         And it would be nice -- if there were other regulations with
     those types of provisions I think we could move forward a lot faster in
     risk-informed, because rulemaking, regardless of everyone's intentions,
     is always a slow, slow process, and -- however, we were able to work
     with that provision, and we did develop for the Westinghouse owners'
     group method and will be doing this also for the EPRI method what we
     called a template submittal.
         With a series of meetings with the staff we determined
     exactly what information the staff needed to facilitate an expedited
     review, and we agreed up front on what needed to be in that submittal. 
     And in addition to that there was an information notice that provided an
     extension of your ten-year interval to allow plants to incorporate the
     improved programs, the ones that were running up to the end of their
     intervals.
         So I'd like to say we've worked very positively with the
     staff in the ISI area, and that's been very productive.
         IST I'll just briefly note.  There has been one approval and
     I think a number -- several other plants are docketed or about to
     docket.  And this one is a -- it's a risk ranking, risk application, and
     does allow some extension of your pump and valve testing for low-safety-
     significant components in a stepwise fashion from the existing quarterly
     requirement up to ultimately a six-year requirement, although not at
     this time.  For the plant that was approved -- for Comanche Peak that
     allows elimination of 1,500 tests in the initial cycle.
         Additionally another cost benefit for this is that for some
     plants IST can be part of your critical path, depending on how your
     outage planning is conducted.
         DR. POWERS:  Numbers that I have seen for the cost per test
     always astound me, because they're so high.  The dollar savings here
     must be extraordinary.
         MR. BRADLEY:  Well, interesting, the numbers that we got
     from Comanche Peak I thought were quite low.  I mean, it was on the
     order of just several hundred dollars per test.
         MR. BARTON:  That doesn't make sense.
         MR. BRADLEY:  That's, you know, that's all I can tell you
     from the numbers that we got from them.  However, plants such as San
     Onofre that are going to be docketing this in the near future estimate
     they can save two days off of critical path outage, and there are
     significant --
         DR. POWERS:  You save a lot of bucks there.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What's LSSC?
         MR. BRADLEY:  Low safety significant component.  That's sort
     of a maintenance-rule terminology, but that's basically the lower half
     of your risk ranking.
         DR. MILLER:  What kind of dollars per test -- back to Dana's
     question -- dollars per test would you have expected to see, even though
     South Texas is quite low?
         MR. BRADLEY:  I don't --
         DR. MILLER:  Hundreds of dollars seems -- I can't believe
     you can do any tests for hundreds of dollars.
         MR. BRADLEY:  Well, that's why -- I mean, I can tell you,
     we've explicitly asked that question, and that's what they have told us
     at that plant.  That's the only data I have at this time.
         DR. POWERS:  And they actually may be right, because they're
     working with LSSCs, and, you know, some tests just are literally
     plugging a meter into the back of a board.
         MR. BRADLEY:  Right.
         DR. POWERS:  And --
         MR. BARTON:  Two electricians stroke a valve.  Maybe the
     $200 is labor costs.
         DR. POWERS:  The average test that's done by a plant is
     pretty expensive.
         MR. BRADLEY:  Another area I'd like to talk about, and I
     think this is another area that I would call a success, and again this
     is due to proactive and good work on the part of the NRC staff.  They
     deserve some credit for this in the whole area of tech specs.  I think
     the tech spec branch has been very forward looking and willing to accept
     change, and has actually put proposals on the table for their own ideas
     of how to risk-inform tech specs, which is somewhat unique for the staff
     as a whole.
         There have been in the last year or so a number of AOT
     extensions approved, as you see here.  The CE plants went in as a group
     submittal for the SITs and LPCIs, and some of them have also gotten the
     AOTs on the diesels.  And as you can see a number of other plants have
     come in and received approvals for diesel generator AOT extensions.
         Again, this was due in part to NRC taking the initiative to
     make some internal changes to facilitate timely reviews and approvals,
     and this resulted from a stakeholder workshop that occurred last July. 
     And there was an elevation in the priority of risk-informed tech spec
     requests from near the low end of the spectrum to near the high end of
     the spectrum and, generally, a targeted six-month approval schedule for
     these types of applications.
         As Mark mentioned, there is a new effort underway by the NRC
     staff in conjunction with the Owners Groups and NEI to look beyond just
     AOT extensions and look at some of the form of tech specs, the form of
     the action statements, the end states.  Tech specs are very conducive to
     risk-informed improvements because in a lot of ways they are not real
     risk smart, the way they are set up now.  You may have end states that
     are less safe than the operating state for your action requirements.
         For instance, if you lose an RHR function or something, the
     action requirement may be to shut the plant down, where you are really
     challenging the system that is not there or degraded.  Also, end states
     where you go to cold shutdown.  It may be preferable in a number of
     cases to go to a hot shutdown where you maintain steam pressure to drive
     turbine driven makeup sources.
         So we are well into that effort now.  We are expecting,
     again, this is one that you can do without rulemaking.  50.36, which is
     the controlling rule for tech specs, doesn't appear to need to be
     changed in order to accommodate these types of changes.  We can put them
     into the improved standard tech spec.  So, again, anything that can be
     done without rulemaking, you know, is well worth pursuing and there is a
     lot of interest in the industry in this effort.
         I wanted to talk a little bit about some overall lessons we
     have learned from all these applications.  What we have seen, I think,
     over the last year, while we have had a lot of improvement, and I guess
     it shouldn't be unexpected that you are not always going to have an easy
     road to hoe on these things, and I guess I would state, you know, it
     hasn't -- we haven't seen consistent execution of the PRA policy
     statements, you know, which says, you know, that you should be able to
     use risk insights to reduce burdens.
         And as Chairman Jackson has said, the staff should be
     willing to let go of what is not important once it is really determined
     that it is not important.  I think the situation is getting better and
     better, but there are isolated instances where the NRC staff, you know,
     will appear to just really have -- try to raise obstacles rather than
     look for resolution paths.  I don't want to, you know, overly emphasize
     this.  I think it is getting better, but there is still some of that.
         We have seen very effective -- you know, the Commission's
     directions to the staff, the EDO tracking memo and the internal panels,
     all those things have been very effective at making this situation
     better.  I think when we talk later today about the maintenance rule,
     maybe, you know, and the idea that the a(4) assessment needs to be
     performed against the entire scope of the maintenance rule, that is one
     area where we could talk about this.
         Also, of course, we have some lessons on the industry side
     and, you know, just like on the NRC side, where you need strong
     management support, you have to have strong management support on the
     industry side as well, especially for the pilot applications, where
     these were multi-year efforts and the resource expenditures became much
     larger than anticipated.  It really took involvement of the top utility
     management continuously to achieve that.  An example of that I think is
     the STP graded QA implementation where just, you know, years and years
     of effort were required.
         Clearly, we have to have complete, credible proposals.  None
     of this is going to work if we don't do it right.  I think that goes
     without saying.  And I think another lesson, and this is, again,
     obvious, is that the schedules, the issues -- you need as much upfront
     understanding as possible because you tend to get into a sequential
     identification of new issues as the process proceeds, and, again, that
     is to be expected to some degree, but it is extremely important to have
     upfront understanding of what the sticky points may be, and at least to
     have that in your plan, and in your decision, you cost benefit decision
     as to whether it makes sense to proceed.
         A couple of more slides.  Relative to PRA, I think this came
     up in Mark's presentation.  Before I even get to that first bullet, I
     think one of the things we have learned is that when you get down at the
     detail level on something like graded QA and some of these other
     applications, much of what you are doing at the component level is not
     in the PRA.  If you look at South Texas, they have evaluated 23,000
     components for graded QA.  Only 1,200 of those were modeled in their
     PRA.  So for approximately 95 percent of that total set of SSCs, they
     are having to use basically a set of risk-informed kind of questions and
     an expert panel process, a whole set of expert panels to run those
     components through and make that determination.
         So, you know, I think maybe that was something that we
     didn't really recognize when we went in, but much of what we do does not
     involve -- you can make a lot of risk judgments and risk insights
     without having the component explicitly modeled.  Now, you will have the
     function, the system or the train modeled, but how that component
     relates to that is something that is not explicitly modeled or
     quantified.
         We talked about PRA quality.  I would mention on
     certification, at this point all four Owners Groups have funded large
     amounts of resources to support certification.  Out of the 104 operating
     plants, 100 of those will undergo the certification process by the end
     of 2001, and we hope to be up to 104 very shortly.  So that is an
     indication of the recognition, I think, on the part of the utility
     management that there is real benefit and a real need to address the
     state of your PRA.
         We have a lot of effort going on now.  Mark mentioned the
     need to reconcile the draft ASME standard with the certification
     process.  That is of paramount importance for the industry because of
     the large investment we have in certification now, and we will be
     meeting with NRC next week to discuss how we do that.  We are actually
     funding through EPRI a significant amount of technical work to reconcile
     those two processes, and we will be demonstrating one section of how we
     believe that could be done at a meeting next week with NRC.
         DR. MILLER:  On that area, the industry strongly believes
     there is a necessity of having both the standard and the certification,
     as long as they are reconciled, is that what I am hearing here?
         MR. BRADLEY:  The industry, you know, clearly, obviously,
     supports that there has to be appropriate treatment of PRA quality as a
     function of application.  We believe those efforts should be reconciled,
     that we shouldn't have a standard that somehow does not recognize what
     we are doing with certification.  And if there are additional elements
     that need to be addressed, you know, we are willing to consider those,
     but we don't want to reinvent the wheel with the standard versus what we
     have done so far in the certification process.
         DR. MILLER:  Now, I know you have just gotten into that and
     the standard is just basically available in the past few months.  Do you
     see a problem with the reconciliation at this point, or is it too early?
         MR. BRADLEY:  Well, I would like to -- you know, I would
     like to think there is not a problem.  I will say that I think the
     current form of the draft standard does not comport very well with the
     certification process.
         The technical elements of the PRA are similar, but the
     approach is somewhat different and the certification is like a four step
     grading process on each of the technical sub-elements of the PRA,
     whereas, the standard uses a reference PRA with about 900 requirements
     and is basically binary.  You either meet it or you don't, and when you
     don't meet it, I think -- and in its current form, it basically leaves
     open the question of what you do.  Whereas, with the certification
     process, you are left with -- you know, it is versus a binary.  It is
     sort of a four level thing that gives you, in my mind, a better
     understanding of the ability of your PRA to support a given application.
         And that -- actually, the work that EPRI is doing right now
     is to take the standard, the draft standard and take the criteria from
     the certification process and superimpose that so that we bring the two
     together.
         DR. MILLER:  Well, one reason to ask that question, as you
     are probably aware, we are moving into phase two of that standard.
         MR. BRADLEY:  Right.
         DR. MILLER:  Which is going to be -- of course, ANS is going
     to take the lead there.  Should the ANS group look at what is happening
     here with this reconciliation process?
         MR. BRADLEY:  Absolutely.  It is extremely important.  I
     think there is some concern that, you know, that effort -- well, I will
     just say, it would benefit greatly from looking at the lessons that have
     been learned through the development of the ASME standard, yes.
         But we are still hopeful that that final product, the final
     standard will reflect the current practice, and with whatever
     improvements may be deemed appropriate.  And we, you know, industry
     supports the concept of a standard.
         DR. MILLER:  Now, both standards groups, ASME and ANS, I
     believe both have NEI representation on them.
         MR. BRADLEY:  I know for sure the ASME one does, and I would
     assume that the ANS does.
         DR. MILLER:  So it should happen automatically, or maybe --
     does somebody have to drive, make certain that does happen?
         MR. BRADLEY:  Yes.  One last -- the second bullet here.  I
     think what we have seen is, relative to quality, the more difficult
     issue that we often grapple with in trying to put submittals together,
     and that also comes up in the review process, is, you know, the
     integrated decision making process where you are trying to combine
     deterministic and risk insights, often which give different answers to
     the question and how do you bring, you know, what may be sort of bipolar
     kind of insights together and mesh them into some solution or decision
     that makes sense.
         And George mentioned defense-in-depth as an element of this,
     and this is an area, in my mind, if we were to do some more work to try
     to expand 1.174 or, you know, industry put together additional guidance
     on how to make this successful, this is an area that could use some more
     work.
         Now, I think this is somewhat obvious.  1.174 has been
     instrumental in allowing these changes to move forward, and I think
     everything we are working in the industry is within the envelope of
     1.174.  We have reevaluated the whole plant study and trying to fold
     that into the prototype for the Part 50 reform effort, and we are really
     looking to try to work within the constraints of 1.174 to do that,
     whereas, previously, we had been sort of in Level III space with that
     effort.  But we do acknowledge that that has provided a good framework
     and a method to achieve success.
         And that concludes what I had to say.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I would like to have copies of the slides.
         MR. MARKLEY:  Yes.
         MR. BRADLEY:  I will get those for you.
         DR. SHACK:  If no more questions, it is --
         DR. MILLER:  I had one kind of broad question.  I was going
     to ask Mark to -- Mark had on his slide the stream is increasing.  Biff
     gives me the viewpoint the stream is going to definitely increase.  Do
     you think the capability of staff at NRC and individuals at plant, their
     capability is going to keep up with this stream?  Right now it has been
     focused primarily on people who really know what PRA is and so forth is,
     both at the plant level and the NRC level.  As this stream increases,
     there is going to be a lot more people who have to be up to speed, so to
     speak.
         MR. BRADLEY:  I can speak, I guess, -- I am not comfortable
     speaking the NRC.
         DR. MILLER:  You can't speak for the NRC.
         MR. BRADLEY:  But for the industry, I think, yes, I mean we
     have more, you know, more volume of resources to bring to bear with
     this, both people and money, and it is a market-driven kind of process. 
     I mean once we see success occurring in the field, it creates an
     incentive for more applications and more interest.  I think the answer
     to that is yes.
         Just trying to do the certifications for 100 plants and put
     those kind of teams together to do that, you know, is requiring us to
     build our expertise to some degree.
         DR. MILLER:  So you don't have any reservations about the
     expertise being -- following very rapidly with the -- or not being a
     limitation, in other words?
         MR. BRADLEY:  I would like to think it isn't.  I guess I,
     you know, -- as we talked about earlier, the plants we have worked with
     thus far are sort of the leaders of the pack in terms of having pretty
     good PRAs.
         DR. MILLER:  Well, they had a good group to start with.
         MR. BRADLEY:  Right.  And I don't have thorough knowledge
     of, you know, beyond there is a certain set of plants that have been big
     players in this, and now we are down to another tier which now has a lot
     more interest than they did.  So, you know, that is really a question
     that remains to be fully answered, but I would like to think we can, you
     know, pull it together.
         DR. MILLER:  It was a year ago we heard -- at least we heard
     that some plants were bailing out, so to speak, and reducing their PRA
     groups and so forth.  With this renewed interest, that means you are
     going to have to return the pendulum, so to speak.
         MR. BRADLEY:  I don't hear about anyone bailing out these
     days.
         DR. MILLER:  I don't think so.  But are they going to be --
     when are the tier three plants, not the tier two, tier three is going to
     be able to catch up?
         MR. BRADLEY:  Right.  Yeah.  I mean the fact that we have
     100 out of 104 plants scheduled for certification is an encouraging
     sign, because that is going to basically -- you know, if you don't have
     a good PRA, it is certainly going to tell you that it is not good and
     provides you the road map to how to make it better, so.
         DR. MILLER:  Mark, could you make a comment on that same
     question?  If the stream becomes a river, so to speak, or a flood, is
     the staff going to be able to keep up?  Because right now you have been
     focused on those who have been involved in this for maybe several years. 
     Not all the staff of NRC has been involved.
         MR. RUBIN:  Not all the staff has been involved, and if the
     floodgates open, definitely, the knowledge base for PRA implementation
     is going to have to be spread more widely.
         DR. MILLER:  Very rapidly.
         MR. RUBIN:  As rapidly as we can.  But I would note that
     that has already occurred to a fairly significant degree.  The PRA
     Branch did not run these pilot reviews, did not do these pilot reviews. 
     They are run by the technical groups.  Nan Gilles ran the tech spec
     activity with support from us.  The Geosciences Branch ran ISI.  MEB ran
     IST.
         There is significant involvement in buy-in.  Now, it is not
     100 percent, but compared to where it was 30 months ago, it is rather
     impressive.  But it will have to be even more.  Can we do it?  Sure.
         DR. MILLER:  Okay.  We heard that, he said sure.
         DR. POWERS:  Are you done?  I am going to take a recess till
     10:30.
         [Recess.]
         DR. POWERS:  Let's come back into session.  Our next topic
     is the proposed final revision to 10 CFR 50.65, the famous maintenance
     rule.  John, I think you are the cognizant member on that.
         MR. BARTON:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  The purpose of this
     session is to hear presentations from and hold discussions with
     representatives of the NRC Staff and NEI regarding the proposed final
     revision to the maintenance rule and associated Regulatory Guide, which
     would require licensees to perform safety assessments prior to
     performing maintenance activities.
         At the 459th ACRS meeting in February the Staff did brief us
     on the final revision to the maintenance rule.  I don't believe there's
     been much, if any, changes to the rule that we are going to hear today
     from what we were briefed on in February.
         The intent of the revision to 50.65 is to require licensees
     to perform assessments before maintenance activities are performed on
     SSCs covered by the maintenance rule and to manage the risk that may
     result from the proposed activities during all modes of operation
     including normal power operation and shutdown conditions.
         Staff has provided a copy of the draft associated Regulatory
     Guide and will brief the committee on this Guide today.  We did not have
     a briefing in February on the Reg Guide.
         The committee is expected to prepare a report on this matter
     and I believe we will also hear from NEI, Biff Bradley, to get
     industry's perspective on the rule change as well.
         At this time I will turn it over to NRC Staff and Rich
     Correia will take the lead.
         MR. CORREIA:  Thank you very much.  Good morning.  Again, I
     am Rich Correia, Quality Assurance Vendor Inspections, Maintenance
     Branch of NRR.  With me today are my Division Director Bruce Boger, my
     Branch Chief Ted Quay, and Wayne Scott, who is in my section, and Dr.
     See Meng Wong from the Probabilistic Safety Assessment Branch of NRR.
         Thank you for describing my intro, that we were here in
     February.  We did present to the committee why we were changing the
     rule, responses from the public on the proposed rule, our proposed
     reconciliation of those comments, and our revised rule language based on
     those comments.  You are absolutely right, nothing has changed since
     February 4th regarding the rule language.
         We have, however, drafted regulatory guidance for this rule
     change and we will present that today.  It is the same information that
     I gave Mr. Singh last week.
         For purposes of comparison, the existing language, which is
     not a requirement in what we are sending up to the Commission soon,
     right now the rule says that an assessment should be performed before
     maintenance activities are conducted, essentially.  Obviously it is not
     a requirement because it says "should" and it also doesn't state what
     the licensee should do with the assessment.  It just says do the
     assessment.
         Modified language changes the "should" to a "shall" do an
     assessment and then it tells them to manage the risk that may result
     from the proposed maintenance activity -- so it is a more complete
     package.
         Originally the Commission gave us different language than
     what we are sending back up but based on the comments we received from
     the industry and public on the concerns they had with the new language
     we revised it, as we told you in February.  This is a reflection of
     that.  Nothing has changed since then.
         DR. SEALE:  Actually it is to manage the increase in risk.
         MR. CORREIA:  Yes.
         DR. SEALE:  So there is an acknowledgment that there can be
     an increase, and that is an important difference.
         MR. CORREIA:  Yes.  Oh -- I'm sorry.  There was one word
     change since February.  Previously we had "assess and manage any
     increase in risk."  We change that to "the increase in risk" -- that was
     the only change.
         As we told you in February, these are our plans.
         To let you know what the current status is, we go into the
     final stages of putting the package together, getting all the right
     concurrences.  We have drafted a Regulatory Guide for this rule change. 
     We hope to have it out soon for public comment, incorporate any changes
     and then have it issued by July timeframe.
         One important point here that isn't on this slide, our
     proposal back to the Commission is that the final rule, if and when
     approved, will not go into effect until 120 days after the Regulatory
     Guide is final.  Initially the Commission said change the rule, deal
     with the Regulatory Guide and it's after the fact.  Public comments were
     that they should work together simultaneously.  We are doing that.  We
     are proposing that the Commission agree with that position.
         MR. BARTON:  I think based on the rule change and some of
     the industry's concerns, I think it is essential that you do get the
     Guide out ahead of the rule.
         MR. CORREIA:  We had a meeting with NEI Tuesday where we
     presented the Guide and our thoughts on it to at least open the door
     with them and the industry so they can start understanding where we are
     going with this, and I think it will help in the long-run to calm some
     of the fears that may have been out there with reading a rule, part of a
     rule, and not understanding what the Staff's expectations were.  We are
     doing that.
         That is essentially where we are with the rule.  If there
     are any questions or comments on that, we could take them now.
         DR. SEALE:  Yes.  I am perturbed.  On the previous slide you
     have what purports to be the existing language and then the modified
     language and we commented about managing the increase in risk and then
     you indicated that the actual language in the previous version talked
     about any change in risk.
         MR. CORREIA:  Any.
         MR. WONG:  In February.
         DR. SEALE:  Yes, in February, right.  That is not in this --
     I mean that language is embedded someplace else in the February thing,
     but that has been completely changed now, eh?
         MR. CORREIA:  No.  This modified April language is what we
     presented to the committee in February with the exception of the word
     "any" --
         DR. SEALE:  Okay.
         MR. CORREIA:  That's all.  That's the only difference.
         DR. SEALE:  I've got you now.
         MR. CORREIA:  What we showed you in February also was the
     language the Commission gave us to put out as a proposed rule.
         DR. SEALE:  Right.
         MR. CORREIA:  Which we modified to this to reflect public
     comment.  We still believe this meets the intent of what the Commission
     told us to do but it is just using different words.
         DR. WALLIS:  Are you going to tell us what "manage" means? 
     I think he is going to tell us what "manage" means.
         MR. CORREIA:  Yes -- assess risk and manage --
         DR. WALLIS:  Because I am trying to imagine what it might
     mean.
         DR. POWERS:  It is a very interesting thought, isn't it, but
     it is also an article of faith within the nuclear community that one can
     manage risk -- and even accidents on top of that.
         DR. SEALE:  And herd cats.
         DR. POWERS:  That is an article of faith within the NRC's
     management structure.
         MR. CORREIA:  Dr. See Meng Wong, who is here today, will
     present the draft regulatory guidance.  He was certainly instrumental in
     drafting it.  He was also involved with many of the maintenance rule
     baseline inspections reviewing this part of the rule.  Even though it
     wasn't a requirement, we did evaluate doing the inspections and what
     essentially this guide does is capture those good practices we saw
     licensees implementing during the baseline inspections, and we hope that
     because of that this is not anything new.  They have seen it before. 
     They understand it and hopefully will agree with it.
         MR. WONG:  Good morning.  My name is See-Meng Wong of the
     NRC branch NRR, and in support of the proposed revision to the
     maintenance rule (a)(3) paragraph, we in the PSA Branch and in
     coordination with Rich Correia's staff have prepared a draft reg guide
     DG-1082 to provide guidance and to lay out the expectations of -- the
     staff expectations for the implementation of this requirement if it goes
     into effect.
         Consistent with the modified rule language, we have titled
     this draft reg guide as "Assessing and Managing Risk of Maintenance
     Activities at Nuclear Power Plants."
         We have stated before the intent of the 10 CFR paragraph
     (a)(4) is to require licensees to assess and manage the increase in risk
     from proposed maintenance activities.  For the assessments for
     maintenance activities the main steps are essentially that we expect the
     licensee to review the current plant configuration and any changes
     expected to plant configuration from the proposed maintenance
     activities, and in this process determine the risk-significance of the
     proposed activity, whether it's going to be a high-risk or low-risk
     activity.
         DR. POWERS:  What constitutes the boundary between high risk
     and low risk?
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  We will go into the definition of the
     risk-significant, because one of the -- the intent of this is to ensure
     that the plant is not inevitably placed in risk-significant
     configurations.  And there are comments from the industry requesting us
     if this rule requirement is going into effect, how do you define it. 
     Okay?  And as you look at the definition that I'm presenting in the next
     slide, the risk of a maintenance activity depends on the configuration
     and also the duration in which that configuration is going to be in. 
     And I'm jumping one step ahead.  Okay?
         DR. POWERS:  Well, you're going to jump ahead, but -- maybe
     I should wait.  But I think I'm going to be asking you more quantitative
     questions than you have on the slide.
         MR. WONG:  Yes.  Yes.  We have that.
         Now our expectation is that the licensee perform the
     assessment commensurate with the complexity of the maintenance
     configuration, and what we mean by this is that the detail of assessment
     can vary from an informed judgment for simple SSCs that are taken out of
     service to using an online PRA tool, like a risk monitor, to evaluate
     multiple SSCs that are out of service.  So we're trying to cover the
     spectrum of the practices that are in place right now.
         DR. POWERS:  You used the word "complexity."
         MR. WONG:  Complexity meaning the size of the configuration.
         DR. POWERS:  I guess that's exactly what I'm asking.  If I'm
     doing maintenance on seven systems that are largely independent of each
     other --
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. POWERS:  There's no interconnection, electrical or
     hydraulic, versus two systems that are interconnected, what is the
     relative complexity of those two possibilities?
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  If there are interdependencies, one would
     have to look and say what are the possible recovery actions that need to
     be taken and to credit in the calculation of the risk of that
     configuration.  So it is independent -- configuration risk say
     calculation on a methodology that we have done through pilot studies is
     that we will look into what is really the delta risk increase that one
     would see, varying say from two to say five orders to seven.  So there
     are what I call calculational considerations that need to be addressed.
         DR. POWERS:  Okay.  If I did these calculations and I ended
     up with a delta CDF of 2 times 10 to the minus 5 --
         MR. WONG:  Okay.
         DR. POWERS:  Is that good, bad, or indifferent?
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  Let me say if I were to do a calculation
     and come up with a number, say 2 E minus 5.  Okay.  An in-depth
     configuration, what we're talking about is that the site say preventive
     maintenance activities, the surveillance activities that take a plant
     out of service, and we have gone through the process of, say, reviewing
     this calculation say with a person of operational experience at the
     site, and he would say if I take this component out of service for
     surveillance purposes, I could be able to recover it within a certain
     time.  And so that's the credit that one needs to address say to reduce
     that delta CDF value that you get.  And that is the number after you've
     gone through that analysis to determine whether it's risk-significant or
     not.
         MR. CORREIA:  So it would be a combination if you are using
     a risk tool --
         MR. WONG:  Right.
         MR. CORREIA:  Of the probabilistic risk versus the other
     actions the utility would take to compensate or try to reduce that risk. 
     Even though you may not be able to quantify it, I think we would agree
     that those kinds of actions occur all the time in work planning -- in
     scheduling.
         DR. KRESS:  Aren't those things amenable to the original
     calculation?  Don't you put those into the PRA -- those other actions? 
     Don't they show up in the PRA?
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  What we're talking about here is that say
     for multiple SSCs that are in a configuration we have identified say
     five, six, seven, whatever it is, okay?  And we use the -- run it
     through the PRA calculations.  Okay.  There are credit or recovery
     actions that are already embedded in the PRA model.
         But further to that, if you consider the operational aspects
     of that configuration, and the example I gave is that in some
     surveillances where the components are taken out of service, but their
     functions are not defeated.  So after the first cut, then you take this
     credit into account, you come up with what I call a much better CDF
     increased number.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Do you mean CDF or CDP?
         MR. WONG:  CDF, then afterwards, then you integrate over the
     time.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So the ultimate criterion is CDP?
         MR. WONG:  CDP, yes.
         DR. BONACA:  But those kind of for example credits you
     have --
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. BONACA:  They are in the PRA, but the operator in the
     control room doesn't know that.  So managing risk means to pull out
     those kind of pieces of information, make them available to him.
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. BONACA:  Okay.
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. BONACA:  It is important.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  They are not necessarily in the PRA,
     though.  I don't think --
         DR. BONACA:  Certain recovery action.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, but, I mean, they are more general, I
     would say, than specific actions that the licensee might take for
     specific maintenance activities.
         DR. BONACA:  No, but I'm saying the PRA can identify what is
     the most important equipment to recover first, should you get in a
     certain situation, and also identifies -- so there are certain
     perspectives about the equipment to recover first and the equipment to
     protect as you are in a certain --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Sure.
         DR. BONACA:  And that's information which is in the PRA but
     is not in the control room.  So what you want to do in managing the risk
     there is to pull out this information, make it available to the operator
     so that he knows what it is.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But in the process of managing risk,
     though, for a particular activity, they may decide to do certain things
     that have not been modeled baseline PRA.  That's what I'm saying.
         DR. BONACA:  Absolutely.
         DR. SEALE:  Could I ask if you have a configuration that is
     complex by virtue of the fact that you're doing maintenance on two
     systems, and they are I won't say certainly but perhaps interconnected,
     where do you go to confirm whether or not an interconnection exists?
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  One of the things that you would do is we
     would go to the PMIDs, and before we do the calculation, we review that
     process with the senior reactor operator, and to have a better
     understanding of what we are calculating.
         DR. SEALE:  You don't go to the PRA to find out whether
     they're interconnected.
         MR. WONG:  No, we don't do that.
         DR. SEALE:  Okay.  Fine.
         MR. WONG:  Okay.
         DR. WALLIS:  I would think that rather than just planning
     some maintenance and then assessing its risk significance, that you
     would actually use what you know about risk in order to plan the
     maintenance activities in an intelligent way.
         MR. CORREIA:  Certainly to identify those systems that are
     most critical to plant safety.
         DR. WALLIS:  An important thing is that in designing your
     maintenance activities and planning them that you bring in risk as a
     criterion for how you go about it.
         MR. CORREIA:  Absolutely.
         DR. WALLIS:  I just didn't see that in the slides.
         MR. CORREIA:  I guess that's a utility determination.  What
     we're trying to do here is when they do do that, consider the risk
     impact of the proposed maintenance and then assure reasonably that you
     can manage it, and make sure that you get the equipment back in service
     back to the level of reliability that you need.
         DR. POWERS:  During what period of plant operations is most
     of the maintenance done on safety-related systems?
         MR. WONG:  I think that depends.
         MR. CORREIA:  Are you talking about during an operating
     cycle?
         DR. POWERS:  Yes.
         MR. CORREIA:  We found that it varies plant to plant.  Some
     plants are very conservative and do very little, and hold it to the
     refueling outage.  There aren't many left, though.  Most plants have a
     rolling 12 or 13-week cycle that they plan to do maintenance on the same
     sets of systems, maybe train A one week, train B the following week, or
     C or whatever.  But it's typically at full power, which is the driving
     force behind this regulation with the increase in online maintenance and
     the -- in order to achieve shorter refueling cycles this in our mind
     is -- this regulation is very important.
         DR. KRESS:  At any given time there might be some important
     equipment out of service.
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         MR. CORREIA:  Yes.
         DR. KRESS:  Is that normally reflected in the PRA that
     calculates the CDF?  Is that normally reflected in the PRA when you
     calculate the CDF?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What?  Is that a piece of equipment that's
     out?
         DR. KRESS:  Piece of equipment would be out for maintenance.
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. POWERS:  It's reflected in an annualized sense.
         DR. KRESS:  Yes.
         DR. POWERS:  The point value of PRA during the period that
     it's out would not appear in an ordinary probabilistic risk assessment,
     but the annualized effect, if the thing was out one week out of every
     12 --
         DR. KRESS:  So each plant has to predict what equipment's
     going to be out of service when, what frequency, in order for that to be
     reflected in the PRA.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, I don't know about that.
         DR. KRESS:  Otherwise you can't reflect it.
         DR. BONACA:  But that's an important point you're making,
     Tom.  What I mean is that in the IPEs and the PRAs to date it was
     reflected in historical unavailability of systems, okay?  When in many
     cases online maintenance wasn't done much.  Now when you go to a much
     more aggressive one, you have to trace exactly that.
         DR. KRESS:  Update the PRA.
         DR. BONACA:  Absolutely.  How are you affecting --
         DR. KRESS:  But you have to have data on when and how much
     equipment is going to be out of service.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's right.  I think what you see
     typically in a PRA, at least the last time I looked, was that, you know,
     you have a system, you have a two-train system, it has periodic
     maintenance requirements and so on, so you do the calculations for that
     system and you average over time.  So you take one cycle and average
     over time.
         DR. KRESS:  I see how you do it, but you have to have that
     data base.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But you don't ask, though, whether during
     the time that this component is down something may be happening in
     another system.
         DR. KRESS:  You don't.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No.  Not in a typical PRA.  Now when you
     go to online maintenance, you may start asking those questions.
         DR. KRESS:  It seems to be something you ought to ask.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
         DR. BONACA:  And in fact --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And you will ask it.
         DR. BONACA:  And those computer programs to do that,
     typically they had to be modified to be able to account for multiple
     system -- because originally they were unable to do that.  In fact --
     but then if you do that, then you begin to trace your unavailability. 
     Now based on that you find that you have different kind of trends for
     the one you represent in the IPEs insofar as, you know, CDF plus
     unavailability included in it.  So there is, you know, there is a lot
     of -- yes.
         DR. KRESS:  Now that leads to the question I was getting to. 
     If those online maintenances are already reflected in the PRA, why the
     hell do we need a delta CDF?  It's already in the CDF.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The combinations are not reflected.
         DR. KRESS:  It's the combinations you say that are needed.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  They are not.
         MR. CORREIA:  What you have just described is paragraphs
     (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the maintenance rule, which requires establishing
     some type of goal or performance criterion for each of the SSCs,
     reliability and availability.  Licensees have to monitor each one of
     those measures, goals, and if they exceed them, they have to take some
     appropriate action, including the impact if it's modeled in PRA of what
     that does to risk.  But that's individually.
         MR. WONG:  Right.
         MR. CORREIA:  But what this part does is integrate those
     reliabilities and unavailabilities and shows you what the potential risk
     could be.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But also now you are calculating the core
     damage probability even that the piece of equipment is out.
         The PRA doesn't do that.  It says we are going in time and
     then this component goes down, okay, and then this one goes down, and we
     are averaging now the unavailability of the whole system in time.  So if
     it is down, say, for an hour-and-a-half every month, then there will be
     a contribution of 1.5 over 720.  That's it.  There will not be a
     separate calculation saying if this is done, then the rest of the system
     has this probability of failure, for different calculations.
         DR. BONACA:  But if you do it instantaneous, however, if you
     do --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But we don't do that in the current PRA.
         DR. BONACA:  Not in the current PRA.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  These guys want to do that.
         DR. BONACA:  Absolutely.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Maintenance.
         DR. BONACA:  But, you know, to give you a sense, when you
     look at some of these results and you take two or three systems, it is
     not unusual to have a CDP going up by a factor of 20 or 30.
         DR. KRESS:  For a short time.
         DR. BONACA:  For a short time.  But that tells you why, I
     think, there is I think an intent in managing that, because you may have
     actually much higher increases than that.
         DR. KRESS:  But I was maintaining that is already reflected
     in the --
         DR. BONACA:  No, because this is for multiple components
     that you assume simultaneously to be failing.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  There are two fundamental differences the
     way I see it.  One, that you are looking explicitly now at combinations
     of components from different systems, right?
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And, second, you are saying if these are
     down, what is the conditional probability of failure, which PRAs don't
     do right now.
         DR. KRESS:  I see no reason why they couldn't do it.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, they could.  Yeah, sure.  Sure.  The
     baseline model can be used to do these calculations.
         DR. WALLIS:  If you could plan all your maintenance ahead of
     time, you ought to be able to work all that out and put it into the PRA. 
     That is a proper assessment of --
         MR. CORREIA:  And we have seen licensees do exactly that.
         MR. BARTON:  And most people do have their maintenance plan
     out for a whole cycle.
         DR. KRESS:  Now, the next question is, do we need -- is
     there some sort of cap on the short time delta CDF?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, you remember we discussed that when
     we were talking about the allowed outage times, and the staff came back
     with --
         DR. KRESS:  I mean if you are going to make some judgment on
     what is acceptable.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, they made a judgment that delta CDP,
     core damage probability, should be less than 10 to the minus 7, or
     something like that, which is the integral of the conditional times the
     interval.
         DR. POWERS:  There was actually a pretty rational reason for
     taking that number.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
         DR. POWERS:  I thought it was a pleasing aspect.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  They had an example.  But that was for --
     yeah, it was for temporary changes --
         DR. BONACA:  No, just, you know, I am interested, in fact,
     in hearing -- because I mean taking out a component out of service of
     system is not a big issue.  I mean for multiple ones, certainly, there
     has to be some understanding of, you know, when do you stop?  Okay.  And
     I haven't seen --
         MR. BARTON:  Are you going to cover that?  All right. 
     Continue with your presentation.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Page 7.
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  The last bullet here, we want --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, we --
         MR. WONG:  You understand that.  Okay.
         DR. WALLIS:  A repeatable, if it is somebody's informed
     judgment, as you said before.
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. WALLIS:  I am not sure that is always repeatable, if you
     ask somebody else.
         MR. WONG:  Well, repeatable I think is for the purposes of,
     you know, when we go and inspect.
         DR. WALLIS:  You mean recoverable and that you can actually
     trace --
         MR. WONG:  The trace, yeah to trace.
         DR. WALLIS:  Repeatable, if somebody else did the same
     assessment.
         MR. WONG:  Yes.  That is what we mean.
         DR. WALLIS:  That is a different kind of repeatable.
         MR. WONG:  Okay.
         MR. CORREIA:  The expectations the licensee would have a
     process, describe adequate training for the people involved.
         DR. WALLIS:  Traceable.  You mean you can track it. 
     Investigate it.  But you don't mean that if some independent person did
     the same assessment, they would come up with necessarily exactly the
     same answer.
         MR. CORREIA:  I think he means close.
         MR. WONG:  Close.  In the ballpark.
         DR. SEALE:  Horseshoes, close.
         DR. WALLIS:  It would have to be a big ballpark.
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  The next slide is the considerations that
     we expect the safety assessments to have, and we expect the assessment
     of the plant maintenance activity would be to cover the SSCs there in
     the scope of the 10 CFR 50.65.
         In response to the concerns from NEI and industry that we
     may be having to deal with a big and unmanageable set of SSCs, so within
     this population, we expect licensee to focus on the risk impact of
     maintenance on system, or at the train function level.  For example, if
     they just look at the assessment for the EDG train, you have to -- train
     B and so on and so forth.
         To my mind, if they do that, we are not looking more than,
     any more than 150 to 200 types of systems or SSCs that need to be
     considered, as opposed to going to the component level where, you know,
     the licensees may be forced to look at, say, instrumentation, you know,
     transmitters.
         MR. BARTON:  Thousands of components.
         MR. WONG:  Thousands of things, right.  So this is in
     recognition of the fact that we would like this to be a reduced burden
     on the licensee.
         One of the things that we expect the licensee to consider is
     that, to my experience in the maintenance rule baseline inspections,
     there are one or two SSCs that are considered as low safety significant,
     but under certain conditions, it may become high risk significance.  The
     examples that I have seen, and I have got three examples one is
     instrument air in the service air compressor.  But artifact of the PRA
     model, it sometimes is categorized as low safety significance because
     there is redundancy and there is, you know, backup nitrogen bottles. 
     Yet, at the same time, there are some -- in some accident sequences, the
     air pressure valves becomes important and the instrument air or the
     service air supply is needed.
         So these are the kinds -- this is one example.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  How were you handling these situations
     before the maintenance rule?
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  Before the maintenance, typically, the
     licensees have got, say, the 12 week ruling maintenance schedule, okay. 
     And the 12 week ruling maintains schedule, say, in this week A, in week
     A, all this first week, period.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right.
         MR. WONG:  I am going to do all the maintenance on, say, all
     the train A systems.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right.
         MR. WONG:  Somewhere before, you know, what we call the free
     state in which, you know, they are going to do the maintenance, all the
     selected systems.  There may be a failure in a component that is in
     another train.  And it is this small set that we think, if the licensee
     do a one time assessment, set it aside, and they don't have to do, you
     know, recurrent calculations every time.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, no, that is not what I meant.
         MR. WONG:  Okay.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What I meant was, before the maintenance
     rule, how did the agency control these complex configurations?
         MR. WONG:  They use the tech specs.
         MR. CORREIA:  The tech specs.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Tech specs according to the document I
     have here were developed to address random single failures of plant
     SSCs.  Evidently they don't deal with combinations.
         MR. BARTON:  They don't deal with this very well, but that
     was the only way that the agency could control it.  Also, there was
     nothing else other than the tech specs.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The agency felt that they could not
     control them, right?
         MR. BARTON:  The tech specs aren't good enough to do this.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The maintenance rule is intended to apply
     to proposed maintenance activities that will directly, or may
     inadvertently result in equipment becoming out of service, so the tech
     specs don't prevent those things.  Right?
         MR. CORREIA:  Right.
         MR. BARTON:  They do on individual components, but they
     don't handle it.
         MR. CORREIA:  They don't handle --
         MR. BARTON:  They don't handle online integrated maintenance
     very well.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So we are imposing additional -- I mean we
     have imposed additional requirements, right, additional regulations.
         DR. BONACA:  But these plants were not designed to be
     maintained online.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Online.  So that was the benefit.
         DR. BONACA:  There was a debate going back 30 years where we
     said we don't maintain online these plants, and that is why the
     technical --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So if you do it offline it doesn't matter.
         DR. BONACA:  Well, and then, of course, we understand that
     offline, when you are shut down, you have also high risk.  So, I mean
     here there is an evolution of understanding, it seems to me, that, you
     know, makes it appropriate to transition here to where you can allow
     online maintenance, with proper understanding.
         MR. BARTON:  Yes.  In fact, tech specs did a worse job in
     shutdown because tech specs weren't written for shutdown.
         DR. BONACA:  That's right.
         MR. BARTON:  So then the problem was worse at shutdown, when
     they just had the tech specs.
         DR. POWERS:  Well, it seems to me that we also have this
     problem that we come along and we say, okay, doing the maintenance
     online has this delta CDF or change in risk.  And we don't have the
     capability of going in and saying, you know, if we did this when we were
     shut down, what would be the delta CDF?  So we really don't know whether
     we are making an optimal selection of maintenance by going online.  We
     know that we are saving costs, because we shorten the outage time.
         And I am certainly willing to defend the belief that cost
     savings do contribute to safety because they make resources available
     for safety, but we just don't have any quantification on it.
         DR. WALLIS:  But if all your maintenance were somehow
     figured into your PRA, and you could plan it to reduce your CDF for the
     year, and maybe if there was a prize for reducing your CDF, there would
     be some incentive to reduce the risk.
         MR. CORREIA:  There may be something close to that in the
     new assessment process.  I am not saying it would be based on risk
     numbers, but, certainly, in my mind, doing the right kind of maintenance
     during power will -- should keep the reliability of the equipment at a
     better level than waiting until you either have a random failure or
     hoping you make it to the next outage to do the maintenance.
         DR. WALLIS:  Is there an incentive now to do it better, or
     just to stay within some limit?
         MR. CORREIA:  I think the maintenance rule, and the fact
     that it requires licensees to monitor unavailability and reliability,
     has really heightened the awareness of licensees.
         DR. WALLIS:  This is some incentive to optimize.
         MR. BARTON:  This is a big incentive to do it better.
         DR. POWERS:  Yes.  There is a big time incentive, because
     you have got to meet your goals --
         MR. BARTON:  You have to meet your reliability goals and all
     that stuff, so you do better maintenance.
         DR. POWERS:  You get rewards for meeting it.
         DR. WALLIS:  Yeah, but you could actually increase your
     economic return by an optimum strategy which might actually end up
     increasing your CDF.
         DR. POWERS:  Sure.
         DR. WALLIS:  More than some other strategy.
         DR. POWERS:  Sure.
         DR. WALLIS:  And you don't get a prize for the reduction of
     risk, but you get a prize for saving money for your company.
         DR. POWERS:  Well, I think that is clearly possible.
         DR. WALLIS:  So there is no tradeoff.
         DR. POWERS:  I think there is.  I think there pretty much
     is.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Remember, you are already in the
     acceptable risk area, so it is okay, it seems to me, to optimize
     operations.  You don't necessarily have to keep reducing risk.
         DR. BONACA:  As long as you understand the risk, that is the
     whole issue.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
         DR. BONACA:  And the other things is that, you know, the
     understanding of the risk is a key support to the operator, because he
     understands what he has to do in the circumstances.  So, I mean it is a
     positive initiative.
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  In response to comments from the industry
     and through interactions with NEI representatives, there was a request
     to ask the staff to define, you know, what do you mean by risk
     significant configurations.  And our definition here addresses
     configurations of multiple SSCs that are concurrently out of service,
     whose incremental contribution to annual risk is substantial.  And the
     word here I mean is that it will put them into what we call the red
     zone.  And any gradations below that, that is going to be determined by
     the licensee.  This reflects --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What do you mean by contribution when I do
     this?  You mean the conditional probability --
         MR. WONG:  Conditional --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If you are in that -- configuration is
     high.
         MR. WONG:  Right.  The delta increase in the conditional
     probability.  Okay.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That is related now to the number that the
     staff has proposed in Regulatory Guide --
         MR. WONG:  1.174, there is --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, no, 74 doesn't have that.  It was the
     one on tech specs.
         MR. BARTON:  76 or 77.
         MR. WONG:  77, yes, 1.77.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So you have that in mind.
         MR. WONG:  That's right.  And as I have stated before, the
     risk of the maintenance activities depends on the configuration and its
     duration.  And the risk matrix we expect licensees to use would be the
     increase in core damage probability or the increase in the large early
     release probability.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The first bullet puzzles me a little bit.
         MR. WONG:  Okay.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Why do you have to put "or would
     significantly affect the performance of safety functions"?
         MR. WONG:  Okay.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If it does that significantly, wouldn't
     you see a significant incremental contribution to annual risk?  Because
     risk is really CDP and LERF.
         MR. WONG:  LERF, yes.
         MR. CORREIA:  This was to addresses the cases where
     licensees were not using PRA.
         MR. WONG:  Right.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, we are trying to do everything here.
         MR. CORREIA:  This does not -- this rule change does not
     mandate a use of PRA.  It is strongly preferred.  And if they have it,
     use it, but --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I wonder whether it makes sense to have it
     in the same sentence.
         MR. CORREIA:  Oh.
         DR. POWERS:  You are right, it appears to be redundant.  On
     the other hand, my reading of the document is that they have done this
     several times, for exactly the reason he is saying, that they wanted to
     cover the case where there was no reliance on PRA or they had a PRA but
     it just wasn't used because the system was fairly simple.  So I mean it
     is on this viewgraph once, but it is several times in the document that
     I read anyway.
         The main thing that I need to wrestle with is what do I do
     during shutdown.
         MR. CORREIA:  We are going to address that.
         MR. WONG:  One of the things that the modified language
     here -- and there is a preamble that it will apply to shutdown
     conditions and as you are well aware, there are not very many shutdown
     PRA models or studies that has been developed or are being used by a
     licensee, and so the statement here is that if you don't have a shutdown
     PRA model then you look at, say, the degradation of the key safety
     functions that are required to be maintained in a shutdown condition.
         DR. POWERS:  Many of the licensees have a thing they call
     ORAM.
         MR. WONG:  Yes.  We are aware of that.
         DR. POWERS:  ORAM provides an output, a lot of output, but
     among the outputs it provides you is a chart with various colors on it.
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. POWERS:  And if those colors are all green, that's good,
     but it also provides colors that are orange and red.  One of the things
     that perplexes me when I try to go through this logic is suppose that I
     have a situation where I have three oranges and the rest are green
     versus the situation where I have one red and the others for argument's
     sake are green.  Which one is the more risk-significant?
         MR. WONG:  I think this process is still being looked on and
     the reactor oversight process is coming up with, you know, like how
     many, say, whites is considered as a yellow and so on and so forth.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Wouldn't it be easier to have a PRA, for
     heaven's sake?
         DR. POWERS:  I could actually like this, George.  I think
     you are too narrow in your thinking.  You like these numbers and I like
     these colors.
         [Laughter.]
         DR. POWERS:  I can trade you three oranges for one red and a
     white --
         DR. WALLIS:  Is there agreement on what is significant, what
     you mean by significant?
         MR. WONG:  I said significant means putting them entirely in
     the red zone.
         DR. WALLIS:  That's entirely in the red zone?
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         MR. CORREIA:  Which is really addressed in the last bullet.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now the last bullet really tells us what
     is risk significant if you have a PRA.
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So you have a similar bullet for the "or"
     part, for the significantly affect the performance of safety functions? 
     Do you have something that gives guidance there?
         MR. WONG:  I don't think we have reached a --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Why not?  Then why would I have an
     incentive to do a PRA if it is free for all if I don't have a PRA but if
     I have a PRA I have to have predetermined levels?
         DR. BONACA:  But I think on the slide you are saying that
     for more than two SSCs you should have a PRA.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Which number is this?
         DR. BONACA:  Page 8.
         MR. BARTON:  We are jumping ahead of the presentation here.
         DR. POWERS:  I think we are going to have to move along,
     because we have a "drop dead" time.  We've got more presentations.
         DR. WALLIS:  Well, I had a very general question.  How
     predictable is all this, when they are going through all these motions,
     but can you predict what you are going to find when you do maintenance? 
     I take my car to be maintained.  They say it will take me an hour and
     then they say oh, no, you have got to leave it for a week.  We found
     something.  Is this the sort of thing that happens?
         MR. CORREIA:  It probably happens all the time.
         DR. WALLIS:  So you can't really assess --
         MR. CORREIA:  I think most licensees are very conservative
     when they assume a certain maintenance duration.  Most I think strive
     for -- if it is a tech spec system -- they have to be LCO.
         MR. BARTON:  That's right.
         MR. CORREIA:  And have contingency actions in place to read
     or restore or I have something else available.  That is all part of the
     planning process.
         DR. WALLIS:  To look at the uncertainty of it.
         MR. CORREIA:  Absolutely.
         DR. POWERS:  I think your concern is not really founded but
     I think that just the way the safety culture that exists -- actually, it
     is not the safety culture but the reward culture that exists among the
     engineering staff that does this is such that penalties accrue
     significantly to the individual for underestimating the amount of time
     that it is going to take for the maintenance activities.
         DR. WALLIS:  You've got to be careful.  You don't want to
     give the guy an incentive to take the thing apart and say, oh, this
     thing is worn, I ought to fix it, but my manager wants it buttoned up by
     10 o'clock so I will button it up by 10 o'clock.
         DR. POWERS:  I don't think that is a problem.
         DR. WALLIS:  Not a problem?
         DR. POWERS:  No.  I think the culture is such that it cures
     that problem.
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  Moving along, the next slide is laying out
     the expectations when the licensees are doing maintenance.  On a single
     SSC what do they thing they should be doing and I put here for single
     SSC -- for a simple SSC, by that I mean, say, a service water pump or a
     valve in one train of a four-train system that's got no interactions
     with other safety-related SSC trains or a drain pump or a drain valve. 
     We think the qualitative assessment by a licensed operator trained in
     the maintenance rule implementation is sufficient.
         The operator should be aware of the SSCs' risk significance. 
     They should also be aware of potential impacts of external conditions
     such as maintenance in the switch yard or inclement weather that may
     increase the potential upset or some great instability.  Those are
     examples of --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now for power operation you still allow
     them not to have a PRA?  Somebody can come in there and say we are
     implementing this without the PRA?
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Even though the IPEs exist?
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So how would I do then all this if I don't
     have a PRA?   How could I re-evaluate the risk impact due to emergent
     failures if I don't have a PRA?
         DR. POWERS:  By qualitative assessment by a licensed
     operator trained in maintenance rule implementation.
         MR. WONG:  Through their experience and their knowledge.
         MR. CORREIA:  I hope it would go back to whether or not he's
     maintaining the safety function. Does he have enough capability to
     protect the fuel, the reactor coolant system pressure boundary, water
     level, electric power.  I think that is fundamental to safe operations.
         DR. POWERS:  Right.
         MR. CORREIA:  What we are saying here is in this simple case
     that is adequate.
         DR. POWERS:  And I think you have good reason to believe
     that operators are pretty good at that for single SSCs.  I think they do
     it all the time.
         MR. BARTON:  Right, they do.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But they don't re-evaluate the risk.  They
     just make sure safety functions are available.
         DR. POWERS:  I think they literally say --
         MR. BARTON:  I think they re-evaluate risk.
         DR. POWERS:  I think they literally do.  I think they sit
     there and they say do I have the capabilities now or have I gotten into
     a problem here?  I think they actually do that.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's not an evaluation of risk.
         DR. SHACK:  That's risk impact which he is talking about. 
     He doesn't have to come up with a number, but he has to know the impact.
         DR. POWERS:  Now I think when you go to the next one, which
     has an unfortunately closeness to the first one -- I think when you have
     got two SSCs then you are starting to get beyond the capabilities of
     anyone to do the mental integrations.
         DR. SEALE:  Get an expert panel.
         MR. WONG:  In the case of the two SSCs, we think they could
     use either qualitative or quantitative assessment or they could use what
     we call pre-analyzed configurations.  There are two-dimensional matrices
     that have been developed.  They will specify, say, if I take Component A
     or SSC A and SSC B, they are prohibited for some reason.  The same thing
     is that the operator should be aware of the potential impacts of
     external conditions, and also to evaluate the risk impact.
         Now in the case of the -- if they are using a PRA assessment
     tool and if that tool does not capture, say, the SSC that is taken out
     of service, then typically the process we expect of them is to refer it
     back to, say, a risk analyst or an expert panel to tell them whether
     it's okay or not to perform that maintenance on, say, the two SSCs.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now, given what Mr. Bradley has said
     earlier today, that there will be in a year or so a hundred plants
     certified, their PRAs will be certified by the industry itself, --
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- why bother to talk about cases where
     they don't use the PRA?  I mean I don't understand that.  The PRA is
     there now, and it will be certified.  We will reconcile it with --
         DR. SHACK:  It may not be certified for this purpose.
         MR. WONG:  We are still in an evolving --
         MR. BRADLEY:  Can I make a comment?
         MR. WONG:  Yes, go ahead.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Of course you can make a comment.
         MR. BRADLEY:  Thank you.  Biff Bradley, NEI.  I think, in my
     mind, the vast majority, if not all, licensees are using PRA or a PRA-
     based tool to make these determinations for power operation.  But given
     that the scope of rule is being explicitly extended to shutdown, where
     it is not modeled, you do have to maintain these -- well, revisions to
     cover that area.
         I am not personally aware of, you know, any -- the way the
     maintenance rule is set up, there were some systems that were added by
     expert panels that may not be reflected in the PRA.  It is really not,
     in my mind, I don't think -- I would hope the plants are going to be
     making these determinations without the use of a PRA.  But there may be
     instances, and when you write rule language and regulatory guidance, you
     have to be very careful because it has legal inspection and enforcement
     implications, and you do have to cover those areas where the PRA may
     just not cover the situation.
         MR. WONG:  Okay.
         MR. CORREIA:  The very short answer is we don't have a
     requirement, but I personally believe we are getting close.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You don't have a requirement for?
         MR. CORREIA:  For a PRA.
         MR. WONG:  For a PRA.
         MR. CORREIA:  We certainly encourage its use.  And every
     maintenance rule baseline inspection that we did, every licensee had one
     and used it to some varying degrees.  So, again, --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But in real life, okay, you don't have to
     have a requirement.
         MR. CORREIA:  Right.
         MR. WONG:  Right.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  In real life, though, when you ask the
     licensee, did you reevaluate the risk impact due to emergent failures,
     or so on, or what is your awareness of potential impacts of external
     conditions, the guy who has the PRA should have an easier life.
         MR. BARTON:  Yes.
         MR. CORREIA:  Yes.  Absolutely.
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
         MR. CORREIA:  And we would hope to hear those kinds of
     answers.
         DR. BONACA:  You know, the value of that is even when you
     don't have a quantitative assessment, the PRA allows you to see the
     dependencies much better, the core systems, and that is really where is
     the value.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I know the value.
         DR. BONACA:  Well, just the information.
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  In the next slide, I think we have
     discussed this a lot previously.  It addresses the expectation on the
     maintenance on single and two SSCs, on multiple SSCs and we expect
     licensee to use a PRA or a comparable analysis, and here I put in --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, that is a misnomer there.
         MR. WONG:  Okay.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Drop the word "comparable."
         MR. WONG:  Comparable.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Some other --
         MR. WONG:  Some other.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Mickey Mouse thing.
         [Laughter.]
         DR. POWERS:  I guess I just can't help but wonder, you know,
     we are insisting that PRAs go through some -- have some standard of
     acceptability or some certification.  I wondered if the theory of
     barrier analysis is something that I can go to, and if one had to do a
     barrier analysis in some certified way?
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  The reason we suggested or we put in a
     barrier analysis, that if I don't have a PRA, if I have taken several
     components out, I want to evaluate, say, what are the defense-in-depth
     elements that may be degraded.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, but the question is, if you have a
     PRA, immediately the issue of quality comes to mind, and so forth.
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If you do a barrier analysis, --
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  -- is there an ASME standard for barrier
     analysis?  Or by abandoning PRA, my life becomes so easy now I don't
     have to convince you that I have a quality analysis, life is great?  It
     should be difficult.  Difficulty must be conserved here.
         MR. WONG:  Okay.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  As it conserved in all other walks of
     life.  So if I spend resources to make sure the quality of my PRA is
     good, then the other guy who does a barrier analysis has to pay the
     price someplace.
         MR. CORREIA:  And I think he would have significant
     challenges from us.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
         MR. WONG:  Right.
         MR. CORREIA:  Because, in my mind, once you get beyond two
     or more, it gets very complex and integrated, it is a difficult argument
     to say I did it deterministically and be credible.
         DR. BONACA:  But you don't ask any documentation of these
     decisions, it seems to me, later on and, therefore, --
         MR. CORREIA:  Well, it is the description of the licensee's
     process.  I would hope that --
         DR. BONACA:  Well, I am saying, therefore, either control
     it.
         MR. CORREIA:  No, we don't control it, but we inspect it. 
     Yes.
         MR. BARTON:  It is a performance-based rule, Mario.
         MR. CORREIA:  Right.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, it is not.  It is not, for another
     reason.  But would you please drop the word "comparable"?
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  We will do that.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Try to find another one.  I gave you a
     suggestion, but I am sure you will not take it.
         DR. SEALE:  Third rate, something like that.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Something comparable to that.
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  The guidance that we have put in a draft,
     we think it will apply to the methods that are commonly used to evaluate
     the risk of maintenance configurations, and we just essentially listed
     the various methods in a graded order.  Typically, most of the -- a lot
     of licensees are using two-dimensional matrix, and then there are also
     licensees like South Texas in which they have developed a database of a
     precalculated set of configurations.  They means they have analyzed
     three, or four, or five SSCs and analyzed the risk.  And so if they
     think they are going to be doing maintenance on those, they will, you
     know, take action to avoid going into that situation.
         MR. CORREIA:  And it is something that is repeatable.  They
     can use it again and again and again.
         MR. WONG:  Over and over again.
         DR. KRESS:  Is the second sub-bullet a subset of the third?
         MR. WONG:  Yes.  Yes.  And then a lot of the utilities, as a
     result of the maintenance rule, is evolving to implementing, you know,
     risk monitors in place and that is the current state of affairs.  Okay.
         Okay.  The guidance here also we wanted to make sure during
     shutdown conditions, if there is a shutdown PRA model we expect the
     licensee to use it.  Otherwise -- because you use qualitative assessment
     of the degradation of the key safety functions, and the key safety
     functions that are needed, decay heat removal, reactor coolant inventory
     control, electrical power availability, reactivity control, and
     containment closure, primary and secondary.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So in this case, then, one cannot
     calculate a delta CDP and delta LERF.  Right?
         MR. WONG:  Yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  In which case there are no performance
     criteria anymore.  It's really not -- I can't have any performance
     goals -- not criteria, it's goal.
         DR. KRESS:  Goal, yes.
         DR. POWERS:  Well, you end up goals that say I'm not going
     to be in red for longer than six hours.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
         DR. POWERS:  So you mean I'll have no more than three
     oranges.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.  And five apples.
         DR. POWERS:  But, I mean, how you come to that conclusion is
     beyond me.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's a point, yes.  So that nice bullet
     you had earlier on slide 7, you know, that the configuration risk-
     significant when delta CDP and delta LERF exceed a certain value, we
     cannot do anymore here.  In fact, that's a good point, that if you have
     a PRA, you are really penalized.
         DR. POWERS:  Sure.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But that's not the way it should be.
         DR. POWERS:  Well, if you don't know, you get lucky.
         DR. SEALE:  Well, I guess I -- my view of --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Because what you don't know won't hurt
     you.
         DR. SEALE:  I think a PRA will help because -- a PRA will
     certainly help the licensee to do more online maintenance or maintain
     more systems simultaneously.  Without that I would really question
     whether or not they really understood the impact on risk of safety, and
     maybe they shouldn't do more than one or two at a time.
         DR. BONACA:  I am not concerned with the people having the
     PRA, I'm concerned about those that don't have a PRA.
         MR. BARTON:  That don't have a shutdown PRA?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, appropriate to the configuration,
     yes.
         DR. POWERS:  I guess what you ask is -- and I see lots and
     lots if AIPs on events that occur during shutdown, and they come from a
     variety of causes, but I often see things that have occurred because of
     conflicts between two or three maintenance activities going on at the
     same time.
         Has there been an effort to look at that somewhat
     systematically and say okay, these combinations of events have caused
     problems in the past, and so when I get -- it's not just the number of
     oranges I get on this ORAM screen that I've created, but if I get an
     orange in decay heat removal and electrical power availability, that's
     okay, but if I get one on decay heat removal and reactor coolant
     inventory, orange in both of those, that's not okay?
         MR. CORREIA:  I can't imagine how it could be.  And I hope
     using this tool will tell licensees the situation that they could be in
     and to avoid it to take other actions to change that orange to a green.
         DR. POWERS:  I've had licensees show me ORAM sheets that say
     look, and we didn't get a single red, the worst we got into was four
     oranges.  Okay.
         DR. MILLER:  Four oranges don't make a red?
         DR. POWERS:  Apparently not.
         MR. CORREIA:  Personally I'm not that familiar with what
     orange means, if it's a cautionary statement, be careful here, have
     heightened awareness, have contingency plans in place versus if it were
     green maybe not to be as concerned, and red, maybe you shouldn't do it
     at all.  I would hope that's the thinking behind this.  It's a tool,
     it's an aid.
         MR. BARTON:  I think it is.  I think you've pretty well
     described it.
         MR. CORREIA:  Right.
         DR. SHACK:  I think there's a certain amount of due
     diligence that goes on here.  I mean, the big risks come from the
     inadvertent ones.  You know, I don't think people really deliberately
     get themselves --
         MR. BARTON:  No, it's inadvertent or it's a human error,
     even though you've got this thing laid out and you've got the risk
     assessed, somebody goes and screws up.
         MR. CORREIA:  Okay.
         DR. SHACK:  I mean, whether this limit should be, you know,
     5 times 10 to the minus 6 or 6 times 10 to the minus 6, but you want to
     make sure that it isn't 10 to the minus 3.
         MR. CORREIA:  And to be able to cope with reasonably
     unexpected failures if they occur.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Do you really see your approving plant
     configurations that are fairly complex without a PRA?
         MR. WONG:  I don't think so.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  As a matter of practice, and that if the
     thing becomes too complex and you don't have a PRA, you might say well,
     gee, I don't really think you understand this.
         MR. CORREIA:  That would be my personal view.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
         MR. CORREIA:  Maybe they shouldn't be taking on --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right.
         MR. CORREIA:  Such complex configurations --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
         MR. CORREIA:  Without --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's a nicer way of putting it.  Yes.
         MR. CORREIA:  A risk tool.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
         MR. CORREIA:  Right.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
         DR. POWERS:  I mean, the problem is that -- if I was sitting
     up there I'd give you the same answer.  I'd say oh, no, no, no, don't do
     that.  When I'm at the desk looking at something and the guy says over
     and over again to me we've done this a hundred times, we've always done
     it this way, it looks good to us, it poses no significant risk, it can
     be very complicated, it can be a highly risk-significant thing in
     reality, but no one's ever calculated it, so we don't know.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
         DR. POWERS:  And yes, you can do it a hundred times and not
     have an event.  That doesn't help us if it's a 10 to the minus 3 event.
         MR. CORREIA:  Right.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.  Yes.
         DR. SEALE:  Would you expect it any other way?  If it's a 10
     to the minus 3.
         DR. POWERS:  I mean, yes, that's right.  I've got 100 of
     them under my belt and didn't have a problem, I wouldn't expect to if
     it's a -- but a 10 to the minus 3 event is a very significant event.
         MR. CORREIA:  Yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Sure.
         DR. BONACA:  See, but where I have a conceptual problem,
     okay, in general is that for risk-informed application there is a very
     clear understanding that you will allow risk-informed applications
     commensurate to the capability of your PRA.  And it seems to me that OSP
     should allow online maintenance of commensurate complexity with your
     capability to assess --
         DR. SEALE:  To assess the risk.
         DR. BONACA:  The concept should be that one.  And I don't
     see, however, any teeth here when you go beyond two or three, because
     management still has the ability of managing that by moving activities
     slightly off by a day or two, and that's done all the time, so that you
     avoid the most complicated -- it's not a huge penalty, you just still
     allow it to do, but you don't allow it to happen simultaneously.  That's
     the whole issue.  Move it by a day and do the same activity on line and
     reduce your risk.  And I'm not sure that I understand, you know, where
     the limit comes in that says you can't do that.
         MR. BARTON:  What limit are you looking for, Mario?
         DR. BONACA:  Well, I am trying to understand when you go
     beyond two or three components or systems, okay, and you don't have a
     PRA here, how -- you know, the point that George was bringing up.
         DR. POWERS:  Well, it may cure itself as we move to having
     fewer and fewer people in the operational forces, can't do more and more
     activities all simultaneously.
         MR. CORREIA:  Yes, there are limits, you're right, on
     operating crews, maintenance crews, just having the equipment and the
     time to do all this.  You're right.  It's true, it's an operational
     limit.
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  Now if the PRA model is used for the
     assessment, this is the seven attributes that we think the PRA model
     should have in order to assure some fidelity of the results, the PRA
     model should reflect the as-built and as-operated plant.  I think Mark
     talked about this in the earlier presentation.  They should reflect
     actual plant performance, meaning that changes in say in the reliability
     or the availability, if there are improved operational practices, they
     should be reflected.  And they should have an administrative process in
     place to update the PRA at some frequent intervals.
         And that it meets the industry standards as in the PRA
     process, because when we go to the sites we don't have a lot of time to
     go to every detail of the PRA that is being used.  We are taking that at
     face value.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But you will have time to review the
     barrier analysis?
         MR. WONG:  We may not have the --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So your next slide will tell us what the
     requirements of the barrier analysis are?
         MR. WONG:  Well, we --
         MR. CORREIA:  Maybe we'll choose a different analysis.
         MR. WONG:  We'll choose a different analysis.
         DR. POWERS:  You can do anything you want to in their
     analysis, George.  It is a much superior --
         [Laughter.]
         MR. WONG:  Okay.  The last slide is on managing risk.  What
     we expect is that the licensee --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Just out of curiosity, does anyone ever
     come before the NRC and argue that yes, it would be nice to have done a
     thermohydraulic analysis for this problem but we really haven't done it,
     so we will use judgment.  Is that something that is accepted?
         DR. SEALE:  It's called a bounding analysis.  They do it all
     the time.
         MR. WONG:  It's not yet.
         DR. POWERS:  Bob's right.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Judgmental bounding analysis.
         DR. FONTANA:  There's a couple of things on this viewgraph
     that kind of jump out at you.  The second big bullet says if the
     proposed configuration exceeds risk acceptance guidelines, then it says
     the management should be around before you enter the configuration. 
     That means you know you are going to enter a configuration that exceeds
     risk acceptance guidelines, which just kind of looks funny.
         MR. CORREIA:  In reality, jumping ahead a little bit, there
     may be cases where a licensee for a safety benefit needs to go into a
     short duration, high risk situation to restore certain equipment to
     reduce that risk, and what we are saying here --
         MR. BARTON:  And they have no other choice, so this needs
     senior management's approval.
         MR. CORREIA:  Right.
         MR. BARTON:  Before you can enter that situation.
         MR. CORREIA:  If you are in a certain configuration,
     something else fails in it, and it causes that risk to go way up, these
     are the kinds of things we would expect the licensee to do.
         DR. FONTANA:  The second sub-bullet looks a little funny. 
     It says minimize duration of the maintenance activity by preplanning and
     prestaging the necessary equipment.
         It seems like on the basis of economics that is what they
     would want to do all the time.
         MR. WONG:  Right.
         MR. BARTON:  And it says if you are going to get into a
     situation that refers to the bullet above that, then you had better make
     sure that you have got proper preplanning and prestaging necessary
     equipment.
         MR. WONG:  These are prudent practices or actions that you
     think the licensee should have if they have to perform the maintenance
     activities involving a high risk configuration.
         DR. BONACA:  What is missing there again I think is the most
     important, is shifting the activities -- that is what you really do.
         MR. CORREIA:  I guess that would fall into the third sub-
     bullet generally, compensatory actions.
         MR. WONG:  Compensatory actions.
         MR. CORREIA:  Move things around, delay, cancel.
         MR. WONG:  Stagger, you know, testing in redundant trains,
     yes.
         MR. CORREIA:  These are just we think good management
     practices that we have seen that should be implemented to manage risk.
         Industry has, and I am sure you will hear from Biff Bradley
     soon, the general concern with all of this is the scope of the
     assessment process.  Again, we believe it should be done at the system
     minimum train level, which is again a much-reduced scope than thousands
     of components, but the decision to risk-inform this rule and any other
     is still before the Commission and I have not yet heard what the
     decision has been, so that remains to be seen.
         It doesn't mean we are against it.  We are going forward
     with this rule as directed by the Commission.  That may change next week
     or next month.  I don't know -- but these are all plans.
         MR. BARTON:  Thank you.  Any questions?
         Let's hear from the industry.
         MR. CORREIA:  Thank you very much.
         MR. BARTON:  Thank you.  Do you have a question?  Go ahead. 
     All right, I'm sorry.  There is a question.
         MR. CORREIA:  We're back.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  On page 9 of the proposed rule, I guess,
     it says that the licensee's assessments of management process
     considerations should include (a) the likelihood that the maintenance
     activity will increase the frequency of an initiating event.  The
     probability of the activity will affect their ability to mitigate the
     initiating event.
         Is this a requirement?  If it is then how can you do this
     without a PRA?  This says probability.
         Maybe I am not reading it right.
         MR. BARTON:  Federal Register notice, page 9.
         DR. SEALE:  That is 9 at the top of the page.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, you don't have it?
         MR. CORREIA:  Don't have it, I'm sorry.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
         MR. BARTON:  It has to do with performing assessments.  That
     is a response to an NEI comment.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  See -- the bottom third of the page --
     "The NRC considers" --
         MR. BARTON:  The lead-in is bottom of page 8.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So are the licensees supposed to do these
     things and if so then that would seem to be a little inconsistent with
     what you presented here, which allows them not to do PRAs.
         MR. CORREIA:  It is.  These are, and I guess they have to go
     back, if a licensee were to use a PRA these are the kinds of items --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, there is a big condition in some of
     those I hadn't seen.
         MR. CORREIA:  Right.
         MR. BARTON:  Yes.
         MR. CORREIA:  Considerations should include.
         DR. WALLIS:  Well, you spend a lot of time on assessing risk
     and almost no time on managing it and I just feel that the amount of
     risk which is actually incurred by the public is probably quite
     sensitive to how it is managed and that just doing a lot of assessment
     and meeting guidelines doesn't reduce the risk of maintenance as much as
     perhaps the way it is planned and managed.
         MR. BARTON:  And that is the licensee's responsibility, to
     manage it.
         DR. WALLIS:  Right, but it is interesting to me that you
     spend almost no time on managing, which actually could have more
     effect -- that's a significant effect on the actual risk to the public.
         MR. SCOTT:  The purpose of the rule is not to make the
     licensees manage their plants.  They are already doing that.  The
     purpose of the rule is to require the licensees to assess the risk. 
     That is the main purpose.
         DR. WALLIS:  I thought the purpose was to protect the public
     safety.
         MR. BARTON:  By assessing and managing --
         MR. CORREIA:  -- risk.  Identify and control, yes.
         DR. WALLIS:  But then how it is managed is going to be
     important in that.
         MR. CORREIA:  This may sound like somewhat of a cop-out, but
     it is a performance-based rule.  We don't prescribe what a license
     should do, only what results they should achieve.  We leave that up to
     the licensee.  The rule is intended to give licensees that flexibility.
         We could prescribe how to do an assessment, what it should
     include, what management steps they would have to take.
         MR. BARTON:  In a deterministic rule.
         MR. CORREIA:  Yes, that's right, and what this does though
     is it gives us a significant challenge in inspection space because
     licensees do have this flexibility.
         DR. WALLIS:  No, I am just trying to take it to a bigger
     view of things, and it is interesting to me --
         MR. CORREIA:  Agreed.
         DR. WALLIS:  -- and it is interesting to me that the purview
     of your activities covers something and then something else is covered
     somewhere else.  What is the total sum for society?  But anyway, I won't
     press that.
         MR. BARTON:  I again thank you.  Biff, you're on.
         MR. CORREIA:  Thank you.
         MR. BRADLEY:  Biff Bradley of NEI again.
         I will try to be brief here and I want to show one slide
     that you did get just handed but we'll take care of that.
         Industry had three major concerns with the rule as proposed
     originally and the first of those was that the original proposed rule
     language basically required a judgment of risk significance and now that
     has been changed to address the need for awareness and action, which we
     think is the appropriate approach for the rule language, so that concern
     has been addressed I think in the language that the Staff has proposed.
         The second had to do with the NRC's policy that the
     implementation guidance for a rule should be issued concurrent with its
     promulgation as a proposed rule and that has sort of been met half-way
     in that we now have a draft Regulatory Guide that would discuss how the
     rule would be implemented.  However, that is not going to get issued
     until shortly before the SECY goes up for the final rule, so it still
     puts us in a little bit of a difficult position of trying to structure
     our comments on the rule, which is already a done deed and now we are
     seeing the guidance for the first time.
         The final area and the one I wanted to discuss at a little
     more length had to do with the provision of the (a)(4) assessment to the
     entire scope of the maintenance rule.
         I want to preface this by saying that industry has agreed
     with the concept of this rulemaking.  We do, even though the "should" is
     legally interpreted as a recommendation and not a requirement, every
     plant has established a program to assess the risk impact of maintenance
     activities.  We recognize the importance of that process.
         We understood, and I think the regulatory analysis for the
     rule stated that it was to codify existing practice, and we have had a
     lot of discussion with the industry, those involved in implementation of
     these activities, as to whether they believe what they see in the rule
     language does codify existing practice.
         I think the one are where we see a significant delta has to
     do with the proposed scope of the assessment.
         As you know, the maintenance rule scope is unique in all the
     regulations.  It is both deterministic and has a series of additional
     requirements for scoping that involve risk insights, and so it is
     basically a deterministic plus risk insights, and there is for many
     plants up to 85 percent of the total SSCs in the plant have been scoped
     into the rule.  It is a vast scope at the component level for many
     plants, and this is a result of a five or so year implementation
     inspection and enforcement process that preceded where we are today.
         It actually involved some what we believe were changes in
     interpretation with regard to the time the rule was initially
     promulgated through the pilot inspections into where we are today where
     all the plants have been through the baselines.  I think the
     expectations originally were that the scope would not be quite as large
     as it has become.
         Because of the very large scope there is concern that it is
     not a practical approach to write a regulation that would apply the
     configuration assessment to that entire scope.  As you know, the
     maintenance rule does have a risk ranking provision in the guidance,
     NUMARC 93.01 and Reg Guide 1160, which endorses it, and there already
     has been a categorization into two categories of what we call in the Reg
     Guide high safety significant components and low safety significant
     components.
         Rich talked about the need to assess this at the system
     train level and I guess I would offer that we believe that assessment
     has already been made and that it has been reviewed, inspected, and we
     know which components affect the function of the systems and trains and
     which ones don't and those are the high safety significant and the low
     safety significant components.
         The tools we have in place right now in the industry to do
     these assessments, particularly the quantitatively driven tools, the
     risk monitors, the PRA based tools, the matrices typically are looking
     at the high safety significant components or the scope of the PRA.  They
     are not looking at the entire scope of the maintenance rule.
         We have work control processes in place that do look at all
     maintenance activities and this really becomes a question as to what is
     the proper scope of regulation?  At what point is it appropriate for the
     regulator to have requirements regarding these assessments?  We believe
     the proper point is for the HSSCs or the SSCs modelled in the PRA.
         We have a concern that the rule language as proposed there
     is a single paragraph that would cover everything from doing maintenance
     on a very highly safety significant component down to something that has
     literally no safety significance that has been scoped in because of some
     of the provisions in the maintenance rule.
         Our past experience with regulations, and the words of
     regulations are very important, and they have to stand the test of time,
     and we have seen this in some degree with 50.59 and also with 50.65, the
     maintenance rule, where the expectation with regard to what the words of
     the regulations say has evolved and changed over time and created very
     large problems for the industry.
         We really feel compelled to try in this case to avoid that
     kind of situation arising again in the future.
         Therefore we believe it is important that the rule language
     itself would differentiate this HSSC and SSCs, LSSCs with regard to the
     need for this assessment.  There are a number of other reasons why this
     is appropriate.
         Reg Guide 177, which is the tech spec Reg Guide, implements
     a configuration risk management program.  This was explicitly
     implemented because the "should" provision of (a)(3) did not require the
     assessment and there was a concern that going into a risk-informed AOT
     there should be a requirement, a hard requirement, to do a risk
     assessment before you entered that, so Reg Guide 177 states that the
     intent of the CRMP is to implement Section (a)(3) of the maintenance
     rule, and there was a lot of discussion about the scope of that CRMP
     with the Staff, the tech spec branch, and other branches and the final
     content in that Reg Guide states that the scope of that CRMP is the
     HSSCs as described in the maintenance rule or the scope -- and/or the
     scope of the PRA.
         We don't understand why there is a different scope being
     proposed now for the maintenance rule revision, given that that
     determination has already been made.
         MR. BARTON:  Well, maybe the Staff can answer that, because
     this issue keeps cropping up and Staff thinks it is resolved by going to
     a train level.  Industry keeps saying it's not resolved, it's an extra
     burden.
         I thought the CRMP program was going to go out when the
     maintenance rule, revised maintenance rule was issued, that licensees
     would request that CRMPs be removed from tech spec, so I guess I am
     confused as to where we really are on this issue.
         MS. GILLES:  This is Nanette Gilles from the Technical
     Specifications Branch.  In our branch we work with the industry in
     development of the configuration risk management program for risk-
     improved technical specifications.
         I guess I'll just make a couple of comments as to why we
     ended up where we did on the scope of the CRMP.
         One, we realized that we were working in a voluntary program
     for risk-informed tech spec improvements and so the industry would not
     be compelled by force of a regulation and we wanted to encourage people
     to come in with risk-informed tech spec improvements so we did work in
     concert with the industry to reach the scope.
         In addition, we were very conscientiously trying to
     encourage the use of PRA in these assessments and because we were trying
     to encourage the use of PRA we felt that the scope that we arrived at
     was the appropriate scope for where we were at.
         DR. POWERS:  Let me ask you a question, Biff.  When the
     categorization between HSSCs and LSSCs was made, was that done
     considering that one or more other systems could have been out for
     maintenance, for other reasons not be available?
         MR. BRADLEY:  I don't think it generally was.  However, the
     expert panel determinations and the work control process and the tools
     we have now do address that.  I guess we talk about this as sort of a
     needle in a haystack of some very few potential combinations of LSSCs
     that may be risk-significant, and I guess the concern is that it seems
     that writing an all-encompassing rule that will require this assessment
     every time you do a maintenance activity on any SSC in the scope of the
     rule seems an impractical approach to try to address that.
         MR. BARTON:  But can't you do some of these in advance once
     and go look at the low level safety significant components and systems
     and say these configurations lead you to the three or four that you are
     worried about so stay out of them, and then you don't have to do it
     again?
         MR. BRADLEY:  But when you have at the component level, you
     know, over 20,000 of these, and it's really a question of if it's simply
     an issue of how it affects safety function, I think we could do that. 
     If you are having to look at all the permutations of all possible
     combinations of these maintenance activities, that cannot be done in
     advance since --
         MR. BARTON:  Is it your interpretation if you take one valve
     or one detector or something that is a low -- LSSC out of service for
     maintenance you are going to have to do a complete assessment on it, one
     of these 20,000?
         MR. BRADLEY:  Well, in combination with whatever else may be
     out at that time, yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, I think you will probably have to do
     the assessment at the train level.
         MR. BARTON:  That is what the Staff is saying.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The trains have components in series and
     then you can easily infer from the train configurations what happens
     when the components are down.
         In fact, Mark Rubin told us this morning that some
     configurations the ranking changes, right?  Would you say that something
     that may be risk insignificant under certain conditions may become risk
     significant --
         MR. RUBIN:  Sure.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But you will catch those without doing the
     combinations.  If you start taking combinations of 20,000 components, I
     mean, boy, that's going to blow up -- but of course then there is always
     a solution of going to barrier analysis where you don't have to do any
     of that.
         [Laughter.]
         MR. BARTON:  Rich, do you have a comment?
         MR. CORREIA:  Yes.  Commenting on Biff's comment, when
     licensees followed the guidance in 9301 to risk rank SSCs it was done at
     the system level.  It was based on a static PRA.  The issue here is
     given the licensees' authority if you will to take out SSCs in
     combinations that weren't analyzed, what happens to risk at that point? 
     That is our concern with the rule.
         We do recognize that there is a population of low-risk
     significant SSCs that as they do an assessment or already have
     recognized through this other process won't have a big impact or any at
     all, that in itself serves as the assessment and our Reg Guide addresses
     that, this one-time assessment, once they have done it and recognized
     it, they don't need to do it again.
         I think both from a tech spec perspective and a plant
     operational perspective, combinations of 25,000 components out of
     service simultaneously is impossible.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  True.
         MR. CORREIA:  So we are looking at a fairly, I think -- not
     fairly, a very controlled environment where tech specs, just in order to
     keep the plant operating you can only have so many different
     combinations of SSCs out of service at one time.
         MR. BRADLEY:  Right, and you mentioned, Rich, the scope, you
     know, that the PRA is static but our proposal is that the scope of the
     PRA would be the scope of this assessment so I think that would address
     that.
         We are talking about SSCs that are not modelled and are not
     reflected in the tools, and that is the concern.
         MR. CORREIA:  It's just the issue of what happens when you
     now take combinations out of service simultaneously that the previous
     analysis didn't cover.
         MR. BRADLEY:  Right.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think the word "modelled" the way you
     just used it, Biff, sends the wrong message.  I mean -- and we discussed
     this when we were reviewing the Regulatory Guide -- one of those.
         MR. BRADLEY:  Right.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  GQA, where people were concerned that a
     lot of the components are not modelled in the PRA, but there is a reason
     why they are not modelled.  They are not left out because they are
     important.
         If it is not in the PRA maybe the component does not
     contribute to risk.
         MR. BRADLEY:  Yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So that is a starting point.
         DR. SEALE:  But that is a decision that may have been made
     on the expectation that the PRA would be applied to full power
     operation.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, for whatever purposes the PRA was
     done.
         DR. SEALE:  Right, but now let's suppose you have --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But if you say they were not modelled and
     put a period after that, I think you are sending the wrong message.
         DR. SEALE:  Yes, okay.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Now of course there are others that are
     not in the PRA, like the passive components, because their reliability
     is much higher and so on -- and then you really have to do something. 
     In fact, Westinghouse came up with a surrogate component idea, so don't
     put a period after it -- they are not modelled.
         MR. BRADLEY:  That was just a comment.
         The other point I would like to make, as SECY 98-300, and I
     know the Commission is still -- well, I guess the votes may be in but
     the SRM isn't out yet -- the recommendation of the Staff in that was
     that the scope of the maintenance rule should be the first priority in
     readdressing the regulated scope with regard with Part 50 reform, and
     that the priority regulation identified in that SECY was the maintenance
     rule.
         If we establish this assessment provision on the entire
     scope of the rule, and believe me, given the inspection history of this
     rule, that will have major programmatic impacts on the plants and if we
     subsequently change the scope of the rule in the near future, I would
     like think to be truly risk-informed there is a disconnect there, and
     that is why we originally proposed putting this rulemaking under that
     other one.
         But that's an additional concern we have with regard to the
     scope issue.
         So I guess that completes what I wanted to say, but we do
     have a concern with whether this is codifying existing practice or
     really establishing a fairly new level of regulation, and that is a
     function of the scope to which it's applied, and we'll be interested in
     looking at the regulatory analysis for the final rule to see how that's
     been treated.  And we remain hopeful that the Commission will determine
     that this should live up to the original intent of being a risk-informed
     performance-based rule, and this is the perfect place to start to risk-
     inform the maintenance rule and all of Part 50.
         MR. SCOTT:  I have maybe a question of Biff.
         Could you comment on the results of NRC inspection activity
     of maintenance rule since the programmatic baseline inspections have
     been completed?
         You expressed that the industry has great concerns about
     this sort of thing, and I just wondered what you see happening in the
     field in the nine months since July 10 last year when the inspection --
     the programmatic inspection --
         MR. BRADLEY:  I think there's by a significant improvement
     in the inspection environment.  However, we've got to remember that this
     rule will live for years, just like 50.59 has lived for years, and which
     we really are trying to learn the lesson here of making sure the rule is
     correct and clearly captures the intent, and that interpretations won't
     be changed at some future time.  I would agree that the inspection
     experience has improved over what we saw early on.
         MR. BARTON:  Thank you, Biff.
         Any other questions or comments?
         If not --
         DR. BONACA:  I just -- my one question was on the safety
     significance, to some degree it's relative, in part depends on now this
     possible complicated grouping of systems being taken out of service. 
     But I take back my comment.  I understand where you're going.
         MR. BARTON:  Having heard no other comments, do you have a
     comment?
         DR. POWERS:  I'm going to take it over from here.
         MR. BARTON:  Oh, thank you.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It was a coup.
         MR. BARTON:  Missed a coup.
         DR. POWERS:  We have a benefit.  Commissioner Diaz has
     joined us to hear this, to emphasize his interest in this particular
     rule, which is indeed very significant, and I'd like to ask Commissioner
     Diaz if he'd care to share some thoughts with us on this subject.
         DR. SEALE:  It's wired for sound.
         COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  Well, I kind of feel almost looking
     around like the proverbial lamb brought into the lions' den.
         DR. POWERS:  I will comment that Commissioner Diaz did say
     that we could treat him just like one of the colleagues, so you're in
     big trouble, sir.
         COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  I didn't say that.
         [Laughter.]
         No, I just wanted to stop by because I'm very interested in
     your deliberations, and sometimes we get a little separated and filtered
     from it, and I just wanted to let you know that we're very interested in
     what you're doing, that, you know, sometimes multiple inputs do
     converge, although we are having a hard time doing that.  I think we're
     trying to get there, and at this time I was wondering whether you have
     any comments that will remove the clouds from a Commissioner's mind on
     the age of the maintenance rule, but I've been listening to it, and I
     guess you're still deliberating.
         If there's something that we should know, we should know it
     soon, because we're still working on that process, and like very soon. 
     I just heard something that it's really -- it's very consistent with the
     way that I've been trying to work in the Commission is that I believe
     rules should be as complete and as clear as possible.  That guidance is
     indispensable and guidance is very good, but sometimes if the rule is
     not as thorough and as complete and as clear as it should be, it might
     tend to be changed later on, or it might be not interpreted properly.
         So I do believe that we need to more and more make the rules
     as clear and as self-contained as possible so that the direction to the
     staff is thorough.  And that's something that I don't think we can
     longer afford to have rules where the guidance actually becomes the rule
     de facto, and that's really the key point I wanted to make.  But if you
     have anything that I should hear before, you know, I go and do some
     work, I'd be happy to hear, specifically on the maintenance rule.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  How much did you hear?
         COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  I heard the last 20 minutes or so, so it
     gave me a reasonable flavor, but I didn't get the rest of it, and
     sometimes, like I say, there's a lapse time, and sometimes things are
     properly filtered, and sometimes they're too filtered.  And so --
         DR. POWERS:  I think there's no question that there are a
     lot of issues came up in this rule, and based on our discussions to this
     point, I think it's fair to say that the scope of the rule is an issue. 
     The Commission passed the original maintenance rule, yes, there was a
     deliberate attempt to expand the scope, and the question, of course, is
     have we gone too far.
         There is a -- clearly an interest in the guidance here
     focusing on risk-assessment tools, but our tools are limited.  We like
     to say let's go to the PRA, but not everybody has a PRA and not every
     PRA is that good, and even the best of them don't cover everything.  And
     what do you do there?  What is the guidance for this?  And that same
     question comes up that PRAs were intended for one function.
         They were designed for a function, and that was to really
     estimate what's the operating risk.  Now you're asking this PRA to
     estimate conditional risks, and they can do it in principle.  Our
     concerns are do they do it in principle -- do it in fact, as well as in
     principle.  Those are the kinds of things that went on I think before
     you came in, and they're going to figure in the deliberations here.  I
     don't know, do other Members have things that they --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, yes.  It seems to me -- I don't know
     again whether you were here when this was discussed --
         COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  That's okay, George, you can stamp it.
         DR. POWERS:  He does that, and my writing takes a beating
     here.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It seems to me that the moment people say
     PRA, immediately the issue of quality and so on comes up, but when we
     talk about other methods, they are not scrutinized to the same degree. 
     And that really bothers me.
         COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  You mean there are uncertainties in
     other methods?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No.
         [Laughter.]
         DR. POWERS:  Well, George, I think that's true in the
     viewgraph, but I think --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The reality is not.
         DR. POWERS:  The reality of the matter is that when the
     staff gets a submission based on other methods, I think that often those
     other methods are simpler and do in fact get a fair amount of scrutiny. 
     I would think that --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, one would hope.
         DR. POWERS:  I mean, one of the reasons we have to go to
     concepts like a certification or standards process is it's really
     impractical for the staff to look at an entire PRA and come away and say
     yes, that's very good.  Whereas a barrier analysis, they're very famous
     and what not, but they typically can be read in a few sheets of paper,
     and I don't -- they do get excluded.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, but ideally one would have to rely or
     should rely less on a barrier analysis than on a PRA.  Okay?
         COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  But in reality, you know, we are in a
     phase now in which we have to use a combination of things.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  True.
         COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  We cannot rely on any one thing.  And I
     think what I heard from both the industry and the staff, and I was
     reading some of the staff slides, is that we realize that this, quote,
     assessment, or even how you, you know, risk, you know, rank a system,
     structure, or component, that there's more than one way of doing it, and
     that people have been doing it.
         Everybody has some type of configuration risk management. 
     Some are very sophisticated, some are simpler.  But they all do it.  And
     they all do it, okay, and in doing it they compensate.  If it has little
     less PRA, then maybe the senior reactor operators look more at it, you
     know, and work with maintenance.  And so there is a combination of
     things.
         We have a very heterogeneous industry and a very
     heterogeneous way of regulating them, and I think right now we are in a
     phase in which we need to start prioritizing which tool serves for what
     better.  And I think that's what we're doing right now.  But it still --
     for several years it will be a combination of things, not one thing.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That was my point.  I mean, what I was
     trying to do, that I don't want people to get discouraged from using PRA
     because of all these conditions that it has to be quality and so on, and
     then you resort to another method, and then all these requirements
     disappear.
         COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  No.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  In real life probably they don't.  I
     agree.
         DR. SEALE:  George, when you put down a number, you
     invite -- there's a bull's eye that's implicit with it when you put down
     a number.  There's something to question.  So you're just asking for it
     when you write down a number.
         [Laughter.]
         COMMISSIONER DIAZ:  I just want to again repeat that we take
     what is happening very serious.  This is a very important deliberation,
     and I know that you know the Commission is looking at it to make
     something that is as good as we can do right now, and your report is
     valuable, and we thank you for it.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Thank you.
         DR. SEALE:  Thank you a lot.
         DR. POWERS:  Thank you.
         With that I'm going to recess for the lunch break, and we
     should get back here promptly for our ethical training.
         [Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the meeting was recessed, to
     reconvene at 1:30 p.m., this same day.].                   A F T E R N O O N  S E S S I O N
                                                      [1:30 p.m.]
         DR. POWERS:  Let's come back into session.  Our next topic
     is to come back to the general discussion of our Subcommittee meeting
     earlier this week, the proposed approach for revising the Commission's
     Safety Goal Policy Statement.  George Apostolakis and Tom Kress are the
     Cognizant Members on this subject.  Dr. Apostolakis is in the flesh here
     before us, ready to go.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
         DR. POWERS:  Chomping at the bit.  So I will let you
     introduce our esteemed speakers.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Thank you.  We had a Subcommittee meeting
     yesterday where we discussed the staff's plans regarding the revision of
     the Safety Goal Policy Statement and the whole Committee was here, so
     there is no need to summarize it.  But what we agreed --
         DR. POWERS:  The Chairman was not present for much of the
     time.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, you were not.  Oh, okay.  So what --
         DR. POWERS:  He was dealing with a far more important
     subject called the reactor fuel.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  What the staff proposed, and they
     plan to propose to the Commission, is that they be given another year to
     work on this, and the primary reason is that they would like to expand
     the scope and develop a Safety Goal Policy Statement that would be
     applicable to all the activities of the agency, not just reactors, and
     that would have to be a combination of qualitative and maybe
     quantitative goals for individual activities, or classes of activities,
     it is not clear at this time.
         So what we suggested was that perhaps they should come up
     with a more specific timetable that would involve deliverables in less
     than a year, because some of us felt that that would add credibility to
     their request, and come back today, in fact, they offered to do that, to
     come back today and tell us what their preliminary thoughts on that are,
     what they can do in six months, or in nine months, or whatever.  So that
     is where we left it.  We asked them not to repeat the presentation of
     yesterday and, you know, I guess we can -- you can go over the
     viewgraphs, Dana.
         But the main idea is that they want to expand the scope and
     really cover all the activities of the agency, including those of NMSS
     in general statements regarding the policies of this agency with respect
     to safety goals, I suppose.
         So, Tom, Joe.
         MR. BARRETT:  And Rich.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And Rich.
         MR. BARRETT:  And the other guy.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And the other guy.  Oh, you are the other
     guy.
         DR. POWERS:  I guess, you know, as you find your places up
     there, I understand pretty well, I think, why it is desirable to have
     the grand, all-encompassing goal that covers all things for all men at
     all times.  I understand that there are challenges to do that.  And I am
     wondering, has there been -- if you can summarize the considerations
     that say, yes, we should have one set of goals that cover everything, as
     opposed to a reactor safety set of goals, and a repository set of goals
     and a special nuclear material user set of goals.  I mean why is that
     irrational to do that?  I mean maybe you are talking about six instead
     of two, or something like that.
         MR. KING:  Well, one, we are not proposing -- maybe I ought
     to, for the record, state our names.  I am Tom King from the Office of
     Research.  With me at the table is Joe Murphy from Research, Rich
     Barrett from NRR, and Seth Coplan from NMSS.  We are not proposing one
     set of goals that covers everything.
         What we are proposing is there are certain goals that cut
     across the agency, reactor/non-reactor things.  Some of those
     considerations are in the current reactor safety goal policy, some
     aren't.  What we are proposing is let's take those that cut across
     everything and raise them to a higher level, and then under that, you
     can have some reactor-specific things and non-reactor-specific things.
         Not everything has to be the same when you get down into
     some of the implementation and some of the details, because the
     population at risk is different.  The purpose of the activities is
     different.  So there would be some -- when you get down particularly
     into the quantitative measures, some differences that should show up in
     differences in goals and criteria.
         MR. MURPHY:  I see it almost as over-arching principles that
     we then develop specific goals from.  But by having a consistent set, we
     can try to keep what we do in the various areas coherent with each
     other, although not necessarily the same.
         MR. KING:  So, in effect, you know, what we are proposing is
     this high level safety policy, as the first bullet says, under which
     specific reactor and non-reactor elements could be included.
         DR. POWERS:  I guess I am really attracted to Joe's
     language.  Rather than saying high level safety policy, say high level
     safety principles.
         MR. KING:  Okay.
         DR. POWERS:  And just -- it is because the baggage you carry
     from the current safety policy, you know, leads to some specific goals,
     whereas, principles, I can imagine principles being of the nature of we
     don't want -- involuntary risks should be very small relative to other
     risks in society.  I mean that would be an over-arching principle that
     would cut across all things.  Maybe it is not one you are thinking of,
     but it could be.  Whereas, a goal tends to have some quantitative or
     qualitative guideline to it that uses a language that is going to be
     peculiar to a field, it seems to me.  And I guess I have enough
     interaction with our brothers in the ACNW to understand that their use
     of words and our use of words are enough different that it causes
     confusion, but I don't think they would argue with an over-arching
     principle.
         DR. WALLIS:  Are you suggesting they should avoid
     quantitative statements entirely?
         DR. POWERS:  No.  No.  What I am saying is that if I am
     looking for something that cuts across the agency, I like the language
     of high over-arching principles rather than over-arching safety policy,
     because of the baggage that that safety policy takes along.
         DR. WALLIS:  Yeah, but suppose they start with your
     principle that the risk should be comparable or less than some other
     risk or something.  Are they then restrained from putting numbers on
     that risk?
         DR. POWERS:  No, what he is saying is that you would have --
     I think what he said, correct me if I am wrong, you have these over-
     arching principles -- I will use my language, or Joe's language, and
     then within the reactor community, they are very likely to come out with
     something that is very quantitative, because they are moving in
     quantitative directions.
         DR. WALLIS:  So your thrust is exactly the opposite of the
     one that I thought -- that I was taking, which was figure out what you
     need to do in order to do risk-informed decision making and do it.  That
     is exactly the opposite of standing why back from everything and doing
     something grand.  That is actually getting a job done, and that is a
     completely opposite idea.
         DR. POWERS:  I guess I don't think so.  I think that the
     problems that you frequently run into in trying to engineer a specific
     task is the difficulty of tying it to a hierarchy of requirements, and
     with the existing safety goals, you tie it to requirements that are
     impractical to implement.  Okay.  So when you come down into the
     development of a regulation or, worse yet, into a Regulatory Guide, you
     haven't got a steady set of consistent sets of requirements coming from
     the very top, you have got a disconnect, usually called CDF.
         DR. KRESS:  I see what you are saying he says is basically
     equivalent.  Because he says figure out what you need to do to risk-
     inform the regulation.  What you are saying is the right way to figure
     it out.
         DR. POWERS:  I think that's right.
         DR. WALLIS:  Yeah, I think there is an agreement, but as
     long as -- my concern was, and I think some other members of this
     Committee, was that if you take too grand a view, you become so vague
     that it is not useful, it can't be implemented, risk-informed
     regulation, that there is a whole new job of work to be done afterwards.
         DR. KRESS:  Well, there would be, but the presumption is
     that that is the right way to go.  That you would do that extra work.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think the very top level principles will
     be useless in that way.
         DR. KRESS:  Oh, yeah.  You will have to further -- you will
     have to translate them further down.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right.  I mean until you reach some
     numbers, you will not be able to do what --
         DR. POWERS:  I mean when we engineer any project, we begin
     with top level, top tier requirements, that very seldom by themselves
     would be of any use to machining or bending metal.  And that you start
     asking the question, okay, if I have to assure that involuntary risk is
     small compared to other risks faced in society, your next question is,
     what the hell do you mean by small, and what are the rest of the risks
     in society?  Then you start building up a pyramid of things here.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  For example, the high-level principle
     might say, in fact I believe it was said yesterday, that you want the
     risks to be small with respect to -- compared to risks from comparable
     activities.  It would be interesting to see what the comparable
     activities are when you go to NMSS.
         DR. POWERS:  Right.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But if you don't say that there, then they
     have to do something that may be different.  It leaves it open.  So the
     principles are important.  There is no question about it.
         MR. KING:  Yes.  We're not proposing to stop work on the
     specific items in the reactor safety goal policy that we identified for
     update, and we're not proposing NMSS stop work on implementing their
     SECY paper, assuming the Commission agrees.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think it's worth trying.  It's worth
     trying to do what you want to do, because if we don't try, then we may
     be accused later that we never tried.
         DR. BONACA:  One of the things that I have the frequency
     with is that for a long time, goals up here, whatever we say is very
     high level, it's all PRA-based, and all the regulation here we lived
     with is all deterministic.  So if I understand it, you're trying to now
     merge somewhat, go from the level up there down to translate some of
     those high-level goals into more specific.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But not at this stage.  At this stage they
     are supplementing the high-level goals.
         DR. BONACA:  I understand that, but I'm saying are you
     attempting also to make some kind of bridging down?
         MR. KING:  My view is that you could have a second tier to
     this high-level document that would bridge down to reactors and
     nonreactors and get down in to QHO, CDF, temporary increases in risk,
     whatever makes sense to put in at that level for, you know,
     quantitative-type goals.
         DR. BONACA:  So it's not yet at that.
         DR. KRESS:  What happens if you do it just as if you didn't
     have a regulatory set of regulations out there?  And then you figure out
     how to make the regulations -- see if they're consistent with the
     regulations you have after you end up getting to that point.
         DR. BONACA:  Yes, but you see why -- for a long time, I
     mean, this decoupling that, you know, it just troubles me, you know --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But that's --
         DR. BONACA:  I understand.  That's the way that the world --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Don't you think that's part of other
     activities like risk-informing Part 50 and all that?
         DR. BONACA:  That may well be, but --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think so.
         DR. BONACA:  But --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Because -- they are talking about very
     high-level --
         DR. BONACA:  I understand that, but still you are working
     here with all these regulations to make your plants -- and then the only
     connection you have to that is to make a PRA to see whether or not you
     meet those goals.  Okay?  But that PRA --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You want to work backwards.
         DR. BONACA:  Yes, I would like to --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's what risk-informing --
         MR. BARRETT:  It's not necessary that these overarching
     goals be risk-related, entirely risk-related.  It's entirely possible
     that some of these goals would be risk-related --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Of course, if they're rational.
         MR. BARRETT:  Others will be rational but not risk-related.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Have a significant element.
         DR. POWERS:  I don't know.  They could be based on barrier
     analysis it seems to me.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You missed that discussion this morning. 
     Some of you did.
         [Laughter.]
         Joe Murphy is smiling.  He knows about barrier analysis.
         [Laughter.]
         I think we've exhausted this subject.  Do you agree, Graham? 
     I mean, clearly they are not doing what you thought they were doing.
         DR. WALLIS:  No, I think they should do both.  I was just --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And they said they would.
         DR. WALLIS:  I was just concerned that they don't get lost
     in the morass of --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, but --
         DR. WALLIS:  Political-type goals and they get on with
     something practical.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  They have a timetable later, which it
     probably will guarantee that this will not happen.
         DR. WALLIS:  Oh, they actually have some deliverables by a
     certain date?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
         DR. WALLIS:  Good.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
         MR. KING:  Okay.  We talked a little bit yesterday about why
     are we doing this, and I want to rehash everything we said yesterday,
     but I think there was a general thought that a lot of the things we had
     on the slide were really facilitating implementation of risk-informed
     regulation, they weren't separate items, and so we tried to restate a
     little bit what the purpose or objectives or advantages of doing this
     are.
         I think, one, it would provide a framework under which
     things like the goals in the strategic plan and the regulatory analysis
     guidelines could be written, provide some consistency with those,
     facilitate implementation of risk-informed regulation, particularly
     consolidating scattered guidance, seeing if there's any gaps that need
     to be filled in, providing a framework for consistency between reactor
     and nonreactor activities.  That doesn't mean they have to be the same,
     but some of these overarching principles ought to guide both.
         And if you do all of that, it will promote public
     confidence.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  In fact, speaking of public confidence --
     well, you guys don't need to be convinced of that.  The Chairman had
     some comments on that, didn't she, recently, on public confidence?  But
     that is a given that we want to have it here.
         MR. KING:  Yes.  That is one of the --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You don't need additional ammunition for
     that.
         MR. KING:  Now, as we go through the self-assessment process
     in the various offices, that is one of our goals, is to have -- do
     things that promote public confidence.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Right.
         MR. KING:  And just one quick summary slide to refresh your
     memory.  The kinds of things that would be considered to be put in this
     high level safety policy would be qualitative goals for public and
     worker protection, possibly qualitative for goals for environmental
     protection.
         DR. POWERS:  Why do you take on the task of worker
     protection?
         MR. KING:  The agency has already taken it on.  Worker
     protection, we have got a Part 20 that deals with worker protection. 
     Maybe in the NMSS area, there may be other things also.  But, you know,
     it seems to me -- for example, in the reactor area, you have the ALARA
     principle.  Except where does ALARA show up?  It shows up in an appendix
     to Part 50.  Should that be some higher level kind of principle that
     applies across the board?  Those are the kinds of things that I think
     this --
         DR. POWERS:  I think you run into a problem doing this.  I
     will grant you that ALARA is in there.  I will grant you that when I
     look at the Part 50 regulations and the Part 20 regulations, that I see
     a lot of things that relate to worker protection.  I will grant for you
     that I see a lot of the activities of residents enforcing good practices
     of workers.  But I think you have a hard time tracking that from your
     founding legislation with those rules.
         MR. KING:  You don't think the Atomic Energy Act applies to
     workers?
         DR. POWERS:  Well, I guess what I am asking is, are you
     tracking the Atomic Energy Act through the work force?
         MR. KING:  It seems to me this is the kind of activity that
     would face that question.  We do regulate now for worker protection.  I
     guess I have always been under the impression the Atomic Energy Act
     covers that.  Assuming that is true, what should be our high level over-
     arching principles for that?  I mean that is where I am coming from.  I
     don't have an OGC person here to help me out on the legalities of that,
     but --
         MR. MURPHY:  It would seem, just as a pragmatic matter, that
     Part 20 would not exist in the current form if it wasn't clearly tied
     back to the Atomic Energy Act.  Somewhere along the line, someone would
     have --
         DR. KRESS:  Well, it make sense for some agency, government
     agency, to protect workers, and in this area, it might as well be the
     NRC.  It seems like that --
         MR. KING:  OSHA doesn't set radiation standards.
         DR. KRESS:  No.  So it sounds like there shouldn't be
     anything wrong with it.
         MR. MURPHY:  Now, in talking about worker protection, it
     would be radiological protection, with the possible exception we
     mentioned yesterday of the chemical hazards.  But for us to get into --
     and I am thinking in terms of UF-6 in particular, where the hazard is
     the F-6 and not the U.  But the way we get into that is if there is a
     memorandum of understanding between NRC and OSHA giving us
     responsibility in that area.  It is really OSHA's responsibility, which
     they then delegate to NRC.  Correct me if I am saying this wrong, Seth.
         So, clearly, there has to be a tieback to enabling
     legislation.  But, as you say, that may not be apparent to everyone
     right now.  One of the things we do in this is to try to make that more
     apparent.
         MR. COPLAN:  Worker safety is a very important part of NMSS
     activities.  In fact, the principal cancer risk in most cases comes from
     normal exposure to workers, and I am not positive of this, but I am
     pretty sure that we do have a responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act
     for that aspect of worker protection.
         I know that we have a memorandum of understanding with OSHA
     to deal with accident situations, protection of workers from accidents.
         So there is a lot of stuff in place, at least with NMSS,
     right now, and I guess my understanding of the reactor situation is that
     Part 20 has to apply there as well.  So that under at least normal
     operation of reactors, again, you have worker protection as an issue.
         DR. POWERS:  There is an absolute fundamental principle, and
     any time you engineer something, you cannot use low level criteria to
     justify high level criteria.
         MR. COPLAN:  That's right.
         DR. POWERS:  Okay.  You cannot come in and say Part 20
     exists, ergo, I have to have a high level criterion to do that.  So you
     have to track that.  I would suggest that in your items, to separate the
     first one into qualitative goals for the public, qualitative goals for
     the worker, because I think you have got a problem finding your
     hierarchy here.  It may be found, but I think it is a problem, and I
     wouldn't, ipso facto, equate those.
         MR. KING:  No, I didn't -- by putting them in one sentence,
     I didn't mean to imply that they would be the same goals.  That's true.
         DR. FONTANA:  I have a question just for clarification.  Who
     looks out for X-ray machines?
         DR. POWERS:  States.  Nearly always run by the states.
         DR. FONTANA:  That is states.  Radiation sources are NRC,
     right?
         MR. KING:  Radioactive material is NRC, but not an X-ray
     machine.
         DR. FONTANA:  The source.  That's right.
         DR. SEALE:  Well, it is mixed.  Most states -- or many
     states have a license -- or an agreement such that they enforce the
     regulations with regard to sources.  And some states have enhanced
     jurisdiction to also monitor the operation of artificial accelerators,
     X-ray machines and so on.  So the states' purview has got a lateral to
     it, just a little bit, in some cases.
         MR. COPLAN:  Radioactivity that is generated by either
     source materials or byproduct materials are regulated by the Nuclear
     Regulatory Commission.  In some instances, we have an agreement with the
     states to do that regulation, in effect, for us.  Machine generated
     radiation is not NRC's bailiwick unless it is a nuclear reactor.  That
     is the only instance.  Otherwise, it is states, in some instances FDA,
     but never NRC.
         DR. KRESS:  The radiation of foods, that is under NRC?
         MR. MURPHY:  Irradiators, yes.
         MR. COPLAN:  It depends how it is irradiated.  If it is
     byproduct material, yeah.  If the source is byproduct material, it is
     NRC.  If it is an accelerator, it would be probably the states.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Coming back to this viewgraph, since you
     want to list the issues, it seems to me that you will have a major
     problem handling the different time scales that are involved in some of
     these activities, even in a qualitative way.  So I would put a sub-
     bullet, the same way you have there under Approach, the three regions,
     risk-informed, and so on, under the top bullet.
         And I mean Dr. Powers mentioned the involuntary nature of
     risk, I mean that is one dimension.  I mean how you compare risks is not
     obvious, I mean if you really think about it a little bit.  And time
     seems to me, the time scale will be important.
         MR. KING:  No, I agree.  We just came up yesterday.  I just
     didn't have time to think about where to fit it in.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, I understand.  I am just offering a
     suggestion.
         MR. KING:  Okay.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  There may be other elements as well that
     --
         DR. KRESS:  Yeah, well, under the fourth bullet, I think I
     would have expected to see the words defense-in-depth, although that may
     be part of the treatment of uncertainty.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The treatment of uncertainty.
         DR. KRESS:  That may be where you mean for it to be.
         MR. KING:  Yeah, I just didn't try and list --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  If you can avoid the words defense-in-
     depth at this high level, that would be great.
         DR. KRESS:  It is probably a good idea.
         MR. KING:  I am not sure you can.
         DR. POWERS:  I would think that --
         MR. KING:  That is an over-arching principle possibly.
         DR. POWERS:  I think that would appear at that level.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Not as an over-arching principle, I hope.
         DR. POWERS:  I would hope.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh.
         DR. POWERS:  Now, that you have gotten some consistent
     advice from the Committee.
         [Laughter.]
         DR. FONTANA:  Going back to the second bullet, is the intent
     of that environmental protection from things like reactor accidents, or
     is that an intent to modify or maybe supplant that great big long list
     of allowable releases that I think are in Part 20?  I think.  I know 10
     CFR has in it a whole list of allowable concentrations.
         MR. KING:  Yeah, that can be released.  You know, levels
     below that can be released.  There is, you know, other things in terms
     of decommissioning that are being worked on, dose levels.  I mean
     there's a lot of things that affect the environment that we work on.
         DR. FONTANA:  Would you think of maybe making those kind of
     risk-informed in a way, or is that what you have in mind up there?
         MR. KING:  I am thinking about what should our overall
     principle or philosophy be for setting those kinds of release levels,
     whether it is from a repository, which has a long timeframe, or whether
     it is from a decommissioned site, which has a short timeframe, or
     whether it is from a reactor accident, which has an immediate timeframe. 
     I don't think we have any guiding principles as to how to deal with
     those things.
         We have standards, we have set them.
         We are working on others for different things.
         MR. MURPHY:  I may be wrong, but my recollection, going back
     many, many years, the last time I really looked at Part 20 in detail, is
     that the standards that are set there for acceptable concentrations are
     based on a rather consistent set of principles telling what the risk to
     the public is, but I don't know whether those are clearly articulated in
     a policy that makes it obvious to everybody that that is so.
         That is the kind of thing I would expect to see here.  I
     think it has been articulated by people like the ICRP and NCRP.  I am
     not sure --
         MR. KING:  Yes, and those only cover gaseous and fluid,
     liquid releases.  There is nothing in the regulations that deals with
     solid materials.  We are working on that now but there's an area there's
     a gap in the regulations and what should the principle be for setting
     that.
         DR. POWERS:  On this slide you speak of qualitative goals,
     the approach to achieving the goals, and then you have treatment of
     uncertainties.
         I can understand that there could be uncertainties in
     connection with a qualitative goal, but it certainly appears that there
     is something quantitative that has appeared somewhere here, without
     actually saying something quantitative appears here.
         MR. KING:  Well, what I had in mind were things like using
     defense-in-depth to try and deal with uncertainties.
         DR. POWERS:  A second order, application of defense-in-
     depth.
         DR. WALLIS:  I would like to see defense-in-depth approved
     to be the appropriate strategy, particularly with uncertainties, rather
     than assumed to be.
         DR. KRESS:  That's quite a policy statement.
         DR. WALLIS:  If you can prove that from a policy statement
     in some truly logical way, hopefully mathematical, that would be a great
     contribution, so we would have to just assume this thing in a religious
     sense, a belief rather than actually having it derive from something
     more fundamental.
         MR. KING:  I don't know if we are going to have mathematical
     derivations in here.
         DR. WALLIS:  Oh, I will look for something rigorous.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  At this level, the way I read the slide,
     we will have qualitative principles and the way i read that sub-bullet
     there, treatment of uncertainties, is that you will draw attention to
     the fact that all these things are highly uncertain and maybe offer some
     principles again as to what one should do about the uncertainties.
         In fact, just by raising the issue, you are making a
     contribution.
         DR. WALLIS:  Oh, but you are going to come to reality after
     this.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But then after that, when they come to
     reality then of course they will have to be more rigorous --
         DR. WALLIS:  You've got to come up with some really hard,
     useful criteria.
         MR. KING:  Start setting numbers like the QHOs, then you
     have to start thinking about these mean values, do you set some
     confidence value on that.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But at this stage, I mean --
         DR. WALLIS:  Don't get stuck too long in this stage.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, they have a --
         MR. KING:  Let's talk about what we are proposing to do.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Can we have an extra copy of it?
         MR. KING:  The handout?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, of the handout.
         MR. KING:  There is one on the table.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The Chairman doesn't have a copy.  I may
     be just as well -- with his views on defense-in-depth.
         [Laughter.]
         DR. SEALE:  Keep that puppy in the dark.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Have we looked at Number 3 enough, do you
     think?  Shall we go on?
         MR. KING:  Yes, we have looked at Number 3 enough.  Let's
     talk about what we are proposing to do.
         We owe the Commission a paper at the end of this month, and
     what we would like to do is make that paper a recommendation to the
     Commission that we take some more time and take a step back and develop
     these overarching principles and give them in that paper some ideas as
     to the topics that these overarching principles would address, the
     issues that need to be dealt with in putting together this higher level
     document, not to give them a draft set of principles but really just to
     give them an idea as to what the scope and the concept is and get them
     to say yes or no, and if they say yes, then what we would proceed on
     is -- think about proceeding on is shown on Slide 4.
         DR. POWERS:  Now does Slide 3 the one that tries to tell me
     what this high level document does?
         MR. KING:  Slide 3 is a condensation of about four slides we
     showed yesterday that I just put in here.  There's certainly going to be
     more detail in a SECY paper than what's on Slide 3.
         DR. POWERS:  The problem I am having here is that when I
     look at Slide 4 I say I am getting something called a high level policy,
     and now I am having Graham's problem.  Am I getting something that I can
     use or am I getting something I can admire?
         MR. KING:  Hopefully both.
         DR. POWERS:  Well, I guess I am looking for something a
     little more specific than that.
         When I got the Commission's existing safety goals I got
     something I could use.  I mean there was something I could actually
     interpret.  Am I going to have something here or am I going to have
     overarching principles?
         MR. KING:  At the end of April you are not going to have
     either.
         DR. POWERS:  I understand, but by the time they come down --
         MR. KING:  By the time they come down to July of 2000 what I
     would envision would be a document that has these overarching principles
     and hopefully would have at least on the reactor side the details filled
     in, QHOs, do we elevate CDF, do we put something in for temporary
     increases in risk -- that kind of thing -- and for the NMSS side, I am
     not sure what the timeframe would be, but ultimately --
         DR. POWERS:  It can be commensurate with the need of Yucca
     Mountain, which means that you go on to 2040.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It is a different timescale.
         [Laughter.]
         DR. POWERS:  Geologic timescale.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So the year 3000 -- now NMSS though does
     have some activities now to make their activities risk-informed.
         MR. COPLAN:  Yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And you are doing this without the benefit
     of a high level principle?
         MR. COPLAN:  That's right.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And so does that show us how useful the
     high level principles are or what does it say?
         MR. COPLAN:  I think it shows you that they are useful
     because one of the first things that we started to realize as we started
     to take risk assessment more seriously across the office and started to
     think about areas where we can implement it, that we did not have any
     kind of a set of metrics or goals that are comparable to the reactor
     safety goal, we don't have those types of principles, and then it
     becomes something of a question of how much use you can actually get out
     of the tools and applying the tools when you don't have some kind of
     targets in mind, and so part of what we had come up with in the paper
     that Tom mentioned is that we were going to need to do this -- what is
     being described here at least within the NMSS universe of things.
         DR. FONTANA:  This, what I was going to ask, I think relates
     to that.
         This paper that develops the high level principles, will it
     have somewhere in it support of some kind where you are thinking how you
     go from these principles to application?
         You have to have thought of it.
         MR. COPLAN:  Yes.
         MR. KING:  Yes, in the sense of how are things to be used.
         DR. POWERS:  I guess I don't, Mario.
         DR. FONTANA:  You can have a high level principle but high
     level principles in theory could be stated in such a way there is not a
     linkage between that high level and what you are actually doing down
     here.
         DR. POWERS:  What he is telling me is I am going to have
     this high level principle and then I am going to have under the reactor
     side -- he's going to say, well, we'll have something like a QHO.  Maybe
     it's the same ones we have got now.  I am willing to bet they are --
     something that says, yes, CDF is a goodie to have --
         DR. FONTANA:  Linkage -- I think it's like for example at
     some time in the past you developed a linkage between allowable LERF and
     allowable site doses or QHOs.  Somebody did those.
         MR. KING:  Yes.
         DR. FONTANA:  I think you came and did those combinations on
     that.
         MR. KING:  Yes.
         DR. FONTANA:  Well, is the intent to have this linkage
     eventually shown for all of these areas?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yeah, but not at this time.
         DR. FONTANA:  Not right away.
         MR. KING:  We could conceivably put, say, the LERF number in
     the policy level at the right location as a subsidiary objective to meet
     the QHOs.  Now what we put in the calculations that show how you went
     from QHO to LERF, no, I wouldn't put that in.
         DR. WALLIS:  This linkage is not a trivial matter.  I mean
     there are different extremely.  There's something like the Constitution
     of the United States, which has some principles and overarching
     principles but it requires an immense amount of interpretation in order
     to be practiced, and the interpretation changes as society's values
     change.
         There is the other kind of principle, like the second law of
     thermodynamic, which actually can be expressed in some rigorous form,
     and used without a tremendous amount of interpretation as to what it
     might mean, so you have to think very carefully about how to formulate
     these overarching principles so that they are usable without -- with
     minimum quibbling so there is some sort of law of minimum equivocation
     and interpretation that you want to apply here.
         DR. KRESS:  I think their intention is not to stop at the
     overarching principle but to make that interpretation themselves and get
     to some sort of a lower level.
         DR. WALLIS:  Sure, but I am saying that you have got to be
     careful.  It's not a trivial matter.
         DR. KRESS:  It won't be misinterpreted, their intent,
     because they are going to do it.
         MR. MURPHY:  I think we have an idea, dealing with what Dr.
     Wallis was saying, for reactors.  We have done enough work on there that
     we have an idea as to how to develop these linkages and put them in, and
     I think that can be fairly robust.  We are going to have to think a lot
     more on the materials end.  We haven't done that thinking yet.  We can't
     describe it to you today, but clearly in developing the process we are
     in an entirely different ball game and that Seth has already said, the
     risk may come more from normal operation than it does from accident in
     at least some of the devices that are considered.  The worker may be
     much more important than the member of the public.  There's a lot of
     considerations that have to go into that.
         We have sort of a collection of those in our mind.  I think
     Seth has done a very good job of expressing that in the Commission paper
     but we put it all together -- you know, I can't tell you we are there
     yet.
         But our hope would be to have the same sort of coherent
     approach that I think we can get to without too much difficulty in the
     reactor end.
         DR. POWERS:  I mean, it seems to me that the safety goal
     that we have now for the reactor -- a useful thing.  Don't have any
     trouble applying those at all.  Got a problem, real quickly, and that my
     technology is not so good that I can use them routinely, quickly found a
     surrogate, almost as quickly found out the surrogate was a little bit
     more conservative than the safety goals.  Said gee, still like my
     surrogate, elevate it.
         That's all we need from this exercise on the reactor side. 
     We can decorate it with some esthetics, but the fact is that at the
     working level all we need is to say that CDF is indeed a goal, gee, it
     might even be nice to have a cap on transient periods of risk, I could
     use that, I mean, I could make use of it if it was given to me, but I'm
     going to have to wait to get all that while you sort out this NMSS
     problem.
         MR. MURPHY:  I don't think you have to wait under what we're
     proposing.
         MR. KING:  No, if you look at the last bullet here, we're
     not proposing to stop work on the things we identified on the reactor
     side.  I mean, those are still valid questions.  They still ought to be
     worked on.
         DR. WALLIS:  When all is said and done, the only thing that
     matters is does it work, and it doesn't have to look pretty or sound
     good as long as it works well.  So that's going to be my criterion.  I
     mean, you may write the most wonderful constitution for the Agency, but
     if it's difficult to use it, it's not as good as something else could
     be.
         MR. KING:  Is it worth doing?
         DR. WALLIS:  Right.
         MR. KING:  What's going to improve or be more efficient or
     effective if you do this?  That's a valid question.
         DR. WALLIS:  Well, it gets back to the question we asked
     which -- I know we asked today is why are you doing this and what's the
     payoff if it's really intangible.  And if you have to sell it to someone
     who's skeptical, you may have to work on that.
         DR. SEALE:  The cosmetics of public acceptance still should
     have some attention.
         MR. KING:  Yes.  To me from the public confidence, public
     acceptance transparency of how we do our business, this would be
     valuable.
         DR. WALLIS:  I just wondered how you would present this if
     you were presenting it to some Senators, for instance.  Would it be
     exactly the same presentation?
         DR. MILLER:  Well, the principles should be sufficiently
     transparent that the Senators would be able to understand it.
         MR. KING:  I think it would make a good framework for a
     presentation to somebody like a Congressman.  This is what we're all
     about, you know, in language they can understand.  Maybe when we get
     down to QHOs, they don't know what you're talking about, but you've got
     to start at someplace they do.
         Okay.  Schedule.  We thought a little bit more about what
     should we do and how long would it take.  It seemed to me if we get a
     paper to the Commission the end of April, it's probably a month before
     they get back to us, assuming they say go ahead, what we're proposing is
     let's take a couple of months and get some people in a room and draft
     something up.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Who are these people, Tom?
         MR. KING:  Joe.
         [Laughter.]
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Joe and Murphy.
         Well, but you need -- an NMSS and --
         MR. MURPHY:  Definitely this table will be involved.
         DR. WALLIS:  Could we have Joe paired with some young
     skeptical person who is unfamiliar with jargon?  Isn't there a Joe, Jr.
     or someone you can bring in.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  There is no Joe, Jr.
         MR. MURPHY:  But I think the suggestion of a young,
     skeptical person is a very good one.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  How young can he be and know as much as
     you know?
         DR. KRESS:  Young is --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You're going to give him stories about
     1976, Joe, and the guy's going to feel so small.
         DR. KRESS:  Young is 50 years old.
         DR. MILLER:  Somebody who doesn't know anything about this
     business, willing to --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's what we need now, somebody who
     doesn't know anything.
         DR. MILLER:  I think you take somebody who's like in the
     Agency just a few years or less.
         MR. MURPHY:  There are people in the Agency who I think have
     the kind of inquiring minds that you're talking about.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Or your senior advisers.
         DR. MILLER:  See, young people aren't tainted by all the
     knowledge that you have.
         MR. MURPHY:  I have to admit, you know, young means somebody
     younger than I am.  I mean --
         DR. POWERS:  That's covering a significant portion of the
     United States.
         DR. KRESS:  They just need to have an inquiring --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So you will not have contractors do this. 
     It will be done in house.
         MR. KING:  This is not a job for contractors.  This is a job
     for staff, legal people certainly need to be involved, and people from
     the program offices.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So it will be a working group or you will
     call on people as you see fit?
         MR. MURPHY:  I don't think we've thought it through enough.
         MR. KING:  I don't envision a dedicated group.  I don't
     think this is a full-time job for five or six people.  I think one
     person having the lead and having the right interactions with other key
     people can do the job, and we're saying take a couple of months to come
     up with a draft and a list of issues that we can then start presenting
     to States, to this Committee, to others that --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So that happens before August.
         MR. KING:  Yes.  Between -- I think in the months of June
     and July this drafting would take place.  I'm assuming we get a go-ahead
     from the Commission the end of May.
         DR. WALLIS:  Well, I'm sure that Joe could actually draft
     for this review by whoever's going to work with him something almost
     immediately.  It's not that far away.
         MR. KING:  Before we bring it to this committee, we want to
     have some internal review and discussion.
         DR. WALLIS:  Oh, yes.
         MR. MURPHY:  I would hope that, you know, I agree with you,
     I think for the initial draft is not a long-term event.  If we get the
     right inquiring people involved in this, the next draft might take a
     little longer than I would hope, and that would be good.  You know, I'd
     prefer it that way.  But I think within the time scale we're talking
     about, there's no problem.
         MR. KING:  Then the next step would be -- I put down a
     period of about six months where we'd have some meetings with outside
     stakeholders, you know, like States, like industry folks, public
     interest groups, maybe just have a general public workshop, this
     Committee, ACNW.  We haven't laid out the details of --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But you will be interacting with us
     before, though, right?  Before September.  Or not?
         MR. KING:  I wouldn't envision us coming back here until
     after this initial drafting is done.  So maybe we come back in August or
     September with something you can look at.
         And then based upon that, put together a final draft for
     Commission consideration.
         DR. FONTANA:  These workshops would have basically one cycle
     and one set with each.  It is not a case of having a workshop, getting
     feedback and having another one with the same people, that is one cycle.
         MR. KING:  Yeah, one set.  Maybe one with the states, one
     public.  Probably, you know, probably a couple of times with this
     Committee, I don't know how many times with ACNW.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So, for reactors, it will not be just a
     high level safety policy statement, it will be more than that.  Is that
     what you said earlier?
         MR. KING:  Say that again.  For --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  For reactors, you will go beyond a high
     level policy statement.
         MR. KING:  Yeah, it will be dealing with the issues in the
     SECY from last year.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But it doesn't say that there, does it?
         MR. KING:  Including recommended --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, down there somewhere.
         MR. KING:  Yeah.  And then the last slide is what we would
     like from this Committee at this point in time.  We would like your
     feedback on is it worthwhile to do this.
         DR. KRESS:  Do you want a letter or do you just want --
         MR. KING:  I would like a letter, but if you don't want to
     write a letter, you know, your verbal feedback is valuable, too.
         You know, do we have any thoughts on --
         DR. SEALE:  Thoughts are organized if it is a letter.
         MR. KING:  That's true.  And, you know, any thoughts you
     have on the scope level of detail and the schedule and approach we have
     put together for proceeding.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, is possible to have -- to go back to
     the previous slide -- and do things sooner than July?
         MR. KING:  You mean do things with this Committee sooner
     than July?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, no, no.  Instead of saying that you
     will provide to the Commission recommendation and so on, July of 2000,
     can you do that sooner than that?
         MR. KING:  It depends how these workshops go and meetings
     go, what kind of comments we get.  What kind of internal consensus we
     get.  And to go from, say, having the last workshop in March of 2000,
     then put together a package, probably have to run the final package
     through this Committee, probably run it through CRGR, get the
     concurrences.  That takes time.  I mean, practically speaking, it is not
     something that happens in a matter of weeks.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Why do the workshops have to be spread out
     over a period of six months?
         MR. KING:  Well, it seems to me we are going to have
     probably at least four get-togethers.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Why four?
         MR. KING:  One with the states, one with --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Separate?
         MR. KING:  One with the public, where that would include
     industry and any public interest groups, anybody else.  We are going to
     come here once.  We are going to come to ACNW once.  Maybe we want to
     come here twice.
         DR. KRESS:  What is your concern, George?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, --
         DR. KRESS:  It is not that big of a hurry.  You don't want
     to rush.
         MR. BARTON:  You want a good product here.
         DR. KRESS:  Yeah, you don't want to rush an artist.  Let him
     --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But this is on top of a year that has
     already passed.
         MR. BARTON:  But not much work was done in this past year.
         DR. FONTANA:  Those are the kind of things that just take a
     lot of time, these workshops, meetings, feedback, all that sort of
     thing.  That takes a lot longer than actually doing it.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think it is a matter of perceptions,
     that, you know, we are really making progress and taking it seriously. 
     Because you really want to get into the linkage with the high level
     goals as soon as you can, and start doing something, you know, beyond
     the high level principles as soon as you can.
         DR. MILLER:  A question on the first bullet.  Does that mean
     the principles, or that is beyond the principles?
         MR. KING:  No, the first bullet is these over-arching
     principles.
         DR. MILLER:  It would seem to me that we could do that maybe
     more quickly than August.
         DR. POWERS:  It is the most difficult job you can do.
         DR. MILLER:  I understand it is the most difficult job, but
     I would like to see -- I think we can develop the principles for the
     Reg. Guide like 1.174.  Having involvement of this Committee in its
     principles, I think was a critical factor.
         DR. KRESS:  I think we ought to leave the schedule up to
     these guys.
         MR. BARTON:  Let them, they have got to do the work.
         DR. KRESS:  Yeah, they know what their workload is and what
     they need to do.
         MR. KING:  Yeah, I don't think it is -- I mean it is not --
     I don't envision it as a long document, but, you know, the fact that is
     a long document, I think is going to make it tougher to write.  The fact
     that it is dealing with some pretty -- everything in it is going to be
     pretty fundamental, that is going to make it tough to write.
         DR. KRESS:  These are pretty fundamental principles.
         MR. MURPHY:  I suspect there will be a lot of internal
     debate over this.
         DR. KRESS:  Yeah, I will bet.  Yes, sir.
         MR. MURPHY:  I suspect when we get something concrete down
     on paper, we will not be able to satisfy this Committee in an hour.
         DR. KRESS:  I wouldn't be a bit surprised.
         MR. KING:  Let alone four or five office directors and the
     head of OGC.
         DR. POWERS:  So the question comes up, immediately to mind,
     gee, I have got a lot of things that, from a societal impact point of
     view, have more impact that I could be doing than this.  Why do I -- and
     this is great, I have a nice, logical, consistent, aesthetically
     pleasing hierarchy that covers everything, and that would be great. 
     There is no question that would be very useful and make me smile when I
     thought about it.  But, quite frankly, I can make progress without it. 
     There is an awful lot of progress than needs to be made.
         We were moving into risk regulation, and you can't calculate
     what may amount to two-thirds of the risk that exists at your plants. 
     You have got gillions of little things that you would like to change. 
     Clearly, one of the things that could have the biggest impact I can
     think of is changing Appendix K over to a more risk-informed, more
     realistic kind of analysis.  Why not do those things, rather than to
     engage in this relative luxury of debating over the fine points of the
     Talmud here?
         DR. WALLIS:  Are you coming around to my point of view?
         DR. POWERS:  I have always been with your point of view, you
     know that.
         DR. KRESS:  It doesn't seem like an either/or thing to me. 
     It is not like you do this or that.
         MR. KING:  I don't think this is resource-intensive in that
     we are talking a lot of people and throwing them on this.  I think it is
     intellectually intensive.  I think it is going to take some, you know,
     careful consideration by some --
         DR. SEALE:  Wise people.
         MR. KING:  Senior people, wise people and senior people. 
     That, to me, is not going to detract from working on 50.46 and some of
     these other things.
         DR. SEALE:  Well, if I may make a comment to that question,
     it strikes me that yesterday one of the things we heard from you was
     that, as you go into this endeavor, you are going to find yourself
     moving further into the area of the things associated with reactor
     activities.
         Because as you've looked at the things, as you've applied
     risk-informed methodology to other things like performance assessment
     and so on, you found that there were -- that you had an incomplete set
     of principles that were guiding you, and you had to go find out or
     fabricate or dream up or something, those additional ideas in order to
     flesh out how risk-informed decision making processes could be used in
     doing those things.  That was one of the things you said yesterday.  It
     strikes me it would be a shame to not take the steps to harvest and
     document those insights as you go through that process, and that's
     really what you're doing.
         MR. KING:  Some of the lessons learned --
         DR. SEALE:  Some of those lessons are being -- well, one of
     the criteria for the lesson is to be able to put it into the context of
     this kind of set of principles, and in fact one of the objectives then
     would be to identify what other guiding principles are -- maybe not
     overarching, but detailed principles you'd need in order to do, say, a
     risk-informed Part 50.
         MR. KING:  Yes, I agree with that.  I think also these
     lessons learned now that NMSS is starting to head down this path, I
     think these lessons learned are -- probably will have a bigger impact on
     the way they proceed than --
         DR. SEALE:  Yes.
         MR. KING:  Than sort of our, you know, somewhat trial-and-
     error approach at the beginning.
         DR. SEALE:  So it's the harvesting of these things rather
     than allowing it to kind of get diffuse again before you go back and ask
     yourself.
         MR. BARRETT:  You know, one of the principles we've tried to
     apply at least recently is that when we talk about applying NRC
     resources to any initiative, whether it's an existing or a new
     initiative, we try to run it past four filters that we've been using,
     and the four filters relate to maintaining safety, reducing unnecessary
     regulatory burden, increasing the effectiveness and the efficiency of
     staff processes, and enhancing public confidence.  And I think that as
     we do this activity, we ought to keep those four filters in mind.
         Dr. Wallis keeps trying to bring us back to the question of
     what is it about this effort that will be necessary to allow us to do
     risk-informed regulation or allow us to go as far as we can reasonably
     go.  You know, that should be something that informs the way we actually
     implement this.  What you're seeing in front of you is a very much of a
     broad outline of a program.  It doesn't have  much meat on it.  Clearly
     there is a connection to public confidence.
         There are many voices out there that have in one way or
     another said that the NRC should make the effort to define safety or
     what's safe enough.  So, you know, in deciding how to go forward with
     this and what detailed steps we should take between now and say August
     and how this should be steered, those are the four filters, and I think
     those filters relate to a lot of what we've heard here the last couple
     of days.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  When did you receive the SRM last year
     that the Commission -- in which the Commission asked you to look at the
     safety goal policy statement?
         MR. KING:  We sent a paper up in May.  We got an SRM back
     June 30 of last year saying okay, go look at those issues.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  So June 30.  Now you're going back
     up at the end of April.  I think you're going to get a question what
     have you done the last, you know, ten months, just came up with the idea
     of having a high-level safety policy statement?
         MR. KING:  And we did put together some -- maybe we should
     make an attachment to the April paper that talks about what we did on
     those specific issues.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  See, that's why I'm concerned about the
     July 2000 deadline.  You have to show progress.  You can't come a year
     later and say well, maybe we need a different kind of principle.  It
     took you ten months to figure that out?
         DR. BONACA:  Realistically, though, I think that it seems to
     me all you can commit is the walking to the workshops.  That's the whole
     issue.  I mean, there is something in that control right now up to the
     workshops and the interactions with the industry, and then the schedule
     is hard to control and to commit to, it seems to me from that point on. 
     Because you don't know how --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, but, see, I'm putting myself now in
     the shoes of a skeptic who says, you know, at some point we have to have
     some progress here and do something, you know, high-level principles are
     okay, and so on, but, you know, I sent you an SRM last June and you come
     back ten months later and you tell me you have to do something bigger. 
     That's all you're telling me?
         DR. KRESS:  You sound like a boss I used to have.
         DR. BONACA:  The reason why I interjected was mostly because
     there is a question here to ask:  What should be the scope and level of
     detail?  That's what they're asking us to answer.  And I have trouble in
     answering that question because of this issue how far are we expecting
     them to go before you, you know --
         DR. KRESS:  Don't think, George, about how long has passed
     since the SRM.  Our job right now is to look at these numbers and what
     they have before them to do and say are these realistic.  I mean, that's
     past.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well --
         DR. KRESS:  That shouldn't enter your thinking at all.  The
     question is are these reasonable or is something wrong with them.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It may enter the thinking of the people
     who have to send the new SRM approving this.
         MR. KING:  But let's go back to your question.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
         MR. KING:  I think it's not -- you've got to realize that
     these are the issues that were in the May SECY paper from last year. 
     The bottom two-thirds of those issues are issues when you look at them
     are really things that are at a higher level than just the reactor area. 
     And part of working on these 11 issues was coming to the realization
     that you can't just deal with some of these things in isolation, you
     really ought to step back and deal with them agencywide.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well --
         MR. KING:  The top four are, yes, they're reactor-specific
     and we can talk about what we've done in those so far.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But maybe then I can push my negativism a
     little bit and say why did it take you ten months to figure this out? 
     Why didn't you come back in October and say gee, we tried to work on the
     bottom third and we realized we need a higher-level principle?
         MR. KING:  Well, I think the things that sort of pushed us
     over the edge started with the congressional hearings in July of last
     year.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So you were doing other things.  Is that
     what you're saying?
         MR. MURPHY:  The schedule for this has been delayed by the
     Commission a couple of times because of the pressures of --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Ah.  So why did you correct me then?  I
     said what have you been doing the last ten months.  The answer is we
     have not been working.
         MR. KING:  We slipped this four months because of the
     followup to the congressional hearings.
         DR. WALLIS:  Your customers would seem to be the Commission
     and the public, but it seems to me that down the road the real
     customers, the real people who benefit from your work, are all those
     people that NRC and the utilities are trying to do a good job of making
     reactors safe, and obeying regulations and setting regulations, and if
     you can set forth some principles and some logic for applying risk which
     helps all those folk, then that's where I see the real payoff is.  You
     have to convince the Commission and the public --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Let me add my --
         DR. WALLIS:  But that's where the real payoff is.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But you said yesterday, Graham, that --
     you quoted the Chairman that the train has left --
         DR. WALLIS:  Yes, and I said these guys are --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's not clear -- and I suspect you're
     going to have some skepticism from the Commission when they say they
     want to have a risk-informed Part 50, risk-informed this, risk-informed
     50.59, and so on, and in July of the year 2000, which means 14 months
     from now, they're going to have general principles.
         And some work on the reactor side -- isn't that sort of
     discouraging?  Wouldn't you like to have something sooner?
         MR. KING:  Don't forget, we have told the Commission to
     risk-inform Part 50.  It's a four to eight year effort too.  I mean it's
     not like you are going to have Part --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Not all Commissioners get excited by that,
     right?
         MR. BARTON:  No, but some of them get upset by that.
         MR. KING:  We got five votes and I didn't see one vote sheet
     that questioned the schedule.
         DR. KRESS:  If you're going to risk-inform Part 50 I
     maintain you have to do this first or you are not going to do it right
     and you are just worried about how fast it gets done and that's these
     guys' job.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
         DR. KRESS:  But you have to do this first if you are going
     to do Part 50 right.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  We are entering another time here.  Yes --
         MR. KING:  If you don't like the schedule --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, what I propose to do, and if you
     don't have anything more important to do, please stay, I want to go
     around the table here and get some advice.  In other words, we are
     entering now, with 10 minutes delay, that table over that says Safety
     Goal Policy Statement.  We have to discuss it and you have to give me
     advice, what to put in the letter, because I think -- well, first of
     all, we do agree we will write the letter?
         DR. KRESS:  Yes, let's write a letter.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  We write the letter.
         DR. KRESS:  I think we agree on that.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And if you gentlemen stay, maybe you can
     help us with the discussion.  I think it will be about 20 minutes.
         So shall we go around the table or you want to speak as you
     are willing to speak?  Already I got a written statement here.
         [Laughter.]
         DR. POWERS:  I wrote your letter for you.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Bob, you want to start, or Bill?
         DR. SEALE:  Sure.  I think Tom's point that this process of
     a risk-informed Part 50 being sort of the cornerstone of where the
     Commission wants to go in the long-run is very appropriate.  The fact
     that it takes eight years is lamentable maybe, but the fact also that
     this is the first thing that ought to happen by way of the formal
     building the framework for doing that kind of effort is also true.
         I think you have to do it.  I would like to see you be able
     to do it sooner, but I think it is more important to do it right.  I am
     just glad you are willing to consider taking it on, because it's going
     to be a big job.
         I hope you can build language into this which gets rid of
     this continual tug-of-war between deterministic and probabilistic
     assessment, make the point that they are part of the overall process,
     and let's grow up.  That is really what it amounts to when you do this,
     so I am all for you.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Graham?
         DR. WALLIS:  Well, I feel that you have sort of asked us,
     you have said to us this is a good thing to do, trust us to do it, and I
     think it is a good thing to do and I trust you to do it.
         But eventually we have to clearly see how this helps the
     Agency do a better job of regulation and how these principles really
     will have an influence on better regulation, better benefits to the
     public or something -- there's going to be some real payoffs -- and I
     think you can't do one without the other.  You can't just go out and
     annunciate principles and hope that things will happen.
         This is often a fault.  Just having the right intentions is
     okay.  The actual mechanics are not so trivial and I do think you
     cannot -- although the committee seems to like the top-down, you also
     have to work bottom-up.  You have to say here is the guy in the trenches
     trying to regulate.  How is what you are doing going to help him do a
     better job.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So what is your advice to me regarding the
     letter?  What should I say?  That is a high level concern -- another guy
     down in the trenches.
         DR. WALLIS:  Condense the transcript of these meetings.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What?
         DR. WALLIS:  You know, I have said the same thing about 10
     times here --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes, but the transcript will be available
     in three days and I am the guy in the trenches now.  I need guidance.
         DR. WALLIS:  I think I still stick to my original view, that
     the reason this came up at all was because of the push to risk-informed
     regulation and the statement that the train had left the station and we
     are now on this track, and then there was a realization that, well, the
     train has left the station but it doesn't have a track laid out.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's on the road.
         DR. WALLIS:  It doesn't have a terminus to go to and it
     doesn't have the hazards along the line surveyed and all that, and this
     has to be worked out.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So this is --
         DR. WALLIS:  So I would say that if you have to make a
     decision one way or the other, you have to have a sort of a guidance or
     a beacon or something that tells you where to go, say does it help me to
     do good risk-informed regulation.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  So then the advice then that I get from
     you will be advice to the Staff that this is very important to do, but
     don't forget why you are doing it, that eventually you have to ask
     yourself is this helping me on the road to risk-informed regulations. 
     Right?
         DR. WALLIS:  And not just that.  I mean you don't just do
     something out of the blue.  You do it because you have already
     identified things that you need to do in order to do risk-informed
     regulation.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Yes.
         DR. WALLIS:  So maybe it requires -- they have probably done
     it already -- but evaluating seriously what it is you would have to have
     in place if you were to do this really good risk-informed regulation,
     from the top down, that envisions the whole tree, not just the top, but
     all the links down the way as well as you can.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Anything else, Graham?
         DR. WALLIS:  Well, I'll have another shot at the letter when
     you write it.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Oh, you will have many shots, yes, but I
     am trying to minimize the frequency of shots.  This is one of my
     cornerstones.
         Dr. Kress?
         DR. KRESS:  I say if the train has already left the station
     it can just stop and wait on us.  I am highly enthusiastic about this. 
     I think it is long overdue.  It is something that has been needed and it
     is absolutely essential that they do this if they are going to
     properly -- and I put the word properly -- risk-inform the regulations.
         I am enthusiastic about their approach.  It's the right way
     to go about it.  I had a little early concerns about the full extent of
     the overarching but if they can handle it I think that is the thing to
     do because we need to address the full NRC mission.  It needs to be put
     on a basis that is coherent, consistent, and that you can deal with and
     derive -- the intent of this policy statement is to be able to derive a
     set of coherent, consistent risk-informed regulations.  That is the
     objective.
         It is apparent to me.  I don't see how you can miss its
     value.  I don't see how you have to articulate what its value is.  It's
     just apparent and I do think you might want to think about early drawing
     the full tree in a sense of conceptually drawing it so that you know
     what parts you do have to work on and where they are going to fit in,
     but that is, you know, that is just a conceptual way to go about it.
         I think you got the right elements to look at in your things
     that you have to consider.  I think they are the right ones.  I am
     particularly interested in how you are going to come up with handling
     uncertainties, how you are going to deal with things like means and
     confidence levels and how you are going to deal with defense-in-depth in
     that concept, but you guys know those are the issues and you know you
     are going to work on them, so I am really enthusiastic about this.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And all three of you, I take it, are
     satisfied with the schedule?
         DR. KRESS:  Oh, the schedule doesn't bother me.  These guys
     know how to set schedules.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No comment on the schedule or you think it
     is reasonable?
         DR. WALLIS:  Well, I am naturally an impatient person.
         DR. KRESS:  So that's it.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Within the constraints of your
     personalities, you are happy with it?
         [Laughter.]
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  This is not -- is this supposed to be
     recorded?  We are discussing the letter now.
         DR. POWERS:  That's fine.
         DR. KRESS:  That's all right.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  As long as these guys are -- because they
     might say something.
         MR. MARKLEY:  Well, it also helps them to reconstruct the
     messages that were derived.
         DR. POWERS:  But I do wish they would keep the snickering
     down.
         [Laughter.]
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Anything else, Tom?
         DR. KRESS:  No.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  Dr. Fontana?
         DR. FONTANA:  Well, I am fully supportive of the approach,
     the people.  They have got the right people working on it.  The schedule
     doesn't bother me.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The right people?  The right person?
         [Laughter.]
         DR. FONTANA:  Well, whatever young person they are going to
     find to work on it -- and the only thing, and it's been said before, is
     that these high level statements have to be done in such a way that they
     are implementable, and I know you have given that a lot of thought, so I
     am supportive of what you are doing.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Great.
         DR. MILLER:  I am going to draw a little analogy, as I had
     earlier, with the principles that were set up for the Regulatory Guides
     on risk-informed regulation.
         I think about a year ago we did that, right?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  We did what?
         DR. MILLER:  The principles that you drew up?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, that is more than a year.
         DR. MILLER:  More than a year ago?  We saw part of the
     success today.  By starting out, Dr. Kress said it right, by doing the
     job right the first time even though we are later than we would like to
     be, is the right way to go.
         I realize setting up principles for this task will be far
     more challenging than probably the risk-informed regulation, but I think
     we saw today -- I am overwhelmed with the success we have had so quickly
     in risk-informed regulation.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Because we did it right.
         DR. MILLER:  There is an old axiom in engineering, "If it's
     worth doing, do it right the first time."  I think this is the right way
     to do it.
         The only thing about schedule that I would like to see, I
     think the overall schedule is fine, I would like to see I think a first-
     round thought process on some of these principles might be done more
     quickly than August and come back to this committee, not necessarily the
     almighty advisors, but I think we did provide good input on the
     principles.  Come back and let us give you input some time.
         MR. KING:  You would like a progress report sometime between
     now and August.
         DR. MILLER:  Sometime between now and August.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  And this time you have to go to the ACNW
     too, eh?
         DR. MILLER:  I'm sure they'll provide you good input too.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That'll teach you.  No, that's fine.  If
     you -- I would support what Dr. Miller just said.  I mean I am really
     anxious to see the first set of principles but scheduling a subcommittee
     meeting and I know you guys have to prepare for it anyway, even if we
     say this is informal and all that --
         DR. MILLER:  We could just have a brainstorming session,
     more or less.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But that is my point.  I don't know
     whether that makes any difference to them.  They still have to prepare
     and get some approvals I suppose.
         MR. KING:  It takes time.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It takes time to come before the ACRS.
         DR. MILLER:  Only one other comment -- I definitely support
     Dr. Wallis's idea of getting a couple young guys in that aren't, as I
     say, tainted by the baggage that you guys are carrying and it might give
     you some -- open some different avenues or perspective.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  This is not a subject for young guys, in
     my opinion.
         DR. MILLER:  I think they would contribute.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Younger than Joe, yes.
         [Laughter.]
         DR. MILLER:  That's easy.
         DR. WALLIS:  I would say half the age.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Half the age of Joe?
         DR. WALLIS:  Half the age and one percent of the experience.
         DR. MILLER:  I find that the university is just more
     challenging when people come in with fresh ideas.  It forces the older
     guys to think differently.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Dr. Powers?
         DR. POWERS:  Well, at first I thought I was writing George's
     letter for him.  Obviously I am writing the additional comments.
         [Laughter.]
         DR. POWERS:  I am going to try to get these older folks to
     think differently.  I would of course be delighted to see a completely
     consistent, logically organized, high level safety policy that covers
     all the regulatory activities of the NRC.
         With respect to the regulation of nuclear reactors,
     development of such a high level policy now is luxury.  With respect to
     the other regulatory activities, the NRC development of a high level
     policy may be premature.  Development of the high level policy will
     necessarily involve the diversion of some of the more talented and
     capable resources in the Agency.
         An objection-free, consensus policy that treats all the
     regulatory activities of the agency may be more difficult and more time-
     consuming than is now anticipated.  What is needed now is a modest
     enhancement to the existing safety goals for nuclear power reactors to
     recognize a practical reality, core damage frequency is a more useful
     measure of safety than are the risk measures.
         This should be easily accomplished if it is unencumbered by
     the manufactured requirement for consistency with safety measures yet to
     be defined for non-reactor regulatory activities.
         I see more pressing needs for the resources of the agencies
     that would be devoted to this effort.  Development of tools and
     techniques to carry out risk-informed regulation for nuclear power is a
     more urgently needed activity now than an aesthetically pleasing policy
     that treats reactors and all other agency activities.  I am against it.
         DR. SEALE:  We gathered that.
         DR. POWERS:  No kidding.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Other than that, do you have any other
     comments?  Bill.
         DR. SHACK:  Well, I personally think that this is a luxury,
     that, you know, there are more important things to be doing.  It seems
     to me, changes to be made simply to deal with getting a risk-informed
     exemption in Part 50 is much more important to a practical
     implementation of risk-informed regulation at this point.  I think 1.174
     is a good tool to work with.
         DR. KRESS:  When will this not be a luxury?
         DR. POWERS:  I can tell you exactly when it won't be a
     luxury.  It will be -- it won't be a luxury when NMSS has explored
     enough into the applications of risk-informed regulation to hone its
     ideas down to the point that it gets some conception of how it is going
     to do this.  I think that is easier to do within the repository than it
     is within the user community.  I think they got a real headache within
     the user community, because I think they are going to react to risk-
     informed regulation about the way they react to leprosy.  Risk-informed
     regulation within the user community is going to be an agency tool and
     not a user tool.  And they have some refinements in their thinking and
     how they would do it.
         Once they have had a chance to explore this, and I think
     that is about a year, to explore it and get some ideas of what their
     needs are, and to come up with some candidates for what they think
     useful safety goals would be, and recognize that there is a risk
     inconsistency between those and that got defined by the reactors, then
     it will no longer be a luxury, because when they go to articulate their
     equivalents of the QHOs and there is a safety inconsistency between the
     two, then it will not be a luxury for the agency, because the agency
     can't tolerate that.
         But those guys over there are in the inception phase, and
     they have not had the benefit of a protracted period of argument and
     debate and exploration of possible alternatives.  And they need to have
     the opportunity to do that, because they have got a tougher nut to crack
     than the reactor guys did, a much tougher nut to crack.
         DR. KRESS:  If the NMSS were not part of this exercise, then
     would it not be a luxury?  Is that the only thing that is making this a
     luxury to you right now?
         DR. POWERS:  Right now what I see is that we are beginning
     to pick the cherries off the risk-informed regulatory tree here, and we
     have done a pretty good job.  I mean I think you guys have done a
     fantastic job.  I just love the stuff that you are doing on risk-
     informed inspections and risk-informed enforcements.  I am stunned by
     it.  I am very impressed.  And I sit here and I say, yeah, but you
     haven't got the tools to follow through.  You haven't got the tools to
     follow through.  You are going to have all kinds of headaches on this. 
     And I think you ought to sort those things out.
         I think Bill brings up a couple of things where there are a
     few more cherries to pluck off this blossom.  I am not enthusiastic
     about a wholesale conversion over to Part 50.  I am very pleased with
     your suggestion of kind of going slow and trying things on this.
         DR. MILLER:  They are developing a set of principles.
         DR. POWERS:  This hierarchy -- I see nothing wrong with the
     existing safety goals except that we found out that there is a big
     computation hurdle to go from Level I to Level III.
         DR. SHACK:  I mean we said that CDF should be a fundamental
     goal and that part, I will stick with.
         DR. POWERS:  Stick with.
         DR. SHACK:  And once I do that, I don't think I have a
     practical problem.
         DR. KRESS:  Well, you have to reconcile.
         DR. SHACK:  I have a conceptually inelegant problem.
         DR. POWERS:  Yes.  Aesthetically unpleasing.
         DR. KRESS:  Well, you have to reconcile that they really
     don't have a societal goal in there, and that is one of the issues they
     are going to deal with.  It really doesn't tell you anything about how
     to deal with defense-in-depth and, in fact, it makes defense-in-depth a
     safety goal policy, and you have got to deal with it some way.
         It doesn't tell you anything about how to deal with the
     uncertainties except that you consider the uncertainties.  The Safety
     Goal Policy Statement we now have is just inadequate, that is the
     problem.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But, Tom, should the effort be then
     focused on fixing the existing statement for reactors and putting all
     these considerations there, without bothering about NMSS at this point?
         DR. KRESS:  Well, that is a debatable point.  Now, that I
     could -- you know, I could buy that.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  The NMSS thing, first of all, I agree with
     what Dana said about the office needing more time to adjust to this new
     -- I mean it took the reactor guys 25 years, let me repeat that.  Right? 
     The reactor safety study was in '74, '75 and now it is 1999, and we
     started this in '97, perhaps '96.  And in NMSS you haven't had the
     benefit of that long history, except in their high level waste area.
         The other problem I see with that is that there are some
     real roadblocks.  The time scale is not just something to think about, I
     mean it is a real major problem here.  On the one hand, you are talking
     about systems that you have now and you know that you will have for the
     next 20, 30, 40 years, something like that.  On the other hand, you are
     talking about thousands.  Again, that is a high level --
         DR. WALLIS:  I always think that what they have to do is
     they have to show a short-term payoff.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, I don't know.  You are offering --
         DR. WALLIS:  Within a year, that if we do this along the
     lines that we have indicated, this will be your reward.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But my argument is --
         DR. WALLIS:  Not say it is 10 years down the road someplace.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  My argument is that developing the
     qualitative high level principle that would apply to all agency
     activities may be a problem that is damn near unsolvable, because the
     comparability of different risks is something that people have been
     investigating for the last 20 years, and I am not sure they came up with
     a solution.
         DR. BONACA:  But, you know, we can argue about this forever. 
     Let them start.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No.  But that is my point.  If we feel
     that we can argue forever, perhaps we can advise them to do those
     wonderful things that we want to see in the QHO side, because we know
     these can be done, and wait on unifying all the activities under general
     principles, because then we may end up discussing it forever.
         DR. BONACA:  And that is fine by me.  You know, maybe it is
     true that we are focused more in on reactor regulation and my thinking
     has been there, but from my perspective, you know, I still believe that
     it is essential that for a structured and orderly transition to Part 50
     -- risk-informed Part 50, you need to have -- at least I need to have in
     my mind something of what you are proposing to do.  And if you don't do
     it, I will have to spend some time at home thinking about how this thing
     all comes together, it will be complete.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  What you need to have, Mario, is what Tom
     mentioned for reactors.
         DR. BONACA:  Sure.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You have to have a statement regarding the
     handling of uncertainty, a statement regarding --
         DR. SEALE:  Defense-in-depth.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Defense-in-depth and so on.  And those
     things I think we can handle in a year.  But when we start broadening up
     the scope, I am not as against it as Dana is, but I really have serious
     doubts.
         DR. KRESS:  I was surprised at Dana because he once told me
     when we were talking about how you write a severe accident computer
     code, he said what you do is you put every phenomena, every equation,
     every correlation you know in there, make it complete, and then just use
     the parts of it you want to for your problem.
         But, anyway, --
         DR. POWERS:  That is how I build computer codes.  I
     evidently agree with you.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But they didn't promise to put down all
     the phenomena and the issues.  They promised to do more than that, to
     integrate.
         DR. KRESS:  I am just using an analogy.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Seth wants to say something.  And I will
     come back to Dr. Shack soon, by the way.  Don't think that I forgot.
         MR. COPLAN:  I wanted to jump into this for a second,
     because I think that to some degree the situation with materials is a
     little bit different than the way it is being described here. 
     Certainly, for high level waste, we have been involved with risk
     analysis for a long, long time.  In the other areas, that has not been
     the case.  But I think that once we get into this, we are going to find
     that the highest level kinds of principles for talking about what kind
     of risk the agency is prepared to accept, general kinds of qualitative
     statements from which quantitative concepts can be derived, I think that
     we are probably as prepared to address that in NMSS as from the reactor
     side.
         I think that Dr. Powers very correctly points out the NMSS
     licensees are going to react to this very differently than reactor
     licensees.  They are going to react to this very differently from one
     activity to another to another.  I mean, there are 40-plus different
     activities that NMSS regulates.  What I would suggest, though, is that I
     think we're going to find to be the case, is that it's how we end up
     implementing through regulation risk-informed concepts that would be
     derived from the general principles.
         In other words, for NMSS I don't think we can expect a
     radiography licensee to do risk assessments.  But we, the staff, can
     look at Part 34 from the standpoint of risk assessments that we have
     done and alter Part 34 consistent with the general principles that are
     articulated.  And that's a big step ahead for us.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Are you leaving out --
         MR. COPLAN:  I think we can do that.  I think we're ready to
     start doing that.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Are you leaving out the waste depositories
     from this?
         MR. COPLAN:  Oh, no.  No.  No.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You know, risk -- to make statements about
     safety and risk and goals --
         DR. POWERS:  George, let me interrupt you enough to ask how
     much longer you think this should go, or should we break or what?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Maybe five, ten minutes.
         DR. POWERS:  Fine.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I think we should give a chance to the
     Members to -- but this is important, though, because it defines, it
     shapes the letter.
         DR. POWERS:  That's not the part I'm worried about.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Is it possible -- you see, I'm really
     worried that these concerns about intergenerational equity and all that
     stuff will lead us to where we are today a year from today.  I'm really
     concerned about that, that we will fail to come up with qualitative
     statement of high-level principles that will cover all the possible
     activities.  Because risk is multidimensinal, and we are used to working
     with certain dimensions in the reactor area, and you guys in the high-
     level-waste area work with different dimensions, and now you want to
     find out what the dimensions are in the other activities.  But the
     dimensions are not the same.
         DR. WALLIS:  Would that slow them down?  It seems to me that
     they can move much faster in the reactor area, and they should.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But that's the thing.
         DR. WALLIS:  Will those other things slow them down in doing
     that?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, but the point is this --
         DR. WALLIS:  To take a broader view?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Should --
         DR. WALLIS:  To be aware of a broader view?
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, but we can recommend in our letter
     that the emphasis be placed on fixing the existing QHO statement for
     reactors and in parallel think about the other thing.  In fact, now the
     more I think about it, I like Don's idea, maybe the other one should be
     conditional, come back in two months, three months, and tell us what
     your ideas are and whether you think -- you the staff think that you
     will eventually get something useful out of this, trying to unify
     everything.
         I think Einstein himself could not come up with a unified
     field theory, right?  So let's see whether there is any hope, instead of
     saying no, you have a year to do this, and then next July we say well,
     gee, it didn't work.
         Now let's come back to Dr. Shack.  Do you have any other
     thoughts to offer?
         DR. SHACK:  Well, I was just going to say, you know, I
     really don't think that you and Tom are ever going to be able to
     convince me that defense in depth is not a high-level principle, and I
     don't think that they'll ever be able to reevaluate --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  This has nothing to do with this.
         DR. KRESS:  You misheard me.  I think defense in depth is a
     high-level principle.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  It's just -- it depends on whether you
     call it principle or something that serves management of uncertainty. 
     Anything else?
         DR. SHACK:  Well, my point is that defense in depth is a
     high-level principle and CDF is a fundamental goal.  I have what I need
     to get on with the job.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.
         DR. KRESS:  You think CDF, LERF, and defense in depth is all
     the goals you need?
         DR. SHACK:  For the foreseeable future.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  For the reactors he will be happy.  Right
     now he doesn't care about the other --
         DR. KRESS:  You don't care about Mario's worry about land
     interdiction?  You don't care about my worry about societal --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Societal risk?
         DR. KRESS:  Risk?
         DR. SHACK:  If I don't melt the core, I don't worry about
     land interdiction, I don't worry about societal risk.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But he worries about defense in depth,
     balance of prevention and mitigation.
         He doesn't want to melt the core, but on the other hand,
     defense in depth --
         DR. SHACK:  Defense in depth is going to be a high-level
     principle.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  And we shall stay there.
         Dr. Uhrig.
         DR. UHRIG:  I think we need to move ahead with what's
     proposed here.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Proposed by whom, Bob?  By the staff.
         DR. UHRIG:  The staff.  It may have taken us 20 years to get
     here at the reactor business, but it's not going to take 20 years for
     NMSS to catch up.  Within the time frame that Part 50 gets made risk-
     informed, they will be caught up.  And I think you need to move ahead. 
     If that part lags, so be it, but it won't lag forever.  I don't worry
     about the time schedule, whether it's off a couple of months one way or
     the other.  That's irrelevant to me.
         MR. BARTON:  Okay.  I agree with what Bob just said.  That
     was my comment.  And also what Tom Kress said earlier.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  You agree with Kress too?
         MR. BARTON:  Oh, yes.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  But you can't agree with both.
         MR. BARTON:  Sure, I can.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, Dr. Bonaca, do you agree with
     everybody?
         DR. BONACA:  Well, you heard me yesterday, and today again. 
     I totally agree on this effort, and it may very well be shown that you
     cannot easily have an overarching goal for it, and you may decide months
     from now that you're not going to do that, but without some minimum
     exercise I think I cannot provide an answer, so is it worthwhile, I
     think it is, and as I said, it is essential to a good transition to Part
     50.  They asked us some question about scope and level of detail, and
     you may appreciate maybe an answer in a particular area.
         My sense is that scope should be sufficient that as a
     minimum we would see a path to future further expansion at a lower
     level, for example, to include cornerstones or issues of that nature
     that are important now in direct regulation.  Again, you don't have to
     address those now, but it seems to me that it should go far enough that
     you can see how the path is going to move to more specifics.
         It shouldn't be so high-level that you don't know how to
     make the next step.  I don't know if that helps, but that's my sense of
     what -- as a minimum you would keep in your mind some idea of how you
     would go there, and that would make it visible, I think.
         And insofar as the third question you had, which was
     schedule and approach, I would reverse it.  To me the approach is
     important, what you're doing now, but schedule, maybe it's less, and I
     wouldn't offer any comment on the schedule.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  Let me offer a compromise.
         DR. BONACA:  Okay.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Would the Committee be willing to see a
     letter that says this is a very noble task, it's important, it needs to
     be done, point number 1.
         Point number 2, the Committee has serious reservations as to
     whether this can be done in a year, given that NMSS, you know, is not up
     to speed in some respects, given the real issues of intergenerational
     equity and all that.
         Third, the Committee then would like to see -- the Committee
     would not like to see this potential problem impede progress in the
     reactor area because of the reasons Dr. Kress mentioned.  So the
     Committee recommends that the work start in parallel, updating the QHO
     statement for reactors, bringing up these issues that we have mentioned
     in other letters, and at the same time start this noble effort, but then
     have a progress check two, three months, whatever the staff feels is
     appropriate, where they will tell us whether they feel that this effort
     will lead to something useful.
         Then if they come back and say yes, we already have a first
     cut at the principle, you know, look at it, then we say go ahead.  Or if
     they say well, gee, you know, it doesn't really look like it's going to
     work, then we drop that part, but we have not been penalized, we keep --
     we have started and we keep working on the QHOs, bringing CDF up and
     doing the things that, you know, really will make a difference in the
     reactor area.
         DR. WALLIS:  Well, I wouldn't use your second paragraph
     there saying you have serious reservations about whether they can do
     something.  You don't set people off to do a job starting off by saying
     well, we've got serious reservations.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  No, but you have to explain why you are
     making the distinction.  I mean, I'm not going to say I have
     reservations about Joe.
         DR. WALLIS:  We should show some faith and hope and realism,
     but we should --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Maybe state some issues?
         DR. WALLIS:  I think that they may surprise you.  They may
     come up with something damn good in six months.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  That's why I'm giving them three months,
     to come back and say yes, there is hope.  And it's not only me, by the
     way.  I mean, we have two gentlemen of the jury here that need much more
     convincing than I do, but in other words I'm not saying drop it right
     now, as some of my colleagues are suggesting.  I'm saying it's so
     worthwhile that even though I have serious reservations, and the letter
     of course will use the right words, I'm willing to give you three
     months, four months.
         DR. WALLIS:  The fact that they've fiddled around for a
     while is all the more reason why they should hurry up now and show
     something -- show a return on this as soon as possible.  Six months is
     not unreasonable.  You've got what, four months from now you're going to
     give us a preliminary -- so that's great.  I'm looking forward to it.
         DR. BONACA:  We are going to give a few months to come up
     with something.  At that point we can kill it if you --
         DR. WALLIS:  Yes, that's what I'm saying.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I don't want to have to kill it next --
     no, it's not a matter of killing it, it's a matter of seeing whether we
     are getting somewhere.  And the staff will be the first one to tell us
     yes, we think we are getting somewhere, or we think it's hopeless at
     this time.  But for the reactor side, it is not hopeless.  We know what
     we need, we know we can do it, it's a matter of time, and it will have a
     tangible benefit.
         DR. KRESS:  I would be willing to sign off on such a letter,
     but I would want to change the wording of the serious reservations.
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  I am sure that you will, Tom.  I'm just
     giving you the major points.
         DR. FONTANA:  Let's not forget that one of the real purposes
     of this is to across all activities that humans are involved in, only
     reactors and high-level waste and all are being imposed with safety
     requirements that are way in excess of what the risks are.  We put up
     with bigger risks in a lot of other areas, and I think something like
     this is important to try to equalize the risk process --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Okay.  I suggest, because of time, that we
     keep that discussion when we meet again.  Before we leave, though, does
     the staff have heartburn regarding a letter of this type?  Would you
     feel that this is something that you really don't want to see, or you
     think that's one idea?
         DR. BONACA:  There was a question on their part on scope,
     and I don't understand --
         DR. APOSTOLAKIS:  Well, I'm changing the scope now.
         DR. BONACA:  Only a couple of people -- I think we should
     talk about, you know, what are we going to suggest insofar as --
         DR. POWERS:  I'm going to take over the meeting at this
     point and declare a break for 15 minutes.  We're recessed.
         [Whereupon, at 3:16 p.m., the meeting was recessed, to
     reconvene at 10:45 a.m., Friday, April 9, 1999.]
	 
	 	 
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