RIC 2009: State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analysis (SOARCA)

Charles Tinkler – Session Chairman
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
March 11, 2009

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Status Of SOARCA Study

- All scenarios have been analyzed
  - Newly completed scenarios:
    - Surry:
      - Interfacing System Loss of Coolant Accident
      - Thermally Induced Steam Generator Tube Rupture
    - Peach Bottom:
      - Short Term Station Blackout
  - Completion of offsite consequence predictions
- Public information booklet has been developed to complement technical NUREG

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Upcoming Activities

- May
  - Complete technical NUREG (4 vol.)
- June
  - Start Peer Review
  - Start Uncertainty Study
- July
  - Brief ACRS

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Presentations

- **Updated Accident Progression Analyses** – Jason Schaperow
- **Reporting Offsite Health Consequences** – Terry Brock
- **Risk Communications** – Dorothy Collins
- **Phenomenological Advances of Severe Accident Progression** – Randall Gauntt

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Updated Accident Progression Analyses

Jason Schaperow
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
March 11, 2009

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Updated Accident Progression Analyses – Progress since RIC 2008

- Added Peach Bottom short-term station blackout
  - Frequency of 3×10^{-7}/year is below SOARCA screening criterion of 1×10^{-6}/year
  - Analyzed to assess risk significance relative to long-term station blackout
- Completed Surry containment bypass events
  - Interfacing systems LOCA
  - Short-term station blackout with consequential thermally induced steam generator tube rupture

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Updated Accident Progression Analyses – Preliminary Conclusions

- All events can reasonably be mitigated
- For unmitigated sensitivity cases – no LERF
- Releases are dramatically smaller and delayed from 1982 Siting Study (SST1)

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Thermally Induced Steam Generator Tube Rupture

- Timing of event is controlled by assumption that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TD-AFW) failure occurs immediately due to failure of Emergency Condensate Storage Tank
  - Release starts at 3.5 hours
- But, release magnitude (<1%) is reduced from earlier assessments due to
  - Subsequent hot leg rupture
  - Decontamination factor of 7 in the steam generator (ARTIST tests)
- Basic thermal hydraulic behavior (hot leg failure after tube rupture) was confirmed by SCDAP/RELAP5 analysis

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Thermally Induced Steam Generator Tube Rupture

- Mitigation
  - Other severe accident analyses showed core damage could be delayed for 9 hours if TD-AFW available to fill steam generators one time following event initiation
  - Security-related diesel-driven pump available for containment flooding

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Thermally Induced Steam Generator Tube Rupture – System Pressure



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Thermally Induced Steam Generator Tube Rupture – Reactor Water Level



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Thermally Induced Steam Generator Tube Rupture – Iodine Distribution



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Scenarios – Peach Bottom

Scenario	Initiating event	Core damage frequency (per year)	Description of scenario
Long-term SBO	Seismic, fire, flooding	$3x10^{-6}$	Immediate loss of AC power and eventual loss of control of turbine driven systems due to battery exhaustion
Short-term SBO	Seismic, fire flooding	$3x10^{-7}$	Immediate loss of ac power and turbine driven systems

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Key Accident Progression Timing for Unmitigated Sensitivity Cases – Peach Bottom

Scenario	Time to start of core damage (hours)	Time to lower head failure (hours)	Time to start of release to environment (hours)
Long-term SBO	10	20	20
Short-term SBO	1	8	8

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Scenarios – Surry

Scenario	Initiating event	Core damage frequency (per year)	Description of scenario
Long-term SBO	Seismic, fire, flooding	$2x10^{-5}$	Immediate loss of ac power, eventual loss of control of turbine-driven systems due to battery exhaustion
Short-term SBO	Seismic, fire, flooding	$2x10^{-6}$	Immediate loss of ac power and turbine-driven systems
Thermally induced steam generator tube rupture	Seismic, fire, flooding	$5x10^{-7}$	Immediate loss of ac power and turbine-driven systems, consequential tube rupture
Interfacing systems LOCA	Random failure of check valves	$3x10^{-8}$	Check valves in high-pressure system fail open causing low pressure piping outside containment to rupture, followed by operator error

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Key Accident Progression Timing for Unmitigated Sensitivity Cases – Surry

Scenario	Time to start of core damage (hours)	Time to lower head failure (hours)	Time to start of release to environment (hours)
Long-term SBO	16	21	45
Short-term SBO	3	7	25
Thermally induced steam generator tube rupture	3	7.5	3.5
Interfacing systems LOCA	9	15	10

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Iodine Release for Unmitigated Sensitivity Cases



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Cesium Release for Unmitigated Sensitivity Cases



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Reporting Offsite Health Consequences

Terry Brock
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
March 11, 2009

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SOARCA Background

- SOARCA to realistically perform offsite consequence analysis
- Consequences are calculated for early fatality and latent cancer fatality (LCF) risk

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Previous Studies

- Used the Linear No-threshold dose response model (LNT) and aggregated doses over all individuals projected to receive any exposures to calculate latent health effects

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International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)

- Risk projections of cancer deaths using the LNT model and involving trivial exposures to thousands of people is not reasonable and should be avoided (ICRP 103, 2007)

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Staff recommended approach in SECY-08-0029

- Calculate the average individual likelihood of cancer mortality conditional to the occurrence of a severe reactor accident
  - Results portrayed as conditional risk
  - Results also portrayed as absolute risk considering scenario frequency
- The calculation includes both LNT and 10 mrem per year dose truncation response model
  - 10 mrem per year interpreted from ICRP 104

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SOARCA provides additional sensitivity analyses

- Study includes additional consequence predictions using alternative dose truncation assumptions
  - Background dose (360 mrem/yr)
  - HPS position (5 rem/yr and 10 rem lifetime)
- Intent of multiple dose response models is to provide more perspective on potential outcomes and provide insight on the sensitivity of the range of dose values to risk

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Sample sensitivity analyses for individual LCF risk in the EPZ relative to LNT



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Staff recommended approach cont.

- Results presented for three distances
  - 0 to 16.1 km (10 miles);
  - 0 to 80.5 km (50 miles); and
  - 0 to 161 km (100 miles)

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Sample average individual risk at three distance intervals relative to the EPZ



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Staff basis

- Facilitate public risk communication by providing a likelihood of consequences that could be compared with the occurrence of LCFs in the general population from causes other than a reactor accident
- The distances selected are consistent with emergency planning zones and the agency's strategic planning goals

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Staff basis cont.

- This approach also would be similar to that used by the Commission in establishing its Safety Goal
- Commission approval on September 10, 2008

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RIC 2009

SOARCA Risk Communication

Dorothy Collins
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
March 11, 2009

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What is risk communication?

"an interactive process used in talking or writing about topics that cause concern about health, safety, security, or the environment"



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Spheres of Argument

Technical Sphere

- Metaphor of "trial or experiment"
- Formality and expertise important
- Only certain kinds of evidence and reasoning permitted

Public Sphere

- Metaphor of "public address"
- Community discussion of priorities and problems
- Both collective preference and conflict present

Goodnight, 1981

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Create Shared Meaning Through Dialogue



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Possibilities for Generative Dialogue

	Social Risk Symbolic Representation	Technical Risk Symbolic Representation	Opportunities for Generative Dialogue
Material Reality			• Connect process (tech) and outcome (social) • Use multiple types of expressions • Highlight shared values about safety
1. Accident at a nuclear reactor	1. Blank or violent like a mushroom cloud	1. Quantify material phenomenon of reactor behavior	
2. Health effects from radiation exposure	2. Physical descriptions of individual experiences	2. Calculate dose-response relationships	
Time/Space			• Acknowledge severity • Demystify reactor technology • Discuss historical experiences
1. Accident progression	1. Immediate progression	1. Modeled to develop over hours	
2. Historical accidents	2. Collapse time and space	2. Safety systems different/improved	

Gergen, Gergen, & Barrett (2004), Hamilton, 2003; Kinsella, 2007; Mirel, 1994

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Opportunities to Create Shared Meaning

Technical Sphere

- Submit research to standards of evidence and reasoning
- ACRS meetings
- External peer review

Public Sphere

Public meetings
- Use facilitators to promote generative dialogue and exchange of information and perspective

Information booklet and NRC Website
- Juxtapose technical and social risk messages in shared space

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Make SOARCA Methods and Results Transparent



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Build Credibility

- Forthcoming external peer review
- Cross reference public communication (e.g.,information booklet) with technical report
- SOARCA is a research project that provides information to support NRC mission
  - Connect SOARCA information to NRC regulatory activity
  - Ex. Describe accident progression alongside background information about how reactors work and description of "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants" from 10 CFR 50, Appendix A

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Phenomenological Advances of Severe Accident Progression

R.O. Gauntt, Reactor Analysis and Modeling Department

Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

Dept 6762 rogaunt@sandia.gov

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