Event Notification Report for November 20, 2026
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/19/2026 - 11/20/2026
EVENT NUMBERS
5854058532585335853458542
Part 21
Event Number: 58540
Rep Org: Curtiss Wright Steam Air Solutions
Licensee:
Region: 2
City: Summerville State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Todd Johnson
HQ OPS Officer: Christopher Prescott
Licensee:
Region: 2
City: Summerville State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Todd Johnson
HQ OPS Officer: Christopher Prescott
Notification Date: 11/18/2026
Notification Time: 09:00 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/2026
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2026
Notification Time: 09:00 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/2026
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2026
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - Defects And Noncompliance
Person (Organization):
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, (EMAIL)
R2 Reactor Events (EMAIL)
R3 Reactor Events (EMAIL)
R4 Reactor Events (EMAIL)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, (EMAIL)
R2 Reactor Events (EMAIL)
R3 Reactor Events (EMAIL)
R4 Reactor Events (EMAIL)
EN Revision Imported Date: 11/20/2026
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - WIRING DEFECTS IN ACTUATORS
The following is a summary of information provided by Curtiss-Wright Steam and Air Solutions (SAS) by fax:
Two Exlar SR31 actuators (S/Ns 17060333 and 17060335) sold to Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station were discovered to have independent wiring defects. The defects were discovered prior to installation of either actuator. The actuators are used in the safety-related electronic governor speed control system (EGSCS) for various terry turbine pump drives (auxiliary feedwater and reactor core isolation cooling). SAS considers the wiring defects to be isolated to the two actuators being reported and not indicative of a systemic or pervasive safety issue. For corrective actions, SAS plans to review current requirements to evaluate spare actuators prior to shipment, implement source surveillance hold points for all repairs and new actuator purchases, and make additional checks and functional testing as part of their standard inspection and dedication process.
No immediate action is required for customers with Exlar SR31 actuators installed. However, SAS recommends sites utilizing the EGSCS for terry turbine pump drives verify all spare Exlar SR31 actuators energize, stroke and function properly. SAS has verified all remaining stock actuators are functional and do not exhibit wiring defects or other operational issues.
Affected Plants: Wolf Creek, Farley, Clinton, Point Beach, Cooper, Hatch, Harris, Watts Bar, Sequoyah, and Arkansas Nuclear One.
Responsible Representative:
Todd Johnson
Product Engineering
843-486-6149
EN Revision Text: PART 21 - WIRING DEFECTS IN ACTUATORS
The following is a summary of information provided by Curtiss-Wright Steam and Air Solutions (SAS) by fax:
Two Exlar SR31 actuators (S/Ns 17060333 and 17060335) sold to Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station were discovered to have independent wiring defects. The defects were discovered prior to installation of either actuator. The actuators are used in the safety-related electronic governor speed control system (EGSCS) for various terry turbine pump drives (auxiliary feedwater and reactor core isolation cooling). SAS considers the wiring defects to be isolated to the two actuators being reported and not indicative of a systemic or pervasive safety issue. For corrective actions, SAS plans to review current requirements to evaluate spare actuators prior to shipment, implement source surveillance hold points for all repairs and new actuator purchases, and make additional checks and functional testing as part of their standard inspection and dedication process.
No immediate action is required for customers with Exlar SR31 actuators installed. However, SAS recommends sites utilizing the EGSCS for terry turbine pump drives verify all spare Exlar SR31 actuators energize, stroke and function properly. SAS has verified all remaining stock actuators are functional and do not exhibit wiring defects or other operational issues.
Affected Plants: Wolf Creek, Farley, Clinton, Point Beach, Cooper, Hatch, Harris, Watts Bar, Sequoyah, and Arkansas Nuclear One.
Responsible Representative:
Todd Johnson
Product Engineering
843-486-6149
Agreement State
Event Number: 58532
Rep Org: Arizona Dept of Health Services
Licensee: Integer Consulting, LLC
Region: 4
City: Gilbert State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-706
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Brian D. Goretzki
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Conklin
Licensee: Integer Consulting, LLC
Region: 4
City: Gilbert State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-706
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Brian D. Goretzki
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Conklin
Notification Date: 11/13/2026
Notification Time: 12:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2026
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/13/2026
Notification Time: 12:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2026
Event Time: 00:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/13/2026
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUND SOURCE
The following information was provided by the Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:
"On November 12, 2026, the Department received a phone call from a contractor that a Troxler model 3450 nuclear moisture density gauge was found off the Interstate 10 and Loop 101 interchange. An inspector responded to the site to retrieve the gauge and transported it back to the [Department]. The Department is in possession of the nuclear gauge and is currently performing leak testing of the device. The gauge contains 8 millicuries of Cs-137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241. The Department has requested additional information and continues to investigate the event.
"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Arizona incident number: 26-066
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was provided by the Arizona Department of Health Services (the Department) via email:
"On November 12, 2026, the Department received a phone call from a contractor that a Troxler model 3450 nuclear moisture density gauge was found off the Interstate 10 and Loop 101 interchange. An inspector responded to the site to retrieve the gauge and transported it back to the [Department]. The Department is in possession of the nuclear gauge and is currently performing leak testing of the device. The gauge contains 8 millicuries of Cs-137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241. The Department has requested additional information and continues to investigate the event.
"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Arizona incident number: 26-066
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Agreement State
Event Number: 58533
Rep Org: Louisiana Dept of Environ Quality
Licensee: Touro Infirmary
Region: 4
City: New Orleans State: LA
County:
License #: LA-1198-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: James Pate
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Conklin
Licensee: Touro Infirmary
Region: 4
City: New Orleans State: LA
County:
License #: LA-1198-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: James Pate
HQ OPS Officer: Adam Conklin
Notification Date: 11/13/2026
Notification Time: 13:32 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2026
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/13/2026
Notification Time: 13:32 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2026
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/13/2026
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SOURCE
The following information was provided by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) via email:
"On November 11, 2026, the licensee contacted the LDEQ concerning a leaking vial source, which was wipe tested on October 15, 2026. The cesium-137 vial source had an activity of 112 microcuries and the removable activity was 21.6 nanocuries.
"The serial number for the vial is CK957, manufacturer: Amersham, model: CDC.V1, and assay date was December 6, 1991, with an initial activity of 250 microcuries.
"There was no contamination event.
"The licensee's radiation safety officer stated that the vial source will be sealed and shipped to a nuclear pharmacy for disposal to correct this situation."
Louisiana incident number: LA20260014
The following information was provided by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) via email:
"On November 11, 2026, the licensee contacted the LDEQ concerning a leaking vial source, which was wipe tested on October 15, 2026. The cesium-137 vial source had an activity of 112 microcuries and the removable activity was 21.6 nanocuries.
"The serial number for the vial is CK957, manufacturer: Amersham, model: CDC.V1, and assay date was December 6, 1991, with an initial activity of 250 microcuries.
"There was no contamination event.
"The licensee's radiation safety officer stated that the vial source will be sealed and shipped to a nuclear pharmacy for disposal to correct this situation."
Louisiana incident number: LA20260014
Agreement State
Event Number: 58534
Rep Org: Tennessee Div Radiological Health
Licensee: Johnson City Medical Center
Region: 1
City: Johnson City State: TN
County:
License #: R-90004
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Andrew Holcomb
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Licensee: Johnson City Medical Center
Region: 1
City: Johnson City State: TN
County:
License #: R-90004
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Andrew Holcomb
HQ OPS Officer: Ian Howard
Notification Date: 11/13/2026
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2026
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/13/2026
Notification Time: 16:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2026
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/13/2026
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT
The following information was provided by the Tennessee Division of Radiological Health (the Department) via email:
"The Department was informed on November 13, 2026, of dose numbers that constituted an underdose to a patient. Contact from the licensee was made on November 9, 2026, but the dose data was not received until November 13, 2026. The physician prescribed a two-treatment fraction of BWXT Y-90 TheraSpheres. The first fraction was successfully delivered, but during the second treatment a kink occurred in the catheter. No spillage or contamination was found. It was estimated that approximately 2 mCi of a planned 23.5 mCi was delivered. The physician confirmed that the patient was informed on the day of the treatment. The post-treatment plan showed an underdose difference of 35,850 rem between the planned 393.5 Gy (39,350 rem) and the delivered 35.0 Gy (3,500 rem). The physician decided against a repeat treatment."
Tennessee Event Report ID Number: TN-26-086
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
The following information was provided by the Tennessee Division of Radiological Health (the Department) via email:
"The Department was informed on November 13, 2026, of dose numbers that constituted an underdose to a patient. Contact from the licensee was made on November 9, 2026, but the dose data was not received until November 13, 2026. The physician prescribed a two-treatment fraction of BWXT Y-90 TheraSpheres. The first fraction was successfully delivered, but during the second treatment a kink occurred in the catheter. No spillage or contamination was found. It was estimated that approximately 2 mCi of a planned 23.5 mCi was delivered. The physician confirmed that the patient was informed on the day of the treatment. The post-treatment plan showed an underdose difference of 35,850 rem between the planned 393.5 Gy (39,350 rem) and the delivered 35.0 Gy (3,500 rem). The physician decided against a repeat treatment."
Tennessee Event Report ID Number: TN-26-086
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 58542
Facility: Louisiana Energy Services
Region: 2 State: NM
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type:
Comments: Uranium Enrichment Facility
Gas Centrifuge Facility
NRC Notified By: Lindsey Zimmerman
HQ OPS Officer: Josue Ramirez
Region: 2 State: NM
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type:
Comments: Uranium Enrichment Facility
Gas Centrifuge Facility
NRC Notified By: Lindsey Zimmerman
HQ OPS Officer: Josue Ramirez
Notification Date: 11/19/2026
Notification Time: 09:59 [ET]
Event Date: 11/18/2026
Event Time: 10:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2026
Notification Time: 09:59 [ET]
Event Date: 11/18/2026
Event Time: 10:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2026
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - Loss Or Degraded Safety Items
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - Loss Or Degraded Safety Items
Person (Organization):
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Peterka, Nicholas (NMSS)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Peterka, Nicholas (NMSS)
DEGRADATION OF ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"The facility is in a safe and stable configuration and no accident has occurred.
"During annual routine maintenance of a tails cylinder station, the surveillance to verify 'IROFS2', a thermocouple for preventing overheating of a cylinder, failed to trip at the required setpoint temperature. The cylinder station was tagged out of service prior to maintenance to ensure no material was present during testing. 'IROFS1' for this station, which provides similar protection, passed the surveillance. The affected thermocouple is located in a tails cylinder station within SBM 1001.
"Corrective actions have begun. A detailed investigation will be conducted. The station will remain out of service until repairs and retesting of 'IROFS2' occurs."
The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
"The facility is in a safe and stable configuration and no accident has occurred.
"During annual routine maintenance of a tails cylinder station, the surveillance to verify 'IROFS2', a thermocouple for preventing overheating of a cylinder, failed to trip at the required setpoint temperature. The cylinder station was tagged out of service prior to maintenance to ensure no material was present during testing. 'IROFS1' for this station, which provides similar protection, passed the surveillance. The affected thermocouple is located in a tails cylinder station within SBM 1001.
"Corrective actions have begun. A detailed investigation will be conducted. The station will remain out of service until repairs and retesting of 'IROFS2' occurs."