Event Notification Report for January 06, 2023

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIALLY DAMAGED GAUGE

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email:

"On December 29, 2022, the Agency was notified by the licensee's consultant that a fire had occurred at the licensee's location. The fire was near two Vega America SHD gauges both containing 120 millicurie (original activity) cesium - 137 sources. The licensee has not been able to determine if the gauges were affected by the fire as of this report. There is a concern that the fire could reflash, so the licensee is being cautious about approaching the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident No: 9977

* * * RETRACTION ON 12/30/22 AT 1325 FROM ART TUCKER TO LAUREN BRYSON * * *

"On December 30, 2022, the licensee notified the Agency that they were able to inspect the gauges and neither gauge was affected by the fire."

Notified R4DO (Gepford) and NMSS Events Notification via email

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST EXIT SIGNS

The following information was provided by Kansas Radiation Control Program via email:

"Kansas Radiation Control Program was notified, at 1016 CST on December 30, 2022, that six tritium exit signs were disposed of inappropriately. A total of 17 tritium exit signs were removed from a church located in Topeka, Kansas, six signs were reported improperly disposed of with 11 remaining in the possession of the owner and later disposed of properly. The church had contracted with EMCOR to dispose of the signs and replace them with LED exit signs. The sub contractor, Mid-West Signs, reported they unintentionally disposed of six of the signs in the trash. Before this error was realized the trash was collected and the signs were determined unrecoverable. The signs were uninstalled on November 3, 2022; however it is unclear at this time when the signs might have been placed in the trash. This is an initial report and the incident is still open pending an investigation and management review."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 1/6/2023

EN Revision Text: LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SOURCE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 2259 EST on 1/3/2023, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 1 B and Unit 2 A emergency diesel generator (EDG) systems, as well as an actuation of the associated auxiliary feedwater (AFW) systems on each unit occurred. The reason for the EDG auto-starts was due to a loss of an offsite power source (loss of one of the two reserve auxiliary transformers (RAT) on each unit) to the Unit 1 B and Unit 2 A safety related buses. The EDG and AFW systems automatically started as designed when the valid undervoltage signal on the affected safety related bus was received.

"This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and the Auxiliary Feedwater Systems for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

EN Revision Imported Date: 1/6/2023

EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0148 EST on January 4, 2023 it was identified that P4400F603B, Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) Supply Isolation Valve, lost position indication. Division 2 EECW System was declared inoperable due to the potential that this valve may not be capable of performing its safety function to automatically isolate the safety related Division 2 EECW system from the non-safety related Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) system. Because the Division 2 EECW system provides cooling to the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room cooler, HPCI was also declared inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non--emergency notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"At 0240 EST, position indication was restored and Division 2 EECW and HPCI was returned to operable following inspection of the associated motor control center (MCC) and testing of the associated fuses. The cause of the loss of indication is under investigation.

"The Senior NRC resident inspector has been notified."

EN Revision Imported Date: 1/6/2023

EN Revision Text: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"In accordance with [University of Missouri Research Reactor] MURR Technical Specification 6.6 paragraph 'c', MURR is reporting an abnormal occurrence. The NRC informed MURR's Reactor Manager today that an [Senior Reactor Operator] SRO's license could not be renewed due to MURR submitting the request within 30 days of the expiration date and the license expiring prior to the NRC being able to act on the application. This meant the license expired on September 22, 2022. The Reactor Manager informed the interim Reactor Facility Director of this issue.

"MURR validated the current SRO in the control room has a valid license and determined the reactor was in a safe condition, operating at 10 [Megawatts] MW. A review of the records shows that all other reactor operator and senior reactor operator licenses are current.

"MURR reviewed all operating logs dating back to September 22, 2022 and has determined that there were three days during which this now unlicensed SRO was in the control room supervising evolutions that require an SRO to be present per Tech Spec 6.1. f. (Initial startup and approach to power, and relocation of any experiment with a reactivity worth greater than 0.0074 units).

"MURR will not let the individual with an expired license stand any control room positions until he obtains a license. MURR will follow up with a letter detailing an investigation into this issue and any other corrective actions from that investigation."

The Reactor Manager notified the NRC Project Manager and Branch Chief for Non-Power Reactors.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

"At 1242 [EST] on 05 January 2023, with the Unit in Mode 1 at 99 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped on low Reactor Pressure Vessel level while restoring power to Digital Feedwater Control Stations when there was a perturbation to the level controls. The reason for perturbation is unknown at this time. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. High pressure core spray was manually initiated in accordance with site procedures. Reactor water level is being maintained via the Feedwater System. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Condenser.

"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

SAFETY ITEM UNAVAILABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"On 1/5/2023 at 1105 [MST], the control room received a call that a crane operator had operated the crane over a strap laying on the crane track. The initial inspection of the crane determined that a component of the crane had been damaged. The component was identified as a device to sweep debris from the crane rails and was not an [item relied on for safety] IROFS related component. At 0245 [MST], a Shift Manager inspected the crane and determined that the damaged component was part of IROFS27e [This IROFS is introduced for Separation Building Modules (SBM) for seismic, tornado, high wind, roof snow load, roof ponding, and site flooding due to local intense precipitation. Design features of the SBMs are to withstand loadings from these natural phenomena.] The component restrains the crane during a natural phenomena hazard. IROFS27e is an IROFS that is required to be available and reliable. An engineering analysis was initiated to determine if the crane would perform its safety function with the damaged component. Although the analysis is in progress, UUSA is reporting this event per 10 CFR 70. Appendix A (a)(4).

"There were no injured personnel and no release to the environment and the plant is in a safe configuration.

"This issue has been entered in UUSA's corrective action program as EV 159031."