Event Notification Report for July 12, 2019

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING RADIOACTIVE SOURCE

The following information was obtained from the state of Ohio via email:

"[Manufacturing and Distribution] licensee received beta back-scatter on a device from customer for repair. Upon receipt, licensee conducted leak test and results indicated >185 Bq (0.005 microCi). Device contained 100 microCi Pm-147 source and is distributed under a general license.

"Upon investigation, licensee determined customer had used probe on wet surface, which clogged aperture, and customer attempted to clear aperture with sharp, pointed object which damaged source. At customer's request, licensee went to customer's location to survey area of use for contamination. No contamination was found."

Ohio report no.: OH190012

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST THEN FOUND SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE IODINE-125

The following information was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:

"Two shipments of licensed material in the form of Iodine-125 saline, one with an activity of 1.75 Curies and the other, 1.25 Curies, were discovered not to be delivered by [a common carrier] to the licensee's authorized use site at 331 Treble Cove Road, Billerica, MA, on Friday, July 12, 2019. PerkinElmer leases authorized use space from another Massachusetts licensee, Lantheus Medical Imaging, Inc., at the same street address. PerkinElmer subsequently contacted Lantheus and [the common carrier] on 7/12/19 at approximately 1416 EDT to report the missing packages.

"On Monday, July 15, [the package] containing 1.25 curies of I-125 was delivered by [the common carrier] to the PerkinElmer shipping department. [The licensee] subsequently reported to [the common carrier] that one of the packages was delivered; however, the second package containing 1.75 curies of I-125 was not. On Tuesday, July 16, [the common carrier] contacted PerkinElmer to report that both packages were delivered and that the case was closed.

"On Wednesday, July 17, at 1054 EDT, [the common carrier] delivered the second package to the PerkinElmer shipping department and stated that it was just picked up from Lantheus a short time before. It had apparently been in Lantheus's possession since Monday, July 15.

"An investigation of the incident is underway."

WASTE DRUM DAMAGED DUE TO OVER PRESSURIZATION

"On July 12, 2019, at approximately 0152 EDT operations personnel in the Uranium Recycle and Recovery area of the plant reported an incident. Production packaged wet recoverable material on July 12 (3rd shift) into a closed drum at the designated drum loading station, performed the required assay measurement and placed the drum into storage. Shortly afterward, the drum pressurized forcing the lid off and some contents to disperse into the immediate vicinity. The drum contents were smoldering, smoke was observed and the smoke detector activated. Dry paper in the drum created a small fire, which was promptly extinguished without use of a water hose or a fire extinguisher. A small portion of the drums content was impacted. The drum was then separated from other stored material. There were no personnel injuries. Health Physics monitored the area with no airborne results approaching radiological limits and no personnel were affected.

"The drum contained production-related contaminated wet recoverable material (e.g., mop heads, filters, and rags) and laboratory waste. The assay results showed a Uranium 235 content of 71.45 Grams. This quantity of material meets the reporting threshold noted above.

"Immediate Corrective Actions.

"Loading operations of wet recoverable material have been suspending pending further evaluation. Operations checked the other drums in the area with heat monitoring equipment and no additional heat generation issues were identified. This incident has been entered into the facility's corrective action program.

"This incident had no impact on the health and safety of the employees, the public or the environment."

The licensee notified the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control and will be notifying the NRC Region II office.

INVALID AUTO ISOLATION SIGNAL OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION

"At 1640 CDT on 7/12/19, Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) received an invalid auto isolation signal which closed the HPCI steam supply valves rendering HPCI inoperable. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The isolation occurred while performing a calibration and functional check of a level switch for the Unit 1 Core Spray system. Continuity was checked across the incorrect set of contacts which completed the circuit in logic bus 'A' for the auto isolation signal in the HPCI system. There was no impact to the safety of the public or plant personnel during the time HPCI system was isolated. HPCI was returned to operable at 2110 CDT on 7/12/19.

"CR 1532094 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector