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Event Notification Report for October 17, 2017

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/16/2017 - 10/17/2017

EVENT NUMBERS
530205302153158

Power Reactor
Event Number: 53020
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2     State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/17/2017
Notification Time: 13:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2017
Event Time: 11:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
SHANE SANDAL (R2DO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SANITARY LIFT STATION OVERFLOW

"At approximately 0319 EDT on 10/14/17, site personnel discovered a sanitary lift station overflowing in the protected area. The overflow entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 12. The estimated release volume was approximately 50 gallons. At 1134 EDT on 10/17/17 an initial notification was made to South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. The cause of the overflow is still under investigation. Functionality of the lift pump has been restored and cleanup is complete.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."


Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 53021
Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Licensee: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Region: 1
City: CARLISLE   State: PA
County:
License #: GENERAL LICEN
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DHARLES BETONEY II
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/17/2017
Notification Time: 16:43 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2017
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
Event Text
FOUR LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

"During a periodic safety inspection of an installation facility, the Safety Manager noted that up to four tritium exit signs were missing from mounting locations above partition wall doorways. Photoluminescent equivalents had been installed in their place. The exit signs were manufactured by Safety Light Corporation with an effective life cycle of ten years set to expire on November 2017. Model numbers and activity levels of the missing signs are unknown. A local search for items returned negative results and the exit signs were determined lost on 16 October 2017. Interviews conducted with base operations personnel and contract employees indicate tritium exit signs were removed on or around 16 August 2017 and replaced with a non-radioactive equivalent. It is believed that the exit signs were disposed of in a municipal waste dumpster on the installation. An internal investigation is underway to gather additional information and determine root cause.

"The U.S. Army Garrison - Carlisle Barracks reported the lost exits signs as a general license holder pursuant to 10 CFR 31.5. Telephonic reporting requirement in 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) applies. A formal written report will be submitted within 30 days after making the telephone report with the NRC that 10 CFR 20.2201(b) requires."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf


Part 21
Event Number: 53158
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT NUCLEAR DIVISION
Licensee: CURTISS WRIGHT NUCLEAR DIVISION
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI   State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIMOTHY FRANCHUK
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/09/2018
Notification Time: 15:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2017
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/09/2018
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
MARK JEFFERS (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACTO (EMAI)
Event Text
PART 21 - FAILURE OF UNDER-VOLTAGE RELEASE MECHANISM

The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail:

On October 17, 2017, Palisades alerted Curtiss-Wright of the failure of the under-voltage dropout mechanism in a molded case circuit breaker to trip the breaker in an under-voltage condition. The specific component was a Westinghouse / Eaton Cutler Hammer P/N KD2200U18, containing CAT# UVH3LB08, Style 1492D79G24 under-voltage release mechanism (manufactured prior to 1999). Six of these components were supplied to Palisades in 1992.

Findings indicated that the under-voltage release mechanism's failure was a result of a misalignment of the solenoid due to excessive play in the design/manufacturing process which allowed the plunger to miss the target that would cause the breaker to trip in an under-voltage condition. Palisades identified this failure and mentioned two previous failures, one in 1996, and one in 2009.

The under-voltage trip mechanism was redesigned in the 1997-1998 time frame. The new design has not exhibited any reported failures. The observed failure on a 1992 breaker having failed in the installed condition took 50 trials to repeat the failure. Given that the excessive play could be a result of combined tolerances, worn tooling, as well as the design itself, and since the OEM has redesigned this mechanism almost 20 years ago, Curtiss-Wright would recommend end users to conduct their own evaluation to determine if a defect, which could create a substantial safety hazard, exists.