Event Notification Report for June 24, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/23/2016 - 06/24/2016
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52042
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK HAWES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK HAWES
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 06/24/2016
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2016
Event Time: 12:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2016
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2016
Event Time: 12:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMPS DEGRADATION
"At 1215 [EDT] on 6/24/2016, James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) was at 100% power when Breaker 710340 tripped and power was lost to L-gears L13, L23, L33, and L43. These provide non-vital power to Reactor Building Ventilation (RBV), portions of Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling (RBCLC), and 'A' Recirculation pump lube oil systems. Off-site AC power remains available to vital systems and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) are available.
"Due to the loss of RBV, Secondary Containment differential pressure increased. At 1215 [EDT], Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillance Requirement SR-3.6.4.1.1 of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. The Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system was manually initiated and Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored by 1219 [EDT].
"The 'A' Recirculation pump tripped at 1215 [EDT] and reactor power decreased to approximately 50%. 'B' Recirculation pump temperature began to rise due to the degraded RBCLC system. At 1236 [EDT], a manual scram was initiated. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level shrink during the scram resulted in a successful Group 2 isolation. All control rods have been inserted. The RPV water level is being maintained with the Feedwater System and pressure is being maintained by main steam line bypass valves. A cooldown is in progress and JAF will proceed to cold shutdown (Mode 4). Due to complete loss of RBCLC system, the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cooling capability is degraded but the Decay Heat Removal system remains available. SFP temperature is slowly rising and it is being monitored. The time [duration] to 200 degrees is approximately 117 hours.
"The initiation of reactor protection systems (RPS) due to the manual scram at critical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The general containment Group 2 isolations are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). In addition, the temporary differential pressure change in Secondary Containment is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.
"At 1215 [EDT] on 6/24/2016, James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) was at 100% power when Breaker 710340 tripped and power was lost to L-gears L13, L23, L33, and L43. These provide non-vital power to Reactor Building Ventilation (RBV), portions of Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling (RBCLC), and 'A' Recirculation pump lube oil systems. Off-site AC power remains available to vital systems and Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) are available.
"Due to the loss of RBV, Secondary Containment differential pressure increased. At 1215 [EDT], Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillance Requirement SR-3.6.4.1.1 of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. The Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system was manually initiated and Secondary Containment differential pressure was restored by 1219 [EDT].
"The 'A' Recirculation pump tripped at 1215 [EDT] and reactor power decreased to approximately 50%. 'B' Recirculation pump temperature began to rise due to the degraded RBCLC system. At 1236 [EDT], a manual scram was initiated. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) water level shrink during the scram resulted in a successful Group 2 isolation. All control rods have been inserted. The RPV water level is being maintained with the Feedwater System and pressure is being maintained by main steam line bypass valves. A cooldown is in progress and JAF will proceed to cold shutdown (Mode 4). Due to complete loss of RBCLC system, the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cooling capability is degraded but the Decay Heat Removal system remains available. SFP temperature is slowly rising and it is being monitored. The time [duration] to 200 degrees is approximately 117 hours.
"The initiation of reactor protection systems (RPS) due to the manual scram at critical power is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The general containment Group 2 isolations are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). In addition, the temporary differential pressure change in Secondary Containment is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52043
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT RUSH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ROBERT RUSH
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 06/24/2016
Notification Time: 19:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2016
Event Time: 15:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2016
Notification Time: 19:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2016
Event Time: 15:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
"On 06/24/2016 at 1511(CDT), an unexpected trip of a Fuel Building ventilation supply fan occurred followed by an exhaust fan trip and secondary containment differential pressure became positive.
"At 1512 (CDT), the standby fuel building ventilation fans auto started and secondary containment differential pressure was restored to Technical Specification required conditions.
"Secondary containment was declared INOPERABLE when Technical Specification-required differential pressure was not being maintained and LCO 3.6.4.1 Action A.1 was entered and exited for the given time period. Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) - 8 was entered due to Secondary containment differential pressure reading positive (greater than 0 inches of water).
"This loss of secondary containment is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"The cause of the fuel building supply fan trip is under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
"On 06/24/2016 at 1511(CDT), an unexpected trip of a Fuel Building ventilation supply fan occurred followed by an exhaust fan trip and secondary containment differential pressure became positive.
"At 1512 (CDT), the standby fuel building ventilation fans auto started and secondary containment differential pressure was restored to Technical Specification required conditions.
"Secondary containment was declared INOPERABLE when Technical Specification-required differential pressure was not being maintained and LCO 3.6.4.1 Action A.1 was entered and exited for the given time period. Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) - 8 was entered due to Secondary containment differential pressure reading positive (greater than 0 inches of water).
"This loss of secondary containment is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.
"The cause of the fuel building supply fan trip is under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52039
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN MACDONALD
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN MACDONALD
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 06/24/2016
Notification Time: 04:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2016
Event Time: 04:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2016
Notification Time: 04:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2016
Event Time: 04:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
CHRIS MILLER (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 93 | Power Operation | 92 | Power Operation |
TS REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO LEAKING SERVICE WATER WELD ON CCW HX
"At 0400 (EDT) on June 24, 2016, Indian Point Unit 2 initiated actions to commence reactor shutdown to comply with Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.7.7, Condition B. TS LCO 3.7.7, Condition A had been entered at 0230 on June 21, 2016 in order to repair a leaking weld on the 20 inch service water pipe to nozzle weld on the 21 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger (CCW HX). Condition A allows 72 hours to restore the inoperable CCW train to service or Condition B is entered which requires the plant to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 4 in 12 hours.
"The initiation of a nuclear plant shutdown required by TS requires a 4-hour report in accordance with 50.72(b)(2)(i) which is being made by this notification."
The licensee notified the New York Independent System Operator and the New York Public Service Commission.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0400 (EDT) on June 24, 2016, Indian Point Unit 2 initiated actions to commence reactor shutdown to comply with Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.7.7, Condition B. TS LCO 3.7.7, Condition A had been entered at 0230 on June 21, 2016 in order to repair a leaking weld on the 20 inch service water pipe to nozzle weld on the 21 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger (CCW HX). Condition A allows 72 hours to restore the inoperable CCW train to service or Condition B is entered which requires the plant to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 4 in 12 hours.
"The initiation of a nuclear plant shutdown required by TS requires a 4-hour report in accordance with 50.72(b)(2)(i) which is being made by this notification."
The licensee notified the New York Independent System Operator and the New York Public Service Commission.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.