Event Notification Report for June 02, 2016

EN Revision Imported Date: 7/8/2021

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED GAUGE

The following was received from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control via email:

"The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control discovered a potential reportable event during a routine inspection of GS2 Engineering, Inc. on 06/08/2021. During the inspection it was discovered that a Troxler Model 3430 portable gauge (serial number 25345) [nominally 8 mCi Cs-137, 40 mCi Am-241:Be source] had been damaged and hit by a vehicle while on a temporary jobsite. The event appears to have occurred on 06/02/16 according to past utilization logs. The Troxler Model 3430 portable gauge has been stored at the licensee's facility within a locked cabinet. Survey results using a NDS ND-2000A survey instrument around the surface of the gauge indicated readings as high as 12 mR/hr. Survey results using a Ludlum 14-C survey instrument around the surface of the gauge indicated readings as high as 25 mR/hr. The gauge is secure within the licensee's storage area. This event is still under investigation by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. "

ADMINISTRATIVE VERIFICATIONS OF VENTILATION CLEAN-OUT CONTAINERS WERE NOT PERFORMED

"Description of the Event: On June 2, 2016 at 1245 [EDT], it was reported to the Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) department that the two administrative verifications of ventilation clean-out containers were not performed.

"The Conversion Area nitric acid scrubber was scheduled for annual inspection and cleaning May 27 thru June 1. On May 18th, 25 disposable clean-out containers were obtained from the storeroom in preparation for the annual scrubber cleaning. The clean-out containers are used to collect special nuclear material (SNM) from scrubber and filter house cleanings. After obtaining new clean-out containers from the storeroom and prior to using them with SNM, one container from each lot is required to be measured by an operator to assure proper dimensions (IROFS STORAGE-GEN-126). An independent measurement by a process engineer to assure proper dimensions is also required prior to use with SNM (IROFS STORAGE-GEN-127). An additional 20 clean-out containers were obtained from the storeroom on May 31st.

"On June 2nd, a process engineer discovered that the measurement verifications were not performed. EH&S was notified of the event by phone and the 'Redbook' reporting system. (Redbook Issue #71225). At no time was there any actual or potential health and safety consequence to the workers, the public, or the environment.

"The safety function of these IROFS [Items Relied on for Safety] is to preclude using an incorrect container size. The ventilation clean-out containers are a standard stocked storeroom item. They have an approximate volume capacity of 1.5 gallons, providing a substantial safety margin to the minimum requirement of 5.7 gallons in the Criticality Safety Evaluation (CSE) which assumes an optimum uranium/water mixture and full 12-inch water reflection. The CSE also requires more than 64 close packed containers with an optimum uranium/water mixture; while the containers are limited to maximum array of 25 (IROFS STORAGE-GEN-112). Additionally, the clean-out containers remained spaced 18 inches apart at all times.

"Based on available IROFS, this accident sequence was unlikely, a failure probability of [10E-3], and not highly unlikely, a failure probability of [10E-4] or less. Therefore, this geometry accident sequence does not meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61. As stated above, the actual configuration remained safe at all times. Also, no external conditions affected the event.

"Immediate Corrective Actions: The clean-out container dimensions were verified as correct.

"This event has been entered into the facility Corrective Action Prevention And Learning system (CAPAL) #1003888517."

The Licensee will notify NRC Region II.

PART 21 - NOT APPROVED CURRENT TRANSFORMERS INSTALLED IN SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT

The following was excerpted from the Ametek Part 21 Report received via email:

"Ametek inverter manufactured with Signal Transformer R-10607, Ametek part number 80-310879-90 was inadvertently installed in several units from an unapproved supplier. The potential for this situation to occur exists for new equipment delivered between July of 2015 and May of 2016. Affected utilities and equipment serial numbers are identified below.

"Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Millstone
96000067-0411, 96000067-0511, 96000067-0611, 96000067-0711

"Krsko Nuclear Power Plant
96000068-0211, 96000068-0311, 96000068-0411

"Exelon, Byron Station
96000075-0311, 96000075-0411, 96000075-0511, 96000075-0611

"Ametek Solidstate Controls is submitting the following Report of a Potential Defect in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.

"To replace the transformers, Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please our Client Services group at 1-614-846-7500. mailto: eric.phillips@ametek.com"

The potential problems include:
- Mag wire terminated with improper lug and tooling which may cause loss of feedback to static transfer function.
- Spot welded band around the core which has not been adequately seismically evaluated.
- 180 degree Celsius insulation system provided instead of the approved 200 degree Celsius and unapproved materials used which impacts the aging analysis.

* * * UPDATE FROM ETHAN SALSBURY TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/3/2016 AT 1103 EDT * * *

Serial numbers for KRSKO and Millstone are corrected as follows:

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Millstone
96000068-0211
96000068-0311
96000068-0411

KRSKO Nuclear Power Plant
96000067-0411
96000067-0511
96000067-0611
96000067-0711

Notified the R1DO (Schroeder), R3DO (Hills) and Part 21 Group via email.