Event Notification Report for May 01, 2015

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN AND RECOVERED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On May 1, 2015 the licensee's corporate office notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that one of its vehicles had been stolen at 10 am today with a moisture density gauge secured on the back of the truck. The gauge was a Troxler 4640 with an 8 millicurie Cesium-137 and 40 millicurie Americium/Beryllium source in the gauge. The truck was stolen at a gas station and local police were immediately called by the driver/technician. The police recovered the vehicle with the gauge still secured in the back of the truck. Details of the event will be provided as the local radiation safety officer and technician are still on-site with the police. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SAE 300."

Texas Incident # I-9309

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

LOSS OF SEISMIC MONITORING DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"This notification is conservatively being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that will result in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g. significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System or offsite notification system.)

"The emergency preparedness plan requires seismic monitoring instruments to diagnose an earthquake for emergency action levels (EAL) HU6 (Natural or destructive phenomena affecting PROTECTED AREA) and HA6 (Natural and destructive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAS).

"At approximately 1600 [CDT] on May 1, 2015, ANO plans to remove Motor Control Center B33 from service for maintenance. This will render the alarm functions for the seismic monitors nonfunctional. It is expected that this maintenance will take approximately 72 hours to complete. ANO procedures provide compensatory measures of using offsite sources to obtain seismic data."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

PART 21 REPORT - DEVIATION IN NOZZLE MODELING INTERNAL REPORTS

The following was received via facsimile:

"[This report pertains] to a deviation in a basic product (EPRI nozzle modeling internal reports) supplied by EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute) regarding Westinghouse Pressurizer Head Nozzle Inner Corner Region Ultrasonic Inspections. EPRI will complete all evaluation efforts and provide a determination of reportability in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21 no later than July 24, 2015.

"EPRI has conducted an evaluation to the basic product's actual use and determined that the ASME examination volume coverage for at least one of the pressurizer nozzles has changed and is now 90 percent or less. A 90 percent threshold is required by ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.

"Design inputs used in EPRI modeling for ultrasonic scanning coverage for nuclear safety related component nozzles may have been inaccurate. In some cases, the upper and lower heads of Westinghouse pressurizers can be offset from the center of each nozzle (spray, safety, relief, surge). This offset results in a change in the thickness of the pressurizer head as compared to an on-axis pressurizer head with the same radial dimensions. Some of the computer models EPRI used to describe these pressurizer heads did not account for an increase in the thickness due to these offsets. As a result, in some cases the ultrasonic inspection parameters produced by these computer models may have produced inaccuracies in the examination volume coverage calculations.

"In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or falls to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

Utility Name/Plant Name
Exelon Corporation / Ginna
First Energy Nuclear Operating / Beaver Valley 1
Entergy / Indian Point 2
Entergy / Indian Point 3
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. / Diablo Canyon Unit 2
Dominion Generation / North Anna

"EPRI has reviewed the pressurizer upper and lower head drawings for the nozzles that it has modeled and determined if these offsets are present. For those cases that are potentially affected EPRI has recalculate the new examination volume coverage for the nozzle inspection detection techniques and provided this information to the corresponding licensees.

"EPRI staff shall develop a matrix or table to better define the necessary design inputs for computer modeling of nozzles. This should also include a question to the utility regarding any obstructions or thickness changes which would impact the ultrasonic inspection parameters. EPRI staff shall improve its documentation for review and approval of design inputs for computer modeling. Consideration shall also be given to including a review of design inputs by the member along with an acknowledgement from the member that the design inputs are appropriate for use. EPRI staff shall consider methods of including additional conservatism to the modeling results to better accommodate changes which may be observed in the field. The project quality plan and quality project instruction shall be updated as necessary to accommodate or clarify these improvements. Completion commitment date - 10/27/2015.

"The coverage calculations indicated in the notification letters would likely increase if the EPRI modeled scan plans are exceeded and or if additional inspection angles were implemented. Conversely, these coverage calculations would likely decrease if physical field limitations prevented the ultrasonic probe from executing the EPRI modeled scan pattern. It is on this basis that recipients of this letter must evaluate the condition pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21.21 to determine if it could represent a substantial safety hazard reportable under 10 CFR Part 21."

Potentially affected US plants include Ginna, Beaver Valley Unit 1, Indian Point Units 2 and 3, Diablo Canyon Unit 2, and North Anna.

* * * UPDATE AT 0938 EDT ON 07/24/15 FROM NEIL WILMSHURST TO JEFF HERRERA VIA FACSIMILE * * *

"As part of the evaluation, EPRI [Electric Power Research Institute] performed an 'extent of condition' review. During the course of the review, EPRI found that the above described deviation also affected EPRI nozzle modeling internal reports supplied by EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute) regarding Westinghouse Steam Generator Primary Nozzles.

"After conducting the 'extent of condition' review, which included recalculation of the modeling data, EPRI concluded that there were no other known reportable conditions associated with this deviation.

"EPRI has completed all evaluation efforts and issued reportability notification letters in accordance with 10CFR Part 21 within the respective reporting timeframes."

Notified the R1DO (Kennedy), R2DO (Musser) and R4DO (Gepford) and Part 21 Group (via email).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PATIENT RECEIVED LESS THAN PRESCRIBED Y-90 DOSE

The following was received from the State of Wisconsin via email:

"On May 4, 2015, the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section received a notice from an Authorized Medical Physicist [AMP] at Gundersen Lutheran Medical Center, Inc., of a medical event that occurred during a Yttrium-90 Therasphere procedure on May 1, 2015. The licensee did not have enough information to determine if the procedure constituted a medical event on May 1, 2015. Upon further evaluation, the AMP determined it was a medical event as of 3 pm CST May 4, 2015. The patient was scheduled to receive two separate Y-90 Therasphere doses to two separate segments of the liver. During the first injection, the overpressure valve opened and filled the overflow vial with the Authorized User applying very little pressure to the saline filled syringe. The patient was to get 147 Gy to Segment 6 of the liver. From residue measurements, the patient received 35.5 percent or 52.2 Gy to Segment 6. The Radiation Protection Section will perform an investigation and update through NMED [Nuclear Material Events Database].

"Event Report ID No.: WI150006"

* * * UPDATE AT 0938 EDT ON 5/18/2015 FROM CAL WALTON TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The correct Wisconsin event ID is WI150007.

Notified the R3DO (Peterson) and NMSS (via e-mail).

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

PART 21 - DEFECT IDENTIFIED 6 INCH GEAR OPERATED BALL VALVES

The following is excerpted from a reported submitted by BNL Industries, INC.:

"On May 1, 2015 BNL identified a discrepant condition in which material was identified by an audited third-party material testing facility as meeting the requirements of ASME SA-105, despite having a test yield strength of 35.6ksi (vice 36ksi required by the specification).

"The discrepant material has already been manufactured and incorporated into a basic component and shipped to the end users.

"Based on BNL engineering evaluations of the design criteria, code requirements and supplied material, BNL has determined there to be no safety hazard. Engineering evaluations EE-A150217 Rev. 0 and EE-A141009-23 Rev. 0 are being supplied to the purchasers.

"First Energy - Perry - 1 endcap supplied, P/N GBV-B2-60-0020 PC. 3, Serial Number A150217-1-1 (Trace Number 547G-1)

"First Energy - Beaver Valley - 7 endcaps supplied, GBV-B2-60-0112 PC. 3, Serial Numbers A141009-23-3 (2pcs.), A141009-23-4 (2pcs.), A141009-23-5 (2pcs.), A141009-23-6 (1 pc.) (Trace Number 547G-1)"