Event Notification Report for December 17, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/16/2014 - 12/17/2014
EVENT NUMBERS
506915069350694506905068750688
Part 21
Event Number: 50691
Rep Org: ABB GROUP
Licensee: ABB GROUP
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: ABB GROUP
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 12/17/2014
Notification Time: 17:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016
Notification Time: 17:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
AARON MCCRAW (R3DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
AARON MCCRAW (R3DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT REGARDING KF RELAYS
"Recent seismic testing results of the above Class 1E KF under-frequency relays uncovered inaccurate qualification by similarity to the tested relay 1328D72A03 (qualified in 2011). The subject relays do not meet the previously published ZPA rating, but meet a rating of 1.7g in accordance with IEEE C37.98-1987 requirements.
"Records show a total of 37 suspect relays were provided to seven customers. ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, thus we are notifying the purchasers or affected licensees of this determination so that they may evaluate the deviation, pursuant to 10 CFR. 21.21(b).
"If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the ABB Technical Support 954-752-6700.
"Dennis Batovsky
Managing Director"
* * * UPDATE FROM DENNIS BATOVSKY TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA FAX ON 3/5/15 AT 1522 EST * * *
"This letter is an update to the Part 21 Notification submitted on December 17, 2014, 'Potential defect regarding KF relay zero period acceleration (ZPA) rating'.
"ABB reminds all licensees, that per ABB KF Under-frequency relays, Instruction Leaflet 41-503.21A effective April 1997, 'the normally closed contact at terminal number 2 should not be used for critical circuits due to a low fragility rating'.
"ABB [has] conducted the following actions:
-ABB has performed an initial extent of condition evaluation to determine if this situation exists in other electromechanical IE qualified relays. There are no additional findings at this time.
-ABB issued a corrective action to improve existing engineering qualification procedures that govern qualification by similarity.
"If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the ABB Technical Support 954-752-6700."
Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Cameron), R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21 Group (via email).
* * * UPDATE FROM DENNIS BATOVSKY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1621 EST ON 11/17/2016 VIA FAX * * *
The following is a synopsis of the updated information received:
The seismic testing results for 1328D72A01 and 1328D72A02 Class 1E KF Under-frequency relays met a ZPA rating of 1.72g. This was previously communicated as 1.7g.
In lieu of previously communicated actions, future orders for 1328D72A01 and 1328D72A02 Class 1E KF Under-frequency relays will be only available at the published ZPA rating of 1.72g. Customers requiring higher ZPA will need to procure Class 1E KF style 1328D72A03 or 1328D72A04, as appropriate.
Notified R1DO (Bickett), R2DO (Lopez), R3DO (Peterson), R4DO (Azua) and Part 21 Group (via email).
"Recent seismic testing results of the above Class 1E KF under-frequency relays uncovered inaccurate qualification by similarity to the tested relay 1328D72A03 (qualified in 2011). The subject relays do not meet the previously published ZPA rating, but meet a rating of 1.7g in accordance with IEEE C37.98-1987 requirements.
"Records show a total of 37 suspect relays were provided to seven customers. ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, thus we are notifying the purchasers or affected licensees of this determination so that they may evaluate the deviation, pursuant to 10 CFR. 21.21(b).
"If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the ABB Technical Support 954-752-6700.
"Dennis Batovsky
Managing Director"
* * * UPDATE FROM DENNIS BATOVSKY TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA FAX ON 3/5/15 AT 1522 EST * * *
"This letter is an update to the Part 21 Notification submitted on December 17, 2014, 'Potential defect regarding KF relay zero period acceleration (ZPA) rating'.
"ABB reminds all licensees, that per ABB KF Under-frequency relays, Instruction Leaflet 41-503.21A effective April 1997, 'the normally closed contact at terminal number 2 should not be used for critical circuits due to a low fragility rating'.
"ABB [has] conducted the following actions:
-ABB has performed an initial extent of condition evaluation to determine if this situation exists in other electromechanical IE qualified relays. There are no additional findings at this time.
-ABB issued a corrective action to improve existing engineering qualification procedures that govern qualification by similarity.
"If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the ABB Technical Support 954-752-6700."
Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Cameron), R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21 Group (via email).
* * * UPDATE FROM DENNIS BATOVSKY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1621 EST ON 11/17/2016 VIA FAX * * *
The following is a synopsis of the updated information received:
The seismic testing results for 1328D72A01 and 1328D72A02 Class 1E KF Under-frequency relays met a ZPA rating of 1.72g. This was previously communicated as 1.7g.
In lieu of previously communicated actions, future orders for 1328D72A01 and 1328D72A02 Class 1E KF Under-frequency relays will be only available at the published ZPA rating of 1.72g. Customers requiring higher ZPA will need to procure Class 1E KF style 1328D72A03 or 1328D72A04, as appropriate.
Notified R1DO (Bickett), R2DO (Lopez), R3DO (Peterson), R4DO (Azua) and Part 21 Group (via email).
Agreement State
Event Number: 50693
Rep Org: NEW MEXICO RAD CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: CHRISTUS SAINT VINCENT HOSPITAL
Region: 4
City: SANTA FE State: NM
County:
License #: MI 485-04
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: VICTOR DIAZ
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: CHRISTUS SAINT VINCENT HOSPITAL
Region: 4
City: SANTA FE State: NM
County:
License #: MI 485-04
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: VICTOR DIAZ
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 12/18/2014
Notification Time: 12:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2014
Event Time: 14:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2014
Notification Time: 12:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2014
Event Time: 14:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PATIENT RECEIVED MORE THAN PRESCRIBED DOSE
A patient received 150 mCi instead of the 30 mCi of I-131 that was prescribed for thyroid ablation treatment. The cause of the overdose was the patient was misidentified. The patient and prescribing physician has been informed. No adverse health effects are expected.
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
A patient received 150 mCi instead of the 30 mCi of I-131 that was prescribed for thyroid ablation treatment. The cause of the overdose was the patient was misidentified. The patient and prescribing physician has been informed. No adverse health effects are expected.
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
Agreement State
Event Number: 50694
Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: JANX INTEGRITY GROUP
Region: 1
City: PENNSAUKEN State: NJ
County:
License #: 507152
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CATHY BIEL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: JANX INTEGRITY GROUP
Region: 1
City: PENNSAUKEN State: NJ
County:
License #: 507152
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CATHY BIEL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 12/18/2014
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2014
Event Time: 15:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2014
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2014
Event Time: 15:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECT
The following report was received from the State of New Jersey via fax:
"A source disconnect occurred during normal radiography operations. The exposure device was a SPEC 150 containing 29 Ci of lr-192. The operators immediately adjusted perimeter barriers and notified their RSO. A source retrieval team arrived in an hour and were able to successfully return the source to its shielded position within another hour. No overexposures were received. Direct reading dosimeters showed no exposure to the radiography team, and a dose of 33 mR and 5 mR were received by the source retrieval two-person team. The event was reported to be caused by operator error in failing to assure that the source tube was securely connected to the camera."
The following report was received from the State of New Jersey via fax:
"A source disconnect occurred during normal radiography operations. The exposure device was a SPEC 150 containing 29 Ci of lr-192. The operators immediately adjusted perimeter barriers and notified their RSO. A source retrieval team arrived in an hour and were able to successfully return the source to its shielded position within another hour. No overexposures were received. Direct reading dosimeters showed no exposure to the radiography team, and a dose of 33 mR and 5 mR were received by the source retrieval two-person team. The event was reported to be caused by operator error in failing to assure that the source tube was securely connected to the camera."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50690
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DARVIN DUTTRY
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DARVIN DUTTRY
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 12/17/2014
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2014
Event Time: 13:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2014
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2014
Event Time: 13:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SEWAGE LEAK
"This report is made due to notification from PPL Susquehanna to Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regarding a sewerage leak at the plant property. The notification was made at 1335 EST hours on 12/17/14.
"During a routine inspection by a contractor who performs checks for PPL Susquehanna, an area was identified as a potential leak location. When the sewerage grinder pump was run, there was visible evidence in the soil that a leak existed.
"Extent and duration of the leak is not know at this time. This event requires notification to Pennsylvania DEP."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This report is made due to notification from PPL Susquehanna to Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regarding a sewerage leak at the plant property. The notification was made at 1335 EST hours on 12/17/14.
"During a routine inspection by a contractor who performs checks for PPL Susquehanna, an area was identified as a potential leak location. When the sewerage grinder pump was run, there was visible evidence in the soil that a leak existed.
"Extent and duration of the leak is not know at this time. This event requires notification to Pennsylvania DEP."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50687
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ED SCHINNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ED SCHINNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 12/17/2014
Notification Time: 12:10 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2014
Event Time: 04:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2014
Notification Time: 12:10 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2014
Event Time: 04:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
MAIN PLANT VENT RADIATION MONITORING UNAVAILABLE
"At 0417 EST on December 17, 2014, the Shift Manager was notified by Radiation Protection (RP) personnel that the Unit 2 AMP-200 radiation monitor used for backup monitoring of the Unit 2 Main Plant Vent when the Unit 2 Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor (WRNGM) is [Out of Service] OOS had experienced a malfunction that caused it to spike high for approximately five minutes before returning to a baseline value of 0 mR/hr. At the same time, the Unit 2 WRNGM was already out of service for the completion of a planned surveillance test. The Unit 2 WRNGM had been removed from service at 0740 EST on December 16, 2014.
"While the WRNGM is OOS, the AMP-200 radiation monitor is procedurally relied upon for being used as the means for determining Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency entry criteria under the applicable Emergency Action Level (EAL) Initial Conditions (ICs). The Unit 2 Main Vent Gaseous Monitor is procedurally relied upon for being used as the means for determining Unusual Event entry criteria for the same EAL ICs and remained in service during this time.
"After investigation by site RP and Maintenance personnel, the functionality of the Unit 2 AMP-200 was restored at 0700 EST on December 17, 2014 following a successful source check of the instrument. The investigation identified that the AMP-200 cable contacts were found wet and were subsequently cleaned and dried. Actions have been taken to prevent reoccurrence of the wetting condition.
"During the time from 0417 to 0700 EST on December 17, 2014, Unit 2 had a condition that represented a loss of emergency assessment capability and is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and the NRC the notification time with the NRC Headquarters was 1210 EST."
"At 0417 EST on December 17, 2014, the Shift Manager was notified by Radiation Protection (RP) personnel that the Unit 2 AMP-200 radiation monitor used for backup monitoring of the Unit 2 Main Plant Vent when the Unit 2 Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor (WRNGM) is [Out of Service] OOS had experienced a malfunction that caused it to spike high for approximately five minutes before returning to a baseline value of 0 mR/hr. At the same time, the Unit 2 WRNGM was already out of service for the completion of a planned surveillance test. The Unit 2 WRNGM had been removed from service at 0740 EST on December 16, 2014.
"While the WRNGM is OOS, the AMP-200 radiation monitor is procedurally relied upon for being used as the means for determining Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency entry criteria under the applicable Emergency Action Level (EAL) Initial Conditions (ICs). The Unit 2 Main Vent Gaseous Monitor is procedurally relied upon for being used as the means for determining Unusual Event entry criteria for the same EAL ICs and remained in service during this time.
"After investigation by site RP and Maintenance personnel, the functionality of the Unit 2 AMP-200 was restored at 0700 EST on December 17, 2014 following a successful source check of the instrument. The investigation identified that the AMP-200 cable contacts were found wet and were subsequently cleaned and dried. Actions have been taken to prevent reoccurrence of the wetting condition.
"During the time from 0417 to 0700 EST on December 17, 2014, Unit 2 had a condition that represented a loss of emergency assessment capability and is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and the NRC the notification time with the NRC Headquarters was 1210 EST."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50688
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: LAUREL KETCHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: LAUREL KETCHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 12/17/2014
Notification Time: 12:56 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2014
Event Time: 10:14 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2014
Notification Time: 12:56 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2014
Event Time: 10:14 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF LOAD
"At 1014 [CST] on 12/17/2014, the reactor automatically tripped due to loss of load on RPS [Reactor Protection System]. Preliminary information indicates turbine-generator trip caused an uncomplicated reactor trip . All safety functions are met. Currently maintaining Mode 3, Hot Shutdown. At time of trip, non-safety related house transformers, T1A1 and T1A2 became inoperable as expected due to generator trip. Entered Technical Specification 2.7 (2)a, 72 hr LCO [for the inoperable T1A1 and T1A2 transformers]."
All control rods fully inserted. All busses are energized via offsite power. Decay heat is being released via AFW and the condenser bypass valves. The unit is stable in Mode 3. Cause of the loss of load is being investigated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
"At 1014 [CST] on 12/17/2014, the reactor automatically tripped due to loss of load on RPS [Reactor Protection System]. Preliminary information indicates turbine-generator trip caused an uncomplicated reactor trip . All safety functions are met. Currently maintaining Mode 3, Hot Shutdown. At time of trip, non-safety related house transformers, T1A1 and T1A2 became inoperable as expected due to generator trip. Entered Technical Specification 2.7 (2)a, 72 hr LCO [for the inoperable T1A1 and T1A2 transformers]."
All control rods fully inserted. All busses are energized via offsite power. Decay heat is being released via AFW and the condenser bypass valves. The unit is stable in Mode 3. Cause of the loss of load is being investigated.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.