Event Notification Report for August 28, 2014

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was received via facsimile:

"At approximately 0950 MST on August 28, 2014, the Agency [Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency] was informed that the licensee had a Troxler Model 3430, portable moisture/density gauge damaged at a construction site. The damage occurred at approximately 0930 MST on August 28, 2014. The gauge was in use and was run over by construction equipment. The sealed sources were not damaged and were intact. The damaged gauge was leak tested and will be returned to Troxler for repairs. The Troxler gauge, serial number 35809, contains 8 mCi of Cesium-137 and 40 mCi of Am:Be-241.

"The Agency continues to investigate the event. The Governor's Office and US NRC are being notified of this event."

Arizona First Notice #: 14-021

BOTH DISCHARGE CANAL RADIATION MONITORS REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"Planned preventive maintenance will render both divisions of discharge canal radiation monitors non-functional. As a result, this represents a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The planned maintenance is expected to last two hours. During this time, alternate plant parameters will be monitored and sampling performed if needed. The health and safety of the public remains protected as the plant is operating in a normal condition.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified prior to removing the discharge canal radiation monitors from service."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN FROM PICKUP TRUCK

A Georgia Department of Transportation crew stopped for lunch at 1200 EDT on 08/28/14 at a Sam's Club in McDonough, GA. A Troxler Model 3430, S/N 31643, containing two sources: 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am241/Be, was stolen from the unattended vehicle. The Troxler was not properly secured as required. The State of Georgia is conducting an investigation into the incident.

The Henry County Police Department is investigating.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AUXILIARY ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT ROOM HVAC INOPERABLE

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident.' While the 'B' train of Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room HVAC was inoperable and out of service for emergent repairs due to an oil leak, the 'A' train of Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room HVAC became inoperable due to a failure of the liquid line solenoid valve. The Main Control Room Envelope consists of the Main Control Room and the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room. Both the Control Room HVAC and the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room HVAC systems are required to be operable in the current mode.

"This is a loss of safety function for a system that is intended to mitigate the consequences of an accident and is discussed in Chapter 6 of the UFSAR and is Tech Spec required and is safety related. Also, the system, structure, or component (SSC) is inoperable in a required mode in the Tech Spec applicability and there is no redundant equipment in the same system that is operable.

"The required actions of Tech Spec 3.7.5 were entered for this event. Online Risk remains Green. The station is currently pursuing repairs to both trains."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

PART 21 - DEFECT IN THE INPUT TO CALCULATE THERMAL LIMITS

The following was received via email by Areva Inc.:

"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Alan B. Meginnis, AREVA Inc., 2101 Horn Rapids Road, Richland, WA 99354.

"(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.
The defect is in the input to a program that calculates the minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) and linear heat generation rate (LHGR) thermal limits for Browns Ferry Unit 2 Cycle 18.

"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
AREVA Inc.

"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
This issue is a defect as defined in 10 CFR 21.3. The error is an omission in the POWERPLEX core monitoring software system input that could result in the application of non-conservative nuclear fuel operating thermal limits when the reactor is operated at 25 to 30% power. In the event of an abnormal operational occurrence while operating in this power range, a fuel thermal safety limit could be exceeded.

"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
August 28, 2014

"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
The defect exists only for Browns Ferry Unit 2 Cycle 18.

"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
AREVA Inc. recommended plant operations be restricted to provide enough margin to the MCPR and LHGR thermal limits anytime power is in the range 25% < P < 30%. AREVA has also provided revised POWERPLEX input to TVA for Browns Ferry Unit 2 Cycle 18 to correct the error permanently.

"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
This defect only had the potential to exceed the safety limit minimum critical power ratio (SLMCPR) and/or one of the Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limits if an AOO [anticipated operational occurrence] occurred during the brief periods the plant was at power levels in the range 25% < P < 30% during Cycle 18. The plant has not had any such events in Cycle 18. The identified defect is a human performance error impacting only Browns Ferry Unit 2 Cycle 18. It does not affect other operating cycles, Browns Ferry Units, or other nuclear plants."