Event Notification Report for August 06, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/05/2014 - 08/06/2014
EVENT NUMBERS
50349503475200350458
Agreement State
Event Number: 50349
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: NIAGARA BOTTLING, LLC
Region: 1
City: ALLENTOWN State: PA
County:
License #: PA-G0243
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: NIAGARA BOTTLING, LLC
Region: 1
City: ALLENTOWN State: PA
County:
License #: PA-G0243
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MELNIC
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/07/2014
Notification Time: 11:35 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/2014
Notification Time: 11:35 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
DAVEY TOTTERER (ILTA)
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
DAVEY TOTTERER (ILTA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST RADIOACTIVE GAUGE
The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via email:
"Event Description: On July 18, 2014 the Department [PA Department of Environmental Protection] performed a routine license inspection and discovered that a gauge was unaccounted for. The licensee believed the gauge was transferred to their Philadelphia plant and began to check records to try and verify its location. On August 6, 2014 the licensee reported to the Department that the gauge could not be located and is considered missing.
"Gauge Information:
Model: Filtec FT-50B
Serial Number: 2398
Isotope: Am-241
Activity: 100 mCi
"Cause of the Event: Human error. No records were kept as required regarding the gauge.
"Actions: The Department plans to issue a Notice of Violation and also provide assistance in locating the gauge."
Pennsylvania Event Report ID No.: PA140019
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via email:
"Event Description: On July 18, 2014 the Department [PA Department of Environmental Protection] performed a routine license inspection and discovered that a gauge was unaccounted for. The licensee believed the gauge was transferred to their Philadelphia plant and began to check records to try and verify its location. On August 6, 2014 the licensee reported to the Department that the gauge could not be located and is considered missing.
"Gauge Information:
Model: Filtec FT-50B
Serial Number: 2398
Isotope: Am-241
Activity: 100 mCi
"Cause of the Event: Human error. No records were kept as required regarding the gauge.
"Actions: The Department plans to issue a Notice of Violation and also provide assistance in locating the gauge."
Pennsylvania Event Report ID No.: PA140019
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50347
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROB DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROB DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 08/06/2014
Notification Time: 05:36 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2014
Event Time: 05:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/2014
Notification Time: 05:36 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2014
Event Time: 05:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/07/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TSC HVAC AND FILTRATION REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"This is a non-emergency notification per Vogtle U1 & U2 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) 13.13.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Action 8.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities on the TSC support systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions, and, actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10 CFR 50.54(q) evaluation has been prepared and approved for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM RUDY JOHNSON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1132 EDT ON 8/6/14 * * *
As of 1124 EDT maintenance has been completed and the TSC has been returned to service.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R2DO (Nease).
"This is a non-emergency notification per Vogtle U1 & U2 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) 13.13.1, Emergency Response Facilities, Action 8.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance activities on the TSC support systems. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions, and, actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10 CFR 50.54(q) evaluation has been prepared and approved for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM RUDY JOHNSON TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1132 EDT ON 8/6/14 * * *
As of 1124 EDT maintenance has been completed and the TSC has been returned to service.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R2DO (Nease).
Part 21
Event Number: 52003
Rep Org: EMERSON PROCESS MANAGEMENT
Licensee: TOPWORX
Region: 1
City: LOUISVILLE State: KY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES MCDILL
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Licensee: TOPWORX
Region: 1
City: LOUISVILLE State: KY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES MCDILL
HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH
Notification Date: 06/13/2016
Notification Time: 14:03 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2016
Notification Time: 14:03 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
ANTHONY MASTERS (R2DO)
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART 21 - SWITCHES NOT ENVIROMENTALLY QUALIFIED
"TopWorx Information Notice: TIN 2016-01
"13 June 2016
"Subject: C7 Switches
"Equipment Affected By This Information Notice: (4) C7-14521-E25 shipped on 6 August 2014
"Purpose: The purpose on this TopWorx Information Notice (TIN) is to alert Fisher that, as of 27 May 2016, TopWorx was made aware of a situation which may affect the performance of the aforementioned equipment. TopWorx is informing Fisher of this circumstance in accordance with Section 21.21 (b) and 50.55 (e) of 10 CFR 21.
"Applicability: This notice applies only to (4) TopWorx C7-14521-E25 shipped on 6 August 2014 to Fisher on Fisher Purchase Order 4123318082.
"Discussion: Fisher Purchase Order 4123318082 specified that TopWorx SV7-14521-E25 were to be provided. Although the C7 switches provided to Fisher in error are also Nuclear-qualified switches, they do not have the same qualification pedigree and therefore cannot be considered qualified for HELB [High Energy Line Break] applications (zones 5 and 10). TopWorx has no indication that the switches provided are defective, yet TopWorx is unable to determine the application or status of use and therefore submits this notice.
"Extent of Condition: Fisher Purchase Orders were reviewed and no other order was found where an incorrect switch was provided.
"Actions Required: If the units mentioned above are to be installed in a zone for which the C7 switch is not qualified, then the units must be replaced. In addition, TopWorx has initiated a Non Conformance Report (NCR 05192016-01) to prevent reoccurrence of this issue.
"10 CFR 21 Implications: TopWorx requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10 CFR 21.
"If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact:
John Conrad
Manger, Quality
TopWorx
3300 Fern Valley Road
Louisville, KY 40213
Fax: (502) 969-8000
Phone: (502) 873-4661
John.conrad@emerson.com"
"TopWorx Information Notice: TIN 2016-01
"13 June 2016
"Subject: C7 Switches
"Equipment Affected By This Information Notice: (4) C7-14521-E25 shipped on 6 August 2014
"Purpose: The purpose on this TopWorx Information Notice (TIN) is to alert Fisher that, as of 27 May 2016, TopWorx was made aware of a situation which may affect the performance of the aforementioned equipment. TopWorx is informing Fisher of this circumstance in accordance with Section 21.21 (b) and 50.55 (e) of 10 CFR 21.
"Applicability: This notice applies only to (4) TopWorx C7-14521-E25 shipped on 6 August 2014 to Fisher on Fisher Purchase Order 4123318082.
"Discussion: Fisher Purchase Order 4123318082 specified that TopWorx SV7-14521-E25 were to be provided. Although the C7 switches provided to Fisher in error are also Nuclear-qualified switches, they do not have the same qualification pedigree and therefore cannot be considered qualified for HELB [High Energy Line Break] applications (zones 5 and 10). TopWorx has no indication that the switches provided are defective, yet TopWorx is unable to determine the application or status of use and therefore submits this notice.
"Extent of Condition: Fisher Purchase Orders were reviewed and no other order was found where an incorrect switch was provided.
"Actions Required: If the units mentioned above are to be installed in a zone for which the C7 switch is not qualified, then the units must be replaced. In addition, TopWorx has initiated a Non Conformance Report (NCR 05192016-01) to prevent reoccurrence of this issue.
"10 CFR 21 Implications: TopWorx requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10 CFR 21.
"If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact:
John Conrad
Manger, Quality
TopWorx
3300 Fern Valley Road
Louisville, KY 40213
Fax: (502) 969-8000
Phone: (502) 873-4661
John.conrad@emerson.com"
Agreement State
Event Number: 50458
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: QSA GLOBAL, INC.
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #: 12-8361
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSHUA DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: QSA GLOBAL, INC.
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #: 12-8361
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSHUA DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 09/15/2014
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2014
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 08/06/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHNATHAN LILLIENDAH (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
FSME PART 21 (EMAI)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
JOHNATHAN LILLIENDAH (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
FSME PART 21 (EMAI)
BILLY DICKSON (R3DO)
MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MANUFACTURING DEFECT RESULTING IN EQUIPMENT TO NOT PERFORM AS DESIGNED
The following information was provided by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:
"On 9/15/2014, Massachusetts Radiation Control Program (MA RCP) was notified by licensee (QSA Global, Inc.) in accordance with 105 CMR 120.142(B)(2) of manufacturing defect of a model 95020 radiographic guide tube resulting in equipment that failed to function as designed. The licensee reported that its customer (Team Industrial Services of South Roxana, Illinois) informed the licensee on 8/6/2014 that the end stop of the guide tube had come off during a radiographic exposure performed 7/25/2014, that the source was able to be returned to the shielded/stored position in the exposure device using normal retraction with the control assembly, and that there was no excessive personnel exposure related to the part failure.
"The licensee reported that its examination of the model 95020 assembly failed part showed that the end fitting had not been swaged to the guide tube housing as is required by the design.
"The licensee reported that upon learning of the part failure, it immediately performed a visual inspection of all guide tube and control assemblies accepted into stock for distribution and that there were no other instances of unswaged fitting or improper manufacture identified for accepted stock. Licensee further reported that it believes that the instance to be an isolated occurrence and that no other assemblies containing this defect remain in the field.
"Licensee reported that manufacturer failed to swage end stop fitting to guide tube and manufacturer failed to perform pull test of end stop fitting to guide tube and check connection for slip using inspection gauge.
"Licensee reported that corrective actions include changes that will be implemented in the production process to increase inspection and review of quality critical operational steps to ensure this type of manufacturing defect is not accepted and released to customers in the future.
"Model 95020 guide tubes are approved for use with QSA Global, Inc. model 880 series radiographic exposure devices described by Sealed Source and Device Registration No. MA-1059-D-334-S.
"Licensee reported that it conducted a review to determine if this type of condition had occurred previously and identified one instance from 2012 where a different model guide tube, model 48906, had not been properly swaged and tested prior to distribution to an international customer.
"MA RCP plans to perform inspection to include evaluation for any generic implications."
The following information was provided by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:
"On 9/15/2014, Massachusetts Radiation Control Program (MA RCP) was notified by licensee (QSA Global, Inc.) in accordance with 105 CMR 120.142(B)(2) of manufacturing defect of a model 95020 radiographic guide tube resulting in equipment that failed to function as designed. The licensee reported that its customer (Team Industrial Services of South Roxana, Illinois) informed the licensee on 8/6/2014 that the end stop of the guide tube had come off during a radiographic exposure performed 7/25/2014, that the source was able to be returned to the shielded/stored position in the exposure device using normal retraction with the control assembly, and that there was no excessive personnel exposure related to the part failure.
"The licensee reported that its examination of the model 95020 assembly failed part showed that the end fitting had not been swaged to the guide tube housing as is required by the design.
"The licensee reported that upon learning of the part failure, it immediately performed a visual inspection of all guide tube and control assemblies accepted into stock for distribution and that there were no other instances of unswaged fitting or improper manufacture identified for accepted stock. Licensee further reported that it believes that the instance to be an isolated occurrence and that no other assemblies containing this defect remain in the field.
"Licensee reported that manufacturer failed to swage end stop fitting to guide tube and manufacturer failed to perform pull test of end stop fitting to guide tube and check connection for slip using inspection gauge.
"Licensee reported that corrective actions include changes that will be implemented in the production process to increase inspection and review of quality critical operational steps to ensure this type of manufacturing defect is not accepted and released to customers in the future.
"Model 95020 guide tubes are approved for use with QSA Global, Inc. model 880 series radiographic exposure devices described by Sealed Source and Device Registration No. MA-1059-D-334-S.
"Licensee reported that it conducted a review to determine if this type of condition had occurred previously and identified one instance from 2012 where a different model guide tube, model 48906, had not been properly swaged and tested prior to distribution to an international customer.
"MA RCP plans to perform inspection to include evaluation for any generic implications."