Event Notification Report for July 25, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/24/2014 - 07/25/2014
Research Reactor
Event Number: 50309
Rep Org: TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
Licensee: TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: COLLEGE STATION State: TX
County: BRAZOS
License #: R-83
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000128
NRC Notified By: SEAN MCDEAVITT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: COLLEGE STATION State: TX
County: BRAZOS
License #: R-83
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000128
NRC Notified By: SEAN MCDEAVITT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/25/2014
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 07/25/2014
Event Time: 09:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2014
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 07/25/2014
Event Time: 09:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DUANE HARDESTY (NPR)
PATRICK ISAAC (NPR)
ALEXANDER ADAMS (PRLB)
DUANE HARDESTY (NPR)
PATRICK ISAAC (NPR)
ALEXANDER ADAMS (PRLB)
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION DUE TO CONTROL ROOM STAFFING
"This morning around 9:45 a.m. (CDT), a reportable occurrence under Section 1.28.f of the NSC [Nuclear Science Center] Technical Specifications was documented at the Texas A&M University Nuclear Science Center (NRC License No. R-83). The incident involved leaving the control room unstaffed by a licensed operator (Section 6.1.3.a.2 of the NSC Technical Specifications) for approximately 2.5 minutes while the 1 MW TRlGA reactor was operating at full power.
"The text below presents a brief description of the event:
"On the morning of July 25, 2014, during steady state operation at 1 MW [full power], Reactor Operator (RO) trainee [Deleted] was in the control room, along with a Senior Reactor Operator on Duty (SRO) [Deleted] and electronic technician [Deleted]. Senior Reactor Operator [Deleted] and Reactor Operator (RO) [Deleted] were signed in as the operators on duty during the duration of the incident.
"Duty SRO and RO were elsewhere in the facility performing Operations tasks, and RO (Licensed) [Deleted] had remained in the Control Room to fulfill the requirement set forth in TS (Staffing) 6.1.3.a.2. At approximately 0948, NSC Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) [Deleted] entered the control room and requested the use of RO [Deleted] key to access a building on site. RO offered to open the building and left [control room] leaving RO trainee and electronic technician alone in the control room. At 0950, RO trainee noted that there was no licensed reactor operator in the control room. RO Trainee paged RO over the intercom and shutdown the reactor via manual SCRAM.
"Manager of Reactor Operations [also SRO] heard the reactor SCRAM from his office above the control room and went to the control room to investigate. [Duty] SRO was notified and immediately returned to the control room. It was determined by SROs that during the 2.5 minutes that RO was absent from the control room, the requirements outlined in Technical Specification 6.1.3.a.2 were not fulfilled. NSC Director was informed of the incident and NSC Form 590 (Unscheduled Scram Recovery Form) was filled out after the unscheduled shutdown. Manager of Reactor Operations authorized the restart of the reactor. NSC Director began implementation of Reportable Occurrence reporting procedures according to Technical Specification 1.28.f."
Licensee is initiating an internal review to identify and correct any practices and/or procedures that may have systematically contributed to the environment that created this situation. Other corrective actions include the internal suspension of one reactor operator's license privileges pending satisfactory retraining.
The unit response during and after the scram was normal.
"This morning around 9:45 a.m. (CDT), a reportable occurrence under Section 1.28.f of the NSC [Nuclear Science Center] Technical Specifications was documented at the Texas A&M University Nuclear Science Center (NRC License No. R-83). The incident involved leaving the control room unstaffed by a licensed operator (Section 6.1.3.a.2 of the NSC Technical Specifications) for approximately 2.5 minutes while the 1 MW TRlGA reactor was operating at full power.
"The text below presents a brief description of the event:
"On the morning of July 25, 2014, during steady state operation at 1 MW [full power], Reactor Operator (RO) trainee [Deleted] was in the control room, along with a Senior Reactor Operator on Duty (SRO) [Deleted] and electronic technician [Deleted]. Senior Reactor Operator [Deleted] and Reactor Operator (RO) [Deleted] were signed in as the operators on duty during the duration of the incident.
"Duty SRO and RO were elsewhere in the facility performing Operations tasks, and RO (Licensed) [Deleted] had remained in the Control Room to fulfill the requirement set forth in TS (Staffing) 6.1.3.a.2. At approximately 0948, NSC Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) [Deleted] entered the control room and requested the use of RO [Deleted] key to access a building on site. RO offered to open the building and left [control room] leaving RO trainee and electronic technician alone in the control room. At 0950, RO trainee noted that there was no licensed reactor operator in the control room. RO Trainee paged RO over the intercom and shutdown the reactor via manual SCRAM.
"Manager of Reactor Operations [also SRO] heard the reactor SCRAM from his office above the control room and went to the control room to investigate. [Duty] SRO was notified and immediately returned to the control room. It was determined by SROs that during the 2.5 minutes that RO was absent from the control room, the requirements outlined in Technical Specification 6.1.3.a.2 were not fulfilled. NSC Director was informed of the incident and NSC Form 590 (Unscheduled Scram Recovery Form) was filled out after the unscheduled shutdown. Manager of Reactor Operations authorized the restart of the reactor. NSC Director began implementation of Reportable Occurrence reporting procedures according to Technical Specification 1.28.f."
Licensee is initiating an internal review to identify and correct any practices and/or procedures that may have systematically contributed to the environment that created this situation. Other corrective actions include the internal suspension of one reactor operator's license privileges pending satisfactory retraining.
The unit response during and after the scram was normal.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50310
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TIM KUDO
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: TIM KUDO
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 07/25/2014
Notification Time: 14:02 [ET]
Event Date: 07/25/2014
Event Time: 11:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2014
Notification Time: 14:02 [ET]
Event Date: 07/25/2014
Event Time: 11:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO A SAFETY INJECTION VALVE DEFECT
"On July 25th, 2014 at 1129 EDT, during investigation of a small leak inside Saint Lucie Unit 2 containment, a defect was identified on a valve (V3811, Safety Injection Tank 281 Outlet Vent Valve). This valve is within the Q-Group A (ASME Class 1 equivalent) boundary of the safety injection line. The leak is currently isolated from the reactor coolant system by a Technical Specification credited isolation check valve. The affected Safety Injection Tank has been declared inoperable and the unit has entered 24 hour shutdown [Technical Specification] action statement 3.5.1.b. Unit shutdown is currently being planned for repair of the flaw.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN REXRODE TO VINCE KLCO AT 0053 EDT ON 7/26/14 * * *
"On July 26, 2014 at 0002 EDT, Saint Lucie Unit 2 commenced shutdown to repair the identified leak.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Unit 2 current power is 88% at 0105 EDT and expect to trip the unit at approximately 0400 EDT.
Notified the R2DO (Musser).
"On July 25th, 2014 at 1129 EDT, during investigation of a small leak inside Saint Lucie Unit 2 containment, a defect was identified on a valve (V3811, Safety Injection Tank 281 Outlet Vent Valve). This valve is within the Q-Group A (ASME Class 1 equivalent) boundary of the safety injection line. The leak is currently isolated from the reactor coolant system by a Technical Specification credited isolation check valve. The affected Safety Injection Tank has been declared inoperable and the unit has entered 24 hour shutdown [Technical Specification] action statement 3.5.1.b. Unit shutdown is currently being planned for repair of the flaw.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN REXRODE TO VINCE KLCO AT 0053 EDT ON 7/26/14 * * *
"On July 26, 2014 at 0002 EDT, Saint Lucie Unit 2 commenced shutdown to repair the identified leak.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Unit 2 current power is 88% at 0105 EDT and expect to trip the unit at approximately 0400 EDT.
Notified the R2DO (Musser).