Event Notification Report for May 06, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/05/2014 - 05/06/2014
Agreement State
Event Number: 50094
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: METCO
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 03018
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENTRY HEARN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: METCO
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 03018
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GENTRY HEARN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/08/2014
Notification Time: 10:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/06/2014
Event Time: 22:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2014
Notification Time: 10:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/06/2014
Event Time: 22:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCES (FSME)
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCES (FSME)
RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE TUBE CRIMPED PREVENTING SOURCE RETRACTION
"On May 7, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notice that a source retraction failure had occurred on May 6, 2014 around 10 o'clock PM. The camera was a QSA Global 880D (sn D11607) with a 46 curie iridium-192 source (sn 12764C). The guide tube had fallen off of the guide tube stand and crimped. The source was retrieved by the licensee by uncrimping the guide tube. No overexposures resulted from this event. The guide tube was removed from service. All other parts are removed from service pending inspection by the licensee."
Texas Incident Report: I-9190
"On May 7, 2014, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] received notice that a source retraction failure had occurred on May 6, 2014 around 10 o'clock PM. The camera was a QSA Global 880D (sn D11607) with a 46 curie iridium-192 source (sn 12764C). The guide tube had fallen off of the guide tube stand and crimped. The source was retrieved by the licensee by uncrimping the guide tube. No overexposures resulted from this event. The guide tube was removed from service. All other parts are removed from service pending inspection by the licensee."
Texas Incident Report: I-9190
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50090
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK MOEBES
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK MOEBES
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 05/06/2014
Notification Time: 13:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/06/2014
Event Time: 08:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2014
Notification Time: 13:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/06/2014
Event Time: 08:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/09/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL DURING INSTRUMENT TESTING
"At 0830 [CDT] on 05/06/2014, the Unit 3 reactor automatically scrammed due to low reactor water level as a result of a trip of both recirculation pumps. Main Steam Isolation Valves remained open with main turbine bypass valves controlling reactor pressure. Reactor feedwater pumps are in service to control reactor water level.
"Primary Containment Isolation System Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 containment isolation and initiation signals were received. Upon receipt of these signals all required components actuated as required. The Reactor Feedwater System controlled and maintained water level above the level 2 initiation setpoint.
"Prior to the Scram, the reactor was operating at 100% power. A Core and Containment Cooling Systems Analog Trip Unit Functional Test was in progress. The cause of the recirculation pump trip is under investigation.
"This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
U1 and U2 remained at 100% power and were unaffected.
* * * UPDATE AT 1302 EDT ON 05/09/14 FROM TODD BOHANAN TO DONG PARK * * *
"Investigation revealed that a failed power supply caused an Anticipated Transient Without Scram/Alternate Rod Insertion (ATWS/ARI) signal to be generated when a level 2 Reactor Water Level was simulated on one instrument. All systems responded to the ATWS/ARI signal as designed. This signal opened the Recirc Pump Trip breakers for both Recirculation Pumps and opened the ARI valves to bleed air from the Reactor Protection System (RPS) scram air header. The resulting transient caused reactor water level to dip below the RPS trip setpoint (level 3 Reactor Water Level), a normal plant response, and the automatic scram signal occurred. At the time of the RPS scram signal, all rods were inserting and reactor power was approximately 2-3% and lowering.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R2DO (Bonser).
"At 0830 [CDT] on 05/06/2014, the Unit 3 reactor automatically scrammed due to low reactor water level as a result of a trip of both recirculation pumps. Main Steam Isolation Valves remained open with main turbine bypass valves controlling reactor pressure. Reactor feedwater pumps are in service to control reactor water level.
"Primary Containment Isolation System Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 containment isolation and initiation signals were received. Upon receipt of these signals all required components actuated as required. The Reactor Feedwater System controlled and maintained water level above the level 2 initiation setpoint.
"Prior to the Scram, the reactor was operating at 100% power. A Core and Containment Cooling Systems Analog Trip Unit Functional Test was in progress. The cause of the recirculation pump trip is under investigation.
"This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
U1 and U2 remained at 100% power and were unaffected.
* * * UPDATE AT 1302 EDT ON 05/09/14 FROM TODD BOHANAN TO DONG PARK * * *
"Investigation revealed that a failed power supply caused an Anticipated Transient Without Scram/Alternate Rod Insertion (ATWS/ARI) signal to be generated when a level 2 Reactor Water Level was simulated on one instrument. All systems responded to the ATWS/ARI signal as designed. This signal opened the Recirc Pump Trip breakers for both Recirculation Pumps and opened the ARI valves to bleed air from the Reactor Protection System (RPS) scram air header. The resulting transient caused reactor water level to dip below the RPS trip setpoint (level 3 Reactor Water Level), a normal plant response, and the automatic scram signal occurred. At the time of the RPS scram signal, all rods were inserting and reactor power was approximately 2-3% and lowering.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R2DO (Bonser).
Agreement State
Event Number: 50107
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 3
City: UTICA State: OH
County:
License #: 03320 99 0000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 3
City: UTICA State: OH
County:
License #: 03320 99 0000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/12/2014
Notification Time: 12:53 [ET]
Event Date: 05/06/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2014
Notification Time: 12:53 [ET]
Event Date: 05/06/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECT
The following information was received from the State of Ohio via email:
"Licensee contacted BROP [Bureau of Radiation Protection] at approximately 2:30 PM on 5/6/14 to report that a radiography crew experienced a source disconnect during radiography operations earlier in the day. After completing the 3rd shot of the day a radiographer attempted to crank the source back into the camera. The drive cable appeared to crank back in but reading on the survey meter indicated that the source was still outside the camera, apparently in the area of the collimator. Licensee personnel attempted to crank the cable in and out several times in an attempt to retract the source, but were unsuccessful. The area was secured and monitored by licensee personnel pending further retrieval efforts.
"The corporate RSO was contacted, who dispatch two trained source retrieval personnel to the location. During evaluation it was determined that the drive cable had broken near the male connector. Licensee personnel were able to unlock the camera, feed the broken drive cable through the camera, and retrieve the source into the shielded position. Retrieval was accomplished at approximately 6:30 PM that evening. A new drive cable was connected to the camera and the radiographers were able to continue operating the camera with the new drive cable without incident.
"The two licensee retrieval personnel recorded doses of 20 mRem and 40 mRem on their pocket dosimeters. The licensee is having the broken drive cable returned to their corporate office for examination to determine the cause of the break. Licensee is preparing a written report on this incident."
The Radiography Camera involved is a QSA Model 880D, Serial number D8378 containing 46.1 Curie Ir-192 source. The sealed source is model number A424-9, serial number 12727C. The incident occurred at the Kensington, OH site.
State of Ohio Reference No.: 2014-010
Corrective actions included obtaining a new cable. Repairs were made without an engineering change to the system.
State of Ohio submitted the NMED Item Number: OH140006 on 05/07/14.
The following information was received from the State of Ohio via email:
"Licensee contacted BROP [Bureau of Radiation Protection] at approximately 2:30 PM on 5/6/14 to report that a radiography crew experienced a source disconnect during radiography operations earlier in the day. After completing the 3rd shot of the day a radiographer attempted to crank the source back into the camera. The drive cable appeared to crank back in but reading on the survey meter indicated that the source was still outside the camera, apparently in the area of the collimator. Licensee personnel attempted to crank the cable in and out several times in an attempt to retract the source, but were unsuccessful. The area was secured and monitored by licensee personnel pending further retrieval efforts.
"The corporate RSO was contacted, who dispatch two trained source retrieval personnel to the location. During evaluation it was determined that the drive cable had broken near the male connector. Licensee personnel were able to unlock the camera, feed the broken drive cable through the camera, and retrieve the source into the shielded position. Retrieval was accomplished at approximately 6:30 PM that evening. A new drive cable was connected to the camera and the radiographers were able to continue operating the camera with the new drive cable without incident.
"The two licensee retrieval personnel recorded doses of 20 mRem and 40 mRem on their pocket dosimeters. The licensee is having the broken drive cable returned to their corporate office for examination to determine the cause of the break. Licensee is preparing a written report on this incident."
The Radiography Camera involved is a QSA Model 880D, Serial number D8378 containing 46.1 Curie Ir-192 source. The sealed source is model number A424-9, serial number 12727C. The incident occurred at the Kensington, OH site.
State of Ohio Reference No.: 2014-010
Corrective actions included obtaining a new cable. Repairs were made without an engineering change to the system.
State of Ohio submitted the NMED Item Number: OH140006 on 05/07/14.