Event Notification Report for January 28, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/27/2014 - 01/28/2014
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49771
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY WATERMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY WATERMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 01/28/2014
Notification Time: 09:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2014
Event Time: 07:34 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2014
Notification Time: 09:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2014
Event Time: 07:34 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
STUART SHELDON (R3DO)
STUART SHELDON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
SERVICE WATER EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR NON-FUNCTIONAL DUE TO PREPLANNED MAINTENANCE
"On Jan. 28, 2014, at 0734 CST, [Radiation Monitor] R-20, Service Water Sampling Effluent Line (Auxiliary Building Service Water Header) was declared non-functional due to planned maintenance. R-20 is used for Emergency action level (EAL) classifications of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that would result in an Alert or Unusual Event and is being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability.
"R-20 is planned to be returned to functional [status] by 1300 CST today, 1/28/2014."
The spent fuel pool is the only heat load requiring Service Water for cooling and no spent fuel pool activities are in progress or planned.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed by the licensee.
"On Jan. 28, 2014, at 0734 CST, [Radiation Monitor] R-20, Service Water Sampling Effluent Line (Auxiliary Building Service Water Header) was declared non-functional due to planned maintenance. R-20 is used for Emergency action level (EAL) classifications of an unplanned release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that would result in an Alert or Unusual Event and is being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability.
"R-20 is planned to be returned to functional [status] by 1300 CST today, 1/28/2014."
The spent fuel pool is the only heat load requiring Service Water for cooling and no spent fuel pool activities are in progress or planned.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed by the licensee.
Agreement State
Event Number: 49772
Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: MEDI-PHYSICS INC
Region: 1
City: PLAINFIELD State: NJ
County:
License #: 456011
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILL CSASZAR
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: MEDI-PHYSICS INC
Region: 1
City: PLAINFIELD State: NJ
County:
License #: 456011
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BILL CSASZAR
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 01/28/2014
Notification Time: 15:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2014
Event Time: 10:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2014
Notification Time: 15:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2014
Event Time: 10:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - EXTERNAL RADIATION LEVELS ON PACKAGE EXCEEDED LIMITS
The following was received from the State of New Jersey via email:
"Event Type:
"External radiation levels on packages containing Type A quantity material received exceeded the limits of 10 CFR 71.47 (200 millirem/h) on the external surface of the package. The maximum reading on one of the packages was 360 millirem/h.
"Event Description:
"A total of 4 packages (Sr-82/Sr-85) were received from Brookhaven National Laboratory Upton, NY.
"As per the licensee's incoming procedures, the TI [Transportation Index], surface and contamination readings were taken. The packages exceeded the regulatory surface limit of 200 mR/hr. No other issues were found on the packages.
"The licensee immediately contacted the Brookhaven Labs and informed them of the surface readings exceeding the regulatory limit of 200 mR/hr. The carrier's Dangerous Goods Division and the NJDEP were also notified. "
The following was received from the State of New Jersey via email:
"Event Type:
"External radiation levels on packages containing Type A quantity material received exceeded the limits of 10 CFR 71.47 (200 millirem/h) on the external surface of the package. The maximum reading on one of the packages was 360 millirem/h.
"Event Description:
"A total of 4 packages (Sr-82/Sr-85) were received from Brookhaven National Laboratory Upton, NY.
"As per the licensee's incoming procedures, the TI [Transportation Index], surface and contamination readings were taken. The packages exceeded the regulatory surface limit of 200 mR/hr. No other issues were found on the packages.
"The licensee immediately contacted the Brookhaven Labs and informed them of the surface readings exceeding the regulatory limit of 200 mR/hr. The carrier's Dangerous Goods Division and the NJDEP were also notified. "
Part 21
Event Number: 49856
Rep Org: NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC.
Licensee: NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC.
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRACY BOLT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: NUCLEAR LOGISTICS, INC.
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRACY BOLT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/26/2014
Notification Time: 17:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/26/2014
Notification Time: 17:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/26/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING A POTENTIAL MANUFACTURING DEFECT IN REPLACEMENT MASTERPACT CRADLES
The following information was received via facsimile:
"Part 21 Report No: P21-01312014
"Subject: Report of potential defect per 10CFR Part 21 primary disconnect assembly
"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a defect. This letter is to notify you of a potential manufacturing defect concerning primary disconnect assemblies used on Masterpact replacement cradles. These assemblies are used in the replacement of the circuit breakers in low voltage switchgear.
"The following information is required per 10CFR 21.21(d)(4),
"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Aron Seiken, Vice President
Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118
"(ii) Identification of the facility, activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.
Facility:
Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118
"The specific part which fails to comply or contains a defect:
"Primary disconnect (p/n AHX30701) for Square D replacement low voltage switchgear breaker cradles (model LGSB4).
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"The primary disconnect was manufactured by Square D Services (Schneider Electric) and supplied as a dedicated component by Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
"(iv) Nature of defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"The cradle is an adaptor between the replacement circuit breaker and the existing switchgear cubicle. Part of the interfaces is the primary disconnects (fingers). The cradle primary disconnects connect to the bus stabs in the switchgear. The cradle primary disconnects are designed to account for vertical misalignment of the stabs in the switchgear. The primary disconnect fingers have vertical flexibility (float) that maintains the finger pressure on the bus stabs when the bus stabs are not completely aligned in the vertical axis.
"The fabrication drawing for the primary disconnect fingers had an incorrect tolerance. If the fingers are made with a dimension at the low end of the specified tolerance, there will be interference with a mating part. This reduces or eliminates the vertical float for the fingers. If the cradle is installed in a switchgear cubicle with vertically misaligned bus stabs, the disconnect fingers may have inadequate contact pressure. This condition may result in a higher than normal contact resistance from the cubicle stab to the cradle primary disconnect. The higher contact resistance at any one finger contact could cause an unacceptable temperature rise at that connection point. At very high temperatures, the springs that maintain the finger contact pressure could relax, which would further increase the connection resistance and cause additional overheating.
"This would not be an issue if there was no vertical misalignment of the switchgear cubicle stabs. See the additional clarifications in section (vi) below.
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
"The information that there is a defect was obtained on January 28, 2014.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
"The issue is applicable to 1600amp cradles only. The same and similar disconnects are used in the different cradle designs identified below. A list of the cradle types, primary disconnect part numbers and affected facilities (plants) in Table 1 as follows:
"TABLE 1
Plant Name / Cradle-Breaker Type / Primary disconnect part number / Quantity / Original breaker type-Notes
OPPD-Ft. Calhoun/LGSB4 with Masterpact NW breaker/AHX30701/18/Original breakers: GE AK-50. OPPD replaced all AHX30701 with narrower disconnect p/n R300112
TVA-Browns Ferry/LGSB4 and LGSB21 with Masterpact NW breaker/AHX30701/28/Original breakers: GE AK-50.
Entergy-River Bend/LGSB9 Masterpact NW breaker/R300112/5/ Original breakers: AKR-50. Narrower disconnect.
FENOC-Beaver Valley/LGSB4 Masterpact NW breaker/AHX30701/20/Original breakers: GE AK-50
FPL-St. Lucie/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/15/Original breakers: ABB K-1600
FPL-Turkey Point/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/12/Original breakers: ABB K-1600
SCE-SONGS/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/8/Original breakers: ABB K-1600
Nextera Energy-Seabrook/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/4/Original breakers: ABB
K-1600
"Additional details:
"- This issue does not affect all of the cradles identified above. Since the issue is a result of incorrect manufacturing tolerances, it will not be present on all cradles.
"- The overheating issue could be a problem with replacement circuit breakers for GE AK-50 circuit breakers. Due to the construction of the switchgear cubicles, there can be vertical misalignment of the stabs in the switchgear. If the primary disconnect float is not adequate, the overheating issue identified above could occur.
"- The overheating issue is expected to be much less prevalent or non-existent on the replacements for GE AKR and ABB K-line circuit breakers. The construction of the switchgear cubicles results in good vertical alignment of the stabs in the switchgear, so the amount of cradle finger vertical float is not as critical.
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
"NLI has generated Technical Bulletin TB-14-001 to direct the plants for inspections to determine if the manufacturing defect is present in the specific applications. The Technical Bulletin will be issued to the potentially impacted plants by March 4, 2014.
"NLl is in process of revising test plans to include verification of the proper operation of the primary disconnects during factory acceptance testing. The verification will be performed on 100% of supplied cradles.
"Square D Services is revising manufacturing drawings to eliminate any tolerance stack up issue that could limit the vertical movement of the finger contacts of the primary disconnect assemblies.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
"NLI Will submit NLI Technical Bulletin TB-14-001 to all facilities where the potentially impacted Masterpact breakers have been installed. The technical bulletin provides a summary of the issue and provides instructions for inspection and testing of the cradles. Please contact me with any questions or comments."
The following information was received via facsimile:
"Part 21 Report No: P21-01312014
"Subject: Report of potential defect per 10CFR Part 21 primary disconnect assembly
"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), AZZ/NLI is providing written notification of the identification of a defect. This letter is to notify you of a potential manufacturing defect concerning primary disconnect assemblies used on Masterpact replacement cradles. These assemblies are used in the replacement of the circuit breakers in low voltage switchgear.
"The following information is required per 10CFR 21.21(d)(4),
"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Aron Seiken, Vice President
Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118
"(ii) Identification of the facility, activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.
Facility:
Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
7410 Pebble Drive
Ft. Worth, TX 76118
"The specific part which fails to comply or contains a defect:
"Primary disconnect (p/n AHX30701) for Square D replacement low voltage switchgear breaker cradles (model LGSB4).
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"The primary disconnect was manufactured by Square D Services (Schneider Electric) and supplied as a dedicated component by Nuclear Logistics, Inc.
"(iv) Nature of defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"The cradle is an adaptor between the replacement circuit breaker and the existing switchgear cubicle. Part of the interfaces is the primary disconnects (fingers). The cradle primary disconnects connect to the bus stabs in the switchgear. The cradle primary disconnects are designed to account for vertical misalignment of the stabs in the switchgear. The primary disconnect fingers have vertical flexibility (float) that maintains the finger pressure on the bus stabs when the bus stabs are not completely aligned in the vertical axis.
"The fabrication drawing for the primary disconnect fingers had an incorrect tolerance. If the fingers are made with a dimension at the low end of the specified tolerance, there will be interference with a mating part. This reduces or eliminates the vertical float for the fingers. If the cradle is installed in a switchgear cubicle with vertically misaligned bus stabs, the disconnect fingers may have inadequate contact pressure. This condition may result in a higher than normal contact resistance from the cubicle stab to the cradle primary disconnect. The higher contact resistance at any one finger contact could cause an unacceptable temperature rise at that connection point. At very high temperatures, the springs that maintain the finger contact pressure could relax, which would further increase the connection resistance and cause additional overheating.
"This would not be an issue if there was no vertical misalignment of the switchgear cubicle stabs. See the additional clarifications in section (vi) below.
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
"The information that there is a defect was obtained on January 28, 2014.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
"The issue is applicable to 1600amp cradles only. The same and similar disconnects are used in the different cradle designs identified below. A list of the cradle types, primary disconnect part numbers and affected facilities (plants) in Table 1 as follows:
"TABLE 1
Plant Name / Cradle-Breaker Type / Primary disconnect part number / Quantity / Original breaker type-Notes
OPPD-Ft. Calhoun/LGSB4 with Masterpact NW breaker/AHX30701/18/Original breakers: GE AK-50. OPPD replaced all AHX30701 with narrower disconnect p/n R300112
TVA-Browns Ferry/LGSB4 and LGSB21 with Masterpact NW breaker/AHX30701/28/Original breakers: GE AK-50.
Entergy-River Bend/LGSB9 Masterpact NW breaker/R300112/5/ Original breakers: AKR-50. Narrower disconnect.
FENOC-Beaver Valley/LGSB4 Masterpact NW breaker/AHX30701/20/Original breakers: GE AK-50
FPL-St. Lucie/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/15/Original breakers: ABB K-1600
FPL-Turkey Point/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/12/Original breakers: ABB K-1600
SCE-SONGS/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/8/Original breakers: ABB K-1600
Nextera Energy-Seabrook/LISB2 Masterpact NW breaker/AJF30101/4/Original breakers: ABB
K-1600
"Additional details:
"- This issue does not affect all of the cradles identified above. Since the issue is a result of incorrect manufacturing tolerances, it will not be present on all cradles.
"- The overheating issue could be a problem with replacement circuit breakers for GE AK-50 circuit breakers. Due to the construction of the switchgear cubicles, there can be vertical misalignment of the stabs in the switchgear. If the primary disconnect float is not adequate, the overheating issue identified above could occur.
"- The overheating issue is expected to be much less prevalent or non-existent on the replacements for GE AKR and ABB K-line circuit breakers. The construction of the switchgear cubicles results in good vertical alignment of the stabs in the switchgear, so the amount of cradle finger vertical float is not as critical.
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
"NLI has generated Technical Bulletin TB-14-001 to direct the plants for inspections to determine if the manufacturing defect is present in the specific applications. The Technical Bulletin will be issued to the potentially impacted plants by March 4, 2014.
"NLl is in process of revising test plans to include verification of the proper operation of the primary disconnects during factory acceptance testing. The verification will be performed on 100% of supplied cradles.
"Square D Services is revising manufacturing drawings to eliminate any tolerance stack up issue that could limit the vertical movement of the finger contacts of the primary disconnect assemblies.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
"NLI Will submit NLI Technical Bulletin TB-14-001 to all facilities where the potentially impacted Masterpact breakers have been installed. The technical bulletin provides a summary of the issue and provides instructions for inspection and testing of the cradles. Please contact me with any questions or comments."