Event Notification Report for December 20, 2012

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO AN IDENTIFIED DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER

"During a walkdown on December 20, 2012 at 1600 CST, two degraded Appendix R fire barriers (walls) were identified. These barriers separate the Torus Room (Fire Area IV)/ 'A' RHR Room (Fire Area I) and the Torus Room (Fire Area IV)/ 'B' RHR Room (Fire Area II). The walls separate Appendix R fire safe shutdown divisional equipment.

"A fire watch was established as a compensatory measure immediately following identification of the issue on December 20, 2012. The barrier affecting the 'B' RHR Room has been repaired on both sides. The barrier affecting the 'A' RHR Room has been repaired on the Torus Room side. The discovery of this non-compliance is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"The fire watch remains in place until verification of the completed repair is performed."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1746 EST ON 2/07/13 FROM JACK EARSLEY TO HUFFMAN * * *

"An eight hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) was conservatively reported on December 21, 2012 for degraded fire barriers between the Torus Room (Fire Area IV) and 'A' RHR Room (Fire Area I), and the Torus Room (Fire Area IV) and 'B' RHR Room (Fire Area II). Subsequent engineering analysis determined that the degraded fire barriers maintained the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains and plant safety was not significantly degraded. The 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) report is retracted."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Kunowski).

PART 21 REPORT - BELDEN WIRE USED ON ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED FORM-WOUND MOTORS NOT FULLY QUALIFIED

"Potential Condition: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Power Service Shops (PSS) installed Belden EPDM lead wire in the rewind of Environmentally Qualified (EQ) safety-related motors utilizing EPRI Technical Report (TR) 1003481 and TR 1001036. EPRI informed PSS that the Belden EPDM lead wire had not been fully qualified in accordance with EPRI TR 1001036.

"Thirteen (13) motors are affected. Ten (10) Browns Ferry motors, one (1) Watts Bar Unit 2 motor, one (1) Progress Energy [Crystal River] and one (1) Florida Power & Light (FPL) [St. Lucie Plant] . All the customers have been notified of a potential Part 21 condition.

"Recommendation: Immediate Actions:
1.) Review PSS data to determine affected motors.
2.) Establish an Equivalency Evaluation (EE) for Belden EPDM lead wire for EPRI TR 1003481/1001036 utilizing a TVA qualified winding system that included Belden EPDM lead wire (Wyle Test Report 18070-1).
3.) Review Progress Energy and FPL EQ profiles.
4.) Perform a root cause investigation to determine how this issue occurred.

"Evaluation/Action Taken:
1.) Action 1 complete. 13 motors affected and all customers notified.
2.) Action 2 - EE developed and currently being reviewed by affected TVA EQ engineers for approval.
3.) Action 3 - FPL indicated that the FPL motor in question had undergone a recent rewind that replaced the lead. Progress Energy provided the EQ profile on 12/20/12 indicating a significant delta between the Wyle Test Report 18070-1 in Radiation (Normal), Radiation (Accident) and accident temperature (Max). Based on this information, the PSS determination was made that defect in a basic component existed and NRC notification was required in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, section 21.21(d)(1) and section 21.21(d)(3)(i).

"TVA PSS will provide a follow-up written notification within 30 days pursuant to Part 21.21(d)(3)(ii).

"Point of Contact- Mark E. Cook, (256) 314-7595"

EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS) OUT-OF-SERVICE

"Computer engineering personnel will be taking the plant integrated computer system (ICS) out-of-service for planned maintenance. During the time ICS is out-of-service, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) will be unavailable. The computer outage is scheduled for six hours.

"Contingency plans have been established to transmit plant parameter data and perform the dose assessment function in the event of an emergency while ERDS is unavailable.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). A follow-up notification will be made when the maintenance activities are complete and the equipment is restored."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM JIM CASE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1309 EST ON 12/20/12 * * *

At 1300 EST, the plant integrated computer system was restored and SPDS and ERDS was returned to service.

Notified R3DO (Cameron) and ERDS Group email.

LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY - RADIATION MONITORS INOPERABLE FOR PRE- PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"This is a non-emergency notification. At 0735 [EST] on December 20, 2012, radiation monitors RM-1CR-3561A, RM-1CR-3561B, RM-1CR-3561C and RM-1CR-3561D, Containment Ventilation Isolation Radiation Monitors, were declared inoperable for preplanned maintenance. These monitors are the only monitors credited in the EALs for monitoring elevated radiation levels inside containment for irradiated fuel.

"These radiation monitors are necessary for accident assessment and are credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to these monitors being out of service is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health or safety of the public or the operation of the facility.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

"At 0354 CST on December 20, 2012, with the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) operating at 100% power, an invalid Group 3 isolation on the 'A' side of the Primary Containment Isolation System occurred. Group 3 isolation signals were generated for Primary Containment Isolation Valves for Drywell and Torus Ventilation, and Purge, Containment Nitrogen Compressor Suction and Discharge, Recirculation Pump Seals, and Post Accident Sample System.

"This event was caused by spurious upscale spike on the 'A' Refuel Floor Exhaust Radiation Monitor.

"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. Specifically, all actuations were complete and successful.

"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into DAEC's corrective action program for resolution.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."