Event Notification Report for December 14, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/13/2012 - 12/14/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
48599485944859548596
Agreement State
Event Number: 48599
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: WILDLIFE INTERNATIONAL, LTD
Region: 1
City: EASTON State: MD
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENNETH BRENNEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: WILDLIFE INTERNATIONAL, LTD
Region: 1
City: EASTON State: MD
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENNETH BRENNEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 12/17/2012
Notification Time: 10:35 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2012
Notification Time: 10:35 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GORDON HUNEGS (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
JIM WHITNEY (ILTA)
GORDON HUNEGS (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
JIM WHITNEY (ILTA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING CARBON-14 VIAL
The following information was received via facsimile from the Maryland Department of Environment:
"In compliance with COMAR 26.12.01-01 (Section D-1201.a), Wildlife International, Ltd. is reporting the loss of 1 mCi of Carbon-14 source material. As per the originator, the radioactive material was shipped to Wildlife International, Ltd. as one shipment containing two vials (each vial contained 1 mCi). However, only one vial was received in the Wildlife International, Ltd facilities, swiped and placed in the Wildlife International, Ltd. inventory. Wildlife International, Ltd. is currently investigating the circumstances of the missing/loss Carbon-14 material, coordinating documents and, shipping procedures with the originator and conducting exhaustive searches of the Wildlife International, Ltd. facilities for its recovery."
The following information was received via facsimile from the Maryland Department of Environment:
"In compliance with COMAR 26.12.01-01 (Section D-1201.a), Wildlife International, Ltd. is reporting the loss of 1 mCi of Carbon-14 source material. As per the originator, the radioactive material was shipped to Wildlife International, Ltd. as one shipment containing two vials (each vial contained 1 mCi). However, only one vial was received in the Wildlife International, Ltd facilities, swiped and placed in the Wildlife International, Ltd. inventory. Wildlife International, Ltd. is currently investigating the circumstances of the missing/loss Carbon-14 material, coordinating documents and, shipping procedures with the originator and conducting exhaustive searches of the Wildlife International, Ltd. facilities for its recovery."
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 48594
Rep Org: METALTEK INTERNATIONAL CARONDELET
Licensee: METALTEK INTERNATIONAL CARONDELET CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: PEVELY State: MO
County:
License #: 24-26136-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES RUUD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: METALTEK INTERNATIONAL CARONDELET CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: PEVELY State: MO
County:
License #: 24-26136-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES RUUD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 12/14/2012
Notification Time: 14:11 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2012
Event Time: 08:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2012
Notification Time: 14:11 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2012
Event Time: 08:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
RADIOGRAPHY GUIDE TUBE DAMAGED DURING USE
While performing radiography operations at the Metaltek facility, the stand that the guide tube was resting on fell over and damaged the guide tube. The source was not able to be retrieved. A licensed source retrieval contractor was utilized and the source was restored to its safe position. There were no overexposures to personnel as a result of this event.
The radiography camera was a QSA Amersham model number A-424-14, serial number 39841B.
While performing radiography operations at the Metaltek facility, the stand that the guide tube was resting on fell over and damaged the guide tube. The source was not able to be retrieved. A licensed source retrieval contractor was utilized and the source was restored to its safe position. There were no overexposures to personnel as a result of this event.
The radiography camera was a QSA Amersham model number A-424-14, serial number 39841B.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48595
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RONALD FRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RONALD FRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 12/14/2012
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2012
Event Time: 13:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2012
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2012
Event Time: 13:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN - CONTROL STRUCTURE CHILLERS INOPERABLE
"At 1350 on 12/14/2012, both Control Structure Chillers at Susquehanna were rendered inoperable. This event required entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3 for both Units. Per Susquehanna procedures, after 1 hour, a power reduction must be commenced. Tech Spec 3.0.3 requires that action be taken within one hour to place the Unit in Mode 3 within 13 hours and Mode 4 within 37 hours.
"Physical power reduction commenced at 1453 for Unit 1 and 1459 for Unit 2.
"The 'A' Control Structure Chiller was previously inoperable for routine maintenance. The system was in service for post maintenance testing and activities were underway to swap to the opposite train to allow removal of test instrumentation and fan belt tensioning for equipment associated with the 'A' Control Structure HVAC system. At 1350, the 'B' Control Structure loop circulating pump tripped, rendering the 'B' Control Structure Chiller inoperable.
"This condition requires immediate entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3. Both Control Structure Chillers are inoperable and this report is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as a shutdown required by Tech Specs, and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of a Safety Function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Efforts are underway to restore at least one system to operable status in parallel with Unit shutdown activities."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be notifying the State of Pennsylvania.
* * * UPDATE FROM ALEX MCLELLAN TO JOHN KNOKE AT 2228 EST ON 12/14/12 * * *
"On 12/14/12 at 1500 EST Susquehanna Steam Electric Station reported a shutdown had been commenced at 1453 EST for Unit 1 and 1459 EST for Unit 2 due to inoperability of both Control Structure Chillers. At 1750 EST the 'A' Control Structure Chiller was declared operable and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. Power reduction for both Units was halted at 1750 and preparations for power restoration initiated. On 12/14/12 Unit 1 power was restored to 98% at 1819 EST and Unit 2 power was restored to 98% at 1943 EST, the maximum power output possible based on grid conditions for Unit 1 and thermal limits for Unit 2."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Holody) notified.
"At 1350 on 12/14/2012, both Control Structure Chillers at Susquehanna were rendered inoperable. This event required entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3 for both Units. Per Susquehanna procedures, after 1 hour, a power reduction must be commenced. Tech Spec 3.0.3 requires that action be taken within one hour to place the Unit in Mode 3 within 13 hours and Mode 4 within 37 hours.
"Physical power reduction commenced at 1453 for Unit 1 and 1459 for Unit 2.
"The 'A' Control Structure Chiller was previously inoperable for routine maintenance. The system was in service for post maintenance testing and activities were underway to swap to the opposite train to allow removal of test instrumentation and fan belt tensioning for equipment associated with the 'A' Control Structure HVAC system. At 1350, the 'B' Control Structure loop circulating pump tripped, rendering the 'B' Control Structure Chiller inoperable.
"This condition requires immediate entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3. Both Control Structure Chillers are inoperable and this report is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as a shutdown required by Tech Specs, and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of a Safety Function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Efforts are underway to restore at least one system to operable status in parallel with Unit shutdown activities."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be notifying the State of Pennsylvania.
* * * UPDATE FROM ALEX MCLELLAN TO JOHN KNOKE AT 2228 EST ON 12/14/12 * * *
"On 12/14/12 at 1500 EST Susquehanna Steam Electric Station reported a shutdown had been commenced at 1453 EST for Unit 1 and 1459 EST for Unit 2 due to inoperability of both Control Structure Chillers. At 1750 EST the 'A' Control Structure Chiller was declared operable and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. Power reduction for both Units was halted at 1750 and preparations for power restoration initiated. On 12/14/12 Unit 1 power was restored to 98% at 1819 EST and Unit 2 power was restored to 98% at 1943 EST, the maximum power output possible based on grid conditions for Unit 1 and thermal limits for Unit 2."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Holody) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48596
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 12/14/2012
Notification Time: 17:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2012
Event Time: 13:06 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2012
Notification Time: 17:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2012
Event Time: 13:06 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 93 | Power Operation | 93 | Power Operation |
CONTROL BUILDING EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE FOR TWO MINUTES
"At approximately 1306 hours Eastern Standard Time (EST), Brunswick Nuclear Plant lost the operability of both trains of Control Building Emergency Ventilation (CREV) for approximately two minutes. This is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"At the time of the event, Brunswick was implementing a modification to upgrade its control building fire detection. In support of short duration circuitry work on the detectors, CREV train A was placed in service manually in compliance with the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). This action prevents an auto-start of the opposite CREV train B, and thus Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3 Condition A was entered to restore CREV train B to service within 7 days.
"During work to electrically isolate ('jumper') one of the fire detectors associated with CREV train A fire protection, electrical continuity was lost. This caused the detector to fail safe, sending an internal charcoal fire signal to the CREV train A circuitry and shutting it down. With CREV train A shut down due to the signal, TS 3.7.3 Required Action C.1 applied for both CREV trains inoperable, requiring both Units to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours. Actions were taken to immediately re-establish the circuitry, which re-started CREV train A, and TS 3.7.3 Required Action C.1 was exited.
"This condition did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.
"The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The CREV function was only inoperable for approximately two minutes. Though considered inoperable, CREV train B remained available and could have been placed in service at any time by alternating the train A and train B control switches."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At approximately 1306 hours Eastern Standard Time (EST), Brunswick Nuclear Plant lost the operability of both trains of Control Building Emergency Ventilation (CREV) for approximately two minutes. This is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"At the time of the event, Brunswick was implementing a modification to upgrade its control building fire detection. In support of short duration circuitry work on the detectors, CREV train A was placed in service manually in compliance with the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). This action prevents an auto-start of the opposite CREV train B, and thus Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3 Condition A was entered to restore CREV train B to service within 7 days.
"During work to electrically isolate ('jumper') one of the fire detectors associated with CREV train A fire protection, electrical continuity was lost. This caused the detector to fail safe, sending an internal charcoal fire signal to the CREV train A circuitry and shutting it down. With CREV train A shut down due to the signal, TS 3.7.3 Required Action C.1 applied for both CREV trains inoperable, requiring both Units to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours. Actions were taken to immediately re-establish the circuitry, which re-started CREV train A, and TS 3.7.3 Required Action C.1 was exited.
"This condition did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.
"The safety significance of this event is considered minimal. The CREV function was only inoperable for approximately two minutes. Though considered inoperable, CREV train B remained available and could have been placed in service at any time by alternating the train A and train B control switches."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.