Event Notification Report for August 17, 2012

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO THE UNPLANNED LOSS OF ANNUNCIATORS > 15 MINUTES

At 0552 EDT Control Room Operators experienced a Loss of Annunciators. At 0607 EDT, the licensee declared an Unusual Event per EAL SU4.1, " Unplanned loss of most or all Annunciators or Indicators associated with Safety Systems on the RTGB [Remote Turbine Gage Board] Sections A and B, Primary System Annunciators and Indicators > 15 minutes." During an alarm test, the annunciators lit up as expected but did not clear at the completion of the test.

Exit criteria for the Unusual Event will be restoration of the annunciator functions. The licensee has compensatory measures in effect. ERFIS [Emergency Response Facility Information System] and the normal RTGB instruments are available.

The licensee notified the state and informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified Other FEDS (FEMA, DHS and NNSA via email).

* * * UPDATE FROM HILL TO KLCO ON 8/17/2012 AT 0954 EDT * * *

On August 17, 2012 at 0940 EDT, the licensee terminated the Unusual Event based on restoring annunciator capability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and has terminated ERDS transmission.

Notified NRR-EO(Thomas), R2DO(Guthrie), IRD(Gott) and other FEDS (FEMA, DHS and NNSA via email)

INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM

"On 08/17/2012, while performing 2-SR-3.3.6.1(3DFT) - HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] Steam Line Space Temperature Functional Test, an inadvertent PCIS [Primary Containment Isolation Signal] Group 4 (HPCI) isolation signal occurred. All automatic actions occurred as designed. Cause of the isolation is unknown with investigation in progress.

"This incident is reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D).

"The incident also requires a 60 day written report.

"The NRC [Resident] Inspector has been notified."

The steam supply valves to HPCI remain closed during trouble shooting and repair, however, HPCI remains available for use if needed.

ONLY ONE IROFS AVAILABLE FOR A SPILL IN THE CERAMICS AREA

"At 12:39 PM (EDT) it was discovered that only one Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS) remained in place to prevent a Criticality Event in the ceramics area of the Fuel Manufacturing Operations facility. The failed IROFS was Fuel Business System (FBS) Control of Mass of Uranium Transportable Container (IROFS 900-01), due to an overweight pellet boat. The IROFS that remained in place at all times was Spill Identification and Cleanup (IROFS 900-11). The initiating event for the accident sequences (spill of a pellet boat) did not occur."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1456 EDT ON 8/17/2012 FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"The pellets have been removed from the overweight boat and placed into an approved container; the IROFS for these accident sequences have been restored. The extent of condition is being evaluated and at this time no other overweight boats have been identified.

"Region II and NMSS HQ and other notifications have been completed."

Notified the R2DO (Guthrie) and NMSS (Waters).

TEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS DAMAGED

Ten tritium exit signs belonging to Bed Bath and Beyond were inadvertently placed into a compactor and damaged. The signs originally contained 7.5 Ci of tritium when they were purchased 7-10 years ago. Shaw Environmental will take smears of the site next week to determine if there is residual contamination or cleanup required. The signs have been placed in drums and the area quarantined.

See report of this same event from the State of Wisconsin EN #48224

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source