Event Notification Report for August 03, 2012

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON PROCESS GAUGE

The following was received from the State of Arkansas via email:

"On August 3, 2012, a licensee notified the Department (Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials) that the shutter mechanism on a RONAN Model# SA1-F37 gauge (SN# 6481GQ), mounted at the apex of a mixing bin, was stuck in the open position. This was discovered during routine maintenance. Since the shutter is in the open position and does not pose an immediate safety risk, the plant continues to operate. The Department was told that even though the gauge is only accessible via man-lift, the gauge has been tagged with a caution sign. The facility has sent email notifications to all personnel as well as posting notices in the plant. The gauge contains 100 mCi of Cs-137. The facility has contacted the manufacturer and the Department will make an onsite visit to coincide with the repair. Further information will be provided as it is obtained.

"Arkansas Incident # AR-2012-005"


* * * UPDATE VIA E-MAIL FROM ROBERT PEMBERTON TO DONALD NORWOOD ON 8/31/2012 AT 1139 EDT * * *

"On 8/9/12, a RONAN technician performed repairs on a RONAN Model SA1-F37, SN# 6481GQ fixed gauge at the Del-Tin facility in El Dorado, Arkansas to correct a stuck shutter. The device was removed from its mounting, disassembled, cleaned, reassembled and remounted. The shutter is now functional. A wipe test showed no leakage.

"The root cause was found to be a dry rotted seal that allowed moisture and debris into the mechanism.

"The Department considers this event closed."

Notified R4DO (Proulx) and E-mail to FSME Event Resource.

LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY

"At 1205 EDT on August 3, 2012, the primary telephone service provider for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) experienced a failure of their communications circuit. This failure has resulted in a major loss of communications equipment at the JAF site. The JAF dedicated Emergency Notification System (ENS), Health Physics Network (HPN), and Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) phone and all other plant phones served by this provider are not functioning as a result of this failure. Alternate dedicated cellular, satellite, and land-based phone lines serviced by other providers remain available to perform communications with off-site facilities.

"This communication failure impacts the ability to readily receive and transmit information between the NRC and JAF. The loss of both the ENS and the HPN constitutes a major loss of communications capability and meets NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The communications provider has been contacted to enact repairs to the affected communications circuit. There is currently no estimated time of restoration."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 8/3/12 AT 1601 EDT FROM STEVE DEFILLIPPO TO DONG PARK * * *

"The communication lines reported as lost in the original notification have been restored to service and are functional. The NRC Resident Inspector had been notified."

Notified R1DO (Krohn).

PART 21 - DEFECTIVE VALVE SEAL CAP

The following was provided via fax:

"Background:

"On July 17, 2012, Duke Power - McGuire NPP notified Flowserve Corporation that they had attempted to install a Seal Cap supplied by Flowserve on a Kerotest 1-1500 Y-Type Globe Valve. They found that the Seal Cap could not be installed on the valve due to interference with the Valve Stem.

"Discussion:

"The Seal Cap is used to contain leakage past the Valve Diaphragm. The Seal Cap fits over the Valve Stem after Handle removal and is screwed onto the Yoke until it contacts the top of the Body. It is then seal welded to the Body to create a leak tight cap. At this point the Seal Cap is considered pressure retaining.

"Inspection of the Seal Cap revealed an inside flat bottom in lieu of the conical bottom shown on the drawing. The conical drill point allows clearance for the valve stem when the Seal Cap is installed on the valve. Review of a layout shows the Seal Cap with a Flat bottom cannot be completely installed whether the valve is open or closed.

"Conclusion:

"The Seal Cap with a flat bottom cannot be properly installed on the Kerotest Series R9900 size 1/2 to 2 Valves for which it was designed. The Valve Stem will prevent complete installation and the ability to seal weld the Seal Cap to the Body. The Seal Caps supplied would not be available at the Nuclear Power Plant site for an urgent repair if required. The following Nuclear Power Plant Utilities were provide these Seal Caps without the conical shaped area.

TVA - Purchase Order# 00020077-00050 and 00020077-00018
First Energy - Purchase Order# 45108999, and 45254808
Alabama Power - Purchase Order# QP040387, QP040872 and QP060575
Duke Power - Purchase Order # NM18494 001, NM25245, 00108212 and 00124677.

"Based on the above, the Nuclear Utilities need to be notified concerning this deviation so that an evaluation may be performed to determine if this constitutes a defect that could create a substantial safety hazard."

CONFIRMED POSITIVE ON A FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCE

The licensee misplaced a static eliminator device containing 10 mCi of Po-210. The device model number is P-2021-8301; Serial number is A2HS590. The device was used to neutralize static charge on plastic parts prior to entering the paint process. The licensee considers the device as lost.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf