Event Notification Report for July 23, 2012

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BROKEN PROCESS GAUGE SHUTTER MECHANISM

The following information was received via E-mail:

"On July 24, 2012, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that on July 23, 2012, it discovered a shutter mechanism on an Ohmart SH-F2-45 gauge mounted on the side of a tank at the licensee's facility was broken and the shutter could not be closed. The gauge contained 200 millicuries of cesium-137. The 3/8 inch cast iron shutter rod broke approximately 1/4 inch below the top surface of the gauge. The licensee has submitted the appropriate request to the Agency for the gauge to remain in operation until repairs can be made. The licensee contacted the manufacturer and scheduled the repair. Further information will be provided as it is obtained.

"Gauge information:
Ohmart SH-F2-45
Serial number: 5334GK

"Source information:
cesium-137
200 millicuries
Serial number: 9-1999"

Texas Incident #: I - 8971

UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

At 0329 EDT, Oyster Creek experienced a loss of offsite power. As a result of the loss of offsite power, the unit automatically scrammed from 100% with all control rods fully inserting and all safety systems functioning as required. Both Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and are carrying loads on the safety buses.

At 0341 EDT, Oyster Creek declared an Unusual Event based on a loss of offsite power for greater than 15 minutes. The unit is stable in Hot Shutdown with decay heat removal via the Isolation Condenser. The cause of the loss of offsite power is currently under investigation by JCP&L.

The licensee notified the State and local agencies, as well as the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will be making a press release.

* * * UPDATE ON 7/23/12 AT 0625 EDT FROM ROBERT SALES TO DONG PARK * * *

"Oyster Creek has terminated from the loss of offsite power Unusual Event [at 0538 EDT]. All safety systems functioned as expected for this event."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), NRR EO (Nieh), IRD (Gott), DHS SWO, FEMA, and DHS NICC.

* * * UPDATE ON 7/23/12 AT 1205 EDT FROM ANDREW ZUCHOWSKI TO VINCE KLCO * * *

"As a result of the loss of offsite power, both Emergency Diesel Generators automatically started and carried loads on the safety buses, as required. Offsite power was returned to service at 0457 EDT and both Emergency Diesel Generators were secured at 0520 EDT.

"Per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), Oyster Creek is reporting any event or condition that results in valid actuation of an Emergency AC electrical power system.

"Additionally, the Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) differential pressure indicated positive 0.25 inches W.G. at approximately 0357 EDT. Reactor Building differential pressure indication returned to normal at 0434 EDT. Oyster Creek is currently investigating the cause of the positive Reactor Building pressure indication.

"Per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Oyster Creek is reporting an event that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to control the release of radioactive material."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Gray).

* * * UPDATE AT 0914 EDT ON 9/12/12 FROM ERIC SWAIN TO HUFFMAN * * *

As a result of further investigation it was found that the Reactor Building Differential Pressure issue was an indication issue only and not indicative of a loss of the secondary containment barrier. The positive indication was caused by a degradation of instrument air pressure to the instrument used to generate the differential pressure indication. The degradation of instrument air pressure was an expected condition caused by the loss of offsite power. Alternate indication, not affected by instrument air pressure, was available throughout the event. The alternate indication read negative 0.4 Inches water gauge throughout the event.

Based on this information Oyster Creek is retracting the portion of this report that was reported per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), an event that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to control the release of radioactive material.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Newport) notified.

TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE

"On July 23, 2012, at 0508 EDT, the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation was tagged out for routine maintenance. It was believed that only the cooling function was affected and that the TSC ventilation system was still capable of performing its intended function of pressurization and filtration. A review by operations today determined that the TSC filtration and pressurization portion was also affected. Under certain accident conditions, the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exists to relocate the TSC to an alternate location. Currently it is expected that the TSC ventilation system maintenance will be completed by the end of the day shift today and turned over to operations. Operations should start up the system early during night shift (7/24).

"This is reportable to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as an eight hour non-emergency notification. The event had no effect on plant operations and no impact on public health and safety has been identified. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, States and Counties."

INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATIONS

"On July 23, 2012, at 2057 hours, the Perry Nuclear Power Plant experienced a loss of the normal power supply to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) A electrical bus. The loss of RPS bus A caused an actuation of several Division 1 containment outboard isolation valves. The actuation signal caused full closure of one or more valves in each of the following Division 1 subsystems: Main Steam line drains, Containment Radiation Monitor, Drywell Radiation Monitor, Reactor Water Cleanup, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup, Liquid Radwaste Sumps, Containment Vessel Chilled Water, Containment Vacuum Relief, Condensate Transfer and Storage, Mixed Bed Demineralizer and Distribution, Containment Personnel Airlocks, Service Air, and Instrument Air. Division 2 components and valves were not affected.

"This event is considered an invalid system actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The isolation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters, and was not a manual initiation. Therefore, this notification is provided via a 60 day optional phone call in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report.

"The event meets reporting criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) as a general containment isolation valve signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. All affected systems functioned as expected in response to an outboard isolation signal. The valves were reopened in accordance with plant procedures. The failure mechanism that caused the loss of RPS bus A was a degraded voltage regulator. The voltage regulator was replaced and retested with satisfactory results.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SHIPMENT

The following information was received from the State of Massachusetts Radiation Control Program via e-mail:

"Containers from REVISS Services, Inc were used to ship return Co-60 sources from Steris Isomedix Services, Northborough, MA to REVISS's UK facility. When the container arrived on 8/7/12 and was opened by the REVISS (UK) staff, they identified that the basket contained only 52 sources rather than the 53 that were expected. When the container arrived the tamper proof seals that were installed by engineers at the plant were intact. A review of the documentation for the operations at the plant indicate that only 52 sources were loaded into the basket. A positive check of the serial numbers confirmed that the one source that was unaccounted for was a Nordion model C-188, Co-60 source, serial number 41313.

"Steris Isomedix Services was contacted and at their earliest chance will inspect the pool to ensure that the source was not dropped onto the floor of the pool. There were no abnormal radiation readings that would indicate that the source was removed from the pool during operations. Because the documentation does not indicate that the source was ever removed from the source module, Steris Isomedix Services has a high level of confidence that the source is still in the irradiator pool.

"Steris Isomedix Services, Northborough, MA and REVISS will continue updating as information is acquired.."

* * * UPDATE AT 1047 EDT ON 8/11/12 FROM JOSH DAEHLER TO HUFFMAN * * *

The subject missing Co-60 source, serial # 41313, was discovered this morning (8/11/12) to be located in module 10, position 23, in the Steris (Northborough) pool irradiator. The serial number of the source was visually confirmed by Steris, REVISS, and a State of Massachusetts Inspector. The source is no longer missing. The State is continuing its investigation into the circumstances of this event.

Notified R1DO (Burritt), R3DO (Lipa), FSME (Henderson), and IRD MOC (Marshall).


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf