Event Notification Report for May 25, 2012

DE-ENERGIZATION OF BOTH DIVISIONS OF RHR SUCTION LINE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATIONS VALVES DURING TESTING

"On Friday, May 25th 2012 at 1322 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced a loss of power to 600V 2EJS*US1 emergency load center while performing scheduled surveillance testing of the Division 1 Remote Shutdown System disconnect switches. Disconnect switch SW 1-2CESA20 was taken to the actuate position which isolated main control room control, bypassed the housing limit switches and aligned the trip test switch for local breaker control of 2EJS*US1 supply breaker 1-3B. Contacts in the trip test switch for 2EJS*US1 supply breaker 1-3B were found to be closed which energized its trip coil. This resulted in a loss of motive power to Division 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system primary containment isolation valve 2RHS*MOV113 on the shutdown cooling suction line from the reactor vessel. At the time of the event, the Division 1 RHR shutdown cooling system was in-service with the Division 2 shutdown cooling suction line primary containment isolation valve 2RHS*MOV112 de-energized open to prevent inadvertent or spurious closure, which would interrupt the shutdown cooling decay heat removal function.

"The result of the event was that both the Division 1 and Division 2 isolation valves on the common RHR shutdown cooling suction line (2RHS*MOV112 and 2RHS*MOV113) were open with no motive power. Thus, neither valve was capable of automatically closing in the event of a reactor level low (level 3) signal due to a leak in the RHR shutdown cooling system. The loss of this isolation function is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of a system that is needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 Condition G was entered and actions to restore the valves to operable status were immediately initiated in accordance with Required Action G.2. Power to 2RHS*MOV113 was restored at 1824 hrs, re-enabling its automatic isolation capability."

The licenses has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - URANIUM SOURCE FOUND AT METAL CHECK RECYCLING FACILITY

"On May 22, 2012 we [Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality (OKDEQ)] were contacted by the Director of Radiology at INTEGRIS Southwest Medical Center in Oklahoma City. The Director informed us that an individual had presented at their Emergency Room complaining that he had been exposed to radiation at the Metal Check, Inc. scrap metal yard located at 5700 South High Avenue, Oklahoma City, OK. According to [the Director], the individual was a heavy equipment mechanic who had been sent to Metal Check to repair a piece of their equipment. While working there he was told by some of the Metal Check employees not to enter a certain part of the facility because it contained radioactive pipe. The mechanic immediately left Metal Check and went to the Medical Center."

"That afternoon [an inspector with OKDEQ] went to Metal Check and spoke with the owner and the manager. They agreed to allow [the inspector] to survey the pipe in question and showed [the inspector] the area where it was stored and where the mechanic was working. It appeared to [the inspector] that the pipe was located approximately 40 feet from where the equipment was being repaired, making it impossible for the mechanic to receive any significant dose from this material. [The manager] showed [the inspector] a small bin approximately six feet long by four feet high by four feet deep filled with miscellaneous pieces of scrap metal. The top of the bin was surveyed with a Ludlum Model 19 microR meter (S/N 70537, cal. Aug. 18, 2011) which produced a reading of approximately 1100 microR/hr. This was very high for NORM [naturally occurring radioactive material] pipe and [the inspector] also noted that the radiation level was not uniform along the length of the bin, having a definite spike approximately two feet from the left end. This led [the inspector] to conclude that there was a localized source somewhere in the bin at that point. [The inspector] then contacted [his supervisor] and related what [he] had found at the facility. [The inspector] suggested returning the next day with an additional person and additional instruments, and attempting to locate the postulated radiation source.

"The following morning [the inspector and an associate] returned to Metal Check and began to unload the bin. Almost immediately [they] found what appeared to be a badly corroded metal bucket which had been crushed around an object inside it. A survey of the object with the same Model 19 used the previous day produced a reading of 2.2 mR/hr on contact with the bucket. A Thermo Fisher Interceptor portable gamma spec was used to collect a gamma spectrum from the object, which the instrument identified as shielded Uranium. A second spectrum was collected through a hole in the bucket surrounding the object; this was identified as natural Uranium. A portion of the object was wiped through a hole in the bucket; analysis of the wipe by the DEQ Environmental Lab confirmed the presence of U-235 and U-238, and their daughters. The object was roughly disk-shaped, approximately 12 inches in diameter and one inch thick. One side had a second, smaller disk, approximately 10 inches in diameter, centered on the larger and approximately 2 inches thick. No markings or labels were visible. [The inspectors] estimate the weight of the object at approximately 40 lbs. Three pieces of NORM pipe were also found with high radiation levels (1 mR/hr). All four objects were removed from the bin which was then surveyed again, producing readings of approximately 300 to 400 microR/hr. Rachel Browder and Michelle Hammond of the NRC were informed of the situation later that day by phone. The uranium object was placed in a locked room at the Metal Check facility pending further guidance from NRC."

PART 21 REPORT - PUBLISHED FLOW COEFFICIENTS FOR PILOT OPERATED RELIEF VALVES GREATER THAN ACTUAL

"This is to notify the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR-Part 21 of a potential deviation identified by Flowserve Corporation.

"On May 25, 2012, Flowserve Corporation notified Exelon - Byron and Braidwood Nuclear Power Stations of the results of a Steam flow test performed by Wyle Labs to confirm steam flow capacity against that specified for WKM PORVs. A refurbished size 6 class 900 WKM model 70-19-9 angle pattern control valve with 4" linear trim had been tested to determine its maximum steam flow capacity. The maximum steam flow was approximately 74% of the anticipated flow rate based on the original published WKM rated Cv for the valve.

"Background and Discussion: As part of their power up rate project, Exelon Braidwood Station procured larger 4" linear valve trim from Flowserve, Raleigh for their steam generator PORVs to increase the valve's steam flow capacity. The original valves were supplied by ACF Industries, WKM Valve Division in the mid to late 1970's with 3" linear trim. The designs for the WKM PORV valves were subsequently acquired by Flowserve. The larger trim was installed in a site spare PORV and tested for steam flow capacity.

"CFD analysis performed by Flowserve on the tested valve with the 4" trim, determined a Cv value that would yield steam flows similar to the test results. Analysis of the valve with the original 3" trim produced similarly reduced Cv values.

"Based on this testing and subsequent CFD analysis it appears that the originally published WKM rated Cv values for WKM angle control valve model 70-19-9 for sizes greater than size 2 are higher than actual values. The actual Cv's are believed to be 65% to 75% of the original WKM ratings.

"Conclusion: Based on the above, the Nuclear Industry needs to be notified concerning this deviation so that an evaluation may be performed to determine if this constitutes a defect that could create a substantial safety hazard.

"Although Flowserve subsequently acquired the rights to the WKM PORV designs, it does not have the historic sales records from ACF industries (WKM Valve Division). The total number of WKM valves potentially affected and their installed locations are not known."