Event Notification Report for May 24, 2012

MISSING FLOOD BARRIER INSIDE EAST SWITCHGEAR ROOM

"On 5/24/12, it was identified that a conduit flood seal was missing between an outside manhole and the interior of the switchgear rooms. The missing flood seal compromised the interior flooding design for both East and West Switchgear Rooms. Repairs were made by procuring and installing a 4" flood seal so that the flood path has been plugged. The conduit plug seal is now functional.

"The event is being reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as internal flooding of both Switchgear Rooms could possibly affect (a.)safe shutdown, (b.)removal of decay heat, (c.)control of release of radioactive material and (d.)mitigating an accident."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

REACTOR SCRAM DURING STARTUP

"At 0639 CDT on 5/24/2012. Unit 3 initiated a manual scram due to multiple rods inserting. At 0637 CDT during Unit 3 start-up Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) 'H' was ranged down instead of up resulting in half scram on Reactor Protection System (RPS) 'B' trip system. The half scram was being reset after IRM 'H' was properly ranged. The operator placed the scram reset switch in Group 2/3 position. As the operator reset groups 2 and 3, a spike on IRM 'A' was received on the RPS 'A' trip system, resulting in rod insertion for groups 1 and 4. When the operator identified multiple rods inserting, the actions of procedure 3-AOI-l00-1 were followed and a manual scram was inserted. Investigation is ongoing.

"All safety systems remained in standby readiness configuration. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) reactor water level initiation set points were reached. Primary Containment lsolations Systems did not received actuation signals and performed as designed.

"This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the RPS when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'any event or condition that results in valid actuation of systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) 'Reactor Protection System (RPS) Including reactor scram and reactor trip.' This event requires an LER within 60 days per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

UNAUTHORIZED INDIVIDUAL GAINED ACCESS TO FACILITY

"At 0833 on 05/24/2012, an uncleared vendor employee was piggybacked by a cleared vendor employee through a security gate into the x3012 Security Area. The uncleared employee was removed from the area. There is no known compromise of classified information.

"This incident is reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as an 8 hour Security Event in accordance with American Centrifuge Administrative Procedure ACD2-RG-044, Nuclear Regulatory Event Reporting, Appendix B, Section K2, IMI-3#14, which states, 'Circumvention of established access control procedures into a security area (excluding Property Protection Area)."

The licensee notified NRC Region 2 (Hartland).

* * * RETRACTION AT 1100 EDT ON 07/18/12 FROM CHARLES SEIDEL TO S. SANDIN * * *

"Update: On 07-18-12 at 1017 the NRC Event has been retracted on the guidance of the Regulatory Organization for the following reason:

"It has been determined that the two previously reported DOE IMI-3 events for 2012 did not meet the requirements for an NRC reportable event and should have been entered into the written log in accordance with 10 CFR 95.57. While they did meet the criteria for an 8-hr reportable event to the DOE they did not meet the NRC requirements for reporting to the NRC Operations Office. We hereby request that both NRC Events 48084 and 47956 be retracted."

Notified R2DO (Desai).

DENSITY GAUGE SHUTTER FAILURE

During a routine bi-annual periodic inspection, a density gauge with a 4 milliCurie Cs-137 source was identified to have a stuck shutter. The gauge was an Ohmart Vega Model SHF1-A, S/N 0964C0. The instrument is permanently installed in an isolated tower area, and this event did not result in exposure to any personnel. The licensee plans on having the gauge repaired by the manufacturer.

The licensee notified R3 (Bramnik).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO OIL SHEEN ON THE RIVER

"On 5/24/2012 at 1541 EDT, a notification to the National Response Center was made after the discovery of a visible oil sheen on waters of the U.S. (the Tennessee River side of Sequoyah's intake forebay skimmer wall). The source of the oil appears to be a tipped or overflowing catchpan located in the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) pumping station. All catchpans in the pumping station have been emptied to eliminate them as immediate potential source of oil released to the environment.

"The following agencies have also been notified: EPA Region 4, and the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA). The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) will be notified.

"Cleanup is in progress. Measures to prevent recurrence are being taken."

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOSS OF FEEDWATER

"At 1348 CDT on 5/24/12 with the Reactor at 33% power, River Bend Station operators inserted a manual reactor scram based on loss of high pressure feed to the reactor following a loss of a 13.8 Kv switchgear.

"The Control Room team observed an electrical transient in the Control Room concurrent with the start of Reactor Feed Pump "B".

"The crew identified that no high pressure feed was aligned to the reactor and inserted a manual scram. Based on the configuration of the electrical plant during startup, all circulating water and Normal Service Water (NSW) was supplied from NPS-SWG1B. MSIVs were closed based on loss of circulating water and Standby Service Water (SSW) initiated automatically based on loss of NSW.

"EOP-0001, 'RPV Control' was entered on reactor high pressure and reactor low water level. EOP-0002, 'Primary Containment Control' was entered based on primary containment pressure high and suppression pool level high. EOP-0003, 'Secondary Containment Control', was entered on annulus pressure high.

"Reactor water level control is being maintained with Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC). High pressure core spray was manually started but was not required and was subsequently shut down. Pressure control is via RCIC and Safety Relief Valves (SRVs). Safety related busses are aligned to offsite power as normal. They were not affected by the electrical transient.

"Immediately after the scram at 1350, a report from the Turbine Building indicated smoke was seen around the Reactor Feed Pump 'B' termination cabinet. The Fire Brigade was activated. At 1358, the Fire Brigade reported that there was no fire. A review of the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) was performed. No emergency declaration was required.

"Initial investigation shows damage to cabling and circuit boards associated with Reactor Feedpump 'B' in the Turbine Building, but no fire was ever observed.

"In addition, the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) lost power. At the time, both facilities continued to be in a state of readiness and emergency functions could be performed. At 1526, power was restored to both facilities, including the ventilation systems."

All rods inserted into the core. The unit is stable at 230 psi and 391 degrees F. Reactor pressure is maintained by RCIC and decay heat removal via safety relief valves to the suppression pool. The unit is in a technical specification for suppression pool high level. There were no safety system failures. There is one non-safety related 13.8 switchgear out of service due to this event and NNS-Switchgear 2A out of service from an event three days ago. Offsite assistance was not required.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

60 - DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION OF AN INVALID DIVISION 2 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(3)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.

"On May 24, 2012, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) received a Division 2 primary containment isolation signal which resulted in closure of Group 3, 8, and 9 primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in the following systems:

"Group 3 PCIVs: Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) ball valves (the TIPS were already withdrawn and the ball valves were already closed); nitrogen purge to TIP indexing mechanism.

"Group 8 PCIVs: Reactor building closed loop cooling system; drywell equipment drain system; drywell floor drain system; instrument air system; hydrogen recombiner system; containment monitoring system; reactor recirculation system flow control valve hydraulic system; containment leakage monitoring system.

"Group 9 PCIVs: Containment purge system (the containment purge valves were already closed).

"All affected PCIVs responded as designed. In addition, the Division 2 containment isolation signal resulted in isolation of the Reactor Building normal ventilation system, starting of the Division 1 and Division 2 standby gas treatment subsystems, starting of the Division 1 and Division 2 Reactor Building safety-related unit coolers, and starting of the Division 2 Control Room envelope filtration subsystem.

"The Division 2 isolation signal was generated during a maintenance activity involving the replacement of a relay in a main control room panel. During the activity, an installed jumper became dislodged from its point of origin, leading to a blown control power fuse and generation of the Division 2 isolation signal. Since the isolation signal was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation, the isolation signal was determined to be invalid.

"This event was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report (CR) 2012-005128. There were no safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event."

The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RECOVERED PACEMAKER

"A patient with a Pu-238 pacemaker died on 5/16/12 and was scheduled to be buried on 5/26/2012. Berkshire Medical Center (BMC) observed the obituary in the newspaper on 5/24/2012 and contacted funeral home to retrieve the pacemaker. The funeral home still possessed the pacemaker as it was extracted before the patient was cremated. On 5/24/2012, the BMC Radiation Safety Officer retrieved the pacemaker. Radiation measurements of the pacemaker were less than 1 mR/hr near the surface and not detectable above background at 1 meter. Leak tests were also not detectable above background.

"BMC registered the source with the DOE Off-Site Recovery Project (OSRP) to have it disposed."

Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf.