Event Notification Report for January 11, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/10/2012 - 01/11/2012
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47585
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNETH BRESLIN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNETH BRESLIN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 01/12/2012
Notification Time: 04:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2012
Event Time: 22:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2012
Notification Time: 04:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2012
Event Time: 22:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On January 11, 2012 at 22:15 [EST], the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to a failure of the turbine governor valve to respond to demanded position. When demanded to travel to the full closed position, the governor valve remained full open rendering the speed and flow control system for the turbine inoperable. The failure was discovered as part of a planned maintenance evolution.
"All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. The unit remains at 100% power.
"The station has initiated an Event Response Team to identify and correct the cause of the failure. No personnel injuries resulted from the event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector [has been notified] and Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified."
The unit is in a 14-day LCO for HPCI inoperability.
* * * RETRACTION FROM JAMES PRIEST TO VINCE KLCO ON 1/13/12 AT 1644 EST * * *
"The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #47585: On January 11, 2012, Hope Creek Generating Station reported to the NRC that High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to a failure of the turbine governor valve to respond to demanded position. This condition was discovered when obtaining an oil sample from the HPCI system. According to the procedure, the HPCI flow controller automatic setpoint was lowered to zero. The procedure set the manual controller setpoint by having the operator lower the demand for a time period rather than verifying the setpoint at zero. The HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump is then started. The governor valve was expected to start to open (intermediate position) and then close. Instead the valve went to the full open position and did not respond to attempts to close the valve from the flow controller. Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to the apparent loss of safety function for Unit 1.
"Subsequent technical evaluation concluded that the performance and response of the HPCI turbine governor control valve was as expected based on the manual controller demand being at 35% when the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump was started to collect a HPCI oil sample. The Engineering review concluded that there are no problems with the HPCI turbine governor control valve response to controller demand. Operating procedures have been revised to provide guidance on verifying manual controller demand at 0% before placing the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump in service under standby conditions for oil sampling or similar evolutions. Since January 11th, 2012, HPCI has remained available to perform its required safety functions and only became inoperable during planned evolutions to either obtain oil samples or to investigate HPCI turbine governor control valve performance. On this basis, the HPCI system was capable of performing its function to mitigate the consequences of an accident and the issue described in Event #47585 is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified of this retraction."
Notified R1DO (Trapp).
"On January 11, 2012 at 22:15 [EST], the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to a failure of the turbine governor valve to respond to demanded position. When demanded to travel to the full closed position, the governor valve remained full open rendering the speed and flow control system for the turbine inoperable. The failure was discovered as part of a planned maintenance evolution.
"All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. The unit remains at 100% power.
"The station has initiated an Event Response Team to identify and correct the cause of the failure. No personnel injuries resulted from the event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector [has been notified] and Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified."
The unit is in a 14-day LCO for HPCI inoperability.
* * * RETRACTION FROM JAMES PRIEST TO VINCE KLCO ON 1/13/12 AT 1644 EST * * *
"The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #47585: On January 11, 2012, Hope Creek Generating Station reported to the NRC that High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to a failure of the turbine governor valve to respond to demanded position. This condition was discovered when obtaining an oil sample from the HPCI system. According to the procedure, the HPCI flow controller automatic setpoint was lowered to zero. The procedure set the manual controller setpoint by having the operator lower the demand for a time period rather than verifying the setpoint at zero. The HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump is then started. The governor valve was expected to start to open (intermediate position) and then close. Instead the valve went to the full open position and did not respond to attempts to close the valve from the flow controller. Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to the apparent loss of safety function for Unit 1.
"Subsequent technical evaluation concluded that the performance and response of the HPCI turbine governor control valve was as expected based on the manual controller demand being at 35% when the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump was started to collect a HPCI oil sample. The Engineering review concluded that there are no problems with the HPCI turbine governor control valve response to controller demand. Operating procedures have been revised to provide guidance on verifying manual controller demand at 0% before placing the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump in service under standby conditions for oil sampling or similar evolutions. Since January 11th, 2012, HPCI has remained available to perform its required safety functions and only became inoperable during planned evolutions to either obtain oil samples or to investigate HPCI turbine governor control valve performance. On this basis, the HPCI system was capable of performing its function to mitigate the consequences of an accident and the issue described in Event #47585 is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified of this retraction."
Notified R1DO (Trapp).
Agreement State
Event Number: 47642
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: GENERAL NUCLEONICS, INC
Region: 4
City: POMONA State: CA
County:
License #: 1288-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: GENERAL NUCLEONICS, INC
Region: 4
City: POMONA State: CA
County:
License #: 1288-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD OESTERLE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 02/06/2012
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2012
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
LINDA HOWELL (R4DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PACKAGE RECEIVED CONTAINING LEAKING SOURCES
The following was received from the State of California via email:
"On Jan. 26, 2012, [the] NRC sent an e-mail to RHB [Radiation Health Branch] management stating that General Nucleonics, Inc. had 22 boxes containing Inflight Blade Inspection (IBIS) devices containing Sr-90 sources (500 microcuries each, Generally Licensed devices) returned to them from the Dept. of the Navy. When the packages were opened, it was discovered that 11 devices were damaged and 5 had removable contamination above 0.005 microcuries. The source manufacturer is QSA Global (formerly AEA Tech), model was Amersham/ now GNI PN # 12205-5 and were installed into GNI PN 12210-1 IBIS Pressure Indicators. Leak testing was performed on 1/11/2012. Source # 3482 / IBIS # 1798, leak test results: 0.13 microcuries of contamination; Source # 1673/ IBIS # 095, leak test results: 0.38 microcuries of contamination; Source # 235 / IBIS # 288, leak test results: 0.30 microcuries of contamination; Source # 2926/ IBIS # 371, leak test results: 0.15 microcuries of contamination; Source # 2843/ IBIS # 378, leak test results: 0.22 microcuries of contamination.
"All indicators were placed into sealed bags and placed into a glove box. The source receiving and testing areas were checked for contamination and none was found. Each IBIS was installed on a U.S.N. CH-53 Sikorsky helicopter for 'warning' of incipient blade failure. Damage had occurred to the top of the indicators, source capsules had been damaged and the source retaining rods were bent from their normal vertical positions. General Nucleonics will be eventually disposing of these devices through a radioactive waste broker."
CA 5010 #: 012612
The following was received from the State of California via email:
"On Jan. 26, 2012, [the] NRC sent an e-mail to RHB [Radiation Health Branch] management stating that General Nucleonics, Inc. had 22 boxes containing Inflight Blade Inspection (IBIS) devices containing Sr-90 sources (500 microcuries each, Generally Licensed devices) returned to them from the Dept. of the Navy. When the packages were opened, it was discovered that 11 devices were damaged and 5 had removable contamination above 0.005 microcuries. The source manufacturer is QSA Global (formerly AEA Tech), model was Amersham/ now GNI PN # 12205-5 and were installed into GNI PN 12210-1 IBIS Pressure Indicators. Leak testing was performed on 1/11/2012. Source # 3482 / IBIS # 1798, leak test results: 0.13 microcuries of contamination; Source # 1673/ IBIS # 095, leak test results: 0.38 microcuries of contamination; Source # 235 / IBIS # 288, leak test results: 0.30 microcuries of contamination; Source # 2926/ IBIS # 371, leak test results: 0.15 microcuries of contamination; Source # 2843/ IBIS # 378, leak test results: 0.22 microcuries of contamination.
"All indicators were placed into sealed bags and placed into a glove box. The source receiving and testing areas were checked for contamination and none was found. Each IBIS was installed on a U.S.N. CH-53 Sikorsky helicopter for 'warning' of incipient blade failure. Damage had occurred to the top of the indicators, source capsules had been damaged and the source retaining rods were bent from their normal vertical positions. General Nucleonics will be eventually disposing of these devices through a radioactive waste broker."
CA 5010 #: 012612