Event Notification Report for October 24, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/23/2011 - 10/24/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
4736847369473704737247445
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47368
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: PAT FOTI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: PAT FOTI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/24/2011
Notification Time: 09:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2011
Event Time: 01:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2011
Notification Time: 09:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2011
Event Time: 01:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH DIVISIONS OF THE RWCU HIGH DIFFERENTIAL FLOW ISOLATION FUNCTION REMOVED FROM SERVICE
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). On October 23, 2011 at 0915 EDT, the Division 1 Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system differential flow - high channel was declared inoperable due to failing its channel check. A troubleshooting plan was developed to determine the cause for the failed channel check. In accordance with this troubleshooting plan, at three separate times (October 24, 2011 at 0152, 0258, and 0519), both the Division 1 and Division 2 RWCU differential flow timers were placed in bypass, and Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.6.1, Condition B was entered for one or more automatic functions with isolation capability not maintained. In each of the three instances, one channel of the RWCU differential flow - high function was restored to Operable status within 1 hour as required by TS 3.3.6.1 Required Action B.1. It was believed at the time of the troubleshooting evolutions that this condition was not reportable because it was a planned maintenance evolution performed in accordance with approved procedures and the plant TS; however, further review has concluded that disabling both divisions of the RWCU differential flow - high function constitutes a reportable condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). On October 23, 2011 at 0915 EDT, the Division 1 Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system differential flow - high channel was declared inoperable due to failing its channel check. A troubleshooting plan was developed to determine the cause for the failed channel check. In accordance with this troubleshooting plan, at three separate times (October 24, 2011 at 0152, 0258, and 0519), both the Division 1 and Division 2 RWCU differential flow timers were placed in bypass, and Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.6.1, Condition B was entered for one or more automatic functions with isolation capability not maintained. In each of the three instances, one channel of the RWCU differential flow - high function was restored to Operable status within 1 hour as required by TS 3.3.6.1 Required Action B.1. It was believed at the time of the troubleshooting evolutions that this condition was not reportable because it was a planned maintenance evolution performed in accordance with approved procedures and the plant TS; however, further review has concluded that disabling both divisions of the RWCU differential flow - high function constitutes a reportable condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47369
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DANIEL A. KOMM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DANIEL A. KOMM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/24/2011
Notification Time: 17:01 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2011
Event Time: 16:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2011
Notification Time: 17:01 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2011
Event Time: 16:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 1 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO ERRATIC IRM INDICATIONS DURING STARTUP
"While performing a startup of HNP-2, after reaching criticality, the crew observed erratic indications on two Intermediate Range Monitors (IRMs), 2C51K601A and 2C51K601C. IRM 2C51K601A had been spiking and was subsequently bypassed. The 2C51K601C was spiking downscale and could not be bypassed due to the 2C51K601A being bypassed already. Both IRMs are in the 'A' RPS trip system. At the time when the second IRM was acting erratic, the crew identified the condition as both IRMs in the same quadrant and did not continue withdrawal of control rods. As a result of not withdrawing control rods, reactor power began to decrease and the crew conservatively inserted a manual reactor scram to shutdown the reactor. All rods did fully insert into the core. No PCIS [Primary Containment Isolation System] actuations occurred and none were expected to occur based on plant conditions following the scram.
"At this time, investigation is in progress, but the investigation and corrective actions have not yet been completed.
"The crew is maintaining HNP-2 in Hot Standby [Mode 3] at this time."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"While performing a startup of HNP-2, after reaching criticality, the crew observed erratic indications on two Intermediate Range Monitors (IRMs), 2C51K601A and 2C51K601C. IRM 2C51K601A had been spiking and was subsequently bypassed. The 2C51K601C was spiking downscale and could not be bypassed due to the 2C51K601A being bypassed already. Both IRMs are in the 'A' RPS trip system. At the time when the second IRM was acting erratic, the crew identified the condition as both IRMs in the same quadrant and did not continue withdrawal of control rods. As a result of not withdrawing control rods, reactor power began to decrease and the crew conservatively inserted a manual reactor scram to shutdown the reactor. All rods did fully insert into the core. No PCIS [Primary Containment Isolation System] actuations occurred and none were expected to occur based on plant conditions following the scram.
"At this time, investigation is in progress, but the investigation and corrective actions have not yet been completed.
"The crew is maintaining HNP-2 in Hot Standby [Mode 3] at this time."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47370
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: AMY MCMARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: AMY MCMARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/24/2011
Notification Time: 17:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2011
Event Time: 10:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2011
Notification Time: 17:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2011
Event Time: 10:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEMS OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO MAINTENANCE ERROR
"On 10/24/11 at 1035 CDT, a maintenance technician performing a field walk-down of a clearance order inadvertently opened the bus potential fuse drawer for Unit 2 Safety Related Bus 23. This caused all loads of Bus 23 to receive an undervoltage (UV) load shed signal. Division I Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) pumps are powered from Bus 23 and are currently aligned to the Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) Air Conditioning system. On a loss of CCSW, the CREV Air Conditioning system is inoperable due to a loss of its emergency cooling water supply. This condition affects both Dresden Units 2 and 3. This condition lasted for approximately 7 seconds before the bus potential fuse drawer was reinserted and the Bus 23 UV condition cleared.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 10/24/11 at 1035 CDT, a maintenance technician performing a field walk-down of a clearance order inadvertently opened the bus potential fuse drawer for Unit 2 Safety Related Bus 23. This caused all loads of Bus 23 to receive an undervoltage (UV) load shed signal. Division I Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) pumps are powered from Bus 23 and are currently aligned to the Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) Air Conditioning system. On a loss of CCSW, the CREV Air Conditioning system is inoperable due to a loss of its emergency cooling water supply. This condition affects both Dresden Units 2 and 3. This condition lasted for approximately 7 seconds before the bus potential fuse drawer was reinserted and the Bus 23 UV condition cleared.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47372
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDON ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDON ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/24/2011
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2011
Event Time: 17:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2011
Notification Time: 20:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2011
Event Time: 17:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY OPERATION FACILITY OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY
" At 1715 hours on 10/24/2011, replacement of a router and circuit at the Emergency Operation Facility (EOF) commenced. This action will cause a temporary outage of network devices such as personal computers, telephones, printers, routers, switches, alarm panels, and wireless communications. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 8 hours. If use of the EOF is subsequently required, this condition may delay activation of the EOF until equipment is restored. Restoration of the equipment will take less than one hour.
"This is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the State of Pennsylvania, Luzerne and Columbia Counties and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ROBINSON TO KLCO ON 10/24/2011 AT 2252 * * *
Systems have been restored and the EOF is operable. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (DeFrancisco).
" At 1715 hours on 10/24/2011, replacement of a router and circuit at the Emergency Operation Facility (EOF) commenced. This action will cause a temporary outage of network devices such as personal computers, telephones, printers, routers, switches, alarm panels, and wireless communications. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 8 hours. If use of the EOF is subsequently required, this condition may delay activation of the EOF until equipment is restored. Restoration of the equipment will take less than one hour.
"This is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the State of Pennsylvania, Luzerne and Columbia Counties and the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ROBINSON TO KLCO ON 10/24/2011 AT 2252 * * *
Systems have been restored and the EOF is operable. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (DeFrancisco).
Agreement State
Event Number: 47445
Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: ATLANTIC STATES CAST IRON COMPANY
Region: 1
City: PHILLIPSBURG State: NJ
County:
License #: 507414
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CATHERINE BIEL
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: ATLANTIC STATES CAST IRON COMPANY
Region: 1
City: PHILLIPSBURG State: NJ
County:
License #: 507414
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CATHERINE BIEL
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 11/16/2011
Notification Time: 10:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2011
Notification Time: 10:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
JOHN CARUSO (R1DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE - SHUTTER FELL OFF FIXED PROCESS GAUGE
"The licensee's two fixed gauges were locked out because of maintenance on refractory equipment occurring the weekend of 10/22/11. On the morning of 10/24/11 it was discovered that the shutter had fallen. The exact timing of when the shutter fell is under investigation. This event resulted in a possible overexposure of members of the public.
"Staff from the NJDEP (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection) is visiting the site today, 11/15/11."
The gauge is a TN Technologies Model #5204, S/N B585, fixed gauge containing 8 Ci of Cs-137.
NJ Incident #: 410183
"The licensee's two fixed gauges were locked out because of maintenance on refractory equipment occurring the weekend of 10/22/11. On the morning of 10/24/11 it was discovered that the shutter had fallen. The exact timing of when the shutter fell is under investigation. This event resulted in a possible overexposure of members of the public.
"Staff from the NJDEP (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection) is visiting the site today, 11/15/11."
The gauge is a TN Technologies Model #5204, S/N B585, fixed gauge containing 8 Ci of Cs-137.
NJ Incident #: 410183