Event Notification Report for April 28, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/27/2011 - 04/28/2011
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 46799
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: BOB STOKES
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: BOB STOKES
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 04/28/2011
Notification Time: 17:23 [ET]
Event Date: 04/28/2011
Event Time: 03:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2011
Notification Time: 17:23 [ET]
Event Date: 04/28/2011
Event Time: 03:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/28/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(3) - MED TREAT INVOLVING CONTAM
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
ERIC BENNER (NMSS)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
ERIC BENNER (NMSS)
MEDICAL TREATMENT ONSITE OF A CONTAMINATED EMPLOYEE
"[An] employee was treated for a chemical exposure at 0330 hours CDT on his ring finger. The employee had contamination on his shoes and coveralls. Contamination levels were 1500 dpm/100cm2 on his coveralls cuff and 200 dpm/100cm2 on the soles of his boots. There was no detectable contamination on the employee's skin. The employee was treated for the chemical exposure [weak hydrofluoric acid or caustic] and returned to work. Reporting IAW 10CFR40.60(b)(3)."
There was no release of contamination offsite involved in this incident.
The licensee informed the NRC Senior Inspector RII (R. Gibson) of this incident.
"[An] employee was treated for a chemical exposure at 0330 hours CDT on his ring finger. The employee had contamination on his shoes and coveralls. Contamination levels were 1500 dpm/100cm2 on his coveralls cuff and 200 dpm/100cm2 on the soles of his boots. There was no detectable contamination on the employee's skin. The employee was treated for the chemical exposure [weak hydrofluoric acid or caustic] and returned to work. Reporting IAW 10CFR40.60(b)(3)."
There was no release of contamination offsite involved in this incident.
The licensee informed the NRC Senior Inspector RII (R. Gibson) of this incident.
Agreement State
Event Number: 46800
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: GREAT SALT LAKE MINERALS CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: OGDEN State: UT
County:
License #: UT2900154
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THILIP GRIFFIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: GREAT SALT LAKE MINERALS CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: OGDEN State: UT
County:
License #: UT2900154
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THILIP GRIFFIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 04/28/2011
Notification Time: 17:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/28/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2011
Notification Time: 17:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/28/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (FSME)
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
JOSEPHINE PICCONE (FSME)
MISSING THERMO MEASURETECH MODEL 5201 DENSITY GAUGE
The State of Utah is making a preliminary report that a Thermo MeasureTech Model 5201 density gauge was discovered missing. The gauge was attached to a pipe that was removed. That section of pipe had been locked shut and not in use for a period of over 3 years. The last time the gauge was accounted for was October 29, 2010. The licensee is conducting a search of the site to locate the gauge.
* * * UPDATE FROM PHILIP GRIFFIN TO CHARLES TEAL ON 5/2/11 AT 1759 EDT * * *
"The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and the Assistant RSO (ARSO) were performing a routine 6-month physical inventory of the devices in the licensee's possession containing radioactive material when they noticed that one of the fixed gauging devices was missing. The device was a Thermo Measuretech Model 5201 (serial #B3988) densitometer containing a 100 mCi Cs-137 source that was attached to a pipe. The device had not been used for more than 3 years prior to the incident, and the licensee had 'locked out' the device at that time with the shutter in the 'closed' position. The RSO had accounted for the gauge during a physical inventory on October 29, 2010. At the time of the incident, the device and the pipe were gone.
"At the time of this report, the RSO and ARSO are continuing to contact anyone who may have any knowledge as to the location/disposition of the device. The RSO and ARSO are also contacting various waste companies and scrap metal companies to see if they received a gauge containing radioactive material, if the company has the capability of measuring for radiation, and to ask them to keep a watch out for the gauge.
"The licensee is undergoing expansion, and employs a number of contractors. The licensee stated that all of the licensee's employees are thoroughly instructed in radiation safety, and that the employees are told that no work involving the licensee's gauges can be done without the RSO or ARSO being present. The licensee's contractors are provided general radiation safety training twice a year.
"The licensee's working theory regarding the loss of the gauge is that a contractor was working in that area of the licensee's facility and was instructed to demolish that portion of the facility. Since contractor often use a demolish that portion of the facility the licensee speculates that a contractor may have placed the gauge in the waste bin with the other materials from the demolition, and the waste bin was then hauled off by a waste disposal company. The licensee is currently attempting to identify any contractors who may have been working in the area of the gauge during the time period from October 29, 2010, to the present."
Notified R4DO (Proulx) and FSME EO (Piccone).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Although IAEA categorization of this event is typically based on device type, the staff has been made aware of the actual activity of the source, and after calculation determines that it is a Less than Cat 3 event.
Note: the value assigned by device type "Category 3" is different than the calculated value "Less than Cat 3"
The State of Utah is making a preliminary report that a Thermo MeasureTech Model 5201 density gauge was discovered missing. The gauge was attached to a pipe that was removed. That section of pipe had been locked shut and not in use for a period of over 3 years. The last time the gauge was accounted for was October 29, 2010. The licensee is conducting a search of the site to locate the gauge.
* * * UPDATE FROM PHILIP GRIFFIN TO CHARLES TEAL ON 5/2/11 AT 1759 EDT * * *
"The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) and the Assistant RSO (ARSO) were performing a routine 6-month physical inventory of the devices in the licensee's possession containing radioactive material when they noticed that one of the fixed gauging devices was missing. The device was a Thermo Measuretech Model 5201 (serial #B3988) densitometer containing a 100 mCi Cs-137 source that was attached to a pipe. The device had not been used for more than 3 years prior to the incident, and the licensee had 'locked out' the device at that time with the shutter in the 'closed' position. The RSO had accounted for the gauge during a physical inventory on October 29, 2010. At the time of the incident, the device and the pipe were gone.
"At the time of this report, the RSO and ARSO are continuing to contact anyone who may have any knowledge as to the location/disposition of the device. The RSO and ARSO are also contacting various waste companies and scrap metal companies to see if they received a gauge containing radioactive material, if the company has the capability of measuring for radiation, and to ask them to keep a watch out for the gauge.
"The licensee is undergoing expansion, and employs a number of contractors. The licensee stated that all of the licensee's employees are thoroughly instructed in radiation safety, and that the employees are told that no work involving the licensee's gauges can be done without the RSO or ARSO being present. The licensee's contractors are provided general radiation safety training twice a year.
"The licensee's working theory regarding the loss of the gauge is that a contractor was working in that area of the licensee's facility and was instructed to demolish that portion of the facility. Since contractor often use a demolish that portion of the facility the licensee speculates that a contractor may have placed the gauge in the waste bin with the other materials from the demolition, and the waste bin was then hauled off by a waste disposal company. The licensee is currently attempting to identify any contractors who may have been working in the area of the gauge during the time period from October 29, 2010, to the present."
Notified R4DO (Proulx) and FSME EO (Piccone).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Although IAEA categorization of this event is typically based on device type, the staff has been made aware of the actual activity of the source, and after calculation determines that it is a Less than Cat 3 event.
Note: the value assigned by device type "Category 3" is different than the calculated value "Less than Cat 3"
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46801
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 04/29/2011
Notification Time: 07:26 [ET]
Event Date: 04/28/2011
Event Time: 23:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2011
Notification Time: 07:26 [ET]
Event Date: 04/28/2011
Event Time: 23:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION DUE TO LOSS OF POWER FROM A DIESEL GENERATOR
"At 2338 [CDT] on 04/28/2011, with Browns Ferry Nuclear Unit 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 4, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, performed a shutdown of the Unit 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator 'C,' due to an oil leak coming from its governor causing voltage and frequency fluctuations. Following securing of the Unit 1/2 Diesel Generator 'C,' the 4kV Shutdown Board 'C,' which was being powered by DG 'C,' de-energized. This resulted in a loss of power to the 1B RPS, causing a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation and the automatic initiation of the three trains of Standby Gas and 1 train of CREV [Control Room Emergency Ventilation System]. The PCIS isolation (Group 2) also caused a loss of Shutdown Cooling on Unit 1 which was restored at 0025 [CDT] 04/29/2011 .
"In addition, the loss of power to the 4kV Shutdown Board 'C.' also caused the loss of 2B RHR Pump, leading to a momentary suspension of shutdown cooling to Unit 2. Shutdown cooling was immediately restored to Unit 2 using the 2D RHR Pump at 2342 [CDT].
"The general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system is reportable as an 8 hour notification to the NRC IAW 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), as 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'
"There were no new Technical Specification LCO's entered as a result of this event.
"This is also reportable as 60 day written report lAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).
"The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified of this event.
"This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as SR# 361382."
"At 2338 [CDT] on 04/28/2011, with Browns Ferry Nuclear Unit 1 and Unit 2 in Mode 4, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, performed a shutdown of the Unit 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator 'C,' due to an oil leak coming from its governor causing voltage and frequency fluctuations. Following securing of the Unit 1/2 Diesel Generator 'C,' the 4kV Shutdown Board 'C,' which was being powered by DG 'C,' de-energized. This resulted in a loss of power to the 1B RPS, causing a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation and the automatic initiation of the three trains of Standby Gas and 1 train of CREV [Control Room Emergency Ventilation System]. The PCIS isolation (Group 2) also caused a loss of Shutdown Cooling on Unit 1 which was restored at 0025 [CDT] 04/29/2011 .
"In addition, the loss of power to the 4kV Shutdown Board 'C.' also caused the loss of 2B RHR Pump, leading to a momentary suspension of shutdown cooling to Unit 2. Shutdown cooling was immediately restored to Unit 2 using the 2D RHR Pump at 2342 [CDT].
"The general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system is reportable as an 8 hour notification to the NRC IAW 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), as 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'
"There were no new Technical Specification LCO's entered as a result of this event.
"This is also reportable as 60 day written report lAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).
"The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified of this event.
"This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as SR# 361382."