Event Notification Report for February 02, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/01/2010 - 02/02/2010
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45672
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOE WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOE WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 02/02/2010
Notification Time: 20:37 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2010
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2010
Notification Time: 20:37 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2010
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PRIMARY EOF UNAVAILABLE DUE TO FAILURE OF VENTILATION DAMPER POSITION INDICATION
"On February 2, 2010, at approximately 1400 CST, Entergy personnel manually switched the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Ventilation System Panel to the isolation mode. This manual switching to the isolation mode will cause the isolation dampers to close and the movement of the dampers closing can normally be heard. An indication light on the ventilation panel will illuminate when the dampers close. For the manual isolation on February 2, 2010, these indications did not occur. Waterford 3 personnel have made a judgment that the isolation dampers may not be closed due the lack of the aforementioned indications. The EOF ventilation system is not able to perform its isolation function if the dampers are not closed. The ventilation system and associated dampers are designed to provide protection from radiological and toxic chemical release. This report is being made because the time to restore the ventilation system to functional status is indeterminate at this time, until the actual condition of the ventilation system can be established.
"The back up EOF facility is judged to be functional based on January 12, 2010 communications check and facility readiness verifications on January 28, 2010."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On February 2, 2010, at approximately 1400 CST, Entergy personnel manually switched the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Ventilation System Panel to the isolation mode. This manual switching to the isolation mode will cause the isolation dampers to close and the movement of the dampers closing can normally be heard. An indication light on the ventilation panel will illuminate when the dampers close. For the manual isolation on February 2, 2010, these indications did not occur. Waterford 3 personnel have made a judgment that the isolation dampers may not be closed due the lack of the aforementioned indications. The EOF ventilation system is not able to perform its isolation function if the dampers are not closed. The ventilation system and associated dampers are designed to provide protection from radiological and toxic chemical release. This report is being made because the time to restore the ventilation system to functional status is indeterminate at this time, until the actual condition of the ventilation system can be established.
"The back up EOF facility is judged to be functional based on January 12, 2010 communications check and facility readiness verifications on January 28, 2010."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45673
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL ARENS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL ARENS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 02/03/2010
Notification Time: 03:14 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2010
Event Time: 20:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2010
Notification Time: 03:14 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2010
Event Time: 20:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TWO OF THREE TRAINS OF AUXILIARY FEED WATER DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On 2/2/10, at 1615 [CST], the Unit 1 TDAFW [Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water] Pump was declared inoperable due to a high temperature identified on an electrical cable in the TDAFW UPS [Uninterrupted Power Supply]. The 1B Diesel Generator had previously been removed from service for scheduled maintenance. As required by the Diesel Generator LCO Required Action Statement, the Unit 1 'B' MDAFW [Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water] Pump was declared inoperable at 2015 [CST], on 2/2/10, due to the combination of its inoperable emergency power supply and inoperable redundant equipment. This resulted in two of three trains of Auxiliary Feed Water being inoperable. Because two out of the three trains of AFW [Auxiliary Feed Water] are required to meet flow requirements for limiting design basis accidents, this represents a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"Repairs to the electrical cable were immediately initiated. At 2216 [CST], on 2/2/10, the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump was returned to operable status, allowing the 1B MDAFW Pump to be declared operable, and restoring the safety function."
The licensee determined that the high temperature in the electrical cable was caused by a high resistance between the lug and cable connection.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 2/2/10, at 1615 [CST], the Unit 1 TDAFW [Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water] Pump was declared inoperable due to a high temperature identified on an electrical cable in the TDAFW UPS [Uninterrupted Power Supply]. The 1B Diesel Generator had previously been removed from service for scheduled maintenance. As required by the Diesel Generator LCO Required Action Statement, the Unit 1 'B' MDAFW [Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water] Pump was declared inoperable at 2015 [CST], on 2/2/10, due to the combination of its inoperable emergency power supply and inoperable redundant equipment. This resulted in two of three trains of Auxiliary Feed Water being inoperable. Because two out of the three trains of AFW [Auxiliary Feed Water] are required to meet flow requirements for limiting design basis accidents, this represents a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"Repairs to the electrical cable were immediately initiated. At 2216 [CST], on 2/2/10, the Unit 1 TDAFW Pump was returned to operable status, allowing the 1B MDAFW Pump to be declared operable, and restoring the safety function."
The licensee determined that the high temperature in the electrical cable was caused by a high resistance between the lug and cable connection.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.