Event Notification Report for July 13, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/12/2009 - 07/13/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
45203452044520545200
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45203
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/14/2009
Notification Time: 01:46 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2009
Event Time: 22:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2009
Notification Time: 01:46 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2009
Event Time: 22:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF ENS PHONE CIRCUITS AND SOME COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY
"At 2200 CDT on 7/13/09 it was discovered the Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone lines in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms and the Technical Support Center were not functioning. Additionally, the Health Physics Network is not functioning. This discovery occurred during extent of condition troubleshooting when it was determined that local cellular phone and land-line phone service was unavailable in some local areas. A successful land-line phone call to the NRC Operations Center was completed following this discovery, All State and local authorities required to be contacted in the event of an Emergency Class declaration were contacted via land-lines and made aware of the situation.
"Also at this time, the Dedicated Emergency Fax/Voice System (DEF/VS) is unable to fax to the Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) Little Rock Operations Center. Land-line voice communications to Little Rock have been verified. The Russellville ADH office is able to receive fax notifications from ANO and can ensure that all state and local agencies can be notified. The Russellville ADH office will remain manned until the situation is resolved.
"At approximately 2345 CDT, it was determined that the NRC Operations Center was unable to directly contact either Unit 1 or Unit 2 control room.
"The cause of the loss of communications is suspected to be a major fiber-optic line being cut In Morrilton, Arkansas. No estimate of time for repairs Is available at this time."
The licensee has established that communication capability exists via either radio or phone with local emergency response and law enforcement organizations. The licensee can still contact the NRC via commercial circuits but cannot receive calls from the NRC. A dedicated cell phone line has been established by the licensee to facilitate communication from the NRC if necessary.
State and local authorities have been informed of the problem. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified and has responded to the site.
* * * UPDATE BY HUFFMAN AT 0500 EDT ON 7/14/09 * * *
The ENS lines and commercial phone service have been restored to ANO and verified operable. R4DO (Gaddy) notified.
"At 2200 CDT on 7/13/09 it was discovered the Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone lines in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms and the Technical Support Center were not functioning. Additionally, the Health Physics Network is not functioning. This discovery occurred during extent of condition troubleshooting when it was determined that local cellular phone and land-line phone service was unavailable in some local areas. A successful land-line phone call to the NRC Operations Center was completed following this discovery, All State and local authorities required to be contacted in the event of an Emergency Class declaration were contacted via land-lines and made aware of the situation.
"Also at this time, the Dedicated Emergency Fax/Voice System (DEF/VS) is unable to fax to the Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) Little Rock Operations Center. Land-line voice communications to Little Rock have been verified. The Russellville ADH office is able to receive fax notifications from ANO and can ensure that all state and local agencies can be notified. The Russellville ADH office will remain manned until the situation is resolved.
"At approximately 2345 CDT, it was determined that the NRC Operations Center was unable to directly contact either Unit 1 or Unit 2 control room.
"The cause of the loss of communications is suspected to be a major fiber-optic line being cut In Morrilton, Arkansas. No estimate of time for repairs Is available at this time."
The licensee has established that communication capability exists via either radio or phone with local emergency response and law enforcement organizations. The licensee can still contact the NRC via commercial circuits but cannot receive calls from the NRC. A dedicated cell phone line has been established by the licensee to facilitate communication from the NRC if necessary.
State and local authorities have been informed of the problem. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified and has responded to the site.
* * * UPDATE BY HUFFMAN AT 0500 EDT ON 7/14/09 * * *
The ENS lines and commercial phone service have been restored to ANO and verified operable. R4DO (Gaddy) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45204
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MORRIS SANDERS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MORRIS SANDERS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 07/14/2009
Notification Time: 09:14 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2009
Event Time: 03:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2009
Notification Time: 09:14 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2009
Event Time: 03:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/14/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAK
At 0303 EDT on July 13, 2009, while in Hot Standby Mode 3, operators at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 identified a leak in the vicinity of the "A" reactor coolant pump (RCP). The containment sump leakage trend indicated a leak rate of 0.03 gallons per minute. At 0540 EDT, chemical analysis confirmed the leakage to be from the reactor coolant system. Follow up inspections are in progress to determine the source of the pressure boundary leak. Operators have cooled the plant to Cold Shutdown Mode 5 in accordance with plant Technical Specification 3.4.6.2, Reactor Coolant Operational Leakage.
The plant entered Cold Shutdown Mode 5 at 1601 EDT on July 13, 2009.
The licensee stated that this report is late due to an administrative oversight.
Licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector.
At 0303 EDT on July 13, 2009, while in Hot Standby Mode 3, operators at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 identified a leak in the vicinity of the "A" reactor coolant pump (RCP). The containment sump leakage trend indicated a leak rate of 0.03 gallons per minute. At 0540 EDT, chemical analysis confirmed the leakage to be from the reactor coolant system. Follow up inspections are in progress to determine the source of the pressure boundary leak. Operators have cooled the plant to Cold Shutdown Mode 5 in accordance with plant Technical Specification 3.4.6.2, Reactor Coolant Operational Leakage.
The plant entered Cold Shutdown Mode 5 at 1601 EDT on July 13, 2009.
The licensee stated that this report is late due to an administrative oversight.
Licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45205
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: MIKE McBREARTY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: MIKE McBREARTY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/14/2009
Notification Time: 22:18 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2009
Event Time: 11:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2009
Notification Time: 22:18 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2009
Event Time: 11:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TEMPORARY LOSS OF POWER TO TEN EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIRENS
"On Monday July 13, 2009, at approximately 1100 PDT, Southern California Edison discovered a loss of the ability to activate 10 Community Alert Sirens (CAS) located on the Camp Pendleton Marine Corp Base. Prior to the discovery, the most recent test demonstrating operability of the sirens was performed on July 10, 2009, at approximately 1152 PDT. On July 13, 2009, at approximately 1130 PDT, SCE re-established the ability to activate the sirens. SCE is currently conducting an investigation to determine the cause of the problem, to try to ascertain the time that the loss of ability to activate the sirens occurred, and to identify the cause of the delay in reporting this event.
SCE assumes the sirens were inoperable for greater than 48 hours, and therefore, is reporting this event as a loss of emergency offsite capability, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"At the time of this report, Unit 2 and Unit 3 were operating at about 99 percent and 100 percent power, respectively."
A CAS power panel was found with a tripped breaker. An investigation into the cause of the breaker trip is ongoing.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1354 EDT ON 7/16/09 FROM M. MCBREATY TO CHARLES TEAL * * *
"During a follow up investigation, SCE identified information to indicate the loss of the ability to activate the 10 Community Alert Sirens located on the Camp Pendleton Marine Corp Base occurred at approximately 1800 PDT on July 10, 2009. Therefore, the sirens were inoperable for greater than 48 hours. Additionally, SCE verified that, prior to the discovery of the inoperable sirens, the most recent test demonstrating operability of the sirens was performed on July 10, 2009 at 1053 PDT (not 1152 PDT as initially reported)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and will be provided with a copy of this report.
Notified R4DO Vincent Gaddy.
"On Monday July 13, 2009, at approximately 1100 PDT, Southern California Edison discovered a loss of the ability to activate 10 Community Alert Sirens (CAS) located on the Camp Pendleton Marine Corp Base. Prior to the discovery, the most recent test demonstrating operability of the sirens was performed on July 10, 2009, at approximately 1152 PDT. On July 13, 2009, at approximately 1130 PDT, SCE re-established the ability to activate the sirens. SCE is currently conducting an investigation to determine the cause of the problem, to try to ascertain the time that the loss of ability to activate the sirens occurred, and to identify the cause of the delay in reporting this event.
SCE assumes the sirens were inoperable for greater than 48 hours, and therefore, is reporting this event as a loss of emergency offsite capability, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"At the time of this report, Unit 2 and Unit 3 were operating at about 99 percent and 100 percent power, respectively."
A CAS power panel was found with a tripped breaker. An investigation into the cause of the breaker trip is ongoing.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1354 EDT ON 7/16/09 FROM M. MCBREATY TO CHARLES TEAL * * *
"During a follow up investigation, SCE identified information to indicate the loss of the ability to activate the 10 Community Alert Sirens located on the Camp Pendleton Marine Corp Base occurred at approximately 1800 PDT on July 10, 2009. Therefore, the sirens were inoperable for greater than 48 hours. Additionally, SCE verified that, prior to the discovery of the inoperable sirens, the most recent test demonstrating operability of the sirens was performed on July 10, 2009 at 1053 PDT (not 1152 PDT as initially reported)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and will be provided with a copy of this report.
Notified R4DO Vincent Gaddy.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45200
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANYI
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANYI
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/13/2009
Notification Time: 11:37 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2009
Event Time: 07:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/13/2009
Notification Time: 11:37 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2009
Event Time: 07:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/13/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE IDENTIFIED
"On 07/13/2009 at 00:38 EDT a planned manual reactor trip was initiated on Unit 2 based on increased, unidentified RCS leakage. The RCS leakage had increased over a four day period. The downpower was initiated at 21:32 EDT from 100% power and proceeded in a controlled manner to 25% power. The reactor was manually tripped at 00:38 EDT, as planned. Following the reactor trip, EOP-1, Standard Post Trip Actions, and EOP-2, Reactor Trip Recovery procedures were completed and the unit was stabilized in Mode 3. Decay heat was removed by the Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS) to the condenser. The Main Feedwater Pump unexpectedly tripped on low suction pressure just prior to the reactor trip, but was recovered prior to levels reaching the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation (AFAS) setpoint. There were no further major equipment failures identified post trip.
"On 7/13/2009 at 07:00 EDT a Containment walkdown confirmed the leak was caused by a J-joint weld defect on the 2B2 RCP Seal injection line. The leak is classified as reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage.
"The plant is in the process of cooling down to enter Mode 5 as required by Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.a.
"This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). Additional investigation is being performed to determine the cause of the leak."
The initial leak rate was less than 0.2 gpm. The repair will require taking the plant to a reduced inventory.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
"On 07/13/2009 at 00:38 EDT a planned manual reactor trip was initiated on Unit 2 based on increased, unidentified RCS leakage. The RCS leakage had increased over a four day period. The downpower was initiated at 21:32 EDT from 100% power and proceeded in a controlled manner to 25% power. The reactor was manually tripped at 00:38 EDT, as planned. Following the reactor trip, EOP-1, Standard Post Trip Actions, and EOP-2, Reactor Trip Recovery procedures were completed and the unit was stabilized in Mode 3. Decay heat was removed by the Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS) to the condenser. The Main Feedwater Pump unexpectedly tripped on low suction pressure just prior to the reactor trip, but was recovered prior to levels reaching the Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation (AFAS) setpoint. There were no further major equipment failures identified post trip.
"On 7/13/2009 at 07:00 EDT a Containment walkdown confirmed the leak was caused by a J-joint weld defect on the 2B2 RCP Seal injection line. The leak is classified as reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage.
"The plant is in the process of cooling down to enter Mode 5 as required by Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.a.
"This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). Additional investigation is being performed to determine the cause of the leak."
The initial leak rate was less than 0.2 gpm. The repair will require taking the plant to a reduced inventory.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector