Event Notification Report for May 12, 2008

24-HR REPORT - UF6 RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM FAILURE

"At 1230 CDST, on 05-12-08 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that an alarm was received for the C-331 Unit 3 Cell 5 UF6 Release Detection (PGLD) System. Operators responded and found that the READY and MANUAL lights for this system were not illuminated. This PGLD System contains detectors that cover C-331 Unit 3 Cell 5 and Sections 2 and 3 of the cell bypass piping. At the time of this alarm, unit 3 Cell 5 and some areas of Sections 2 and 3 of the cell bypass were operating above atmospheric pressure. TSR 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in the cell and in each defined section of the cell bypass are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. With the Unit 3 Cell 5 PGLD system inoperable, none of the required cell heads and only 2 of the required 3 heads in Sections 2 and 3 of the cell bypass were operable. This PGLD System was declared inoperable, TSR LCO 2.4.4.1.A.1 and 2.4.4.1.C.1 were entered and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour. Engineering has determined that the system would not have been able to perform its intended safety function when this alarm came in. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-08-1412; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-14; Worksheet No. Responsible Division: Operations"

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING IRIDIUM-192 SOURCE

QSA Global reported to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that a shipment containing a 149.2 Curie Ir-192 source that was originally shipped on 5/7/08 was missing. The shipment arrived in Miami and was transferred from FedEx to Amerijet. Amerijet reported to an agent of QSA Global, on 5/9/08, that the shipment could not be found at the time of its originally scheduled flight to Trinidad, its final destination.

As of 1345 on 5/12/08 Amerijet still could not locate the package. The company initiated a warehouse search. The signature that FedEx had on record as receiver was reported to be "not an eligible" receiver by Amerijet.

* * * UPDATE AT 1710 FROM BOB WALKER TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *

Amerijet has located the missing shipment in their Miami facility. The package is undamaged and will shortly resume transport to its final destination of Trinidad.

Notified ILTAB (Whitney), R1DO (Krohn), FSME (Reis), IRD (McDermott), and DHS (Lee).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy.

ARIZONA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION EVENT DUE TO A BROKEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The following information was provided by the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency via email on 5/12/08 @ 1854 EST:

"By letter dated May 7, 2008, the Licensee reported that their contractor had detected a broken 20 curie tritium exit sign at their Glendale store. A second contractor with a Certified Health Physicist, was called in to decontaminate and investigate the circumstances on April 25, 2008. The second contractor found up to 16,900 dpm/100 cm2 removable contamination on the wall where the sign had been located. On the floor beneath the sign, the contractor reported contamination up to 1,400 dpm/cm2. The date of breakage is unknown and could have actually occurred up to one year prior to discovery.

"The device was a SRS Technologies, Inc. Serial number 304150, 20. The sign has been shipped to Canada to Shield Source, Inc., a Canadian licensee.

"The Agency is investigating the delay in reporting this event since the report was not made within 24 hours."

SHUT DOWN INITIATED DUE TO INOPERABLE STEAM GENERATOR FLOW CHANNELS

"This 4-hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 has initiated a manual reactor shutdown in accordance with [Technical Specification] 3.0.3. The shutdown was initiated due to all eight steam generator steam flow channels being declared inoperable at 1500 on 5/12/08. All eight steam flow channels were indicating lower than actual steam flow such that the high steam flow coincident with low steam pressure or low-low Tave would not occur within the allowable values specified in the technical specifications. Salem Unit 2 is currently in Mode 1. Reactor Coolant System Temperature is 551 degrees Fahrenheit with pressure @ 2235 PSIG. Salem Unit 2 has no other shutdown Tech. Spec. action statements in effect. Prior to the initiating event Salem Unit 2 was raising power at 1/2 % per hour after 2R16 refueling outage.

"All ECCS and ESF Systems are available.
"No personnel injuries have occurred as a result of the shutdown.
"No radiological release due to this event.
"21 service water pump is cleared and tagged for strainer replacement. 21A and 23B circulating water pumps are cleared and tagged for maintenance."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.