Event Notification Report for December 27, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/26/2007 - 12/27/2007
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43870
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT ALEXANDER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT ALEXANDER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 12/28/2007
Notification Time: 02:24 [ET]
Event Date: 12/27/2007
Event Time: 20:04 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/28/2007
Notification Time: 02:24 [ET]
Event Date: 12/27/2007
Event Time: 20:04 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/28/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
TROY PRUETT (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SPDS CAPABILITY FOR GREATER THAN ONE HOUR
"At 2004, while performing a routine surveillance (Manual Scram Functional Test) the operator performing the surveillance identified that the Plant Management Information System (PMIS) terminals in the control room did not respond as expected to the surveillance. The expected response would have displayed an 'RPS channel trip' message.
"PMIS is the computer system which implements the Safety Parameter Display System [SPDS] and dose determination. Dose determination was available using manual calculations. This system also supports the ERDS (Emergency Response Data System) and the core monitoring system.
"Additional investigation found that the PMIS displays had stopped updating at 1950. Attempts to cause the system to fail over to the backup computer (the 'A' computer) thus restoring functionality were unsuccessful. Information Technology (IT) personnel were called and responded to the plant. IT personnel manually restarted the 'A' computer and switched the input/output (I/O) devices to the 'A' computer. Personnel have verified the Technical Support Center and Emergency Offsite Facility systems are also functional. Functionality of the SPDS system and its related systems was verified to be restored at 2330. The backup system ('B') remains out of service and will be addressed tomorrow.
"This event is reported under 50.72(b)(3)xiii, Any event which results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 2004, while performing a routine surveillance (Manual Scram Functional Test) the operator performing the surveillance identified that the Plant Management Information System (PMIS) terminals in the control room did not respond as expected to the surveillance. The expected response would have displayed an 'RPS channel trip' message.
"PMIS is the computer system which implements the Safety Parameter Display System [SPDS] and dose determination. Dose determination was available using manual calculations. This system also supports the ERDS (Emergency Response Data System) and the core monitoring system.
"Additional investigation found that the PMIS displays had stopped updating at 1950. Attempts to cause the system to fail over to the backup computer (the 'A' computer) thus restoring functionality were unsuccessful. Information Technology (IT) personnel were called and responded to the plant. IT personnel manually restarted the 'A' computer and switched the input/output (I/O) devices to the 'A' computer. Personnel have verified the Technical Support Center and Emergency Offsite Facility systems are also functional. Functionality of the SPDS system and its related systems was verified to be restored at 2330. The backup system ('B') remains out of service and will be addressed tomorrow.
"This event is reported under 50.72(b)(3)xiii, Any event which results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43982
Rep Org: AREVA NP, INC.
Licensee: AREVA NP, INC.
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GAYLE ELLIOTT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: AREVA NP, INC.
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GAYLE ELLIOTT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/13/2008
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 12/27/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/13/2008
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 12/27/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/13/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2)
PART 21 COORD (NRR)
GLENN DENTEL (R1)
EUGENE GUTHRIE (R2)
PART 21 COORD (NRR)
PART 21 INVOLVING POTENTIALLY DAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLY SPACER SIDE PLATES
The following information was received via facsimile:
"Reportable Defect
"(i) Name and address tithe individual informing the Commission: Gayle Elliott, 3315 Old Forest Road, Lynchburg, VA 24501
"(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, potentially may contain ATRIUM- fuel assemblies with damaged spacer side plates.
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which falls to comply or contains a defect: AREVA NP Inc. (AREVA NP) supplied the ATRIUM-10 fuel assemblies to the Susquehanna units. The spacer side plates were damaged during recent re-channeling campaigns at the reactor site.
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such a defect or failure to comply: The damaged (missing) spacer side plates could impact the critical power performance of the fuel assemblies and the local power peaking distribution within the fuel assembly.
"(v) The date on which the information of such a defect or failure to comply was obtained: This issue was determined to be a deviation on December 27, 2007.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which fails to comply, the number and the location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part: The known defect has occurred at Susquehanna Unit 1. Based on the number of spacer pieces found, four (4) fuel assemblies could be damaged.
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for this action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action: AREVA NP recommended and PPL Implemented Operating Limit penalties for the potentially damaged fuel assemblies to protect the MCPR Safety Limit and LHGR SAFDL.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees: See (vii) above."
The following information was received via facsimile:
"Reportable Defect
"(i) Name and address tithe individual informing the Commission: Gayle Elliott, 3315 Old Forest Road, Lynchburg, VA 24501
"(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, potentially may contain ATRIUM- fuel assemblies with damaged spacer side plates.
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which falls to comply or contains a defect: AREVA NP Inc. (AREVA NP) supplied the ATRIUM-10 fuel assemblies to the Susquehanna units. The spacer side plates were damaged during recent re-channeling campaigns at the reactor site.
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such a defect or failure to comply: The damaged (missing) spacer side plates could impact the critical power performance of the fuel assemblies and the local power peaking distribution within the fuel assembly.
"(v) The date on which the information of such a defect or failure to comply was obtained: This issue was determined to be a deviation on December 27, 2007.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which fails to comply, the number and the location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part: The known defect has occurred at Susquehanna Unit 1. Based on the number of spacer pieces found, four (4) fuel assemblies could be damaged.
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for this action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action: AREVA NP recommended and PPL Implemented Operating Limit penalties for the potentially damaged fuel assemblies to protect the MCPR Safety Limit and LHGR SAFDL.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees: See (vii) above."