Event Notification Report for September 25, 2007

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST / RECOVERED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

"On September 25, 2006 at approximately 6:15 P.M., a gauge user from Geo-Environmental, Inc., had returned to the office to return Troxler gauge 3440, S/N 34036 (9 mCi Cs-137, 44 mCi Am-241:Be) to it's storage location, when he noticed that the gauge was missing and immediately contacted the RSO to report the incident. After the RSO had spoken with the gauge user, the RSO received a call from the office manager that the gauge had been recovered by the Irvine Police Department on Jamboree Rd. in Irvine near the intersection of Jamboree Rd., and Richter Ave. The gauge was returned to the Geo-Environmental, Inc., office at approximately 6:45 P.M. The gauge most likely was out of the control of the licensee for approximately one hour. The gauge case was intact with a single scuff mark. The gauge was inspected by the licensee and found to be intact. The RSO then contacted RHB [DELETED] by phone to report the incident by voice mail. At approximately 9:00 A.M. on September 26, 2007, [RHB] spoke with the RSO about the incident and instructed him to have the gauge inspected and leak tested by a service provider and the RSO stated that he would take the gauge to Maurer Technical Services to be inspected and leak tested. [RHB] also instructed the RSO to provide, within 30 days, a written report, in accordance to 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(1)(i). The RSO stated that the gauge user involved was allowed to transport the gauge in an open bed truck and with two chains and two locks and with two locks on the gauge case. He also stated that the gauge was transported with only a single lock to secure both chains."

CA report number: 092607

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

LEAKING SULFURIC ACID TANK

"At 2356 CDT, 9/24/2007, the National Response Center was notified (Report Number 849830) of a leaking sulfuric acid tank located at the C-616 facility. At 0005, 9/25/2007 CDT, the Kentucky Emergency Response Team (Report Number 2007-3170) was notified of this same issue. The tank has developed a leak on the bottom and contains approximately 420 gallons of sulfuric acid which is leaking into a concrete containment dike. This containment dike can be valved to a neutralization pit. The amount of the sulfuric acid which has leaked exceeds the reportable quantity.

"This event is reportable as 'USEC shall notify NRC of any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.'

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-07-2542: PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2007-12"

POTENTIAL FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SPECIFICATION CONFIGURATION

Two Electroswitch P/N 70034K01 L-2 Auxiliary Switch Assemblies supplied to First Energy Perry Nuclear under purchase order #45151322 were taken from a spare parts inventory and were missing a spacer bushing (P/N 650311A39) that holds the rotary contact in position. First Energy Perry Nuclear reported this under OE25399. The absence of the bushing could allow the contact to move out of position, resulting in a loss of electrical contact. The presence or absence of the spacer cannot be determined from electrical or functional tests of the switch, because the electrical contact may not be displaced from its correct operating position.

The two nonconforming switch assemblies were not installed or placed in operation. Plant procedures require all switches to be opened and inspected prior to installation.

ABB has taken or is taking action to quarantine and physically inspect all available on-hand inventory, notify all customers, revise dedication procedures, and review historical procurement and customer records.