Event Notification Report for August 18, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/17/2006 - 08/18/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
428774290142789427864279242796
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42877
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DONALD C. SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DONALD C. SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/05/2006
Notification Time: 14:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2006
Event Time: 19:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2006
Notification Time: 14:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2006
Event Time: 19:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.
"On August 18, 2006, at 1958 hours CDT, with Unit 2 operating at 100% thermal power, the electrical power to reactor protection system (RPS) bus 2B was interrupted during the performance of surveillance testing on RPS circuit protectors 2B1 and 2B2. The RPS buses 2A and 2B are normally powered from motor-generator (MG) sets 2A and 2B, respectively. During testing or maintenance intervals affecting either the MG set or the normal supply circuit protectors, the affected RPS bus is powered from a transformer supply through alternate power circuit protectors 2C1 and 2C2. Power to RPS bus 2B, which was being powered through the alternate power circuit protectors via a temporary transformer, was interrupted when circuit protector 2C1 actuated on a sensed under voltage condition. The Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic circuits powered from RPS bus 2B were de-energized, and PCIS logic Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 were actuated. None of the plant conditions which require PCIS Groups 2, 3, 6, or 8 actuation (e.g., low reactor water level, high drywell pressure, abnormal area radiation levels, high area temperature, etc.) existed; therefore, these actuations are considered invalid.
"The following actuations/isolations occurred:
"Group 2: Isolation of the Pressure Suppression Chamber head tank pumps and Drywell Floor and Equipment Drains Isolation;
"Group 3: Isolation of the reactor water clean-up system;
"Group 6: Initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System, Initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation, and Isolation of the reactor zone and refuel zone normal ventilation systems;
"Group 8: This logic isolates the Traversing In-core Probes (TIP) if they are inserted. The TIPs were not inserted at the time of this event.
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. At the time of the loss of power from the alternate source, the surveillance testing had already been completed and activities were in progress to transfer the RPS bus back to its normal supply. These actions were completed and RPS Bus 2B was re-energized from RPS MG set 2B. The affected logic was reset, and equipment was realigned as appropriate.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for evaluation and resolution.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this report.
"Reference corrective action document PER 109090."
Also see similar NRC event number 42837.
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.
"On August 18, 2006, at 1958 hours CDT, with Unit 2 operating at 100% thermal power, the electrical power to reactor protection system (RPS) bus 2B was interrupted during the performance of surveillance testing on RPS circuit protectors 2B1 and 2B2. The RPS buses 2A and 2B are normally powered from motor-generator (MG) sets 2A and 2B, respectively. During testing or maintenance intervals affecting either the MG set or the normal supply circuit protectors, the affected RPS bus is powered from a transformer supply through alternate power circuit protectors 2C1 and 2C2. Power to RPS bus 2B, which was being powered through the alternate power circuit protectors via a temporary transformer, was interrupted when circuit protector 2C1 actuated on a sensed under voltage condition. The Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic circuits powered from RPS bus 2B were de-energized, and PCIS logic Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 were actuated. None of the plant conditions which require PCIS Groups 2, 3, 6, or 8 actuation (e.g., low reactor water level, high drywell pressure, abnormal area radiation levels, high area temperature, etc.) existed; therefore, these actuations are considered invalid.
"The following actuations/isolations occurred:
"Group 2: Isolation of the Pressure Suppression Chamber head tank pumps and Drywell Floor and Equipment Drains Isolation;
"Group 3: Isolation of the reactor water clean-up system;
"Group 6: Initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System, Initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation, and Isolation of the reactor zone and refuel zone normal ventilation systems;
"Group 8: This logic isolates the Traversing In-core Probes (TIP) if they are inserted. The TIPs were not inserted at the time of this event.
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. At the time of the loss of power from the alternate source, the surveillance testing had already been completed and activities were in progress to transfer the RPS bus back to its normal supply. These actions were completed and RPS Bus 2B was re-energized from RPS MG set 2B. The affected logic was reset, and equipment was realigned as appropriate.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for evaluation and resolution.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this report.
"Reference corrective action document PER 109090."
Also see similar NRC event number 42837.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42901
Rep Org: R & M ENGINEERING INC
Licensee: R & M ENGINEERING INC
Region: 4
City: JUNO State: AK
County:
License #: 50-23509-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK PUSICH
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: R & M ENGINEERING INC
Region: 4
City: JUNO State: AK
County:
License #: 50-23509-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK PUSICH
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/12/2006
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2006
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE FELL FROM TRANSPORT VEHICLE
A portable Troxler moisture density gauge was properly secured in its case with the case and handle locked in place. However, the case was not properly secured in the back of the transport pickup truck. The gauge fell from the back of the truck in front of the business office and was noticed immediately by a public official. This official then brought the gauge to the company office. The gauge was out of the company's possession for approximately 90 seconds.
Troxler model 3450 S/N 363
Sources:
Am-241 S/N 47-3052 40 milliCuries
Cs-137 S/N 750-5849 8 milliCuries
A portable Troxler moisture density gauge was properly secured in its case with the case and handle locked in place. However, the case was not properly secured in the back of the transport pickup truck. The gauge fell from the back of the truck in front of the business office and was noticed immediately by a public official. This official then brought the gauge to the company office. The gauge was out of the company's possession for approximately 90 seconds.
Troxler model 3450 S/N 363
Sources:
Am-241 S/N 47-3052 40 milliCuries
Cs-137 S/N 750-5849 8 milliCuries
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 42789
Rep Org: SUPERIOR WELL SERVICES, INC.
Licensee: SUPERIOR WELL SERVICES, INC.
Region: 1
City: INDIANA State: PA
County:
License #: GL704677-7
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SROCK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: SUPERIOR WELL SERVICES, INC.
Region: 1
City: INDIANA State: PA
County:
License #: GL704677-7
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SROCK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/20/2006
Notification Time: 18:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2007
Notification Time: 18:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
RAYMOND LORSON (R1)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
ILTAB (via email)
RAYMOND LORSON (R1)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
ILTAB (via email)
GENERAL LICENSE DENSITY GAUGE DISCOVERED MISSING
On 8/18/06 the Superior Well Services crew at a temporary worksite approximately 2 hours drive from Vernal, UT discovered that their Thermo MeasureTech Density Gauge was missing. The device, a Model #5192 - S/N B7000 containing a 200 mCi Cs-137 source, is normally stored in the back of their vehicle and was last used the day before on 8/17/06. The licensee is continuing their investigation to determine whether the device was stolen or fell off the back of the vehicle. The device itself weighs 150 pounds and is in a metal housing 36 inches in length (Sealed Source Registry No. TX0634D105B).
The licensee contacted the Utah Highway Patrol, the Vernal County Sheriff's Office and will contact the Utah Radiation Control Office. Also, a press release offering a $10,000.00 reward for return of the device will be issued.
* * * UPDATE FROM CRAIG JONES TO J. KNOKE AT 12:06 ON 10/30/07 * * *
Craig Jones from the state of Utah called to say that on 10/19/07 a member of the public located the Thermo MeasureTech Density Gauge South of Duchesne, UT along State Road 191. The licensee's RSO was notified and responded to the site. A leak test and survey was performed on the equipment and area, and the results were negative. The licensee indicated the person who found the gauge will be given the reward. Licensee now has the Thermo MeasureTech Density Gauge in their possession. The state of Utah will be conducting a follow-up meeting with the licensee in the near future.
Notified R1DO (Dentel), R4DO (Powers), FSME (M. Burgess), ILTAB (email)
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
On 8/18/06 the Superior Well Services crew at a temporary worksite approximately 2 hours drive from Vernal, UT discovered that their Thermo MeasureTech Density Gauge was missing. The device, a Model #5192 - S/N B7000 containing a 200 mCi Cs-137 source, is normally stored in the back of their vehicle and was last used the day before on 8/17/06. The licensee is continuing their investigation to determine whether the device was stolen or fell off the back of the vehicle. The device itself weighs 150 pounds and is in a metal housing 36 inches in length (Sealed Source Registry No. TX0634D105B).
The licensee contacted the Utah Highway Patrol, the Vernal County Sheriff's Office and will contact the Utah Radiation Control Office. Also, a press release offering a $10,000.00 reward for return of the device will be issued.
* * * UPDATE FROM CRAIG JONES TO J. KNOKE AT 12:06 ON 10/30/07 * * *
Craig Jones from the state of Utah called to say that on 10/19/07 a member of the public located the Thermo MeasureTech Density Gauge South of Duchesne, UT along State Road 191. The licensee's RSO was notified and responded to the site. A leak test and survey was performed on the equipment and area, and the results were negative. The licensee indicated the person who found the gauge will be given the reward. Licensee now has the Thermo MeasureTech Density Gauge in their possession. The state of Utah will be conducting a follow-up meeting with the licensee in the near future.
Notified R1DO (Dentel), R4DO (Powers), FSME (M. Burgess), ILTAB (email)
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42786
Rep Org: DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION CENTER
Licensee: DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION CENTER
Region: 1
City: NEW CANTERBURY State: PA
County:
License #: 37-30062-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID COLLINS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION CENTER
Region: 1
City: NEW CANTERBURY State: PA
County:
License #: 37-30062-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID COLLINS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/18/2006
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2006
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2006
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2006
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
RAYMOND LORSON (R1)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
RAYMOND LORSON (R1)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
TRITIUM SOURCES MISSING DURING ANNUAL INVENTORY BUT SUBSEQUENTLY FOUND
An inventory of the tritium sources at the Defense Logistics Agency in Aniston, AL was performed.
"Initial results of Annual Inventory indicates a loss of the following items:
4 ea NSN 1240001508886 Telescopic panoramic at 3.8 Curies each
5 ea NSN 1240001508890 Mount Telescope at 0.15 Curies each
2 ea NSN 1240003321780 Collimator at 10 Curies each
Causative research is currently being conducted and results will be reported in follow up letter to NRC. Total loss would equal 35.95 Curies of H3."
The last annual inventory was completed 10/11/2005.
* * * UPDATE RECEIVED FROM DAVID COLLINS TO JOE O'HARA AT 0955 ON 10/02/06 * * *
The Defense Distribution Center Depot has accounted for all items previously reported as being missing. The items were located in a proper radiological storage area. However, they were not located in the same area as the licensee had documented in their computer system. After performing a full inspection of the radiological storage area, the items were accounted for and properly documented in a report issued 9/28/06.
Notified R1DO(Krohn) and NMSS(Burgess)
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
An inventory of the tritium sources at the Defense Logistics Agency in Aniston, AL was performed.
"Initial results of Annual Inventory indicates a loss of the following items:
4 ea NSN 1240001508886 Telescopic panoramic at 3.8 Curies each
5 ea NSN 1240001508890 Mount Telescope at 0.15 Curies each
2 ea NSN 1240003321780 Collimator at 10 Curies each
Causative research is currently being conducted and results will be reported in follow up letter to NRC. Total loss would equal 35.95 Curies of H3."
The last annual inventory was completed 10/11/2005.
* * * UPDATE RECEIVED FROM DAVID COLLINS TO JOE O'HARA AT 0955 ON 10/02/06 * * *
The Defense Distribution Center Depot has accounted for all items previously reported as being missing. The items were located in a proper radiological storage area. However, they were not located in the same area as the licensee had documented in their computer system. After performing a full inspection of the radiological storage area, the items were accounted for and properly documented in a report issued 9/28/06.
Notified R1DO(Krohn) and NMSS(Burgess)
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42792
Rep Org: NEW MEXICO RAD CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: A. S. HORNER, INC.
Region: 4
City: ALBUQUERQUE State: NM
County:
License #: DM375-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WALTER MEDINA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: A. S. HORNER, INC.
Region: 4
City: ALBUQUERQUE State: NM
County:
License #: DM375-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WALTER MEDINA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/21/2006
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2006
Event Time: 17:30 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2006
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2006
Event Time: 17:30 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/21/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
ILTAB (E-MAILED)
MEXICO (E-MAILED)
TROY PRUETT (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
ILTAB (E-MAILED)
MEXICO (E-MAILED)
NEW MEXICO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE.
This State provided the following information via e-mail:
"This is to notify you that the Density/Moisture Gauge, Seaman C-300 with serial number 21049, was stolen from the back of a pickup, parked at 10216 Andalusian, SW, Albuquerque, NM 87121 sometime between August 18, 5:30 PM and August 20, 3:30PM. The assigned employee, [deleted], the field monitor for A. S. Horner, worked late last Friday, August 18th and instead of taking the gauge to either a project office or the main office and storing it in a locked closet, decided to park the truck backed against the garage door at his residence noted above. The gauge handle was locked, stored in the approved container, that was also locked and the container itself was secured to the bed of the pickup with a chain and a lock. Mr. [deleted] was out of town for the weekend and upon his return at about 3:30 PM on Sunday, he noticed the entire box was gone. Two cut locks were found on the bed of the pickup. There must have been more than one person committing this crime to pickup the heavy box from the rear of the vehicle.
"Mr. [deleted] immediately notified the police and the fire department, who cordoned off the area first, then interviewed. Mr. [deleted] and took pictures of the vehicle and the area. Mr. [deleted] searched the nearby dumps and did not find any trace of the gauge. The police report will be available shortly. The fire department, as we understand, has notified the hospitals in the area.
"Mr. [deleted] acted in violation of the company policy and we are dealing with this issue. The company has had two moisture/density gauges for more than five years and this is the first incident of this nature. The employees have been instructed to store the gauges in locked closets in the locked buildings inside a fenced area with a locked gate.
"I called the 24 hour emergency number and Mr. [deleted] yesterday at about 5 PM and left messages describing the incident. The exact time of the theft is unknown, however, according to the neighbor of Mr. [deleted], it must have happened on Saturday, August 19, between 2 AM and 7 AM, when he noticed that the tool box was open but nothing was missing from the tool box. The neighbor did not notice the box in the back of the vehicle was missing.
"Please let me know if there is anything else I need to do other than keep in close contact with the police and fire departments on the status of the recovery of this gauge."
Seaman C-300 Moisture Density Gauge contains approximately 10 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries of Americium-241.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This State provided the following information via e-mail:
"This is to notify you that the Density/Moisture Gauge, Seaman C-300 with serial number 21049, was stolen from the back of a pickup, parked at 10216 Andalusian, SW, Albuquerque, NM 87121 sometime between August 18, 5:30 PM and August 20, 3:30PM. The assigned employee, [deleted], the field monitor for A. S. Horner, worked late last Friday, August 18th and instead of taking the gauge to either a project office or the main office and storing it in a locked closet, decided to park the truck backed against the garage door at his residence noted above. The gauge handle was locked, stored in the approved container, that was also locked and the container itself was secured to the bed of the pickup with a chain and a lock. Mr. [deleted] was out of town for the weekend and upon his return at about 3:30 PM on Sunday, he noticed the entire box was gone. Two cut locks were found on the bed of the pickup. There must have been more than one person committing this crime to pickup the heavy box from the rear of the vehicle.
"Mr. [deleted] immediately notified the police and the fire department, who cordoned off the area first, then interviewed. Mr. [deleted] and took pictures of the vehicle and the area. Mr. [deleted] searched the nearby dumps and did not find any trace of the gauge. The police report will be available shortly. The fire department, as we understand, has notified the hospitals in the area.
"Mr. [deleted] acted in violation of the company policy and we are dealing with this issue. The company has had two moisture/density gauges for more than five years and this is the first incident of this nature. The employees have been instructed to store the gauges in locked closets in the locked buildings inside a fenced area with a locked gate.
"I called the 24 hour emergency number and Mr. [deleted] yesterday at about 5 PM and left messages describing the incident. The exact time of the theft is unknown, however, according to the neighbor of Mr. [deleted], it must have happened on Saturday, August 19, between 2 AM and 7 AM, when he noticed that the tool box was open but nothing was missing from the tool box. The neighbor did not notice the box in the back of the vehicle was missing.
"Please let me know if there is anything else I need to do other than keep in close contact with the police and fire departments on the status of the recovery of this gauge."
Seaman C-300 Moisture Density Gauge contains approximately 10 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries of Americium-241.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42796
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: FLAGSTAFF MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: FLAGSTAFF State: AZ
County:
License #: 03-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY V. GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: FLAGSTAFF MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: FLAGSTAFF State: AZ
County:
License #: 03-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY V. GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/23/2006
Notification Time: 13:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2006
Event Time: 12:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2006
Notification Time: 13:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/18/2006
Event Time: 12:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
TROY PRUETT (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
ARIZONA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TRASH CONTAINING IODINE -131 TAKEN TO LANDFILL
The State provided the following information via e-mail:
"At approximately 12:30 PM 8/18/2006 the Agency was informed by the Licensee that a patient receiving Iodine 131 therapy was discharged 8/16/2006. The Radiation Safety Staff proceeded to clean the patient's room. The containment items were placed into a plastic bag. The bag was transported to the waste storage area, where the Staff was unable to unlock the door. Security was called and they were unable to open the door. The Staff then moved the materials to the nuclear medicine preparation room which could be locked. The trash read 1.3mr/hr at the surface. The trash was not marked as being radioactive.
"Upon arrival the next day, the Staff discovered that the cleaning crew had removed the trash. The cleaning crew were trained that if the trash is not marked 'Radioactive' they were to remove it. They attempted to catch the trash before removal to the landfill, but they were unsuccessful. The Staff also went to the landfill and attempted to recover the trash but were unsuccessful.
"The material represents minimal public health risk if disposed into the landfill.
"The Agency continues to investigate the event.
"Press coverage is not anticipated."
First Notice: 06-07
The State provided the following information via e-mail:
"At approximately 12:30 PM 8/18/2006 the Agency was informed by the Licensee that a patient receiving Iodine 131 therapy was discharged 8/16/2006. The Radiation Safety Staff proceeded to clean the patient's room. The containment items were placed into a plastic bag. The bag was transported to the waste storage area, where the Staff was unable to unlock the door. Security was called and they were unable to open the door. The Staff then moved the materials to the nuclear medicine preparation room which could be locked. The trash read 1.3mr/hr at the surface. The trash was not marked as being radioactive.
"Upon arrival the next day, the Staff discovered that the cleaning crew had removed the trash. The cleaning crew were trained that if the trash is not marked 'Radioactive' they were to remove it. They attempted to catch the trash before removal to the landfill, but they were unsuccessful. The Staff also went to the landfill and attempted to recover the trash but were unsuccessful.
"The material represents minimal public health risk if disposed into the landfill.
"The Agency continues to investigate the event.
"Press coverage is not anticipated."
First Notice: 06-07