Event Notification Report for February 28, 2006

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE

The agreement state submitted the following report via e-mail:

"Texas Incident No.: I-8311
"Event date and time: February wear period
"Report Received Date: March 9, 2006
"Event location: Brown and Root construction site, 14035 Industrial Road, Houston, TX
"Event type: Presumptive badge overexposure

"A radiographer trainee was working with a trainer at a construction site in Houston, TX when he noticed that his badge had fallen off approximately 6 feet from a 95 Ci, model G-60 Ir-192 source (S/N NA0502), SPEC model 150 camera (S/N 750). It is uncertain whether the trainee [name deleted] failed to report the incident to the radiographer, supervisor, or RSO.

"The incident was thought to have occurred in late February. The trainee is assigned other duties not involving exposure to radiation and the company is considering having cytogenetic testing performed. A second reading of the dosimeter by the company processing the device rendered an inconclusive result.

"The radiography company and DSHS staff are performing an investigation although the company is presuming the situation is a badge only exposure since the pocket dosimeters and processed dosimeter worn by the trainer were consistent with their typical monthly exposures of approximately 100 mRem."

The film badge read 25.343 Rem. The state will be following up on this incident.

INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION DUE TO WORK INSTRUCTION ERROR

"General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves.

"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) system checked above. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below.

"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.

"This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On February 28, 2006 at 02:50 EST the implementation of Work Order 1051442601, to perform a routine replacement of a relay 1C61-K86, called for lifting of wires related to the relay. During the evolution, the lifting of wires at CC-107 in panel 1 H11-P623 resulted in a daisy chain effect and the auto start of all four Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) fans. Both the Unit One and Unit Two reactor building and refueling floor normal ventilation systems automatically shutdown and isolated. These actuations were a result of the loss of power to relay 1C61-K75. This relay initiates the logic for isolation of the reactor building and refueling floor ventilation and initiation of SBGT.

"Subsequent investigation determined that in order to prevent this daisy chain effect the wires should have been lifted at DDD-1 in panel 1H11-P623. This error was the result of inadequate work instructions.

"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.

"The four Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) fans auto started and both Unit One and Unit Two reactor building and refueling floor normal ventilation systems automatically shutdown and isolated. The SBGT initiation and the ventilation system shutdown were both complete actuations.

"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.

"The above systems functioned successfully."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.