Event Notification Report for February 23, 2006

MINOR LEAKAGE OF WASTEWATER FROM TRANSPORT TRUCK

"On February 22, 2006, at 1000 PST, two tankers containing wastewater with trace levels of radioactivity departed San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 1 Industrial Site for Clive, Utah. Each truck contained about 4500 gallons of water. At about 0400 PST February 23, 2006, SCE was notified by the trucking company [Triad Transport Company] that minor leakage from a valve on top of one of the trucks had been observed. The leakage was observed while the truck was stopped in Parawan, Utah approximately 4 hours from its destination.

"The driver of the truck immediately notified his management who traveled to the site, identified the origin of the leak as spray from a valve on top of the truck, relieved the tank pressure from a vent valve, and stopped the leak. Dampness was observed on the ground beside the tanker. Unconfirmed measurements indicate radiation levels are near background.

"SCE has dispatched a team to the site to coordinate remediation efforts as necessary. The second tanker has arrived at the site in Clive, Utah and no leakage was observed during receipt inspection. The Director of the Utah's Division of Radiation Control and the NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified of this occurrence. At the time of this report, Unit 1 was undergoing decommissioning."

The activity from the radionuclides in the entire truck totaled 70.9 mCi, and primarily consisted of Cs-137 (41 mCi), Ni-63 (15 mCi), and Co-60 (5 mCi). The transport company notified the National Response Center. The truck traveled thru 4 States: CA, NV, AZ UT.

* * * UPDATE FROM C. WILLIAMS TO M. RIPLEY 1607 EST 03/01/06 * * *

"On February 23, 2006, SCE notified the NRC that a small leak had been identified from a tanker that was transporting wastewater with trace levels of radioactivity from SONGS to Clive, Utah. That incident was reported to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72.(b)(2)(xi) and the Utah Division of Radiation Control.

"SCE is updating this report to provide the NRC with the following remediation status:

"1. SCE has decontaminated the tanker exterior and the leaking flange has been repaired. On February 24, 2006, the tanker completed its trip to the disposal site in Clive, Utah. Enroute, SCE personnel followed the tanker and inspected the flange at planned stops every hour. No leakage was observed and the tanker was received at the disposal facility without further incident.

"2. SCE surveyed the truck stop in Parowan and identified two contaminated locations. The first was an asphalt area near the diesel pumps; the second was a gravel area where the truck had parked (about 150 yards from the diesel pumps). All contaminated materials including asphalt, concrete, dirt, and gravel were removed and shipped to the disposal site in Clive, Utah. No detectable levels of licensed material remain at the
truck stop.

"3. SCE surveyed personnel at the truck stop and determined that one individual had been contaminated. The pants leg of the trucking supervisor who had climbed on top of the truck to stop the leak had been contaminated (SCE took possession of the contaminated garment). There was no contamination on his skin.

"4. Approval was obtained from the Utah Division of Radiation Control, the remediated areas of the truck stop were backfilled.

"5. SCE is continuing to investigate the cause of the flange leak and will implement appropriate corrective actions.

"The NRC resident Inspectors have been notified of this update and will be provided with a copy of this update."

Notified R4 DO (J. Whitten) and NMSS EO (S. Flanders)

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- STUCK NEUTRON GENERATOR WELL LOGGING SOURCE

The State provided the following information via email:

A neutron generator well logging source is stuck at 11,000 feet in a well in the Gulf Of Mexico. The location is : long 91degrees 37 min 48.490 sec, and Lat 28 degrees 36 min 26.849 sec. It is in the Gulf of Mexico, Eugene Island.

The company is continuing to try and retrieve the stuck source.

The radioisotope is H3, but the State does not know the activity level.

Texas Incident No: I-8307

DEGRADED CONDITION OF SHROUD TIE RODS

"While performing Unit One [In-Vessel Visual Inspection] IVVI examination of the four Shroud Tie Rods (Upper Support Horizontal Support Surface) the following results were reported:

"Tie Rod at 135 degree location: Crack-like indications beginning at the inner corner on both sides of the left support and extend to two thirds of the way to the outer corner with full penetration.

"Tie Rod at 225 degree location: Crack-like indication beginning at the inner corner on one side of the left support and extending a small portion of the way toward the outer corner. The indication is similar to that described for the shroud tie rod in the 135 degree location except that it is much less pronounced and is only on one side.

"Tie Rod at 45 degree location: No apparent indications present.

"Tie Rod at 315 degree location: No apparent indications present.

"One of the design criteria of the Shroud Tie Rods is to maintain zero separation between the shroud horizontal welds at 100% uprated power, assuming all of the horizontal welds (H1 thru H8) are fully cracked. The Shroud Tie Rods are also designed to maintain structural integrity of the shroud during all design basis accidents and transients.

"These findings bring into question the ability of these shroud tie rods to have performed their design function with the reactor in operation. This condition constitutes a serious degradation of a principal safety barrier had the unit been operating. The reactor is presently shutdown and the condition discovered does not represent an immediate safety concern for Unit 1. The extent of this condition is believed to be limited to Unit 1, since Unit 2 core shroud tie rods are made of different materials and installed in a different configuration."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM E. BURKETTE TO M. RIPLEY 0859 EDT 04/21/06 * * *

"Retraction of NRC Event # 42372: After further review and evaluation it has been determined that the eight hour call made February 23, 2006 per the guidance of 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) should be retracted.

"On 02/23/2006 at approximately 2135 EST, Unit 1 was in the refuel mode. During that time routine inspection of the Reactor Vessel Shroud Restraint Tie Rod Assemblies was in progress. The inspections revealed two cracks on the 135 degree assembly and one crack on the 225 degree assembly. In addition the mechanical preload on the 315 degree assembly was found to be below the design value. These assemblies were originally installed as a mechanical replacement of the horizontal shroud welds.

"An evaluation was performed of the as-found condition that considered the effects of the cracks on the upper supports and the reduced mechanical preload on the 315 degree assembly. The results of the analysis showed that sufficient compression existed for the tie rod assemblies to be considered operable in the as found condition. Inspection and evaluation of the horizontal shroud welds (original plant design) further determined that sufficient intact weld ligament existed to ensure the shroud design function was maintained without relying on the tie rod assemblies. Therefore, the structural integrity of the shroud was and is maintained for normal operation as well as all design basis accidents and transients."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2 DO (M. Lesser)

ACCIDENT INVOLVING TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

At 0331 EST on 2/23/06, a tractor trailer truck delivering new fuel assemblies backed into the Fuel Handling Building roll up door. The door was 4 feet from the full up position. The upper fuel transport container was pushed into the door but had no visible damage. The truck sustained no damage also. The Fuel Handling Building roll up door had slight damage. This door is only required as a barrier during spent fuel handling which is not in progress. No release of radioactivity occurred.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

*** UPDATE FROM PRUSSMAN TO KNOKE AT 12:44 EST ON 2/23/06 ***

Licensee is retracting this event based on the following information:

"At 0429 hours EST, Indian Point 2 reported a tractor trailer truck delivering new fuel assemblies backed into the Fuel Handling Building roll up door. This was event 42365. This event was reported based upon procedural guidance that referenced 49CFR171.15. Indian Point 2 is retracting this notification based on a review of the detailed reporting requirements of 49CFR171.15(b) and a conclusion that none of those reporting requirements was met."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Henderson)

FITNESS FOR DUTY EVENT

"At approximately 0816 CST a senior licensed operator failed a random fitness-for-duty test administered by the station. The individuals access to the site has been blocked."

The licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness -for-duty test. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER

Loss of main feedwater occurred due to an instrument air line failure during a maintenance activity. The reactor was manually tripped and all control rods inserted fully. Auxiliary feedwater received an auto start signal and is providing feedwater to the steam generators. No safety relief valves or PORVs lifted. Decay heat removal is via the turbine bypass valves to the condenser. The plant is in a normal shutdown plant electrical lineup and there was no effect to Unit 3. The licensee notified the State of Connecticut and the city of Waterford. A media press release will be made at a later time.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING LOSS AND RECOVERY OF A MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information is a summary of a report received via fax:

On 2/24/06 the Texas Department of State Health Services was notified that a moisture density gauge was left in a motel room and later recovered still in its DOT shipping container. The cause of the incident is attributed to negligence on the part of the authorized user who has been subsequently terminated by the licensee. Local Police, FBI, and other States, as needed, were notified as well as San Antonio Police HazMat. There were no known personnel exposures involved. The license number, make, model and source content of the moisture density gauge were not available at the time of the report. Additional information will be submitted to NMED when available.

TX Incident No. I-8310

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MALFUNCTIONING RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"This event involved a crank cable for a Source Production & Equipment Company radiographic exposure device (model SPEC 150, serial number 876; with sealed source model SPEC G-60, serial number ML0608). The activity contained in the radiographic exposure device at the time of the incident was 2.66 terabecquerels (72 Ci). A crimped fitting on the crank cable housing came loose when a radiographer was moving the radiographic exposure device. The source was in the shielded position at all times when it was being moved. No source disconnect occurred. The cause of this incident is not known since the equipment had been functioning until this incident. The licensee believes it to be a manufacturing problem. When the incident occurred, radiographic operations were immediately stopped. And the radiography crew (radiographer, radiographer's assistant, and Radiation Safety Officer) returned to the licensee's Utah facilities. The control cable was tagged out of operation until a new housing could be obtained from the manufacturer.

"The Utah Division of Radiation Control was notified by the licensee in a letter dated March 23, 2006 (received on March 29, 2006).

"The licensee notified the manufacturer and the malfunctioning equipment was returned. It was immediately replaced with a new cable housing.

"Event Location: Structural Steel & Plate Fabrication, 555 N. Main, North Salt Lake, Utah 84054"

Utah Event Report ID No. : UT-06-0001