Event Notification Report for December 10, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/09/2002 - 12/10/2002
EVENT NUMBERS
39433394343943539436
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39433
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 12/10/2002
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2002
Event Time: 08:25 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2002
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2002
Event Time: 08:25 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO STEAM GENERATOR LEVELS APPROACHING LOW LEVEL TRIP POINT
The unit was manually tripped from 100% power due to steam generator levels approaching the low level trip setpoint. The motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps auto started as a result of a trip of both main feedwater pumps and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump autostarted due to low steam generator levels. The main feed pumps trip was a result of loss of power to the control systems. An unintentional impact to the power supply for the control systems by plant facilities personnel resulted in the loss of power. All rods fully inserted, no ECCS actuation occurred and no relief valves lifted. The unit is currently in mode 3 and all plant systems responded as designed.
The NRC Resident inspector was notified.
The unit was manually tripped from 100% power due to steam generator levels approaching the low level trip setpoint. The motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps auto started as a result of a trip of both main feedwater pumps and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump autostarted due to low steam generator levels. The main feed pumps trip was a result of loss of power to the control systems. An unintentional impact to the power supply for the control systems by plant facilities personnel resulted in the loss of power. All rods fully inserted, no ECCS actuation occurred and no relief valves lifted. The unit is currently in mode 3 and all plant systems responded as designed.
The NRC Resident inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39434
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CARL MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CARL MOORE
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 12/10/2002
Notification Time: 12:20 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2002
Event Time: 11:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2002
Notification Time: 12:20 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2002
Event Time: 11:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
CHRISTOPHER GRIMES (NRR)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
ELIZABETH HAYDEN (OPA)
SCOTT MORRIS (EDO)
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
CHRISTOPHER GRIMES (NRR)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
ELIZABETH HAYDEN (OPA)
SCOTT MORRIS (EDO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SUSPICIOUS INDIVIDUAL
The licensee is issuing the following press release:
"BRACEVILLE, IL - About 11:30 p.m. Monday, a man driving a compact vehicle failed to stop at the Braidwood Nuclear Station's initial security checkpoint in violation of station security policies. The unidentified male, who was in the plant's parking lot briefly, refused to obey the security officers' instructions, drove through the station parking lot and left the site. He did not threaten the safety of the plant. At no time was the health and safety of the public threatened. The man left the site after a few minutes and was detained in a short period of time by officers from the Wilmington Police Department, who had been notified by the Braidwood Police Department.
"After the man entered the station property, Braidwood security officers used a direct communications link to immediately contact local authorities, who subsequently notified the FBI. Exelon is working with the FBI's Chicago office and local authorities and has notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
"Plant security forces acted promptly and effectively in handling the incident and received outstanding support from local law enforcement. The FBI is handling the investigation."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee is issuing the following press release:
"BRACEVILLE, IL - About 11:30 p.m. Monday, a man driving a compact vehicle failed to stop at the Braidwood Nuclear Station's initial security checkpoint in violation of station security policies. The unidentified male, who was in the plant's parking lot briefly, refused to obey the security officers' instructions, drove through the station parking lot and left the site. He did not threaten the safety of the plant. At no time was the health and safety of the public threatened. The man left the site after a few minutes and was detained in a short period of time by officers from the Wilmington Police Department, who had been notified by the Braidwood Police Department.
"After the man entered the station property, Braidwood security officers used a direct communications link to immediately contact local authorities, who subsequently notified the FBI. Exelon is working with the FBI's Chicago office and local authorities and has notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
"Plant security forces acted promptly and effectively in handling the incident and received outstanding support from local law enforcement. The FBI is handling the investigation."
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 39435
Facility: FRAMATOME ANP RICHLAND
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: JERALD S. HOLM
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: JERALD S. HOLM
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 12/10/2002
Notification Time: 14:41 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2002
Notification Time: 14:41 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
CHRISTOPHER GRIMES (NRR)
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
CHRISTOPHER GRIMES (NRR)
POWERPLEX INCORE MONITORING SYSTEM
Location of fuel assemblies in BWR/6 reactors with the POWERPLEX incore monitoring system may affect their orifice pressure loss coefficients by as much as 40%. The GE core monitoring system uses average orifice loss coefficient values for all assemblies in the core, and a recent evaluation by GE for current fuel designs indicates that the assumption may be non-conservative by up to .01 in predicted MCPR.
Analyses have been performed at Grand Gulf and River Bend, the two BWR/6 reactors in the U.S. which use the POWERPLEX incore monitoring system, to assess the impact of using position dependent orifice loss coefficients. The analyses indicate that for Grand Gulf, MCPR is non-conservatively over predicted by not more that 2%, and that LHGR and MAPLHGR are non-conservatively under predicted by not more than 2%. For River Bend, the analyses indicate that MCPR is non-conservatively over predicted by up to 1.2%, LHGR is non-conservatively under predicted by up to 0.7%, and MAPLHGR is non-conservatively under predicted by up to 0.6%.
The affected plants, Grand Gulf and River Bend, have been notified by Framatome. Compensatory measures were recommended to apply an administrative penalty on the allowed values of MCPR, LHGR, and MAPLHGR. The POWERPLEX incore monitoring input decks have been modified to include the correct orifice loss coefficients. The plants are currently operating with correct orifice loss coefficients in the POWERPLEX incore monitoring system.
Location of fuel assemblies in BWR/6 reactors with the POWERPLEX incore monitoring system may affect their orifice pressure loss coefficients by as much as 40%. The GE core monitoring system uses average orifice loss coefficient values for all assemblies in the core, and a recent evaluation by GE for current fuel designs indicates that the assumption may be non-conservative by up to .01 in predicted MCPR.
Analyses have been performed at Grand Gulf and River Bend, the two BWR/6 reactors in the U.S. which use the POWERPLEX incore monitoring system, to assess the impact of using position dependent orifice loss coefficients. The analyses indicate that for Grand Gulf, MCPR is non-conservatively over predicted by not more that 2%, and that LHGR and MAPLHGR are non-conservatively under predicted by not more than 2%. For River Bend, the analyses indicate that MCPR is non-conservatively over predicted by up to 1.2%, LHGR is non-conservatively under predicted by up to 0.7%, and MAPLHGR is non-conservatively under predicted by up to 0.6%.
The affected plants, Grand Gulf and River Bend, have been notified by Framatome. Compensatory measures were recommended to apply an administrative penalty on the allowed values of MCPR, LHGR, and MAPLHGR. The POWERPLEX incore monitoring input decks have been modified to include the correct orifice loss coefficients. The plants are currently operating with correct orifice loss coefficients in the POWERPLEX incore monitoring system.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 39436
Rep Org: R. M. WESTER ASSOCIATES CONSULTING
Licensee: TSI ENGINEERING
Region: 3
City: ST LOUIS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-32205-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT WESTER
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Licensee: TSI ENGINEERING
Region: 3
City: ST LOUIS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-32205-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT WESTER
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS
Notification Date: 12/10/2002
Notification Time: 18:18 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2002
Event Time: 14:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2002
Notification Time: 18:18 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2002
Event Time: 14:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
PATRICK HILAND (R3)
NADER MAMISH (IRO)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
HUMBOLT MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED
At a construction site in Downtown St. Louis, a moisture density gauge was run over by a high lift. The gauge was in the uncovered position, and is currently buried in the soil. Local fire department was notified, and came to the site to measure radiation levels. Levels were 112 mr/hr at a distance of 3 feet. The area has been secured, awaiting arrival of a hazardous material removal team from R.M. Wester Associates (license #24-20091-01). The hazmat team will remove the gauge and any contaminated soil that they find. Humbolt is also dispatching an environmental response team to the site. The moisture density gauge contains 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241.
The R3 PAO was notified. The R3DO (P. Hiland) contacted the state of Missouri.
**** UPDATE AT 2030 EST FROM R3DO AND DARREL WIEDEMAN TO MIKE RIPLEY ****
Gauge has been recovered. Actual readings were 1.25 mr/hr at 3 feet. Gauge was slightly damaged, but the source was intact. No contamination was found in the area. Humbolt representative was on the scene.
At a construction site in Downtown St. Louis, a moisture density gauge was run over by a high lift. The gauge was in the uncovered position, and is currently buried in the soil. Local fire department was notified, and came to the site to measure radiation levels. Levels were 112 mr/hr at a distance of 3 feet. The area has been secured, awaiting arrival of a hazardous material removal team from R.M. Wester Associates (license #24-20091-01). The hazmat team will remove the gauge and any contaminated soil that they find. Humbolt is also dispatching an environmental response team to the site. The moisture density gauge contains 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241.
The R3 PAO was notified. The R3DO (P. Hiland) contacted the state of Missouri.
**** UPDATE AT 2030 EST FROM R3DO AND DARREL WIEDEMAN TO MIKE RIPLEY ****
Gauge has been recovered. Actual readings were 1.25 mr/hr at 3 feet. Gauge was slightly damaged, but the source was intact. No contamination was found in the area. Humbolt representative was on the scene.