Event Notification Report for October 23, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/22/2002 - 10/23/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39311
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TOM VEITCH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TOM VEITCH
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/23/2002
Notification Time: 12:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2002
Event Time: 11:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2002
Notification Time: 12:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2002
Event Time: 11:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY FAILED TO START ON DEMAND
The licensee was in the process of conducting normal testing when attempting to start the High Pressure Core Spray Pump, it did not start. The problem is being investigated at this time. This notification is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) under accident mitigation.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee was in the process of conducting normal testing when attempting to start the High Pressure Core Spray Pump, it did not start. The problem is being investigated at this time. This notification is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) under accident mitigation.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39313
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: FORSYTH MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 2
City: WINSTON-SALEM State: NC
County:
License #: NC 034-0878-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES ALBRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Licensee: FORSYTH MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 2
City: WINSTON-SALEM State: NC
County:
License #: NC 034-0878-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES ALBRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/23/2002
Notification Time: 16:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2002
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2002
Notification Time: 16:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2002
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
MELVYN LEACH (NMSS)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
MELVYN LEACH (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SOURCE IN BRACHYTHERAPY DELIVERY SYSTEM
North Carolina Incident Report #02-40. While performing a QA/QC test of a Gamma Med Brachytherapy system, the source (unknown strength at this time) stuck half way out. Efforts to retrieve the source normally, with the emergency retrieval system, and the manual crank were not successful. The manufacturer has been notified and the area secured. One physicist entered the room during the recovery operation and may have received a dose, survey meter pegged at 2 Rem/hour on entry to room.
North Carolina Incident Report #02-40. While performing a QA/QC test of a Gamma Med Brachytherapy system, the source (unknown strength at this time) stuck half way out. Efforts to retrieve the source normally, with the emergency retrieval system, and the manual crank were not successful. The manufacturer has been notified and the area secured. One physicist entered the room during the recovery operation and may have received a dose, survey meter pegged at 2 Rem/hour on entry to room.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 39315
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RICK LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RICK LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 10/23/2002
Notification Time: 20:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2002
Event Time: 11:08 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2002
Notification Time: 20:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2002
Event Time: 11:08 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
MELVYN LEACH (NMSS)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
MELVYN LEACH (NMSS)
91-01 RESPONSE BULLETIN 24 HOUR REPORT- LOSS OF ONE CONTROL (GEOMETRY)
"On 10/23/02 @ 1108 hours, The Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a violation of NCSA-0705_035 Control #23 in the X-705 Tunnel Basement Area. Control #23 states in part, 'At no time shall the depth of standing liquid, covering the entire floor area, exceed a depth of 1.7 inches.' Operations Personnel reported that as a result of a failure of the Facility Condensate System, the entire floor was covered by Non-Fissile Liquid greater than 1.7 inches in depth, thus constituting a loss of one Control (Geometry). All other Double Contingency Controls (Concentration, Interaction, and Other Passive Designs) were maintained throughout this event. The Failed System has been isolated and all Uranium Bearing Material Evolutions have been suspended pending repairs to the failed Facility Condensate System.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
This event has a low safety significance. The majority (99%) of the liquid on the floor area is overflowing steam condensate tank. The only credible way for additional Uranium bearing solution to be added to the liquid on the floor is for a fissile solution storage bank to catastrophically fail. All uranium bearing solution evolutions in this work area have been suspended pending repairs.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALLY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
One filled fissile solution storage bank fails while filled with fully enriched saturated U02F2 solution and all of the solution empties onto the floor of the tunnel basement floor mixing with the existing liquid to a minimum depth of 2 inches everywhere on the floor.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
The NCSA/NCSE controlled the floor of the tunnel basement area (Geometry), the condition of the floor of the tunnel basement (Geometry), and the depth of standing liquid allowed on the floor of the tunnel basement area.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
Less than [. . .] grams of U-235 in the standing liquid on the floor of the tunnel basement area with a maximum enrichment of [. . .] wt% of U-235.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The depth of standing liquid, as measured at the deepest location, exceeded the allowed depth of 1.7 inches.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
No Safety System Activation resulted. All uranium bearing solution evolutions were suspended at 1108 hours as a result of this event and will remain as such pending repairs to the Facility Condensate System."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the onsite DOE Representative of the event.
"On 10/23/02 @ 1108 hours, The Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a violation of NCSA-0705_035 Control #23 in the X-705 Tunnel Basement Area. Control #23 states in part, 'At no time shall the depth of standing liquid, covering the entire floor area, exceed a depth of 1.7 inches.' Operations Personnel reported that as a result of a failure of the Facility Condensate System, the entire floor was covered by Non-Fissile Liquid greater than 1.7 inches in depth, thus constituting a loss of one Control (Geometry). All other Double Contingency Controls (Concentration, Interaction, and Other Passive Designs) were maintained throughout this event. The Failed System has been isolated and all Uranium Bearing Material Evolutions have been suspended pending repairs to the failed Facility Condensate System.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
This event has a low safety significance. The majority (99%) of the liquid on the floor area is overflowing steam condensate tank. The only credible way for additional Uranium bearing solution to be added to the liquid on the floor is for a fissile solution storage bank to catastrophically fail. All uranium bearing solution evolutions in this work area have been suspended pending repairs.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALLY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
One filled fissile solution storage bank fails while filled with fully enriched saturated U02F2 solution and all of the solution empties onto the floor of the tunnel basement floor mixing with the existing liquid to a minimum depth of 2 inches everywhere on the floor.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
The NCSA/NCSE controlled the floor of the tunnel basement area (Geometry), the condition of the floor of the tunnel basement (Geometry), and the depth of standing liquid allowed on the floor of the tunnel basement area.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
Less than [. . .] grams of U-235 in the standing liquid on the floor of the tunnel basement area with a maximum enrichment of [. . .] wt% of U-235.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The depth of standing liquid, as measured at the deepest location, exceeded the allowed depth of 1.7 inches.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
No Safety System Activation resulted. All uranium bearing solution evolutions were suspended at 1108 hours as a result of this event and will remain as such pending repairs to the Facility Condensate System."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the onsite DOE Representative of the event.