Event Notification Report for September 26, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/25/2002 - 09/26/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39218
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAGE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAGE
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 09/26/2002
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2002
Event Time: 10:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2002
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2002
Event Time: 10:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
ANIELLO DELLA GRECA (R1)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
ANIELLO DELLA GRECA (R1)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PART 21 REPORT FROM LICENSEE REGARDING MALFUNCTIONING OVERCURRENT SENSORS
Two new EC-1 overcurrent sensors withdrawn from warehouse stock failed during bench testing in preparation for installation in the plant during the upcoming refueling outage. The failure mode was premature tripping of the magnetic (instantaneous) element of the device, such that the associated circuit breaker would have tripped early and the corresponding loads would not have remained energized to perform their required safety function.
The only application of these specific EC-l overcurrent sensors is in the circuit breaker used in cubicle 71-11510, which is the emergency bus feeder breaker providing 600 VAC power to Motor Control Center (MCC)- 151. (The circuit breaker contains a total of three of these devices, one per phase.) Electrical loads powered from this MCC include various safety systems such as the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT), Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) and High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI). The loss of the MCC could have resulted in the failure of SBGT to perform its safety function.
The test information indicates that the circuit breaker would have prematurely tripped based on the starting current of the 'A' SBGT Exhaust Fan and thus the associated MCC would not have remained energized. Assuming a concurrent single failure of the 'B' SBGT subsystem, this could have resulted in the loss of both subsystems and the failure of SBGT to perform its safety function. Therefore, a substantial safety hazard existed in that the potential existed for a major deficiency/major degradation of essential safety-related equipment.
No other safety functions would have been lost.
Component and Supplier:
GE Model Type EC-1 Trip Device General Electric Nuclear
225 Amp, 60 Cycle M/C397
Sensor Trip, Characteristic 1 B-2C 175 Curtner Ave.
GE P/N QEC10225ABCG10N00 San Jose, CA 95125
Serial Nos. 77386-3A and 77386-3B
The defective components were placed in a "hold" status to prevent issuance in the plant. A Corrective Action Request will be issued to General Electric for evaluation.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified
Two new EC-1 overcurrent sensors withdrawn from warehouse stock failed during bench testing in preparation for installation in the plant during the upcoming refueling outage. The failure mode was premature tripping of the magnetic (instantaneous) element of the device, such that the associated circuit breaker would have tripped early and the corresponding loads would not have remained energized to perform their required safety function.
The only application of these specific EC-l overcurrent sensors is in the circuit breaker used in cubicle 71-11510, which is the emergency bus feeder breaker providing 600 VAC power to Motor Control Center (MCC)- 151. (The circuit breaker contains a total of three of these devices, one per phase.) Electrical loads powered from this MCC include various safety systems such as the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT), Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) and High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI). The loss of the MCC could have resulted in the failure of SBGT to perform its safety function.
The test information indicates that the circuit breaker would have prematurely tripped based on the starting current of the 'A' SBGT Exhaust Fan and thus the associated MCC would not have remained energized. Assuming a concurrent single failure of the 'B' SBGT subsystem, this could have resulted in the loss of both subsystems and the failure of SBGT to perform its safety function. Therefore, a substantial safety hazard existed in that the potential existed for a major deficiency/major degradation of essential safety-related equipment.
No other safety functions would have been lost.
Component and Supplier:
GE Model Type EC-1 Trip Device General Electric Nuclear
225 Amp, 60 Cycle M/C397
Sensor Trip, Characteristic 1 B-2C 175 Curtner Ave.
GE P/N QEC10225ABCG10N00 San Jose, CA 95125
Serial Nos. 77386-3A and 77386-3B
The defective components were placed in a "hold" status to prevent issuance in the plant. A Corrective Action Request will be issued to General Electric for evaluation.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 39219
Rep Org: ARCTIC PIPE INSPECTIONS
Licensee: ARCTIC PIPE INSPECTIONS
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 50-17314-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM HILDEBRENDT
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Licensee: ARCTIC PIPE INSPECTIONS
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 50-17314-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM HILDEBRENDT
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Notification Date: 09/26/2002
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2002
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2002
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2002
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JOHN PELLET (R4)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
ANIELLO DELLA GRECA (R1)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
JOHN DAVIDSON (NSIR)
JOHN PELLET (R4)
JOHN GREEVES (NMSS)
ANIELLO DELLA GRECA (R1)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRO)
JOHN DAVIDSON (NSIR)
LOST I-192 RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE DURING SHIPMENT
A 20.3 Curie Ir-192 radiography camera SN# 94 was being shipped from Kenin, AK to AEA Technologies in Burlington, MA by Federal Express. The shipment arrived in Newark, NJ on 9/21/02 at 0257 and was scanned to leave on 9/24/02 at 0022 EDT. The Licensee reported that the camera has not arrived in MA, and that Federal Express could not account for the source's location. The source was being shipped in it's shipping container and the Licensee believed that it had a combination lock on it.
***UPDATE CHUCK CAIN TO MIKE NORRIS 1800 9/27/02***
The missing Arctic Pipe source changer has been found at the FedEx Newark terminal. The shipping container was not damaged, but had it's paperwork missing. Notified R4DO (Pellet), R1DO (Della Greca), DIRO (Wessman), NSIR IAT (Davidson) and OHS (Brahm).
A 20.3 Curie Ir-192 radiography camera SN# 94 was being shipped from Kenin, AK to AEA Technologies in Burlington, MA by Federal Express. The shipment arrived in Newark, NJ on 9/21/02 at 0257 and was scanned to leave on 9/24/02 at 0022 EDT. The Licensee reported that the camera has not arrived in MA, and that Federal Express could not account for the source's location. The source was being shipped in it's shipping container and the Licensee believed that it had a combination lock on it.
***UPDATE CHUCK CAIN TO MIKE NORRIS 1800 9/27/02***
The missing Arctic Pipe source changer has been found at the FedEx Newark terminal. The shipping container was not damaged, but had it's paperwork missing. Notified R4DO (Pellet), R1DO (Della Greca), DIRO (Wessman), NSIR IAT (Davidson) and OHS (Brahm).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39240
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: R4DO KRISS KENNEDY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: R4DO KRISS KENNEDY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Notification Date: 10/02/2002
Notification Time: 17:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2002
Notification Time: 17:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/02/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24 HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT
The following is a facsimile received from the Region 4 Duty Officer.
"This facsimile is being sent to confirm a telephonic report of October 1, 2002 that was made pursuant to the Columbia Generating Station Operating License (NPF-21) condition 2.F, which states:
'With the exception of 2.C(2) the licensee shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2.C, and E of this license within 24 hours by telephone and confirm by telegram, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region V or that administrator's designee, no later than the first working day following the violation, with a written followup report within 14 days.
'The subject of the report is the discovery that all the provisions of the Commission-approved physical security plan were not maintained in effect for a period of approximately 2 hours on September 26, 2002 when personnel gates to the independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) protected area were unlocked, open, and unattended. During this time, the operable ISFSI intrusion detection system did nor detect any entry into the ISFSI protected area. A written follow-up report regarding this issue will be submitted on or before October 15, 2002.'
The following is a facsimile received from the Region 4 Duty Officer.
"This facsimile is being sent to confirm a telephonic report of October 1, 2002 that was made pursuant to the Columbia Generating Station Operating License (NPF-21) condition 2.F, which states:
'With the exception of 2.C(2) the licensee shall report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2.C, and E of this license within 24 hours by telephone and confirm by telegram, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to the NRC Regional Administrator, Region V or that administrator's designee, no later than the first working day following the violation, with a written followup report within 14 days.
'The subject of the report is the discovery that all the provisions of the Commission-approved physical security plan were not maintained in effect for a period of approximately 2 hours on September 26, 2002 when personnel gates to the independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) protected area were unlocked, open, and unattended. During this time, the operable ISFSI intrusion detection system did nor detect any entry into the ISFSI protected area. A written follow-up report regarding this issue will be submitted on or before October 15, 2002.'