Event Notification Report for September 20, 2002

INADVERTENT ALIGNMENT OF THE NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER TO STANDBY NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER POND

On September 20, 2002, McGuire Nuclear Station experienced an inadvertent alignment of the Nuclear Service Water (EN) system to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP). This event occurred when a Unit 1 "B" Train blackout signal was inadvertently generated during surveillance testing of the 13 Diesel Generator sequencer panel.

Further evaluation determined that the blackout signal which automatically aligned RN to the SNSWP was not in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of a blackout signal or the SNSWP safety function. Since alignment of RN to the SNSWP was not in response to a valid signal, this represented an invalid actuation reportable per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). However, as per 10 CFR 50.73(a) (1), McGuire is providing a telephone notification of this invalid actuation instead of submitting a written LER.

The following additional information is being provided as part of the telephone notification of this event:

"B" Train of RN actuated to align Unit 1 and Unit 2 RN to the SNSWP.

"B" Train actuation of Unit 1 and 2 RN to the SNSWP functioned successfully and was complete.

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.

INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF BLACKOUT SIGNAL ON UNIT 1 DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING

"Inadvertent Actuation of B Train Blackout Signal on Unit 1. Actuation occurred during testing of the 1B Diesel Generator sequence panel. The actuation caused the B Train Nuclear Service Water System to realign to the standby Nuclear Service Water Pond on both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Unit 2 was not affected due to the realignment. The Unit 1 Boric Acid pump transfer pump automatically secured and various containment and Auxiliary Building Ventilation components were affected due to the actuation. The procedure used for testing the sequencer simulated an undervoltage signal on the B Train Emergency Bus. Plans are being evaluated to restore the sequencer from the test alignment and realign all affected equipment."

Neither reactor residual heat removal cooling or spent fuel pool cooling were affected by this event. Electrical buses remained energized and no EDG autostart occurred since the blackout signal was simulated and not based on an actual undervoltage condition. The licensee is attributing the cause preliminarily to an inadequate procedure.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE ON 9/27/02 @ 1437 BY JOHNSON TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION

Further evaluation determined that the blackout signal which automatically aligned RN to the SNSWP was not in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of a blackout signal or the SNSWP safety function. Since alignment of RN to the SNSWP was not in response to a valid signal, this represented an invalid actuation which is not reportable per 10 CER 50.72(b) (3) (iv) (A). In addition, 10 CFR 50.72(b) (3) (iv) (B) does not identify the ultimate heat sink portion of RN systems as a system applicable to 10 CFR 50.72(b) (3) (iv) (A). Therefore, McGuire is retracting Event Report 39202.

Note: McGuire will report this event in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. (see event # 39223)

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO PRESSURE AND SPEED FLUCTUATIONS

"On 9/20/02 at 10:02 AM EDT, the Unit 1 HPCI system was declared inoperable due to observation of speed and pressure fluctuations while operating in the manual mode. HPCI was being run for the quarterly surveillance test. Site engineering is currently troubleshooting. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for failure of a single train accident mitigation system."

The NRC resident inspector was notified.

*** UPDATE ON 11/15/02 AT 1032 EST BY PETER GARDNER TO HOWIE CROUCH ***

"Troubleshooting identified that the output of the Ramp Generator and Signal Converter (RGSC) was fluctuating. The HPCI RGSC and Electronic Governor [-Motor] (EG-M) were replaced and the post maintenance testing (PMT) was successfully completed.

The HPCI safety function requires the system to provide adequate coolant makeup to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) in the automatic mode for the spectrum of analyzed events. The small break LOCA [Loss of Coolant Accident] event (one-inch diameter pipe break) requires the greatest HPCI flowrate. HPCI must provide adequate RPV coolant makeup to maintain core coverage and prevent an actuation of ADS [Automatic Depressurization System] during this event.

HPCI successfully completed the portion of the surveillance test that required operation in the automatic mode just prior to the observed speed fluctuation. Two successful HPCI runs were performed following the replacement of the RGSC and EG-M in June 2002. The speed fluctuation occurred intermittently in the manual mode of operation following a reduction in speed to 3150 rpm. Failure analysis of the RGSC and EG-M did not reveal any condition that would have prevented HPCI from providing the required coolant makeup."

Therefore, the licensee is retracting this event.

Licensee notified the NRC resident of the retraction.

NRC region 1 duty officer (Harold Gray) was notified.

LOUISIANA DEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AGREEMENT STATE REPORT RE: STOLEN MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE

"ON SEPTEMBER 20, 2002, A TROXLER 3411-B GAUGE WITH SERIAL NUMBER 4524 WAS STOLEN FROM THE BACK SEAT OF A GMC EXTRA CAB TRUCK. THE GAUGE CONTAINED A 8.0 mCi (MILLICURIE) SOURCE OF CS-137 AND A 40 mCi SOURCE OF AM241:BE. THE GAUGE WAS STOLEN BY BREAKING THE LOCK ON THE SIDE REAR WINDOW OF THE TRUCK. THE GAUGE WAS NOT CHAINED TO THE TRUCK. THE FACILITY HAS CHANGE ITS PROCEDURES TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF EVENT FROM OCCURRING AGAIN."

"CONSTRUCTION TESTING LAB, 3008 5TH STREET, METAIRIE, LA"

"STOLEN FROM 1995 GMC EXTRA CAB TRUCK"