Event Notification Report for September 11, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/10/2002 - 09/11/2002
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 39181
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: THOMAS WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: THOMAS WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 09/11/2002
Notification Time: 22:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2002
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2002
Notification Time: 22:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2002
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
JANET SCHLUETER (NMSS)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
JANET SCHLUETER (NMSS)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT
"At 0900, on 9-11-02 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PBS) was notified of the following:
During removal of two 4-Inch valve subassemblies that ultimately connects to 12-Inch crossover piping in C-337, fireproof covers were not properly attached to the adjacent piping such that it could not perform Its intended function. The covers were installed using tape instead of the required clamp. NCSA GEN-10, Removal and Handling of Contaminated Equipment from the Cascade at PGDP, requires fireproof covers to be installed on cascade system openings greater than 10-inches in diameter, to prevent the introduction of moderator from a sprinkler activation, lube oil leak, or RCW leak.
"Double Contingency is maintained by an unlikely event and control on moderation. The control on moderation was not properly implemented end was therefore lost. The unlikely event (moderation entering the piping) did not occur. This event resulted In a loss of one leg of double contingency.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The improper installation of fireproof covers caused them to not be able to perform their criticality safety related function. However, no moderator was available to enter the system. Therefore, the process condition was not lost.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S1 OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR
In order for a criticality to be possible, a fire would have to unseat the fireproof covers and activate the sprinkler system. The moderator would have to fill over 300 ft of maximum diameter 6-inch piping before accumulating in the unsafe geometry 12-inch piping.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION ETC)
Double contingency is maintained by an unlikely event and 8 control on moderation control
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT , ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
No known mass of licensed material exists in the affected piping.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
The first leg of double contingency is based on the unlikely event of a moderator release (Sprinkler, RCW, oil) into the open process system during the time the system is open. Since there was no moderator release Into the system, this leg of double contingency was maintained.
The second leg of double contingency is based on the fireproof cover preventing a moderator release from entering the open process system. Since the fireproof covers were not attached such that a waterproof seal would be maintained In the unlikely event of a fire or solution release, the ability to prevent introduction of moderator was lost. The control was violated and double contingency was lost.
Since double contingency is based on an unlikely event and a control on moderation, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"The fireproof covers have been properly installed with the approved clamps."
"At 0900, on 9-11-02 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PBS) was notified of the following:
During removal of two 4-Inch valve subassemblies that ultimately connects to 12-Inch crossover piping in C-337, fireproof covers were not properly attached to the adjacent piping such that it could not perform Its intended function. The covers were installed using tape instead of the required clamp. NCSA GEN-10, Removal and Handling of Contaminated Equipment from the Cascade at PGDP, requires fireproof covers to be installed on cascade system openings greater than 10-inches in diameter, to prevent the introduction of moderator from a sprinkler activation, lube oil leak, or RCW leak.
"Double Contingency is maintained by an unlikely event and control on moderation. The control on moderation was not properly implemented end was therefore lost. The unlikely event (moderation entering the piping) did not occur. This event resulted In a loss of one leg of double contingency.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
The improper installation of fireproof covers caused them to not be able to perform their criticality safety related function. However, no moderator was available to enter the system. Therefore, the process condition was not lost.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S1 OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR
In order for a criticality to be possible, a fire would have to unseat the fireproof covers and activate the sprinkler system. The moderator would have to fill over 300 ft of maximum diameter 6-inch piping before accumulating in the unsafe geometry 12-inch piping.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION ETC)
Double contingency is maintained by an unlikely event and 8 control on moderation control
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT , ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
No known mass of licensed material exists in the affected piping.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES
The first leg of double contingency is based on the unlikely event of a moderator release (Sprinkler, RCW, oil) into the open process system during the time the system is open. Since there was no moderator release Into the system, this leg of double contingency was maintained.
The second leg of double contingency is based on the fireproof cover preventing a moderator release from entering the open process system. Since the fireproof covers were not attached such that a waterproof seal would be maintained In the unlikely event of a fire or solution release, the ability to prevent introduction of moderator was lost. The control was violated and double contingency was lost.
Since double contingency is based on an unlikely event and a control on moderation, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"The fireproof covers have been properly installed with the approved clamps."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39182
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 09/11/2002
Notification Time: 23:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2002
Notification Time: 23:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
DAVID LEW (R1)
WILLIAM RULAND (NRR)
DAVID LEW (R1)
WILLIAM RULAND (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 15 | Power Operation | 15 | Power Operation |
1-HOUR SECURITY REPORT INVOLVING AN UNACCOUNTED FOR SECURITY WEAPON
A security weapon was discovered missing from its' stored location. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. The licensee informed local law enforcement and will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
A security weapon was discovered missing from its' stored location. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. The licensee informed local law enforcement and will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.