Event Notification Report for July 11, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/10/2002 - 07/11/2002
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39051
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MACLENNAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MACLENNAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 07/11/2002
Notification Time: 04:00 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2002
Event Time: 02:41 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2002
Notification Time: 04:00 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2002
Event Time: 02:41 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
GARY SHEAR (R3)
GARY SHEAR (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 82 | Power Operation | 80 | Power Operation |
INITIATION OF PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM 82% AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPEC 3.0.3
It was determined that reasonable assurance of continued operability of Safety System Components associated with Unit 2 steam lines could not be supported. They had noticed perturbations since the beginning of June indicating a problem with their steam separators. They have since had an operability and loose parts evaluation for this and recently experienced another perturbation that's calling into question the loose parts evaluations. Therefore, the licensee is assuming that there may be a loose parts problem, so they have commenced plant shutdown at 0241 and are to be in hot shutdown in 12 hrs and cold shutdown in 36 hrs.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
It was determined that reasonable assurance of continued operability of Safety System Components associated with Unit 2 steam lines could not be supported. They had noticed perturbations since the beginning of June indicating a problem with their steam separators. They have since had an operability and loose parts evaluation for this and recently experienced another perturbation that's calling into question the loose parts evaluations. Therefore, the licensee is assuming that there may be a loose parts problem, so they have commenced plant shutdown at 0241 and are to be in hot shutdown in 12 hrs and cold shutdown in 36 hrs.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39053
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: PHILIP J. NORTH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: PHILIP J. NORTH
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 07/11/2002
Notification Time: 22:02 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2002
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2002
Notification Time: 22:02 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2002
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
ANNE BOLAND (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY THAT THE ALTERNATE POST-LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA) BORATION DILUTION FLOW PATH FOR ALL UNITS IS OPENED IF THE PRIMARY PATH FAILS
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Event: At 1800 hours on 7/11/02, a review of the small break LOCA mitigation section of the [emergency operating procedure (EOP)] determined that the alternate post-LOCA boron dilution flow path for all units is opened if the primary path fails. This alternate flow path was designed to be opened during a large break LOCA. Current analyses do not exist to support opening the flow path under elevated [reactor coolant system] pressures. With this being the case, execution of the EOP during a [small break LOCA] could open the alternate flow path under conditions that may potentially degrade portions of the [low pressure injection (LPI)] system (e.g. [reactor building emergency sump] screen, LPI pump). Since analyses do not exist to support operation of the flow path under elevated pressures, this condition is being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)v."
"Initial Safety Significance: The potential safety significance of this issue is that opening the alternate boron dilution flow path under elevated pressures could adversely impact the reactor building emergency sump. This flow path would only be opened following a single failure of the primary path. Oconee is conservatively reporting this condition. Analyses are being performed to determine whether the EOP guidance related to opening this flow path could have impaired sump recirculation."
"Corrective Action(s): Guidance has been provided to the operating shifts to not open the alternate flow path. An EOP change will be expeditiously made to resolve this procedural issue."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"Event: At 1800 hours on 7/11/02, a review of the small break LOCA mitigation section of the [emergency operating procedure (EOP)] determined that the alternate post-LOCA boron dilution flow path for all units is opened if the primary path fails. This alternate flow path was designed to be opened during a large break LOCA. Current analyses do not exist to support opening the flow path under elevated [reactor coolant system] pressures. With this being the case, execution of the EOP during a [small break LOCA] could open the alternate flow path under conditions that may potentially degrade portions of the [low pressure injection (LPI)] system (e.g. [reactor building emergency sump] screen, LPI pump). Since analyses do not exist to support operation of the flow path under elevated pressures, this condition is being conservatively reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)v."
"Initial Safety Significance: The potential safety significance of this issue is that opening the alternate boron dilution flow path under elevated pressures could adversely impact the reactor building emergency sump. This flow path would only be opened following a single failure of the primary path. Oconee is conservatively reporting this condition. Analyses are being performed to determine whether the EOP guidance related to opening this flow path could have impaired sump recirculation."
"Corrective Action(s): Guidance has been provided to the operating shifts to not open the alternate flow path. An EOP change will be expeditiously made to resolve this procedural issue."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39065
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: AMERISTEEL CORPORATION
Region: 2
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GRANT T. MILLS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: AMERISTEEL CORPORATION
Region: 2
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GRANT T. MILLS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/16/2002
Notification Time: 14:08 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2002
Notification Time: 14:08 [ET]
Event Date: 07/11/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
FRED BROWN (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING Cs-137 SOURCE FOUND IN SCRAP STEEL
"SUBJECT: North Carolina Incident No. 02-21
"On July 11, 2002 the North Carolina Radiation Protection Section was notified by AmeriSteel Corp., Charlotte Steel Mill Division that they had discovered a radioactive source in their scrap stream. The source has been isolated and secured by AmeriSteel personnel. Exposure rates of 120 microR/hr @ 3" have been reported by AmeriSteel personnel. Using an Exploranium GR-130 AmeriSteel personnel have identified the source as Cesium-137. The North Carolina Radiation Protection Section is continuing to gather information and work with the facility to provide appropriate action."
"SUBJECT: North Carolina Incident No. 02-21
"On July 11, 2002 the North Carolina Radiation Protection Section was notified by AmeriSteel Corp., Charlotte Steel Mill Division that they had discovered a radioactive source in their scrap stream. The source has been isolated and secured by AmeriSteel personnel. Exposure rates of 120 microR/hr @ 3" have been reported by AmeriSteel personnel. Using an Exploranium GR-130 AmeriSteel personnel have identified the source as Cesium-137. The North Carolina Radiation Protection Section is continuing to gather information and work with the facility to provide appropriate action."