Event Notification Report for December 14, 2000

DISCOVERY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AT A SCRAP YARD IN ORLANDO, FLORIDA, THAT COULD POSSIBLY BE TIED TO THE U.S. AIR FORCE

At 0950 on 12/15/00, Patrick Air Force Base (AFB) in Florida notified Bolling AFB in Washington D.C. of the discovery of radioactive material that may be tied to the U.S. Air Force at a scrap yard (E&H Car Crushing) in Orlando, Florida. Patrick AFB received the report late in the afternoon on 12/14/00.

It was determined that the material involved a rocket body from a titan rocket that belonged to a memorabilia collector who apparently obtained the rocket body from the U.S. Air Force approximately 10 years ago. (The memorabilia collector died, and his estate either transferred or sold the rocket body to the scrap yard.) Other radioactive materials were also discovered in the same vicinity (a 55-gallon drum containing scrap metal, a metal bale, and a titan nose cone), but there is no proof that this other material belonged to either the memorabilia collector or the U.S. Air Force.

It was reported that the rocket body contain a magnesium/thorium alloy. However, the activity and percent weight is not know at this time in order to identify whether or not the material meets the unimportant quantity requirements in 10 CFR 40.13, paragraph 4.

The U.S. Air Force plans to contact its Occupational Health Team in San Antonio, Texas, in order to have them survey the material next week. They also plan to dispose of the rocket body (at a minimum) and to possibly dispose of the other questionable material as well.

It was reported that a law firm surveyed the material and got readings of 2 mR/hour on contact and less than 200 µR/hour at a distance of 5 feet. The type of equipment used to perform these surveys and the qualifications of the individuals taking the surveys for the law firm were not known a the time of this notification.

The licensee plans to notify their lawyer as well as the NRC Region 4 office (Chuck Cain). The NRC Region 2 office plans to notify the State of Florida. (Call the NRC operations officer for a contact telephone number.)

PART 21 REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE INOPERABILITY OF A SAFETY RELATED STATIC INVERTER

"On December 14, 2000, Entergy determined that a potential defect existed in the Indian Point 3 safety related 34 static inverter supplied by Westinghouse. Six (6) aluminum electrolytic capacitors manufactured by Mallory Inc. (part number CGS432T200X4C) were purchased from Westinghouse (part number 454A8391110) as commercial grade components. The capacitors were identified as replacement parts in the Westinghouse instruction manual for the 34 static inverter. The capacitors were subsequently dedicated for use in the Indian Point 3 safety related static inverter 34. The dedication program did not identify a mounting restriction since this is not typically a critical characteristic for replacement parts. The Westinghouse instruction manual, used for procurement, did not specify any restriction on mounting orientation. Indian Point 3 (IP3) considers this a deviation. IP3 was notified, by Westinghouse letter dated September 5, 2000, that an internal design change to the capacitor had been made by Mallory that imposed the mounting restriction. Mounting of the capacitors in a horizontal direction could result in catastrophic failure of the component (i.e., short circuit) and render the 34 static inverter and associated instrument bus inoperable. IP3 considers this a potential substantial safety hazard because IP3 is not designed for a postulated design basis accident with a single failure (e.g., failure of another inverter) and the failure of the 34 static inverter. On October 26, 2000 the plant was shutdown and corrective action was completed to replace the inverter capacitors prior to their failure. An operating experience event report is being prepared for distribution to the industry. Westinghouse has discontinued use of this model Mallory capacitor. The Indian Point 3 staff has not ascertained other potential users or uses of the capacitors."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A BLOWN CONTROL POWER FUSE ON AN INTERMEDIATE RANGE NEUTRON DETECTOR

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"[The Unit 2] reactor automatically tripped at 0630 [CST] due to a blown control power fuse on intermediate range neutron detector 2N35. Reactor power at the time of the trip was in the source range [10E+4] cps, well below the actual intermediate range trip setpoint. [Unit 2] is exiting a refueling outage, the reactor was made critical at 0543 [CST]. Troubleshooting is in progress. The heat removal mechanism is steam dump discharge from the steam generator atmospheric relief valves. There are no known steam generator tube leaks."

The licensee stated that auxiliary feedwater was supplying water to the steam generators both before and after the trip. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3. Pressurizer heaters and sprays, normal charging and letdown, and the reactor coolant pumps are being utilized for primary system pressure, inventory, and transport control. Containment parameters are normal, and offsite power is available. There were no engineered safety actuations or emergency core cooling system actuations, and none were required. The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required and that there was nothing unusual or misunderstood. There were no related maintenance activities ongoing at the time if the trip.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO THE U.S. COAST GUARD ABOUT A FUEL OIL SPILL

The licensee notified the U.S. Coast Guard of a spill of less than 5 gallons of diesel fuel oil released to the discharge canal. Absorbent booms are deployed across the discharge canal and in the storm drain discharge to the canal.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the state of Arkansas.

THE LOCATION OF 2 FUEL PINS IN THE SPENT FUEL POOL IS UNKNOWN

"As part of the ongoing decommissioning of Millstone Unit 1, a detailed documentation of the fuel currently in the Unit 1 spent fuel pool is underway. A detailed verification of spent fuel pool content records was part of this effort. During this process, workers identified a discrepancy in the paperwork relating to the location of two spent fuel pins that were removed from a fuel assembly in October 1972. A search is underway; however, these fuel pins have not yet been located among the 2,884 fuel assemblies containing more than 140,000 fuel pins currently in the spent fuel pool. In addition, workers are also searching pertinent records.

"Due to the radiation levels of the fuel pins, if they were removed from the spent fuel pool, the use of a shielded cask would have been required and the shipment could have only been made to a licensed facility. Any other movement of these pins from the site would have been immediately detected by the site radiation monitoring system. Therefore, there is a high degree of confidence that these pins are not in an unrestricted area and are under the control of a licensed facility; either here in the spent fuel pool or possibly at a licensed radioactive waste disposal site. As a result, we are also confident that no overexposure of workers or members of the public has resulted. An independent team with relevant expertise is on-site to assist in an ongoing investigation to determine the location of the 2 fuel pins."

The licensee notified NRC Region 1 (Todd Jackson) and the state of Connecticut. The licensee intends notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 1031EDT ON 10/5/01 FROM R. MALONEY TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is updating this report as follows to include the results of their investigation:

"DETAIL:

"On October 1, 2001, Northeast Utilities provided its final report on the Millstone Unit No. 1 fuel rod accountability project to DNC (Dominion Nuclear Connecticut). This project was undertaken after it was determined that 2 fuel pins from a Millstone Unit No. 1 spent fuel assembly could not be accounted for. The NU project team conducted extensive inspections of the Millstone Unit No. 1 spent fuel pool as well as comprehensive reviews of material accountability and waste shipment records and interviews of personnel historically involved with these activities. On the basis of this report, DNC concludes it is unlikely that the pins are in the Millstone Unit No. 1 fuel pool. The investigation into the disposition of the pins found no evidence to indicate that the pins were diverted and concluded that the pins were most likely intermingled with other contaminated material removed from the Unit No. 1 spent fuel pool and shipped to a licensed low level waste repository. The report concludes, based on a study performed by a reputable expert, that the health and safety of the public has not been adversely impacted by this condition.

"This condition is reportable under 10CFR70.52(a) as a loss of special nuclear material.

"ACTIONS TAKEN:

"A team of DNC personnel has reviewed the report and interviewed members of the NU project team to obtain clarifications and additional information. A separate root cause is being prepared by NU for this event.

"RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:

"Incorporate into the MP1 decommissioning plan, as necessary, any DNC recommendations for additional future spent fuel pool inspections.

"ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

"Dominion Nuclear Connecticut (the licensee) will be delivering copies of the final report to NRC Headquarters and Region I offices for placement on the docket today (10/05/01)."

The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Conte), NRR EO (Tappert), NMSS EO (Brown), IRO (Wessman), NRR IAT (Skelton), NMSS IAT (Weber), NMSS (Essig), Region 1 (Pangburn), OPA (Jasinski), and Liaison Team (Stauss).

OVERPOWER CONDITION DUE TO FEED TEMPERATURE CALCULATION ERROR

"Braidwood Station Operating License condition 2.C.1 restricts licensed thermal power level to 3411 MW thermal. From December 13, 2000 at 0410 to December 14, 2000 at 0600, Braidwood Unit 2 was operated at a power level of 100.55 percent in violation of this license condition.

"On December 14, 2000 at 0600 the station Thermal Performance Engineer discovered that Feedwater inlet temperature was not being calculated correctly by the plant process computer. Following a transfer of computer room ventilation trains on December 12, 2000 at 1800 feedwater calculated temperatures were 3°F higher than actual feedwater temperatures. This resulted in the process computer calorimetric reading 0.6% low. Reactor power was adjusted using this incorrect calculation resulting in the overpower condition.

"Following identification of the error, Unit load was reduced to ensure that reactor power was less than 100%. Nuclear instrumentation was verified to be indicating less than 100%. No adjustment to the nuclear instrumentation was performed using the incorrect calculation.

"This is being reported pursuant to License Condition 2.g, which requires notification within 24 hours of the violation of any condition in section 2.c of the Operating License."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

***** UPDATE AT 1539 CST ON 12/20/00 FROM JIM ROYSTON TO LEIGH TROCINE *****

The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"The initial report to the NRC (Event #37597) was based upon an observation of a 3°F increase in the indicated Feedwater temperature (a primary input to the Calorimetric calculation) following a Computer room temperature change initiated by a swap of the ventilation system. An increase of 3°F in Feedwater temperature results in a 0.55% reduction in Calorimetric power. A declining Calorimetric indication results in Operator action to increase and maintain that indication at 100%. Because of this, the initial indication was that the Unit was inadvertently increased to 100.55%."

"Upon execution of troubleshooting it was discovered that the temperature measurement problem was caused by miss-wired RTD temperature elements, which are used to compensate thermocouples for their cold reference junction temperature. From this data, a correction to the temperature measurements was performed such that the true Feedwater temperatures were determined during the event. After applying this correction, it was determined that prior to the event the unit was operating at 99.488%. Following the event, at the highest power level period, the unit was operating at 99.935%. This data also confirms the conclusion that Unit 2 did not exceed 100% power. As an additional check, Calorimetric calculations were performed independently of those executed on the Plant Process Computer which indicate that no problems exist."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Kozak).

TROXLER GAUGE STOLEN AND RECOVERED

A model 3440 Troxler moisture/density gauge was stolen from a company truck by cutting the chain restraining it. The theft occurred about 0800 on 12/14/00 in Wyoming , MI. The gauge contains <10 mCi Cs-137 and <50 mCi Am-241. A report was filed with the Wyoming Police Department, who also recovered the gauge.

ISOLATION OF A CONTAINMENT INSTRUMENT AIR HEADER FROM ITS NORMAL SUPPLY AND ACTUATION OF THE ASSOCIATED BACKUP NITROGEN BOTTLE BANK PROGRAMMER

The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:

"At 2130 PST, the plant experienced an isolation of the 'B' Containment Instrument Air (CIA) header from its normal supply and actuation of the associated backup nitrogen bottle bank programmer. The isolation and actuation were due to an actual system low pressure caused by performance of a maintenance procedure in conjunction with a failed heater in the non-safety related normal Containment Nitrogen (CN) system."

"The CIA system supplies nitrogen to provide motive force for safety-related valves inside the primary containment. The valves are reactor pressure vessel Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) and inboard Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)."

"Evaluation of computer information indicates that pressure on the 'A' CIA header may have been below the administrative allowable value for the associated pressure switch. Investigation continues as to why the isolation and [actuation] involved only the 'B' train."

"The plant is stable, and there were no other abnormal occurrences in conjunction with this event."

The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.

STOLEN LEAD ANALYZER CONTAINING 6 mCi CADMIUM-109

This report is made under 10 CFR 20.2201(1)(a)(1). A lead analyzer containing 6 mCi of Cd-109, used for checking for lead in paint, was stolen while momentarily unattended in the hall of the Edison Middle School. The school authorities and police have been notified. A reward of $500 has been posted. There is little threat to the public as readings on contact are only 100 - 200 µR/hr when source is exposed.

NMED # CA000035

***** UPDATE AT 1302 EST ON 12/19/00 FROM ROBERT FUNDERBURG TO LEIGH TROCINE *****

The California Radiation Control Program reported that the stolen lead analyzer was returned yesterday. The source was shielded, and it was reported that the individual was not harmed.

The NRC operations officer notified the R4DO (Bill Jones) and NMSS EO (Don Cool).